United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for July 9, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/06/2012 - 07/09/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47326 48053 48054 48058 48073 48074 48075 48076 48077 48078

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Part 21 Event Number: 47326
Rep Org: ATC NUCLEAR
Licensee: MOORE CONTROLLERS
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GREG HOTT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/06/2011
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (E-MA)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING MOORE PROCESS CONTROLLERS

The following information was received from ATC Nuclear via facsimile:

"This notification is in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulation 10 CFR 21.21(a)(3)(ii)(b).

"Exelon Corporation Clinton and LaSalle Stations have identified common mode failures associated with Moore 535 Controllers (Part Number 535-000000HOST-SSTRV) provided through ATC Nuclear Tennessee. These items were provided as safety related components to Exelon under Clinton Purchase Order 00461980 and LaSalle Purchase Order 00462363. All safety related failures to date appear to originate from these specific purchase orders. The failures have been evaluated with the original equipment manufacturer and appear to be isolated to controllers containing a main processor board containing 'Revision F' labeling manufactured in early 2010 (Date Code 1310). These items all passed an extended burn-in during testing. The failures may manifest themselves as process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (less than 1 year) following installation.

"Because the end-use application of each item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to the customer. The Licensees above have been formally notified of the defect."

* * * UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO DONG PARK AT 1638 EDT ON 7/2/12 VIA FACSIMILE * * *

"A failure analysis has been concluded to determine the causes for Moore Industries International (MII) 535 Single Loop Process (SLP) Controller failures, initially reported October 6, 2011 and provided by ATC Nuclear, Oak Ridge, TN. The original failure symptoms were reported to be process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (<1 year) following installation. These controllers passed all Method 1 Testing including an extended burn-in to monitor for early life failure. Initial investigation isolated the failure to the controller MPU [Micro-Processing Unit] Board and identified the cause as 'Indeterminate.'

"Completion of a rigorous analysis by the OEM [Original Equipment Manufacturer] and ATC Nuclear has identified the failures are the result of the introduction of a 3 vDC SRAM Chip P/N CY62256VNLL-70SNXI on the MPU by Moore Industries International in 2010 which is not compatible with the 5vDC circuit. Operation of the 3V part at 5V reduces reliability of the part and could lead to failures in the field. The part change bypassed Moore's Engineering Change Process and therefore was not evaluated as their program requires. An Extent of Condition review performed by the OEM verified no additional part changes at Moore went unevaluated."

The orders were delivered to the following facilities: Clinton, LaSalle, Byron, Callaway, Fermi 2.

Notified R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Allen), and Part 21 Group via e-mail..

* * * UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FAX 1141 EDT ON 7/7/12 * * *

"During the ATC root cause investigation, a technical error in the original qualification document S2000-RP-03, Revision 0, issued on February 7, 2000 was identified. The qualification test report identified the Moore 535 SLP controller's ability to withstand a total integrated dose (TID) of 1E5 Rad. This information is in error and is related to the original report creator's misunderstanding of the relationship between the presence of semiconductor materials and a citation from an EPRI report on the effects of radiation. The Moore 535 controllers have been tested for a TID of 1E3 Rad without failure. A report revision will be issued to clarify this item. No orders reviewed were provided for IEEE 323 harsh environment applications.

"Because the end-use application of each specific item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to customers. The licensees above have been formally notified of the defect."

Notified R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Allen) and Part 21 group via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48053
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 06/28/2012
Notification Time: 01:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2012
Event Time: 20:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO 100% LOAD REJECT

"Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip was actuated due to indications of a 100% Load Rejection. The cause of the Load Rejection is not known at this time. All Control Rods are fully inserted. The RCS is being cooled by forced flow (reactor coolant pumps). Secondary heat sink is being provided by the condenser steam dumps utilizing the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated based on low steam generator level, but has since been secured. There were no unexpected (inconsistent with nature of trip) pressure or level transients. Off site power remains available. No release occurred nor is ongoing. Emergency Core Cooling Systems did not actuate. No unexpected isolations occurred. Emergency Plan entry was not required."

The plant is stable at normal temperature and pressure. The electrical system is in a normal offsite power alignment. The Unit 2 Reactor Trip had no effect on Unit 1 which continues to operate at 100% power.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC SONNENBERG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2337 EDT ON 7/6/12 * * *

"On June 27, 2012 at 2046 CDT, a Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip was initiated in anticipation of an automatic turbine trip due to operators noticing the turbine governor valves closing and turbine load reduction. It was originally reported that the cause was not known. This notification is updated to provide information to the cause of the load reduction.

"Troubleshooting has shown that the reduction of turbine load was due to a turbine speed channel card failing in the turbine control system. The card failure resulted in sending the auxiliary governor in the turbine control system an incorrect indicated overspeed condition and throttling the turbine governor valves to reduce the turbine speed. There was no actual turbine overspeed condition.

"The auxiliary governor is not part of the reactor protection system. No reactor protection setpoints were exceeded.

All other plant systems functioned as required, including the Reactor Protection System. All control rods fully inserted into the core due to the manual reactor trip. There was no Emergency Core Cooling System actuation. No Emergency Diesel Generators were started and power continued to be supplied from off site. The reactor coolant system had forced circulation and the condenser steam dumps were used for decay heat removal from the steam generators."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Daley).

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Agreement State Event Number: 48054
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: MILLER ENGINEERING & TESTING
Region: 1
City: NORTHBORO State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 23-4571
NRC Notified By: DOUG CULLEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/28/2012
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2012
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()
FSME RESOURCE ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the Commonwealth of MA. via fax.

"An automobile with a Nuclear Density Gauge stored in its trunk was stolen from a work site in Roslindale, MA. The nuclear density gauge was manufactured by Campbell-Pacific, Model No. MC3, Serial No. M390204846, containing sealed sources of Cs-137 and Am-241, of less than 10 millicuries and 50 millicuries, respectively. The gauge is licensed with the MA Radiation control Program, with Miller Engineering & Testing of Northboro, MA under license No. 23-4571.

"A police report for the stolen property is being filed with the Boston Police.

"Agency [state] continues with the investigation into this matter, and has asked the licensee for a copy of the police report and subsequent findings. Thus, the investigation remains open."

* * * UPDATE FROM DOUG CULLEN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1607 EDT ON 6/28/12 * * *

The Boston Police Department has recovered the stolen vehicle with the gauge intact in the trunk of the vehicle. The radiation profile is normal for the gauge and the police have notified the company to come and recover the gauge.

Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco) and FSME/ILTAB via e-mail


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Agreement State Event Number: 48058
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SAINT JOSEPH HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: EUREKA State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/29/2012
Notification Time: 15:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2012
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
FSME RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL MEDICAL EVENT DUE TO LEAKING I-125 SEEDS

The following was received via e-mail:

"On 6/28/12 Saint Joseph Hospital personnel were surveying a packing materials used to ship I-125 seeds, for a procedure conducted earlier that day, when they noted elevated readings. Further surveys revealed that the elevated readings were not coming from the packing material associated with the 6/28/12 procedure but from packing material that was used to ship I-125 seeds for a previous procedure, which was in the area of the survey. Surveys of the packing material revealed no loose contamination on the exterior or interior of the box but elevated readings of 2500-350000 cpm and .2 mrem/hr. Receipt and post procedure surveys of the procedure associated with contaminated box did not reveal any abnormal readings. The Saint Joseph RSO assumes the material is I-125 but they do not have the capability to verify this. No loose seeds were found in any of the packing material. The I-125 seeds were accompanied by the manufacturers leak test report which indicated no contamination.

"The patient, whose procedure was associated with the contaminated packing material, will be evaluated on Monday 7/2/12 to determine if there was any uptake in his urine or thyroid of I-125 as a result of leaking seeds."

CA Report Number: 062912

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

* * * UPDATE ON 7/2/12 AT 1806 EDT FROM EUGENE FORRER TO DONG PARK VIA EMAIL * * *

"This is a follow up of an incident, as information only, on Friday, June 29, 2012. Radiologic Health Branch reference would be 5010 #062912. The notification was about contaminated packaging that had contained Best Medical I-125 seeds. A thyroid count was performed on the patient who had the seeds implanted in May. The thyroid count verified that there had been an uptake of iodine by the thyroid. Below is the write up and preliminary dose estimate from the licensee regarding.

"Based upon this morning's patient measurements, instrument-manufacturer supplied efficiency data, and reference data for dose conversion, we estimate the patient involved received a thyroid uptake of 0.1 mCi of I-125 and a dose to the thyroid of 300 cGy.

"1) Conversion of counts per minute (cpm) to activity

Two[Pi] counting efficiency for I-125 (per manufacturer) is 133.5%
fraction of 2[Pi] solid angle subtended by a 2 inch diameter detector at a distance of 30 cm from the thyroid is 10.13 squared cm / 5654.9 squared cm = 0.00179
overall efficiency = 1.335 x 0.00179 = 0.00239

(190493 - 30) net cpm / 0.00239 x 4.505x10-10 mCi/dpm = 0.0359 mCi present thyroid burden.
Back-correcting 60 days to time of implantation (conservatively assuming that all uptake occurred at that time) with 42-day effective half-life, initial uptake given by 0.0359 / 0.3715 = 0.0967 approximately 0.1 mCi

"2) Taking the value quoted by Chen et.al. (attached) from NUREG/CR-6345, we assume the dose to thyroid is 780 cGy per mCi of I-125 administered, and this value assumes 25% uptake into the thyroid. Our calculated estimated thyroid burden of 0.1 mCi then gives an estimated absorbed dose of 0.0967 mCi x 780 cGy/mCi / 0.25 (since we measured actual thyroid burden v. amount administered) = 302 cGy approximately 300 cGy (rad) to thyroid.

"3) Whole body committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) from a 300 rad dose to the thyroid (using a thyroid weighting factor of 0.04) would be 12 rem."

Notified R4DO (Allen) and FSME (Einberg).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48073
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOE GIOFFRE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/06/2012
Notification Time: 08:24 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2012
Event Time: 02:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE

"Calvert Cliffs Tech Support Computer power supply failed rendering the ERDS system incapable of transmitting data to the NRC. ERDS is out of service for both Unit-1 and Unit-2. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment. Control Room Emergency Response Organization personnel will use backup methods already captured in emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data to the effected Emergency Response Facilities and NRC during the plant data network outage."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM JOE JIOFFRE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1528 EDT ON 7/7/12 * * *

ERDS was returned to service at 1528 EDT after replacing the computer power supply. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Henderson).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48074
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TRACY SUDOKO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/06/2012
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2012
Event Time: 10:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF 21 OFFSITE SIRENS DUE TO INCLEMENT WEATHER

"At 1012 EDT on July 6, 2012, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) notified Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) due to a loss of twenty-one (21) offsite sirens. Siren outages are believed to be from power supply failures caused by high winds resulting in downed trees last night. Efforts are in place to restore offsite sirens to service.

"A loss of 21 of the 108 offsite sirens does not constitute a significant degradation in the Alert and Notification System. (A loss of 32 sirens constitutes a significant degradation.)

"Both Sequoyah units remain at 100 percent power.

"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48075
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PEDRO WILLIAMS, JR.
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/06/2012
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2012
Event Time: 10:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF 7 OFFSITE SIRENS DUE TO INCLEMENT WEATHER

"On the evening of July 5, 2012, a severe thunderstorm warning was issued by the National Weather Service for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) area. These storms included wind and tree damage to the surrounding area.

"On the morning of July 6, 2012, TVA pulsed the sirens in the emergency response system by providing an electrical signal to each of the siren towers. It was determined there had been localized power outages and possible tree damage to 7 out of the total of 99 offsite sirens. While the number of sirens out does not meet the required notification, this data was given to the state for informational update. This information was provided to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) at 1012 EDT. Due to the interaction with the state and local government agencies, this report is being made as a four hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"The sirens will be repaired as needed and returned to service. There were no plant events that required siren actuation, and all plant systems are operating as required.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48076
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/07/2012
Notification Time: 01:51 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2012
Event Time: 00:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LOST AMERTAP BALLS

"At 0009 CDT, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer that up to 1482 Amertap Balls had been lost from the Unit 2 Condenser Tube Cleaning System. Since the Minnesota State Duty Officer was contacted, this constitutes a 4 hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48077
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BLAIR WILSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/08/2012
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2012
Event Time: 12:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2012
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
VICTOR McREE (R2RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED FOR A FIRE ALARM IN THE REACTOR BUILDING

VC Summer operators declared an Unusual Event due to one fire detector being in alarm inside the reactor building 'B' steam generator cubicle. There are no other fire detectors in alarm nor are there any elevated containment temperatures. The licensee is making preparations to enter the reactor building to investigate. The reactor continues to operate at 100% power.

The licensee contacted the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE AT 1640 ON 7/8/2012 FROM BRUCE THOMPSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On 7/8/2012 at 1202 EDT, an Unusual Event was declared. The event was [declared based on] HU 2.1 'Fire within the Protected Area not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection' and was based on a single smoke detector alarm in the Reactor Building. There were no other indications of a fire. The NRC was initially notified at 1230 EDT.

"At 1542 personnel entered the Reactor Building and verified that no fire had occurred. A faulty smoke detector is suspected.

"At 1634 the Unusual Event was terminated."

The smoke detector was declared inoperable.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the IRD (Marshall), R2DO (Bonser), NRR (McGinty), DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48078
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/08/2012
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2012
Event Time: 16:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS NOTIFIED THAT PILGRIM STATION WORKERS RATIFY NEW CONTRACT

"On July 8, 2012, at 1627 [EDT] hours and the reactor at 100% core thermal power, the following informational statement was issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor action at the site:

"UWUA Local 369 Pilgrim Station Workers Ratify New Contract.

"UWUA Local 369 Pilgrim Station union members voted today to ratify a new, four-year bargaining union contract which is effective May 16, 2012.

"'The new contract, which came to fruition as a result of a lot of hard work on both sides, reflects our commitment to our employees, is acceptable to our union workers and preserves union interests,' said Pilgrim Site Vice President, Robert Smith. 'We look forward to our employees returning to work, which has been our goal throughout this process,' he continued.

"While specific details of the agreement are not being disclosed, the new four-year contract represents a substantial commitment to employees in the form of guaranteed wage increases, a comprehensive benefits package including premium health care plan options, a Company-matching 401(k) savings program, a defined benefits pension plan and a union incentive plan.

"'We now turn our attention to the transition/turnover process and have initiated our Reintegration Plan which is a deliberate process to ensure the qualifications, training and other site requirements of returning employees are current and meet all NRC or procedural requirements. As employees are reintegrated, we will be phasing out our alternate staffing/contingency plan and expect to have all of our union employees back to work this week,' said Smith."

The licensee notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, July 09, 2012
Monday, July 09, 2012