Event Notification Report for February 01, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/31/2012 - 02/01/2012
Part 21
Event Number: 47630
Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/01/2012
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2012
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
PART21 GROUP
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
PART21 GROUP
PART 21 REPORT - FAILURE OF CRD COLLET RETAINER TUBE/OUTER TUBE WELD
The following information was received via facsimile:
"During a recent refurbishment of a Control Rod Drive (CRD) performed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) for a domestic customer a 360 degree failure of the collet retainer tube fillet weld was identified. This weld is part of the CRD 919D258G003 Cylinder, Tube and Flange (CTF) assembly. The collet retainer tube fillet weld was performed in 1983 and subsequently assembled into a Group 003 part number 919D258G003 CTF. This G003 CTF assembly was assembled into a CRD in 1995 and placed into service in 1996. GEH continues to investigate the cause(s) of the failed fillet weld. Once the cause of the fillet weld failure is determined, GEH will review the extent of condition of this failure as well as the consequences to determine if a reportable condition exists.
"There were no adverse effects on the CRD's operation observed due to this failure.
"This 60-day interim notification, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), will be sent to all BWR/2-6 plants that utilize CRDs equipped with either 919D258G002 or 919D258G003 CTF assemblies."
The affected plants are: Nine Mile Point 1-2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Clinton, Dresden 2-3, LaSalle 1-2, Limerick 1-2, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, Perry 1, Duane Arnold, Cooper, Susquehanna 1-2, Brunswick 1-2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1 - 2, Browns Ferry 1-3, Monticello, and Millstone.
* * * UPDATE FROM GE HITACHI VIA FAX AT 1259 EDT ON 6/6/12 * * *
"GEH has completed the evaluation of this condition and has determined that the failure of Control Rod Drive collet retainer tube fillet weld is not a Reportable Condition as defined by 10CFR Part 21."
Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Widmann), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Group (via email).
The following information was received via facsimile:
"During a recent refurbishment of a Control Rod Drive (CRD) performed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) for a domestic customer a 360 degree failure of the collet retainer tube fillet weld was identified. This weld is part of the CRD 919D258G003 Cylinder, Tube and Flange (CTF) assembly. The collet retainer tube fillet weld was performed in 1983 and subsequently assembled into a Group 003 part number 919D258G003 CTF. This G003 CTF assembly was assembled into a CRD in 1995 and placed into service in 1996. GEH continues to investigate the cause(s) of the failed fillet weld. Once the cause of the fillet weld failure is determined, GEH will review the extent of condition of this failure as well as the consequences to determine if a reportable condition exists.
"There were no adverse effects on the CRD's operation observed due to this failure.
"This 60-day interim notification, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), will be sent to all BWR/2-6 plants that utilize CRDs equipped with either 919D258G002 or 919D258G003 CTF assemblies."
The affected plants are: Nine Mile Point 1-2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Clinton, Dresden 2-3, LaSalle 1-2, Limerick 1-2, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, Perry 1, Duane Arnold, Cooper, Susquehanna 1-2, Brunswick 1-2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1 - 2, Browns Ferry 1-3, Monticello, and Millstone.
* * * UPDATE FROM GE HITACHI VIA FAX AT 1259 EDT ON 6/6/12 * * *
"GEH has completed the evaluation of this condition and has determined that the failure of Control Rod Drive collet retainer tube fillet weld is not a Reportable Condition as defined by 10CFR Part 21."
Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Widmann), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Group (via email).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47631
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ALLIANT ENERGY - WP&L
Region: 3
City: PARDEEVILLE State: WI
County:
License #: 021-1063-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHOBER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: ALLIANT ENERGY - WP&L
Region: 3
City: PARDEEVILLE State: WI
County:
License #: 021-1063-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHOBER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/02/2012
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2012
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON INDUSTRIAL GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the State of Wisconsin via fax:
"On February 1, 2012, the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section received notice that the licensee had a gauge with a stuck shutter. The device is an Ohmart SHD-0 fixed gauge (serial number 64781) originally containing 250 mCi of Cs-137. A licensed service provider unmounted the gauge and attempted to fix the shutter but was unsuccessful. The RSO placed the device in a secured, remote storage location with the radiation beam pointing into the ground. Exposure rates at 1 foot are less than 2 mR/hr.
"The Radiation Protection Section will continue to monitor the situation, pending replacement or disposal of the device, and will perform an inspection within the next two weeks."
WI Event Report No.: WI120001
The following information was obtained from the State of Wisconsin via fax:
"On February 1, 2012, the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section received notice that the licensee had a gauge with a stuck shutter. The device is an Ohmart SHD-0 fixed gauge (serial number 64781) originally containing 250 mCi of Cs-137. A licensed service provider unmounted the gauge and attempted to fix the shutter but was unsuccessful. The RSO placed the device in a secured, remote storage location with the radiation beam pointing into the ground. Exposure rates at 1 foot are less than 2 mR/hr.
"The Radiation Protection Section will continue to monitor the situation, pending replacement or disposal of the device, and will perform an inspection within the next two weeks."
WI Event Report No.: WI120001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47773
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES MCBREEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES MCBREEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/26/2012
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2012
Event Time: 21:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2012
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2012
Event Time: 21:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
60-DAY OPTIONAL REPORT - INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), this telephone notification reports an invalid actuation of the Unit 2 train B (2B) Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) on February 1, 2012, at 2100 hours. At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown. The 2B DG was being prepared for an operability surveillance following a planned work window. As part of this surveillance, a chart recorder is installed to monitor key DG parameters to include the DG start signal. When the second lead was connected across the starting relay contact test point, a DC ground alarm was received and the 2B DG started. The engine functioned successfully and as expected, the 2B DG did not automatically connect to its safety bus, since no bus under-voltage signal was present. The cause is attributed to a faulty chart recorder in that an inadvertent ground resulted in the actuation of the starting relay. This condition was entered into the corrective action program."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), this telephone notification reports an invalid actuation of the Unit 2 train B (2B) Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) on February 1, 2012, at 2100 hours. At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown. The 2B DG was being prepared for an operability surveillance following a planned work window. As part of this surveillance, a chart recorder is installed to monitor key DG parameters to include the DG start signal. When the second lead was connected across the starting relay contact test point, a DC ground alarm was received and the 2B DG started. The engine functioned successfully and as expected, the 2B DG did not automatically connect to its safety bus, since no bus under-voltage signal was present. The cause is attributed to a faulty chart recorder in that an inadvertent ground resulted in the actuation of the starting relay. This condition was entered into the corrective action program."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.