Event Notification Report for February 24, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/23/2012 - 02/24/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
47701477064769547697
Agreement State
Event Number: 47701
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: EAST KENTUCKY POWER COOPERATIVE
Region: 1
City: WINCHESTER State: KY
County:
License #: 201-161-51
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CURT PENDERGRASS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: EAST KENTUCKY POWER COOPERATIVE
Region: 1
City: WINCHESTER State: KY
County:
License #: 201-161-51
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CURT PENDERGRASS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 02/27/2012
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2012
Event Time: 11:26 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2012
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2012
Event Time: 11:26 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON PROCESS GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Kentucky via facsimile:
" KY RHB [Kentucky Radiation Health Branch] was notified by telephone and email on 2/24/12 at 2:32 p.m. EST by the Radiation Safety Officer at East Kentucky Power Cooperative of a shutter on a Kay-Ray Model 7700D (S/N 17902) containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 being stuck in the closed position. The event occurred on 2/24/12 at 12:26 p.m. EST. The RSO is stationed in Winchester, KY and the incident occurred at the licensee's facility in Maysville, KY. The State has received an initial telephone notification and an initial written report from the licensee and will continue to keep NRC informed of the status of our investigation."
KY Event Report ID No: KY 120001
The following was received from the State of Kentucky via facsimile:
" KY RHB [Kentucky Radiation Health Branch] was notified by telephone and email on 2/24/12 at 2:32 p.m. EST by the Radiation Safety Officer at East Kentucky Power Cooperative of a shutter on a Kay-Ray Model 7700D (S/N 17902) containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 being stuck in the closed position. The event occurred on 2/24/12 at 12:26 p.m. EST. The RSO is stationed in Winchester, KY and the incident occurred at the licensee's facility in Maysville, KY. The State has received an initial telephone notification and an initial written report from the licensee and will continue to keep NRC informed of the status of our investigation."
KY Event Report ID No: KY 120001
Part 21
Event Number: 47706
Rep Org: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL FITZGERALD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL FITZGERALD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 02/28/2012
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2012
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL MINIMUM WALL VIOLATION ON SEISMIC PLATE VALVE BODIES
"While reviewing Valve Body drawing 16B2201, it was discovered that an area in the packing bore has the possibility to not meet the minimum wall requirements of ASME B16.34 for a Class 150 valve at the minimum material condition due to a potential stack up of tolerances.
"Upon discovery of this possible failure to comply, an investigation was performed on all NPS 3-12 Type A11 Class 150 Seismic Plate Valve Bodies and it was determined that this issue was isolated to the NPS 8 Type A11 Class 150 Seismic Plate Valve Body per drawing 16B2201.
"It is the opinion of Fisher that there is no inherent safety risk associated with this situation. Fisher will be working with the individual plants [Clinton Power Station and Watts Bar] in question to measure the actual dimensions of the bodies to determine if a problem exists and will take appropriate corrective action."
Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2012-01
"While reviewing Valve Body drawing 16B2201, it was discovered that an area in the packing bore has the possibility to not meet the minimum wall requirements of ASME B16.34 for a Class 150 valve at the minimum material condition due to a potential stack up of tolerances.
"Upon discovery of this possible failure to comply, an investigation was performed on all NPS 3-12 Type A11 Class 150 Seismic Plate Valve Bodies and it was determined that this issue was isolated to the NPS 8 Type A11 Class 150 Seismic Plate Valve Body per drawing 16B2201.
"It is the opinion of Fisher that there is no inherent safety risk associated with this situation. Fisher will be working with the individual plants [Clinton Power Station and Watts Bar] in question to measure the actual dimensions of the bodies to determine if a problem exists and will take appropriate corrective action."
Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2012-01
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47695
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHAD EURAY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHAD EURAY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 02/23/2012
Notification Time: 14:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2012
Event Time: 05:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2012
Notification Time: 14:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2012
Event Time: 05:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANNED MAINTENANCE WILL RESULT IN THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER BEING UNAVAILABLE
"The Technical Support Center will be unavailable for approximately 10 hours due to planned maintenance on motor control center SMXE."
Maintenance is expected to begin at 0500 on February 24, 2012.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The Technical Support Center will be unavailable for approximately 10 hours due to planned maintenance on motor control center SMXE."
Maintenance is expected to begin at 0500 on February 24, 2012.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47697
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEWART BYRD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEWART BYRD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 02/24/2012
Notification Time: 07:42 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2012
Event Time: 00:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2012
Notification Time: 07:42 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2012
Event Time: 00:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
VALID REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING NEUTRON INSTRUMENT TESTING
"On 2/24/2012 at 0037 EST, Unit 1 was in Mode 4 when an unplanned Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred. The trip occurred while operators were returning the Mode Switch to the 'Shutdown' position during restoration from Neutron Instrumentation testing. Jumpers had not been installed to bypass this actuation signal at the time the Mode Switch was operated, resulting in a valid signal of the RPS.
"The RPS actuation is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The safety significance of this event was minimal. Plant equipment performed as expected. All control rods were inserted prior to the RPS actuation and remain inserted.
"The RPS actuation was reset and the plant remains in Mode 4."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MARK TURKAL TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1316 EST ON 3/1/12 * * *
"Based on a detailed review of NUREG-1022, Revision 2, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,' this event has been determined not to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The RPS actuation was inadvertent and was caused by a human error (i.e., failure to install appropriate jumpers) that occurred during a surveillance test. This RPS actuation was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation of the RPS. There was no plant condition present that either warranted a scram or would prompt manual operator action in anticipation of scram condition. Therefore, this RPS actuation is considered invalid and is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Condition Report (CR) 519432.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction." Notified the R2DO (Mark Franke).
"On 2/24/2012 at 0037 EST, Unit 1 was in Mode 4 when an unplanned Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred. The trip occurred while operators were returning the Mode Switch to the 'Shutdown' position during restoration from Neutron Instrumentation testing. Jumpers had not been installed to bypass this actuation signal at the time the Mode Switch was operated, resulting in a valid signal of the RPS.
"The RPS actuation is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The safety significance of this event was minimal. Plant equipment performed as expected. All control rods were inserted prior to the RPS actuation and remain inserted.
"The RPS actuation was reset and the plant remains in Mode 4."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MARK TURKAL TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1316 EST ON 3/1/12 * * *
"Based on a detailed review of NUREG-1022, Revision 2, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,' this event has been determined not to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The RPS actuation was inadvertent and was caused by a human error (i.e., failure to install appropriate jumpers) that occurred during a surveillance test. This RPS actuation was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation of the RPS. There was no plant condition present that either warranted a scram or would prompt manual operator action in anticipation of scram condition. Therefore, this RPS actuation is considered invalid and is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Condition Report (CR) 519432.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction." Notified the R2DO (Mark Franke).