| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/22/2012 - 02/23/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 47672 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: NLMK PENNSYLVANIA
Region: 1
City: FARRELL State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1074
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 02/17/2012
Notification Time: 10:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2012
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER ON A METAL THICKNESS GAUGE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On February 16, 2012, during leak testing by a consultant vendor a radioactive materials gauge shutter was discovered to be stuck open. No radiation exposure to personnel occurred.
"The device is identified as:
Manufacturer: LFE
Model: SS-3A
Serial #: 02311
Isotope: Am-241
Activity: 37 GBq (1 Ci)
"The gauge manufacturer was notified and repairs are scheduled to be conducted today.
"Event Report ID No.: PA120007" |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47674 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEST AMERICA
Region: 4
City: ARVADA State: CO
County:
License #: 486-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDGAR ETHINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/17/2012
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2012
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A FAILED LEAK TEST OF AN ECD SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of Colorado via fax:
"On February 16, 2012 Test America at 4955 Yarrow Street in Arvada, Colorado (CO License # 486-03), notified the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment that one of their Ni-63 electron capture detectors [ECD] failed a leak test. The leak test results for Device HPU0946 exceeded the 0.005 microCurie level. The test wipe measured at 0.0062 microCurie.
"The ECD detector was immediately withdrawn from service and the instrument in which the ECD was located was decontaminated by cleaning with Radiac Wash solution. A direct beta survey was then performed which showed no residual contamination present on the instrument or ECD. ECD No. HPU0946 was sent to the manufacturer for repair." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47675 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: SUNOCO PHILADELPHIA REFINERY
Region: 1
City: PHILADELPHIA State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0853
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID J. ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/17/2012
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING SHUTTER TEST FAILURES ON FIXED GAUGES
The following information was received from the State of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Notifications: On Wednesday February 15, 2012, the licensee left a voice message to the Central Office and followed with a phone conversation on February 16th regarding an event that took place on January 18, 2012. Additional information was then sent to Central Office via email on Friday, February 17, 2012. This event is reportable within 24-hours under 10CFR30.50(b)(2).
"Event Description: Shutter test failures occurred on 3 fixed gauge devices at the Sunoco Philadelphia Refinery. Air actuators are used as the primary testing means to close the shutters. All three actuators failed to close the shutters on the devices and the instrument technicians were unable to manually close the shutters. The instrument technician foreman was unaware of any reporting requirements to the State and did not communicate this event to the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) until February 14, 2012.
"The 3 devices are identified as:
Manufacturer: Ohmart Vega
Model: SH-F1
Serial #: OVO125; OVO129; OVO131
Isotope: Cs-137
Activity: 10 mCi (each)
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: Air actuator malfunction
"ACTIONS: The manufacturer has been contacted and the parts have been ordered to repair the shutter mechanisms. The RSO reported that the failures of the shutter mechanism do not pose any additional threat to employee safety, and surveys in the area indicate readings of <0.5 mR/hr at 1 foot from the source. The Department plans to do a reactive inspection.
"Media attention: None at this time
"Event Report ID No.: PA120008" |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47676 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/17/2012
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2012
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
ADELAIDE GIANTELLI (FSME)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
CINDY JONES (NSIR)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL RADIOGRAPHER OVEREXPOSURE
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On February 17, 2011, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee of an overexposure event involving one of their radiographers. The radiographer was working in a shooting bay at the licensee's facility using a QSA D880 radiography camera serial number D7293 containing a 37 curie iridium 192 source. The radiographer entered the shooting bay to setup for their next shoot. They stated that they carried their dose rate meter with them but did not pay attention to the reading. The radiographer completed the setup and left the shooting bay. The radiographer attempted to crank the source out, but discovered that the source was already cranked fully out. The radiographer cranked the source back to the fully shielded position and notified their Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of the event. The RSO questioned the radiographer and found that the radiographer had spent approximately 3 minutes within 10 inches of the source, and about 3 minutes at 3 feet from the source during the setup. Initial calculations by the licensee indicated that the radiographer may have received as much as 20 rem TEDE from the event. The RSO stated that the radiographer did not have to relocate the source to perform the shot so they do not believe there is any extremity dose involved. The RSO also stated that the electrical breaker that supplied power to the shooting bay had been opened therefore the alarm did not function. The RSO stated that they were going to review security video to determine who opened the breaker. The radiographer has been removed from all work involving exposure to radiation and their personal monitoring device will be sent to the licensee's processor. The Agency provided contact information for the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site to the RSO. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
"Texas Incident #: I-8934" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47683 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WAYNE EPPEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 02/22/2012
Notification Time: 01:55 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2012
Event Time: 23:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 11 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FEEDWATER HEATER HI HI ALARM
"During a normal shutdown in preparation for refueling outage 2R27, with Unit 2 at approximately 11.42% power, Unit 2 was manually tripped on 2/21/2012 at 2342 CST. The manual reactor trip was in response to a 21/22/23 Feedwater Heater Hi Hi alarm and was directed by the alarm response. Procedure 2E-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,' was completed at 2345 CST. No Safety Injection was required. 2ES-0.1, 'Reactor Trip Recovery,' is in progress. Offsite power remains on all safeguards buses for both units. Unit 2 decay heat is via forced circulation and condenser steam dump with main feedwater providing flow to 21/22 steam generators. Auxiliary Feedwater start was not required and Unit 2 AFW remains in its safeguards alignment. No emergency event was declared as a result of this trip. Unit 1 remains at 100% power in Mode 1. Reportable actuations are: Unit 2 reactor protection (scram). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. State [State of Minnesota] / local [Goodhue county] / Press release will be made. Other government agencies will not be notified. Nothing unusual / not understood. Unit 2 will continue to mode 5." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47684 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MORGAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/22/2012
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2012
Event Time: 13:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM MAINTENANCE TO IMPACT EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES
"Calvert Cliffs will be performing planned U-1 Refueling Outage maintenance to a portion of the sites 1E Electrical Distribution System. This maintenance window is expected to be 36 hours long and will start at 1400 today. This will impact the dissemination of plant data to the TSC, EOF, and OSC. ERDS will also be out of service for both Unit-1 and Unit-2. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment.
"Control Room Emergency Response Organization personnel will use backup methods already captured in emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data to the effected Emergency Response Facilities and NRC during the plant data network outage. MIDAS (Meteorological Data) will continue to be operational at the site."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 47685 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HOMER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/22/2012
Notification Time: 17:21 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
PART 21 - REACTORS (EMAI)
| Event Text MISSING UPPER MOUNTING PADS ON SUBCOVER ASSEMBLIES
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 12/20/11 upon notification of an issue with four subcover assemblies at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. It was reported that Perry was performing a maintenance activity whereby they were replacing four cylinder head subcover assemblies on their Enterprise diesel engine. During installation, it was noted that qty. 2 of 11 bolt holes were missing an upper mounting pad. This was visually apparent once the customer attempted to install the bolts, which have a 6" length. The two areas missing the upper landing pad did not have an area for the underside of the bolt head to rest upon.
"The evaluation was concluded on 2/17/12 and it determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21.
"DISCUSSION:
"Lack of the mounting pads alone will not result in a failure, however if a customer attempts to install the subcover without recognizing the missing material, there is the possibility that two of the eleven hold down bolts will provide no clamping function. This may result in loosening of the subcover mounting which could allow the cover to separate from the cylinder head.
"The subcover is a device that is fastened to the top of the cylinder head and provides support for the rocker arms and rocker shafts and encloses the valve stem area. There is one subcover per cylinder head and thus for a model DSRV-16-4 Enterprise engine there are 16 subcovers. Failure of a subcover would impact the ability of either of the corresponding rocker arms to provide the mechanical force to actuate the intake and exhaust valves. Without valve actuation, that particular power assembly would be unable to generate power which would reduce the output of the emergency diesel generator (EDG). Failure of the EDG to produce its nameplate rated power could prevent the safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant during an emergency situation.
"AFFECTED USERS AND SHIPMENTS:
"ESI has supplied subcovers with the incorrect mounting pad to the following customers [in USA]:
"Perry; Qty: 4; Date: October 2011.
"Note: The subcovers returned by Perry are the subject of this evaluation.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
"Customers may elect to justify use of a shorter bolt to facilitate installation of in-stock covers. Otherwise it is ESI's recommendation that customers return the subcovers for replacement.
"The root cause analysis determined that the cause of this issue was that the pattern for the casting is missing the portions that would ultimately form this upper mounting pad. In addition, the machining drawing was unclear in showing these locations. As a result, ESI's inspections did not specifically check for these locations and the non-conforming subcovers were shipped to the customer.
"The pattern is now being corrected to ensure the presence of the upper mounting pads. Also, ESI's dedication report is being revised to add specific checks to inspect for the presence of these pads. This will be completed prior to any future shipments of this item." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47686 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BACKUS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 02/22/2012
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2012
Event Time: 13:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO CERTAIN POSTULATED FIRE CONDITIONS
"At 1307 CST on February 22, 2012, it was identified that under certain fire conditions, the ability to meet the performance criteria of the approved fire protection program may be challenged. Specifically the cabling for Train A Pressurizer Power Operated Relief valve and Train B Pressurizer Power Operated Relief valve alternate circuits may be affected under certain fire conditions affecting the relay room. The ability to maintain pressurizer level within the indicated range may be challenged due to a spurious opening of a pressurizer power operated relief valve during these postulated conditions.
"Compensatory actions to address the fire in the area of concern are in place. This condition is reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"A similar condition was previously reported [by the licensee] in EN #44482. The compensatory measures that had been put in place for that earlier condition remain applicable to this current condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47687 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CURTIS DUNSMORE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 02/22/2012
Notification Time: 23:36 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2012
Event Time: 20:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 88 | Power Operation | 73 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABILITY OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
"At 1859 hours, the Brunswick site experienced a loss of balance of plant (BOP) bus Common C. As a result, makeup pumps to the ECCS discharge line keepfill systems lost power. At 1905 on Unit 1, 'A' loop of the Core Spray (CS) system received a low discharge pressure alarm and was declared inoperable. At 1916 hours, 'B' loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system received a low discharge pressure alarm and was declared inoperable. With the loss of the second low pressure ECCS system, Condition J of Technical Specification 3.5.1, 'ECCS Operating,' was entered, which requires the Unit 1 to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately. At 1931 hours, 'A' loop of RHR was declared inoperable due to low discharge pressure. Power reduction of Unit 1 was initiated at 2014 hours.
"At 2055 hours on Unit 2, 'A' loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system received a low discharge pressure alarm and was declared inoperable. At 2128 hours, 'B' loop of the Core Spray (CS) system received a low discharge pressure alarm and was declared inoperable. With the loss of the second low pressure ECCS system, Condition J of Technical Specification 3.5.1, 'ECCS Operating,' was entered, which requires the Unit 2 to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately. Power reduction of Unit 2 was initiated at 2219 hours.
"This event reportability is in accordance with 10CRF50.72(b)(2)(i), Technical Specification Required Shutdown, due to inoperability of ECCS systems.
"The initial safety significance of this event Is minimal. Offsite power and the Emergency Diesel Generators are operable. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system remains operable on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remains operable on Unit 1 and is being restored following maintenance on Unit 2.
"Troubleshooting activities to determine the loss of the BOP Common C bus are in progress. Efforts are in progress to install temporary power to the keepfill makeup pumps."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM CURTIS DUNSMORE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0223 EST ON 2/23/2012 * * *
"Unit 1 - At 2315 hours, temporary power was provided to the ECCS keepfill makeup pump and the ECCS systems were restored. LCO 3.0.3 was exited on Unit 1 at 0041 hours with restoration of the 'A' and 'B' loops of the RHR systems. The 'A' loop of the Core Spray system was restored at 0058 hours on 2/23/2012."
During the shutdown, Unit 1 was manually scrammed due to high delta-pressure across the Circulating Water Pump traveling screens. See EN #47690 for details.
"Unit 2 - At 2315 hours, temporary power was provided to the ECCS keepfill makeup pump and the ECCS systems were restored. LCO 3.0.3 was exited on Unit 2 at 2354 hours with restoration of 'B' loop of the RHR system. The 'A' loop of the Core Spray system was restored at 0039 hours. Unit 2 was at 96% of Rated Thermal Power when the shutdown was terminated."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47688 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ALLAN BRIESE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 02/23/2012
Notification Time: 00:45 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2012
Event Time: 18:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE DISCOVERED ON SITE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73
"At 1852 hours, Palo Verde Unit 1 was notified of a suspicious package located in the Owner Controlled Area outside the Protected Area. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office was contacted for assistance with a bomb disposal unit. Local media has become aware of this event and expressed interest by dispatching helicopters and television crews.
"There are no safety systems impacted by the package and operations personnel are not hampered in their ability to operate safety related equipment. There is no release of radioactivity to the environment as a result of this package and it has not adversely affected the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. All three Palo Verde units are being maintained stable at approximately 100% power.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47689 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARVIN GOLD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 02/23/2012
Notification Time: 01:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2012
Event Time: 01:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Offsite notification to law enforcement agencies was made by the licensee due to an individual making threats against personnel and security at the site. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47690 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CURTIS DUNSMORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 02/23/2012
Notification Time: 02:55 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2012
Event Time: 23:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 73 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO HIGH DELTA-P ACROSS CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRAVELING SCREENS
"At 2319 hours, a manual Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation was inserted on Unit 1 in anticipation of a loss of condenser vacuum. Shortly before the manual RPS actuation, Circulating Water Intake Pump (CWIP) 1B tripped due to high delta-pressure across the intake traveling screen. This caused the trip of the remaining pumps. Previously, at 1859 hours, balance of plant (BOP) bus Common C unexpectedly de-energized. This caused loss of power to the CWIP traveling screen motors which, in turn, lead to the high delta-pressure across the traveling screen(s).
"All control rods inserted properly. As a result of the scram, reactor water level reached the Low level 1 actuation set point and Primary Containment (i.e., Group 6) isolation occurred. All systems functioned as designed. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system is being used, as needed, for pressure control. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system is being used, as needed, for level control. No Safety/Relief Valves (SRVs) actuated as a result of the manual RPS actuation.
"The manual RPS actuation is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The actuation of the HPCI and RCIC systems and the Group 6 isolation are reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The unit is currently in Mode 3 with a cooldown in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |