| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/19/2012 - 06/20/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 47933 | Rep Org: ND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MIDWEST INDUSTRIAL X-RAY, INC
Region: 4
City: DICKENSON State: ND
County:
License #: 33-14907-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEWIS VIGEN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/18/2012
Notification Time: 10:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2012
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA CRANKOUT GEARS LOCKED WITH SOURCE EXPOSED
"On Wednesday May 16, 2012 at 1900 MDT, two Midwest Industrial X-Ray, Inc. radiographers had a reportable incident involving a radioactive material exposure device. The exposure device involved was a SPEC 150 SN:386 loaded with an Ir-192 sealed source model G-60 SN: TC1301. The activity level on 5/16/12 was 56 Ci (2072 GBqs). A SPEC Double Gear Control Assembly with red conduit was used for the drive cable.
"The radiographers had made previous exposures during the day without incurring any equipment malfunction. At approximately 1900, the radiographers had 'cranked out' the source to make an exposure and upon retraction were unable to retract the source. The radiographers removed the cover plate of the control assembly and manually pulled the drive cables in order to retract the source back into the locked and shielded position. The sealed source was exposed for approximately 3 minutes. Caution Radiation Area cones were posted at 95 ft. from the source and no persons were inside the 2mR/hr zone. The drive cable was disconnected and no further exposures were made that day. The exposure device was inspected and was found to be in good working condition.
"Corrective Actions: A set of SPEC single gear control assembly, yellow conduit drive cables were brought to the radiographers to replace the malfunctioning drive cables. The set of malfunctioning drive cables will be sent back to SPEC and traded in for a set of single gear control assembly/yellow conduit drive cables."
* * * UPDATE FROM STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA VIA EMAIL AT 1046 EDT ON 6/15/12 * * *
Source Production & Equipment Company (SPEC) was unable to replicate the failure using the returned gears. They did note that the gears offered a large amount of resistance, had impurities and that the drive cable was out-of-tolerance.
Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME Events via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA VIA EMAIL AT 1148 EDT ON 6/19/12 * * *
The final closeout report of event notification 47933 was provided.
Notified R4DO (Miller) and FSME Events via email. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48012 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: S.T. WOOTEN CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: SANFORD State: NC
County: LEE
License #: 098-0792-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DIANA SULAS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/11/2012
Notification Time: 11:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2012
Event Time: 05:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
FSME email (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the State of North Carolina via email:
"The [North Carolina] Branch Manager received a call June 11, 2012 from a radioactive materials licensee S. T. Wooten Corporation (license number 098-0792-1) based out of Wilson, NC.
"An individual was on a worksite late. After completing his work, he stored the gauge, as well as other construction material, outside his residence at [redacted] in Sanford, NC. The licensee contact confirmed that the individual followed the 'two barrier' rule.
"At 5:45 a.m. on June 11, 2012, the individual reported the gauge and the additional construction material missing to the local law enforcement and to the Radiation Protection Section. He last saw the gauge at 11:30 p.m. on June 10, 2012.
"The truck was investigated by local law enforcement at the site and is on its way back to the headquarters office in Wilson, NC. [The North Carolina] regional inspector will meet the truck there for an onsite inspection. [The North Carolina] Increased Controls Coordinator has a good relationship with local law enforcement and has contacted them as well as informed emergency management. The proper notifications will be made to FBI, etc.
"The gauge is a Troxler model 4060B, it can contain up to 9 millicuries of Cs-137 (a beta/gamma emitter)."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 48015 | Rep Org: CARIBBEAN MARINE CONTRACTORS, CORP
Licensee: CARIBBEAN MARINE CONTRACTORS, CORP
Region: 1
City: TRUJILLO ALTO State: PR
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALFONSO DIAZ
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/12/2012
Notification Time: 08:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
FSME Events Resource ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text PREVIOUSLY STOLEN SOURCE HOLDER LOCATED IN A SCRAP YARD
The following information was received by facsimile:
"On June 5, 2012, US NRC Region I communicated with [Caribbean Marine Contractors, Corp] to notify that Ronan Measurement RLL-1 SN #206762A registered on behalf of Caribbean Marine Contractors had been found in a scrap yard in Taiwan. Immediately, we started doing our investigations to verify whether the RLL-1 found in Taiwan was ours. We proceeded to look in our storage container for the RLL-1. Noticing the absence of RLL-1, we talked to company personnel who regularly entered the storage container and everyone questioned arrived at this conclusion.
"Approximately two years ago, Caribbean Marine was doing work of dredging in the town of Guayama, PR. We stopped the work of dredging and we were doing preventive maintenance to the marine equipment (washing with fresh water, removing rust, paint, etc.). [A manager] who at that time was in charge of the project gave the order to take the RLL-1 that was not working out of the dredge and store it in the storage container of the project. Weeks later, thieves broke in the container and stole the metals that were inside. Usually metals lead them to recycling centers and sold by weight. These recycling centers in turn sold the material to Taiwan or India. That [is the] way we understand that you found the RLL-1 #206762A in Taiwan.
"The Ronan ultra-low level series of source holders (RLL) use very small quantities of radioactive materials. The RLL-1 is permitted to contain to a maximum of 900 microCuries of cesium-137 or 200 microCuries cobalt-60. The radioactive material is completely encapsulated in a stainless steel capsule, which is then heli-arc or laser welded closed. Due to high structural integrity, these source capsules qualify as special material form; virtually eliminating the possibility of the spread of radioactive contaminant. The sealed capsules are loaded into the RLL-1 device. This is a stainless steel tube that is welded shut at both ends and installed inside a shielded, steel housing. The general licensee is not permitted to repair, modify, or otherwise tamper with the device or its shielding. The combination of high structural integrity and low source quantity permits the general licensee to install and commission the device without special training or certification. The general licensee is required to install and operate the gage in accordance with the instructions provided by Ronan Engineering. The RLL-1 device is not required to be wipe tested and there is no shutter or moving parts that have to be periodically inspected or maintained. Important Exception The RLL-1 device is required to be tested every three years if it contains a single wipe capsule in excess of 100 microCuries. If a leak test is required, to stainless steel tag will be permanently affixed to the device stating. 'Leak Test Required'.
"Iso distance curves are provided in this manual for various applications as specified in the table below:
Application Drawing Number
Weight Gages C-16307-K and C-16310-K
Continuous Level Gages B-16306-K and C-16309-K
Density / Point Level Gages B-16305-K and B-16308-K
"These curves indicate that the maximum dose rate, at one foot, from any device is less than 0.5 mR/h. Most of these devices require (as a conservative estimate) less than 1 hour of handling to install. Based upon these low dose rates and the short period of time required for handling/installation it is unlikely that any personnel would receive a significant exposure. In fact, it can be safely assumed that working personnel will receive considerably less than 10 percent (10%) of the dose limits specified in column IV of 10 CFR 32.24, for the appropriate organs, and less than ten percent of the dose limits specified in 10 CFR 20.1201(a)."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "NOT RECORDED" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48017 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: UC BERKELEY
Region: 4
City: BERKELEY State: CA
County:
License #: 1330-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/12/2012
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2012
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
FSME (E-MAIL) ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LAB AREA CONTAMINATED
The following report was received via fax:
"On 06/06/12, the ARSO [Assistant Radiation Safety Officer] at UC Berkeley contacted the RHB [Radiological Health Branch] to report an event that occurred on 06/05/12. This event involved contamination caused by a Cs-137 source that is not a sealed source per manufacturer's statement. This source has a very thin window to permit transmission of betas. This source was used in a vacuum chamber and the contamination occurred and was detected when researchers were changing the flange. The licensee cordoned off a 6' x 10' area within a much larger lab. No floor contamination was detected, however, the bench and some equipment within the cordoned off area are still being cleaned. Access to this area was restricted for over 24 hours. The current activity of the source is 950 microCuries. Applying conservative assumptions to convert the detected contamination counts into activity, the licensee has come up with a total activity on the order of 10 microCuries (summed over the contaminated spots).
"The licensee notified the RHB within 24 hours, since the area was cordoned off for more than 24 hours, however, the activity detected is minimal per 30295(b)(1)(B) where the involved quantity is less than 5 times the lowest ALI specified in Appendix B 10 CFR 20 incorporated by reference in section 30253. Also, since this is not a sealed source, the reporting criteria for leakage of more than 0.005 microCuries does not apply. Based on these criteria, no reporting is required."
California incident: 060612
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48036 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 06/19/2012
Notification Time: 19:48 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/2012
Event Time: 17:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MODE CHANGE REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"On June 19, 2012, Unit 1 was shut down due to increasing drywell unidentified leakage. At 1720 EDT on June 19, 2012, the leakage location was discovered to be a welded joint on the 'A' reactor recirculation piping where a 4 inch blank-flanged pipe for chemical decontamination connects to the 28 inch pipe. This constitutes pressure boundary leakage. The location is within the recirculation loop isolation valves on the suction side of the recirculation pump, therefore isolable from the reactor vessel. The reactor was in mode 3 at the time of discovery and LCO 3.4.4 requires entry into mode 4 within 36 hours.
"As such, the change in modes is required by Technical Specifications, therefore reportable within 4 hours under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). In addition, the pressure boundary leakage at a welded joint is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)A) and is therefore 8 hour reportable as well."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. A press release is planned by the licensee. | |