United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for March 20, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/19/2012 - 03/20/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47539 47737 47752 47753 47754 47755

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Part 21 Event Number: 47539
Rep Org: DRESSER CONSOLIDATED
Licensee: DRESSER CONSOLIDATED
Region: 4
City: ALEXANDRIA State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/20/2011
Notification Time: 14:26 [ET]
Event Date: 12/20/2011
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
PART21 GROUP ()

Event Text

PART 21 - CAPACITY FAILURE OF PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE

The following information was received via facsimile:

"A potential issue exists involving Dresser's pressure relief device model 1982. The Part 21 investigation was initiated because of a nameplate capacity failure during National Board certification testing. The Dresser model 1982 pressure relief device is used for system overpressure protection. Dresser's engineering and quality assurance departments are currently working to identify the root cause of this capacity failure and to determine if the equipment is being used in safety related applications subject to 10 CFR Part 21. Should it be determined that the equipment at issue is being used in safety related applications, a notification will be provided in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21."

* * * UPDATE AT 1431 EST ON 1/9/12 FROM PHILIP WALTZ TO HUFFMAN VIA FACSIMILE * * *

The following is a summary of an interim report on this issue:

"During the investigation process of 10 CFR Part 21, File No. 2011-02, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, GE Dresser has not been able to obtain the required flow capacity and does not have the required information regarding the system to determine the required flow capacity of the valve in question.

"We have completed a Transfer of Information in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21 (b) to Entertech and Exelon to assist in the determination of Part 21 reportability.

"The Transfer of Information letter [below] has been sent to Enertech and Exelon.

"GE Dresser supplied a pressure relief valve dedicated as ASME Section VIII Safety Related to Enertech, which was then sold to Exelon and installed at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2. As a result of an investigation of the effect of outlet piping on the flow capacity of similar pressure relief valves it was noted that the pressure relief valve installed at Dresden, Unit 2 may not relieve its ASME certified flow capacity when installed with outlet piping. In order to determine if a reportable condition exists, the flow capacity provided by a pressure relief valve to prevent the protected system from exceeding a pressure 10% greater than systems design pressure is required. GE Dresser has not been able to obtain the required flow capacity and does not have the required information regarding the system to determine the required flow capacity. As such GE Dresser cannot determine if the identified deviation from technical requirements would create a reportable condition within the requirements of 10CFR Part 21. GE Dresser provides this Transfer of Information, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21(b) to Enertech and Exelon to assist in the determination of Part 21 reportability."

NRC R3DO (Orth) and R4DO (Lantz) have been notified. The NRC Part 21 Group has been sent a copy of this interim report.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1315 ON 3/19/2012 FROM WILLIAM ALEXANDER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following report was received via fax:

"During the investigation process of 10 CFR Part 21 File No. 2011-02, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21, GE Dresser was not able to obtain the required flow capacity and did not have the required information regarding the system to determine the required flow capacity of the valve in question.

"We completed a Transfer of Information in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(b) to Enertech and Exelon to assist in the determination of Part 21 reportability. This information was attached to our previous Transfer of Information letter.

"We have received updated information from Entertech and Exelon. Upon receiving 10CFR Part 21 notification from Dresser, Dresden Design Engineering performed an evaluation and has concluded that their system will produce a flow, for this valve, much less than the minimum flow valve determined by test of a representative valve. Upon receipt of system flow capacity from Dresden, GE Dresser's Engineering department has confirmed the valve in question will operate according to Dresden requirements.

"The above information clears the one valve which was in question for this 10 CFR Part 21 reportable.

"GE Dresser is filing this retraction letter to state we do not have a reportable issue involving a pressure relief device type 1982 valve and therefore closing our 10CFR Part 21 File No. 2011-02."

Notified the R3DO (Kunowski) and Part-21 Group (e-mail).

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Agreement State Event Number: 47737
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: CLARA MAASS MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: BELLEVILLE State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PEROS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/13/2012
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ABORTED FRACTIONAL DOSE TREATMENT

The following information was received from the State of New Jersey:

"A patient was treated with a Nucletron microSelectron 106.990(v3) HDR unit on March 12, 2012. The prescription dose was 600 cGy per fraction for 5 fractions. The fractional treatment planned was for a total of 14 dwell positions in two different catheters: six dwell positions in the ring to be treated on HDR Channel 1 and eight dwell positions in the tandem to be treated on HDR Channel 3. After all appropriate QA, the patient treatment was started with Channel 1 being the first set of dwell positions treated. At the completion of the Channel 1 treatment, the HDR unit gave an error stating that there was a 'Possible incomplete source retraction in Channel 2.' Even though all radiation indicators did not detect the presence of radiation, and even though the licensee was not using Channel 2, immediate emergency procedures were implemented. The emergency stop was activated and the room was entered with a survey meter to verify that there was no elevated radiation present. All indications were that the source was retracted properly and that there was no danger to the patient or the staff.

"The error displayed on the treatment screen indicated that it was possible that dust was on the optocoupler, thus causing the fault. However, the error could not be cleared by using the reset button. Nucletron was immediately contacted. Nucletron support personnel attempted to walk the licensee through some steps that may have cleared the error, but they were unsuccessful. Therefore, the remaining part of the patient's treatment was aborted. Nucletron scheduled one of their service engineers to respond to the licensee's facility to repair the unit.

"The authorized user informed the patient that the complete treatment was not delivered due to the machine malfunction and that the authorized user would determine what action to take on the future fractions. The patient and the treatment room were surveyed prior to release. No elevated readings were observed. The patient received 120 cGy (versus the prescribed dose of 600 cGy). The deviation from the written directive was documented in the patient's chart."

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47752
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: FRED POLLAK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/19/2012
Notification Time: 02:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/2012
Event Time: 23:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 1 Startup 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY ANOMALOUS BEHAVIOR

"At 2336 EDT, during performance at Low Power Physics Testing, Unit 1 was manually tripped while the reactor was critical at less than 1% power due to Control Element Assembly (CEA) Regulating Group #3 exhibiting anomalous behavior (continued to insert with no operator action). The trip was uncomplicated and all CEAs fully inserted when the reactor was tripped. No automatic safety system actuations were required and none occurred. The cause for the abnormal CEA performance is under investigation.

"The plant is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. RCS Heat Removal is being maintained with Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves. The offsite power grid is available and stable.

"This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to manual RPS actuation with the reactor critical"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47753
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CURTIS MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/19/2012
Notification Time: 08:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2012
Event Time: 01:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS PUBLIC PROMPT NOTIFICATION CAPABILITY

"At approximately 0119 CDT on 3/19/12, Cooper Nuclear Station was informed by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not working. This affects the tone alert radios Cooper Nuclear Station provides to members of the public to notify them of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Local county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ have been notified of the condition of the Shubert radio transmission tower and the affect on this tone alert radios and will utilize Local Route Notification (backup notification method.)

"At approximately 0635 CDT, the National Weather Service reported that the Shubert radio transmission tower had been restored and tested satisfactorily."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local authorities of the condition.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47754
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/19/2012
Notification Time: 12:41 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2012
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE

"On March 19th 2012 at 1300, Limerick Generating Station will be performing routine preventative maintenance on the Charcoal Adsorber and HEPA Filter associated with the on-site Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Ventilation system. While performing this maintenance, the TSC Emergency Ventilation system will not be available to be restored within the time period required to staff and activate the TSC Emergency Response Organization (ERO).

"This work is expected to be completed by 3/19/12. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC ERO activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable procedures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an Emergency Facility because of the planned unavailability of the TSC Emergency Ventilation system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately four hours.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 3/20/12 AT 0019 EDT FROM WEISSINGER TO HUFFMAN * * *

The TSC emergency ventilation system has been returned to a normal status. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Schmidt) notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47755
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER BUSH
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/20/2012
Notification Time: 00:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2012
Event Time: 16:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL FOR AERIAL LIFT TO IMPACT SERVICE WATER PIPING DURING SEISMIC EVENT

"At 1612 on 3/19/12 it was identified that an aerial lift was located in the Auxiliary Building stored in a seismic storage area near Train A and Train B safety related service water piping to Control Room Air Conditioning (CRAC) Alternate Cooling System. This resulted in both trains of Service Water being INOPERABLE per TS 3.7.8 and both trains of CRAC Alternate Cooling system per TS 3.7.11.

"At this time, there is no conclusive information that would support the OPERABILITY of the Service Water System during a seismic event therefore this event is being conservatively reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'The nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' and 5.71(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D) 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structure systems that are needed for: (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.'

"The aerial lift was removed and the plant is no longer in the condition noted above."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012