United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for May 9, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/08/2012 - 05/09/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47876 47877 47878 47879 47883 47905 47906 47907 47908 47909 47910

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Agreement State Event Number: 47876
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: STUDSVIK
Region: 1
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: R-79273
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BETH SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/30/2012
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
DEBORAH JACKSON (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SOURCE FOUND IN DRUM FROM PREVIOUS OWNER

The following report was received via fax:

"Studsvik contacted The Division of Radiological Health (DRH) regarding an incident that occurred on January 23, 2009. Studsvik was going through 18 drums from the previous owner (RACE) that were identified as legacy lead. The drums were scheduled for segregation for potential free release, reuse and disposal. These drums were scheduled for processing in a specific order based on radiological data. When they reached the final drum, they suspected that package SPFM 2008 04 40 (30-gallon drum) contained more than just lead based on the fact that it was stored in the high radiation room. It contained a 10 gallon drum. Between the space of the inner and outer drum were several empty lead pigs. The inner drum was wrapped in a lead blanket, containing 3 pigs, 2 empty and the third one contained a sealed source. The outer surface of the pig containing the sealed source read 2.5 R/hr. A shielded enclosure was constructed and the source was removed with proper handling devices. The dose rate at one inch from the source was 850 R/hr. The source was immediately returned to the pig. The 10 gallon drum was lined with lead blankets and the pig was placed in the middle. Ends of the blankets were folded over the pig. More blankets were placed inside the drum and it was closed. Blankets were then used to cover the drum. Duct tape was used to secure the blankets in placed. Approximately 700 lbs of blankets were shielding the pig and source. The dose rate was at 61 mR/hr on contact of the blankets. The 30 gallon drum, the small lead pigs and the original lead blankets were removed from the high radiation room. No contamination was found on the pig, blankets or drum. The Health Physicists received 16 mrem and 11 mrem on their electronic dosimeters. No extremity dosimeters were used but are being purchased for future remote source handling. The source was shipped through Northwest NARM Services and arrived on July 1, 2010 at US Ecology for disposal."

Tennessee Report Number: TN-09-015

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Agreement State Event Number: 47877
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: K & S ASSOCIATES, INC
Region: 1
City: NASHVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-19075
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BETH SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/30/2012
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
DEBORAH JACKSON (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SR-90 CATHETER STUCK WHILE BEING CALIBRATED

The following report was received via fax:

"K&S Associates were attempting to perform a routine calibration of a Beta-Cath system, when the Sr-90 source train became stuck in the 'out' position. They believed they could cut the catheter and isolate the source train and subsequently place the train and housing unit into a pig and send the system back to the manufacturer. While cutting the plastic catheter, they misjudged where the source train was located and severed the train. Approximately 10 mL of water spilled out onto a table, along with the train. Paper toweling was used to wipe up the water. A survey was performed to account for the seeds. The total leaking activity was under 3.5 milliCuries. The entire source train of 4 cm contained 16 seeds with a total activity of 56 milliCuries. After the Division received the notification from K&S, two members of our staff from the Nashville Field Office responded to the incident to investigate. The Division found that K&S Associates were performing work they were licensed to do. However, when the catheter was cut, an unlicensed task was performed. A Notice of Noncompliance was issued. K&S responded to the noncompliance letter with the actions that were implemented as a result of this incident."

Tennessee Report Number: TN-11-10

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Agreement State Event Number: 47878
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: WORLD TESTING
Region: 1
City: CLARKSVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-95009
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BETH SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/30/2012
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
DEBORAH JACKSON (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following report was received via fax:

"World Testing reported a 3.66 TBq (99 Ci) Se-75 radiography source (QSA Global model A-424-25W) disconnect from the exposure device (QSA Global model 880 Delta, serial #D1120) that occurred on 3/3/2011. The lead radiographer determined that the source remained in the collimator at the end of the guide tube following retraction attempts. The work area was surveyed and the barricade was appropriately adjusted. A manned lift was used to detach the exposure device from overhead piping and lower it to the ground. A six-foot retrieval tool was used to grasp the collimator and elevate it until the source fell out of the end of the guide tube. Using concrete and lead for shielding, personnel were able to place the source back into the exposure device and secure it. Inspection of the source drive cable revealed that the crimped connection, which attaches to the source pigtail, detached from the drive cable. QSA Global was notified of the failure."

Tennessee Report Number: TN-11-038

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Agreement State Event Number: 47879
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP INC
Region: 1
City:  State: KY
County:
License #: 201-699-05
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARISSA VEGA-VALEZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/30/2012
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2012
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
DEBORAH JACKSON (FSME)
CHRIS EINBERG (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FILM BADGE INDICATES RADIOGRAPHER OVEREXPOSURE

"KY RHB [Kentucky Radiation Health Branch] was notified on April 27, 2012, by the corporate RSO (CRSO) of Mistras Group, Inc. (license 201-699-05), that on the morning of April 27, 2012 he received a notice from Landauer that [an employee] received an extremely high dose reading on his film badge for the month of March 2012. The report stated that 'Dosimeter has exceeded the reporting capabilities of 1000 Rads, dosimeter reprocessed, second read agrees with reported dose.' The representative with Landauer told the CRSO that the image blinded the camera and was too blurry to read. She also stated that the reading was so high they could not get a reading. The CRSO conducted a telephone interview with [the employee] and he was told that his dosimeter never went off scale during that period and his film badge was on him at all times while performing radiography procedures. He did say his film badge may have been stored in his work bucket in the dark room of his transport vehicle. The CRSO has instructed [the employee] to turn in his [the employee's] current film badge to the office manager and is not to participate in radiographic operations until this matter has been resolved. According to a telephone conversation with the RSO early this evening, [the employee] is not experiencing any signs or symptoms of radiation exposure and he will be calling Oak Ridge tomorrow morning (5/1/12) to schedule blood work for [the employee]."

Kentucky Report: 120008

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Agreement State Event Number: 47883
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: BP - COOPER RIVER PLANT
Region: 1
City: WANDO State: SC
County:
License #: 252
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/01/2012
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTER FAILED IN CLOSED POSITION

The following report was received via fax:

"The SC [South Carolina] Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified in writing on January 25, 2012, that during a routine shutter check, a Vega Americas Corporation Model SHRD gauging device containing 20 Ci of Cs-137, had a shutter mechanism that was harder to operate than normal. Vega Americas Corporation was contacted and on January 24, 2012, a Vega Americas Corporation technician arrived and was evaluating the operation of the shutter when it failed in the closed position. The metal operating handle broke off and the shutter cannot be moved. The source holder was surveyed and [it was] verified that the shutter is in the closed and safe position.

"Following further correspondence with the licensee on May 1, 2012, the licensee stated that Vega Americas Corporation will not repair the source holder. Vega Americas Corporation will be handling the proper disposal of the SHRD fixed gauge.

"Even though this event is being reported, the Department of Health and Environmental Control does not feel that this is a reportable event since the shutter is closed and radiation exposure in excess of regulatory limits is not possible."

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 47905
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE TERRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/08/2012
Notification Time: 08:16 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2012
Event Time: 23:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

"On May 7, 2012, at 2357 CDT, with the plant in MODE 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure, leakage from a transmitter manifold test valve diaphragm seal was determined to be pressure boundary leakage per TS 3.4.13. The manifold test valve is associated with pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-430. It has been determined that the most likely cause of the leakage is a cracked manifold diaphragm and that this is classified as part of the Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary per 10 CFR 50.2.

"This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) because the defect is associated with the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.

"Isolation and repair of the leakage is being pursued.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee closed the root isolation valves for the pressure transmitter to allow repair of the diaphragm, however there is still leakage past these valve. This leakage is quantified as a few drops per minute.


* * * RETRACTION FROM MIKE TERRY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1552 EDT ON 5/8/2012 * * *

"On May 8, 2012, EN #47905 provided notification of leakage from a pressurizer manifold valve that was potentially pressure boundary leakage. Since the leak could not quickly be determined to be otherwise, it was conservatively reported as pressure boundary leakage.

"Subsequent investigation and evaluation determined that the identified leakage originated from the mechanical components of the valve and not the pressure boundary.

"The leak has been isolated and the affected manifold valve is being repaired.

"Therefore, the leakage did not constitute pressure boundary leakage and this condition did not meet the reportability criteria identified in 10CFR50.72.

"As a result, the notification made on May 8, 2012 is hereby retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Giessner).

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 47906
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/08/2012
Notification Time: 08:49 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2012
Event Time: 12:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
LARRY CAMPBELL (NMSS)

Event Text

CONTAMINATED INJURED PERSON

"An employee received a laceration on the bridge of his nose when removing a respirator. He went into the onsite medical dispensary where the nurse cleaned the wound and applied a bandage. The employee had been working in the Feed Materials Building. He was donning PPE [Protective Personal Equipment] in the cooling shack on the 6th floor. There was approximately 33,000 dpm/100cm? contamination on the bottom of the employee's plant issued shoes. The employee returned to work following the treatment."

The licensee notified the Senior NRC Inspector.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47907
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN DULLUM
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/08/2012
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2012
Event Time: 16:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL REPORT - INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS). On 3/13/12, at approximately 1604 hours, Unit 2 experienced an invalid PCIS partial isolation. An equipment operator was in the process of making an adjustment to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) MG Set output voltage during daily rounds. As the rheostat was beginning to be rotated to increase the voltage, output voltage quickly dropped below the MG Set undervoltage trip setpoint. The BC757B and BC757D MG Set output breakers opened, resulting in the loss of the 2B RPS bus causing a half scram. The half scram signal resulted in closure of the instrument nitrogen primary containment isolation valve, secondary containment normal ventilation isolation valves and start of the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment supply fan.

"The invalid PCIS isolation was a result of the failure of the voltage adjustment rheostat for the MG Set output voltage.

"This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (AR 1340452) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 47908
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
                   FABRICATION & SCRAP
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County: PENTON
License #: SNM-1227
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001257
NRC Notified By: ROBERT E LINK
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/08/2012
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2012
Event Time: 07:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
LARRY CAMPBELL (NMSS)

Event Text

IMPROPERLY ANALYZED CONDITION

"This plant condition is being reported under 10CFR70, Appendix A criterion (b)(1), 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that ... was improperly analyzed ... and which results in a failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'

"AREVA's conclusion that such a condition exists at the AREVA Richland facility is based on an NRC issued letter dated May 7, 2012 from John D. Kinneman to Janet R. Schlueter which among other things states:

"'It is not acceptable, however, to conclude that a process does not need IROFS because an event is 'not credible' due to the characteristic provided by some other controls or features of the plant that are not IROFS.'

"Based on this NRC position, AREVA did not adequately analyze the facility (in accordance with the May 7th position) because unacceptable consequences resulting from some process upsets were determined to be 'not credible' based on plant conditions or features that were not declared as IROFS.

"For example, an accidental criticality accident resulting from a solution leak onto the floor was declared not credible because gravity would cause the leak to spread out on the floor into a safe geometry. However, the floor was not declared an IROFS. Another example is that accidental criticality in a 1-inch diameter pipe was declared 'not credible' due to the geometry of the pipe and no credible mechanism being identified that could cause the pipe to balloon into an unfavorable geometry, yet the pipe diameter was not declared an IROFS. Other similar conditions exist at the Richland facility.

"Therefore, AREVA Richland has concluded that the NRC approved ISA does not meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61(e). However, the safety significance of this technical non-compliance is considered to be low because all proposed changes to the facility are evaluated for potential impact to the facility ISA before they are made. These changes are reviewed and approved by a diverse group of people including staff who is familiar with the safety basis for each process system and the 10CFR70.72 change control requirements and will not authorize changes that could invalidate the safety basis.

"Additionally, although these items are not individually identified as IROFS, the ISA summary on pg. 7-9 states:

"'... the following general criticality safety program elements are considered IROFS, albeit that they differ from other listed IROFS in that although they are key to safety, they are not always individually identified and used in specific accident sequences:

"-- equipment dimensions and materials forming the basis for a nuclear criticality safety analysis (NCSA); and

"-- bounding assumptions used in an NCSA'."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47909
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BEN COOK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/08/2012
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2012
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

AN UNANALYZED CONDITION COULD DELAY TRANSFER TO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS UNDER CERTAIN POSTULATED CONDITIONS

"At 0900 [CDT] on May 8, 2012, it was determined that Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant did not meet Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.8.1 because the requirement of Table 3.3.8.1-1 for the 4.16 KV Essential Bus Degraded Voltage time delay transfer to the Emergency Diesel Generators [EDGs] of 9.2 seconds could not be met under all postulated conditions. The degraded transfer scheme has the ability to transfer to an intermediate offsite source (1AR) which under a degraded voltage condition, coincident with an accident, would delay the transfer to the EDGs an additional 5 seconds. Both EDGs were subsequently declared inoperable."

As an interim action 1AR transformer has been removed from service. This eliminates the unanalyzed condition, restores Technical Specification compliance, and restores both EDGs to an operable condition.

Additionally this event is being reported under criteria 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47910
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MATTESSICH
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/08/2012
Notification Time: 19:09 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2012
Event Time: 11:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE

"On 5/8/2012 at 1114 EDT, maintenance informed the Control Room that a fan blade on one of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation compressors had failed, causing the fan and motor to become unstable. As a result, Operations secured TSC ventilation and declared the TSC non-functional.

"The on-call Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator were notified and the alternate TSC remains available.

"The affected unit has been isolated and TSC ventilation re-started and declared functional as of 1900 EDT on 5/8/2012."

The license will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, May 09, 2012
Wednesday, May 09, 2012