| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/06/2012 - 02/07/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47512 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAYDEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 12/09/2011
Notification Time: 00:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 17:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION POTENTIALLY COULD AFFECT THE COMMON CONTROL ROOM
"At 1755 on 12/8/11, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed for the common Control Room for both Units. A high energy line break (HELB) barrier issue was discovered while performing a fire barrier surveillance and the condition is believed to have existed from initial plant construction. A HELB barrier was found to have a significant breach in it that could allow steam from a HELB in the Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown system to potentially impact equipment in the Control Room. The Control Room is not analyzed for a steam environment. The degree of the impact could not be readily determined, but could likely affect the safety related equipment in the Control Room. At 1803 on 12/8/11, Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown was secured to eliminate the potential for a HELB in the affected area which eliminated the potential unanalyzed condition. Therefore, an 8 hour report to the NRC is required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' since there was not a reasonable expectation that the Control Room environment could support operation of safety related equipment with Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown in service. Further analysis is underway."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * RETRACTION AT 0059 EST ON 2/7/12 FROM KENT MILLS TO HUFFMAN * * *
"Engineering performed an evaluation to address the impact of the degraded condition on the barrier's design functions. The evaluation concluded that the barrier remained capable of performing its design function with the degraded seal present. Therefore, this condition does not represent an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47515 | Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JAMES PRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/09/2011
Notification Time: 22:41 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2011
Event Time: 18:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PART 21 ISSUE WITH SEISMIC CLIPS ON RCIC SYSTEM CONTROLLERS RESULTS IN SYSTEM INOPERABILITY
"On December 7, 2011, a 10 CFR 21 report (reference NRC EN No. 47498) was received from a vendor for a defect with NUS Controllers. The defect involves spring clips that form part of the seismic restraints for the controllers. The controllers referenced in the report are installed for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system in the control room and remote shutdown panel. Based on initial information provided by the vendor, it was determined that the RCIC system remained operable. On December 9, 2011, additional information provided by the vendor did not support the immediate operability determination and the RCIC system was declared inoperable for Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.3 Condition A at 1835 hours [EST]. At 1932 hours [EST], the High Pressure Core Spray system was verified operable per TS LCO 3.5.3 Required Action A.1. TS LCO 3.5.3 Required Action A2 requires restoration of the RCIC system to operable status within 14 days. Qualified spring clips have been obtained and will be installed on the controllers. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to remove residual heat.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM CHARLES ELBERFELD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1415 EST ON 12/10/11 * * *
"As a follow-up to the condition reported above, we have replaced the affected seismic clips on the controllers and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system is now operable as of 0734 on December 10, 2011.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." R3DO (Skokowski) notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LLOYD ZERR TO CHARLES TEAL ON 2/6/12 AT 1504 EST * * *
"The vendor provided a seismic report to the station. This report showed that the seismic clips holding the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) controller meet the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) test requirements and design requirements for a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) for Perry. Based on this review, it was determined that the spring clips would function properly during and OBE and SSE. Because the condition reported in Event Number 47515 would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to remove residual heat, the condition is not reportable, and this notification is being retracted. The evaluation for this condition is documented in condition report 2011-06531. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Notified R3DO (Giessner) and Part 21 Group via email. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47540 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LANDON BRITTAIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 12/21/2011
Notification Time: 06:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2011
Event Time: 00:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH UNIT TWO SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOORS WERE INADVERTENTLY LEFT OPEN
"On 12/21/11 at 0046 Secondary Containment integrity was lost when both U2 Reactor Building interlock doors were open simultaneously. Interlock door electrical checks were in progress. TS LCORA 3.6.4.1.Condition A was entered. Reactor Building differential pressure remained within Tech Spec limits. The doors were both open for approximately 9 seconds.
"The cause of the event is being investigated."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Illinois Inspector will be notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM KATHARINE NETEMEYER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 2/6/12 AT 1243 EST * * *
"On 12/21/2011, EN 47540 was made describing a condition where secondary containment was declared inoperable due to not meeting the surveillance requirement for having one access door closed. This was reported as a loss of safety function for the secondary containment. This condition occurred during a planned maintenance activity.
"During a maintenance activity both doors unexpectedly opened. As a part of the maintenance, the inner door was opened by maintenance personnel using the normal control pushbutton. Upon personnel observing the outer door opening, the inner door button was released and the functional door automatically closed. Although both doors were briefly open, the negative pressure required to ensure secondary containment integrity was maintained at all times. Based on the door immediately closing and negative pressure being maintained, this is not considered a loss of safety function. Therefore this EN is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Giessner). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47631 | Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ALLIANT ENERGY - WP&L
Region: 3
City: PARDEEVILLE State: WI
County:
License #: 021-1063-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHOBER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/02/2012
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2012
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON INDUSTRIAL GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the State of Wisconsin via fax:
"On February 1, 2012, the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section received notice that the licensee had a gauge with a stuck shutter. The device is an Ohmart SHD-0 fixed gauge (serial number 64781) originally containing 250 mCi of Cs-137. A licensed service provider unmounted the gauge and attempted to fix the shutter but was unsuccessful. The RSO placed the device in a secured, remote storage location with the radiation beam pointing into the ground. Exposure rates at 1 foot are less than 2 mR/hr.
"The Radiation Protection Section will continue to monitor the situation, pending replacement or disposal of the device, and will perform an inspection within the next two weeks."
WI Event Report No.: WI120001 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47640 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 02/06/2012
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2012
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO UNPERMITTED RELEASE
"The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) was notified of a release of 27 gallons from the condensate system. The release contained the following chemicals:
1) 11.2 ppm of methoxy propylamine (MPA);
2) 8.1ppm of ammonia;
3) 11.2 ppb of hydrazine;
4) 1.50 E-5 microCi/mL (15,000 pCi/L) of tritium.
"The condensate was released from parts Warehouse #1 heating steam system overflow vent. Condensate return pumps failed to operate causing 27 gallons of condensate to backup and overflow onto the ground. A catch basin has been installed and the steam inlet valve has been closed preventing the addition of steam into the system.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. "
The licensee also notified the Prairie Island Dakota Indian Community. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 47641 | Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS
Licensee: VA MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: LITTLE ROCK State: AR
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 02/06/2012
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2012
Event Time: 12:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
| Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
| Event Text PACKAGE SURFACE CONTAMINATION IN EXCESS OF REPORTING LIMITS
"Per 10 CFR 20.1906(d), [The Department of Veterans Affairs is] reporting receipt of a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination on the outside of the package greater than NRC reporting limits.
"The package was received today (February 6, 2012) at around 12:15 PM ET by VA Medical Center, West Palm Beach, Florida. The VA Medical Center, West Palm Beach, Florida, holds permit number 09-25328-01 under the master materials license. A wipe test performed on the external surface of the package indicated a removable contamination level of 962 dpm/cm2 as compared to the regulatory limit of 220 dpm/cm2.
"The package contained Technetium-99m labeled radiopharmaceuticals and was shipped from Cardinal Health in Jupiter, Florida.
"The vendor/shipper serves as the final delivery carrier.
"The VA facility Radiation Safety Officer immediately notified the vendor about the contaminated package at about 12:30 PM ET. As corrective action, the package was set aside in a restricted area at the VA Medical Center to provide time for decay. The permittee does not plan to use the dosage." |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 47643 | Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY GILL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 02/06/2012
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2012
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - DEFECTIVE PLUG INSULATORS
The following report was received via fax:
"This letter is issued to provide initial notification of a potential defect in Plug Insulators (P/N: GB-1A-1) supplied as part of GRAYBOOT 'A' (GB-1A) Connector Kits. There are two affected lots of Plug Insulators (Lot #: BA59961 and BA67711). The potential defect is an out of tolerance dimension that will possibly affect the sealing ability of the Plug Insulator to wire interface.
"The affected Customers and their associated Purchase Orders are listed below. All Customers will be notified today.
Ralph a. Hiller; PO: NUC7505, Item 1, 15 Kits (P/N: GB-1A [16-18], Lot BA59961) supplied 19JAN2012.
Bruce Power, PO: 00168187, Item 1, 20 Kits (P/N: GB-1A [12-14], Lot BA59961) supplied 13DEC2011.
Dominion - Surry, PO: 45886290, Item 1, 22 Kits (P/N: GB-S-1A, Lot BA59961) supplied 19DEC2011.
Dominion - Surry, PO: 45897749, Item 2, 30 Kits (P/N: GB-S-1A, Lot BA67711) supplied 01FEB2012.
Ringhals AB, PO: 621728-053, Item 10, 30 Kits (P/N: GB-1A [16-18], Lot BA59961) supplied 19DEC2011.
Ringhals, PO: 620625-066, Item 10, 300 parts (P/N: GB-1A-1, Lots BA59961/BA67711) supplied 30JAN2012.
Ringhals, PO: 620996-066, Item 50, 1 Kit (P/N: GB-1A [16-18], Lot BA59961) supplied 29NOV2011.
OKG, PO: 4113847, Item 4, 86 parts (P/N: GB-1A-1, Lot BA59961) supplied 30NOV2011.
"It is requested that all affected parts be returned for replacement to QualTech NP; 330 West Park Loop; Huntsville, AL 35806. Customers can contact Cindy Tidwell at (256) 895-7250 ext. 229 for freight collect shipping instructions.
"Additional details, corrective actions and root causes will be provided once complete. If you require additional information or would like to discuss this further please do not hesitate in contacting:"
Tony Gill
Quality Assurance Supervisor
QualTech NP, Huntsville
A business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company
Office 256-722-8500 ext. 1
Cell 256-426-4558
tgill@curtisswright.com |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47644 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM LYNDE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 02/06/2012
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2012
Event Time: 17:19 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 25 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL RPS ACTUATION DUE TO TURBINE TRIP
"Unit 2 had been connected to the grid at 1431 CST today following a recent forced outage and was in the process of power ascension in accordance with plant procedures. At approximately 25% reactor power (approximately 240 MWe), the operators were transferring main feed flow to the steam generator lower nozzle through the feedwater isolation valves, (i.e. 2FW009A, B, C, D).
"2FW009C was the first valve to be opened due to previously experienced problems with this valve being stuck in the seat. No issues were experienced during the opening of 2FW009C. Upon opening of 2FW009C, the 2C steam generator level began to rise as expected. The operators throttled back feedwater flow to control steam generator level. However, the 2C steam generator level increased to the High-High level setpoint of 80.8% (p-14). Since the reactor was below 30% (P-8), no automatic reactor trip signal was generated. However, the turbine automatically tripped, a feedwater isolation signal was initiated, and 2C Main Feedwater pump trip occurred as designed. With no main feedwater flow available, the operators manually tripped the reactor and entry into procedure 2BEP 0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Unit 2 was entered. The operators then manually started the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps to supply water to the steam generators prior to reaching the Low-Low steam generator level setpoint of 36.3%.
"Transition from 2BEP 0 to 2BEP ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, was completed and the emergency procedures were exited. Unit 2 is being maintained in a stable condition in Mode 3."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | |