United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for June 14, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/13/2012 - 06/14/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47993 47994 47996 48019 48020 48021 48022 48023

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Agreement State Event Number: 47993
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: EASTMAN CHEMICAL COMPANY
Region: 1
City: KINGSPORT State: TN
County:
License #: R-82007-H15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN GRAVES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/05/2012
Notification Time: 12:47 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

TENNESSEE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON FIXED GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the state of Tennessee via fax:

"On June 4, 2012 Eastman Chemical Company contacted the [Tennessee] Division of Radiological Health concerning an incident that had just occurred. A shutter on a fixed level gauge was difficult to operate and could not be completely closed. In an attempt to close the shutter, a viscous polymer material which had leaked onto the top part of the gauge was removed. However, removal of the polymer still did not allow for complete closing of the shutter. Surveys have confirmed that radiation levels around the gauge are normal. The vessel manway is posted and procedures are in place to prevent entry into the vessel prior to the gauge being repaired or replaced."

The level gauge contained 173 mCi of Cs-137. No personnel overexposures were reported.

Tennessee Event: TN-12-148

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 47994
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: OCALA HEALTH IMAGING SERVICES, LLC
Region: 1
City: OCALA State: FL
County:
License #: 4236-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/05/2012
Notification Time: 13:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS EMAIL ()
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was obtained from the state of Florida via email:

"First quarter 2012 whole body dosimeter badge for a nuclear med tech indicated a 10.5 Rem dose. Badge was recounted and the dose remained the same. Dose is not confirmed by ancillary ring dosimeters. Ring dosimeters indicate a typical 100 mR/month. Because the ring dosimeters do not confirm the badge dose, the consulting health physicist does not think this is a valid dose and the med tech is still working. Florida is investigating."

The isotope used by the medical technician is Tc-99, 30 mCi.

Florida Incident Number: FL12-049

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 47996
Rep Org: INBERG-MILLER ENGINEERING
Licensee: INBERG-MILLER ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: CHEYENNE State: WY
County:
License #: 49-19477-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GLEN BOBNICK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/05/2012
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The gauge operator finished with a density reading and left the Troxler device at the measurement area when he was storing his tools in his truck. When he was returning to the measurement area, an end-loader drove over the Troxler, destroying the hand operating pad. At the time of the accident, the source was retracted into the shield. Immediately after the accident, the operator covered the gauge with shielding and established a boundary zone. No overexposures or contaminations are expected as the sources were retracted into the shielded position.

The Troxler is a model 3430 which contains 40 mCi of Am-241 and 8 mCi of Cs-137. The licensee is conferring with Troxler to determine whether the gauge will be repaired or returned for disposal.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48019
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/13/2012
Notification Time: 01:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2012
Event Time: 17:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 98 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF THE PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM

"At 1757 EDT on 6/12/12, Brunswick Nuclear Plant experienced a fault on the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) uninterruptible power supply (UPS) electrical bus 'A'. This resulted in a loss of site Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The cause of the fault is not yet understood and under investigation. No other major plant effects occurred and no major plant evolutions are planned.

"During the loss of SPDS, the emergency response capability of that system was lost to the site. During the loss of ERDS, the automatic data transfer feature of that system was lost for transmissions to the NRC, however manual data transfer is still available. During the loss of the PPC, automatic core thermal power averaging and automatic core thermal limit monitoring was lost. Manual calculations are available for these functions.

"Unit 1 SPDS was restored to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at 1949 EDT. Unit 2 SPDS was restored to the EOF at 2030 EDT. ERDS and PPC remain unavailable with troubleshooting in progress. Both units reduced power to 98% as a conservative measure.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MILLER TO JOE O'HARA AT 0257 ON 6/14/12 * * *

"The Unit 1 and 2 ERFIS, SPDS, and ERDS functions were restored by approximately 0630 hours on June 13, 2012, after an alternate power supply configuration was established. In addition, the PPC functions were restored by approximately 1630. Compensatory actions will be maintained until the UPS 'A' bus is restored and returned to normal configuration. The Brunswick Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been briefed on the compensatory actions in place.

"Investigation of this condition will be documented in the corrective action program in Condition Report (CR) 542704.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

Notified R2DO(Ayres)

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48020
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/13/2012
Notification Time: 12:44 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

SAFETY PARAMETERS DISPLAY SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE

"At 1032 [EDT], on June 12, 2012, the Unit 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) system ceased valid data transmission to the control room computer terminals. Remote terminals were unaffected. The loss was discovered on the morning of 6/13/12 and the connection was restored at 0945 [EDT] on 6/13/12. This was a duration of greater than 8 hours which was not discovered until after the fact. This condition affected unit 2 only. ERDS was unaffected.

"Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system was unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48021
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD CONNOLLY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/13/2012
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2012
Event Time: 13:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2012
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
ALLEN HOWE (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
BILL DEAN (RA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 85 Power Operation 85 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT AFTER AN AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE SPILL IN THE ADMIN BUILDING

"Seabrook declared an Unusual Event [HU3 - hazard or other conditions affecting plant safety] due to a spill of one gallon of ammonium hydroxide in the stockroom area of the Administration Building. No reports of injured individuals [were received] at this time. No plant or equipment damage occurred. The lower level of the Administration Building is evacuated. Personnel in SCBAs [Self Contained Breathing Apparatus] are mitigating the spill."

The Administration Building is in the Protected Area adjacent to the Turbine Building.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.

Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC, DOE, USDA, and HHS.

* * * UPDATE AT 1747 ON 6/13/2012 FROM ED LYONS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"At 1343 [EDT] on 6/13/12 an Unusual Event was declared due to a reported Ammonium Hydroxide spill in a storeroom on the first floor of the Administration Building. At 1357 [EDT] the State of NH was notified and at 1401 the State of Massachusetts was notified of the Unusual Event using the State Notification Fact Sheet. The delay to the State of Massachusetts notification was due to issues with the dedicated phone system.

"At 1422 the NRC was notified of the Unusual Event using the Event Notification Worksheet. This initial notification reported a one gallon spill of Ammonium Hydroxide. Additionally there were no reported injuries and no impact to plant equipment.

"Further investigation revealed that the spill amount is 1-2 pints out of a 1 gallon container and the initial report of no injuries was validated. The concentration of the Ammonium Hydroxide is 25.5%. The spill was confined to a small area of the store room on the first floor of the Administration Building. The spill had no impact on plant equipment used for normal operation. Initial cleanup by plant personnel is complete and external services have been notified to complete the final spill cleanup.

"Seabrook Station is terminating the Unusual Event. Seabrook Station will continue to investigate and resolve the issues with the dedicated state notification phone system. Currently we have a troubleshooting team which has verified backup communications via the commercial phone lines is available."

The Unusual Event was terminated at 1730 EDT.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State.

Notified R1DO (Gray), NRR ((Howe), IRD (Grant), DHS, FEMA, NICC, DOE, USDA, and HHS.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 48022
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/13/2012
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2012
Event Time: 15:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
JAMES RUBENSTONE (NMSS)

Event Text

SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE - CRITICALITY AIR HORNS NOT TESTED FOR AUDIBILITY

"While reviewing Maintenance Work Package 'Performance of the C-335 Annual CMS Surveillance' from April 28, 2012 an error was identified. Procedure 'C-335 CMS Maintenance And Testing' requires an audibility check if the as-found values for the regulator air pressure drift feeding the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CMS) air horns is >?12 psig. However, an audibility check was not performed as required at six locations all on the cell floor of the process building that were discovered to be out-of-tolerance. All air pressure regulators were adjusted to within acceptable-as-left tolerances prior to the system being made operable on April 28.

"Without the audibility testing being performed, the audibility of the C-335 CMS was questionable prior to the April testing. On June 13, 2012, a work package was developed to recreate the pressures encountered on April 28 and to test the audibility of the CMS. Subsequent testing has shown that three of the CMS horns fed by out-of-tolerance pressure regulators may not have provided the required sound levels necessary for audibility in those areas. This is failure of safety equipment required by TSR 2.4.4.2.

"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2), 'An event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: (i) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; (ii) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand; and (iii) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.'

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATRC-12-1496; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2012-03; Responsible Division: Operations"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48023
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: THOMAS BRADFORD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/14/2012
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2012
Event Time: 17:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

"On 6/13/12 at 1700 CDT, it was determined that valve 2-FCV-73-81 (HPCI steam line warm-up valve) was not capable of performing its intended primary containment isolation valve function. This determination was made during performance of a prompt determination of operability for a steam leak from a missing adapter on a Furmanite injection port in the valve packing area. To meet Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 action requirements for an inoperable primary containment isolation valve, 2-FCV-73-2 (HPCI inboard steam isolation valve) was closed at 1745 hrs., rendering U2 HPCI inoperable. As a result TS 3.5.1 actions were entered.

"This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B) and (D) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident.'

"It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"This event has been entered into the Licensee's Corrective Action Program as SR 565729."

Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 had a 4-hour shutdown action statement which was satisfied when the HPCI inboard steam isolation valve was closed. Technical Specification 3.5.1 action statement is a 14-day shutdown LCO.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, June 14, 2012
Thursday, June 14, 2012