| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/24/2012 - 05/25/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 47925 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BUDINGER AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: SPOKANE State: WA
County:
License #: I0139
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDY KETTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/16/2012
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2012
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FRONT END LOADER RAN OVER A PORTABLE NUCLEAR GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Washington via email:
On 5/11/2012 a front end loader ran over a Troxler moisture density gauge. The gauge contained a 0.37 GBq Cs-137 source and a 1.85 GBq Am-241 source.
The cause was identified as inattention to detail.
WA Item: WA12034 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47931 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NINYO AND MOORE GEOTECHNICAL
Region: 4
City: Moreno Valley State: CA
County:
License #: 7633-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/17/2012
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2012
Event Time: 11:26 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
MEXICO (FAX)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State of California submitted the following information via email:
"On May 17, 2012, at 1126 [PDT], [the licensee Assistant Radiation Safety Officer] ARSO of Ninyo and Moore, contacted the California Emergency Management Agency with a report of a theft of a Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge, S/N 38771 (9 mCi Cs-137, 44 mCi Am:Be-241) in Moreno Valley, CA. This occurred between 1000 and 1030 [PDT]. The ASRO stated that the gauge operator arrived at the construction site and unlocked and opened the tailgage/hatch on their Nissan Armada SUV and then walked away approximately 15 feet to speak with the site manager to find out where to make the measurements. The gauge was still inside the gauge transport case with two locks and a trigger lock. The case was tied down to the inside of the vehicle, but was not secured to the frame of the vehicle. While the gauge operator was speaking with the site manager, an older model black sedan (make and model unknown and did not have a license plate) stopped next to SUV and an unknown individual exited the sedan, grabbed the gauge case out of the SUV, placed the gauge case in the sedan and then left the scene before anyone could stop the theft. The gauge operator then contacted their office to report the theft. The Moreno Valley Police and Cal EMA were also notified. The Moreno Valley Police then arrived to investigate (Police report #MZ121380120).
"At approximately 1215 [PDT], [the California State Department of Public Health, Senior Health Physicist] spoke with the ASRO about the incident. [The ASRO] confirmed the information in the previous paragraph. [The ASRO] also stated that the measurements were to be taken of the asphalt/concrete of the sidewalk on the side of the road, which allowed the public easy access to the vehicles at the site. When asked about the security of the gauge, [the ASRO] stated that the gauge case had two locks and a the gauge had a handle lock. The gauge case was tied down inside the vehicle, but was not locked or secured otherwise. During transport, the tailgate is locked, securing the gauge inside the SUV. When asked if the vehicle had an alarm, [the ASRO] stated that he was not sure, but the vehicle did have a Lojack tracking device installed. The ASRO was informed that a written report was required within 30 days and that a newspaper ad with a reward and description of the stolen item be placed in a local paper. The ASRO was also informed that the gauge operator should be writing a statement and that the most current leak test should be submitted to [State] office. [The ASRO] stated that his [Radiation Safety Officer] RSO was currently working on those items. When asked if anyone had attempted to search the immediate area in an attempt to locate the gauge or the vehicle, [the ASRO] stated that they were going to have some of their employees search the local neighborhood in the afternoon.
"The licensee will be cited for leaving the gauge unattended. Any other citations will be deferred until the licensee has submitted the 30-day report and the investigation has been completed by this office. As of the time of this report, the gauge has not been recovered."
California Incident 5010 Number - 051712
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 47932 | Rep Org: BOEING LTS
Licensee: BOEING LTS
Region: 4
City: HALEAKALA State: HI
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACK SHOCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 05/17/2012
Notification Time: 20:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST IONIZER DEVICES
During a review of records on May 10, 2012, the licensee was unable to account for 4 NRD Nuclecel In Line Ionizer model number P-2021 1000. A thorough sweep of the facilities was completed on May 16, 2012 at 1600 HST. The sweep failed to locate these devices and they were declared lost.
The materiel involved were four devices, each containing 10mCi of Polonium-210 and encased in a steel pressure welded cylindrical case, each approximately 2.3 inches long and .5 inches in diameter.
The circumstances under which the loss occurred were that one shipment of 2 devices (Serial Numbers: A2HE600A/A2HE601A) were last known to have been delivered to the licensee logistics center in August 2010 and there were no record of those two items having been returned to NRD, LLC. These two items were received from NRD on 7/8/2010. A second set of two devices (Serial Numbers: A2HT541/A2HT540) were last known to have been in a sealed package in the possession of a Boeing employee in March, 2012. These items were received from NRD on 7/14/2011.
All devices are presumed lost and potentially disposed of as ordinary waste. The casing of all devices were known to be intact at the time of loss and no exposure has occurred. A thorough review of shipping records and site wide physical search have been conducted and failed to account for the devices.
In the future, all such devices will be subject to the accountability rules, requirements, and procedures established by the USAF Bio-Environment office, Hickam Air Force Base, Honolulu, Hawaii. Internal company procedures will be updated to conform to the requirements of the USAF Bio-Environmental Office, Hickam Air Force Base.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47933 | Rep Org: ND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MIDWEST INDUSTRIAL X-RAY, INC
Region: 4
City: DICKENSON State: ND
County:
License #: 33-14907-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEWIS VIGEN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/18/2012
Notification Time: 10:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2012
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA CRANKOUT GEARS LOCKED WITH SOURCE EXPOSED
"On Wednesday May 16, 2012 at 1900 MDT, two Midwest Industrial X-Ray, Inc. radiographers had a reportable incident involving a radioactive material exposure device. The exposure device involved was a SPEC 150 SN:386 loaded with an Ir-192 sealed source model G-60 SN: TC1301. The activity level on 5/16/12 was 56Ci (2072GBqs). A SPEC Double Gear Control Assembly with red conduit was used for the drive cable.
"The radiographers had made previous exposures during the day without incurring any equipment malfunction. At approximately 1900, the radiographers had "cranked out" the source to make an exposure and upon retraction were unable to retract the source. The radiographers removed the cover plate of the control assembly and manually pulled the drive cables in order to retract the source back into the locked and shielded position. The sealed source was exposed for approximately 3 minutes. Caution Radiation Area cones were posted at 95 ft from the source and no persons were inside the 2mR/hr zone. The drive cable was disconnected and no further exposures were made that day. The exposure device was inspected and was found to be in good working condition.
"Corrective Actions: A set of SPEC single gear control assembly, yellow conduit drive cables were brought to the radiographers to replace the malfunctioning drive cables. The set of malfunctioning drive cables will be sent back to SPEC and traded in for a set of single gear control assembly/yellow conduit drive cables." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47955 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NEEL SCHUCKLA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/24/2012
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2012
Event Time: 06:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | M/R | Y | 1 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP
"At 0639 CDT on 5/24/2012. Unit 3 initiated a manual scram due to multiple rods inserting. At 0637 CDT during Unit 3 start-up Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) 'H' was ranged down instead of up resulting in half scram on Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'B' trip system. The half scram was being reset after IRM 'H' was properly ranged. The operator placed the scram reset switch in Group 2/3 position. As the operator reset groups 2 and 3, a spike on IRM 'A' was received on the RPS 'A' trip system, resulting in rod insertion for groups 1 and 4. When the operator identified multiple rods inserting, the actions of procedure 3-AOI-l00-1 were followed and a manual scram was inserted. Investigation is ongoing.
"All safety systems remained in standby readiness configuration. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached. Primary Containment lsolations Systems did not received actuation signals and performed as designed.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) 'Reactor Protection System (RPS) Including reactor scram and reactor trip.' This event requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 47956 | Facility: PORTSMOUTH LEAD CASCADE
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817
Region: 2
City: PIKETON State: OH
County: PIKE
License #: SNM-7003
Agreement: Y
Docket: 70-7003
NRC Notified By: CHARLES SEIDEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/24/2012
Notification Time: 13:14 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2012
Event Time: 08:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
| Event Text UNAUTHORIZED INDIVIDUAL GAINED ACCESS TO FACILITY
"At 0833 on 05/24/2012, an uncleared vendor employee was piggybacked by a cleared vendor employee through a security gate into the x3012 Security Area. The uncleared employee was removed from the area. There is no known compromise of classified in the location.
"This incident is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an 8 hour Security Event in accordance with American Centrifuge Administrative Procedure ACD2-RG-044, Nuclear Regulatory Event Reporting, Appendix B, Section K2, IMI-3#14, which states, 'Circumvention of established access control procedures into a security area(excluding Property Protection Area)."
The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (Hartland). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47957 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: RYAN TREGRE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/24/2012
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2012
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTRABAND FOUND INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA
"On May 23, 2012, at approximately 1700 hours, a beer bottle was discovered in a trash can inside the protected area. The bottle was discovered during trash collection by housekeeping personnel who reported the discovery to their supervision. The bottle was determined to contain remnants of moisture and had an odor of beer, constituting the potential presence of alcohol. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719 (b)(1) based on the presence of alcohol in the protected area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
"We do not know if it was consumed in the Protected Area. It was found in the Construction Support Building, not in a Vital Area. This has been entered into the Corrective Action Program and investigation has been in progress". |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47959 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF EPPERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/24/2012
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2012
Event Time: 15:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
ANTONAY GREER (EPA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 75 | Power Operation | 75 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO OIL SHEEN ON THE RIVER
"On 5/24/2012 at 1541 EDT, a notification to the National Response Center was made after the discovery of a visible oil sheen on waters of the U.S. (the Tennessee River side of Sequoyah's intake forebay skimmer wall). The source of the oil appears to be a tipped or overflowing catchpan located in the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) pumping station. All catchpans in the pumping station have been emptied to eliminate them as immediate potential source of oil released to the environment.
"The following agencies have also been notified: EPA Region 4, and the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA). The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) will be notified.
"Cleanup is in progress. Measures to prevent recurrence are being taken."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47960 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: STEVEN CARTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/24/2012
Notification Time: 18:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2012
Event Time: 13:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
DAVID SKEEN (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 33 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A LOSS OF FEED AS RESULT OF A LOSS OF SWITCHGEAR
"At 1348 CDT on 5/24/12 with the Reactor at 33% power, River Bend Station operators inserted a manual reactor scram based on loss of high pressure feed to the reactor following a loss of a 13.8 Kv switchgear.
"The Control Room team observed an electrical transient in the Control Room concurrent with the start of Reactor Feed Pump "B".
"The crew identified that no high pressure feed was aligned to the reactor and inserted a manual scram. Based on the configuration of the electrical plant during startup, all circulating water and Normal Service Water (NSW) was supplied from NPS-SWG1B. MSIVs were closed based on loss of circulating water and Standby Service Water (SSW) initiated automatically based on loss of NSW.
"EOP-0001, 'RPV Control' was entered on reactor high pressure and reactor low water level. EOP-0002, 'Primary Containment Control' was entered based on primary containment pressure high and suppression pool level high. EOP-0003, 'Secondary Containment Control', was entered on annulus pressure high.
"Reactor water level control is being maintained with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC). High pressure core spray was manually started but was not required and was subsequently shut down. Pressure control is via RCIC and Safety Relief Valves (SRVs). Safety related busses are aligned to offsite power as normal. They were not affected by the electrical transient.
"Immediately after the scram at 1350, a report from the Turbine Building indicated smoke was seen around the Reactor Feed Pump 'B' termination cabinet. The Fire Brigade was activated. At 1358, the Fire Brigade reported that there was no fire. A review of the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) was performed. No emergency declaration was required.
"Initial investigation shows damage to cabling and circuit boards associated with Reactor Feedpump 'B' in the Turbine Building, but no fire was ever observed.
"In addition, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) lost power. At the time, both facilities continued to be in a state of readiness and emergency functions could be performed. At 1526, power was restored to both facilities, including the ventilation systems."
All rods inserted into the core. The unit is stable at 230 psi and 391 degrees F. Reactor pressure is maintained by RCIC and decay heat removal via safety relief valves to the suppression pool. The unit is in a technical specification for suppression pool high level. There were no safety system failures. There is one non safety related 13.8 switchgear out of service due to this event and NNS-Switchgear 2A out of service from an event three days ago. Offsite assistance was not required.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47962 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: THOMAS ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/24/2012
Notification Time: 21:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2012
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text MISSING FLOODING BARRIER INSIDE EAST SWITCHGEAR ROOM
"On 5/24/12, it was identified that a conduit flood seal was missing between an outside manhole and the interior of the switchgear rooms. The missing flood seal compromised the interior flooding design for both East and West Switchgear Rooms. Repairs were made by procuring and installing a 4" flood seal so that the flood path has been plugged. The conduit plug seal is now functional.
"The event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as internal flooding of both Switchgear Rooms could possibly affect (a.)safe shutdown, (b.)removal of decay heat, (c.)control of release of radioactive material and (d.)mitigating an accident."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |