| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/07/2011 - 06/08/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46519 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 01/03/2011
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/03/2011
Event Time: 13:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE VULNERABILITY DISCOVERED WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY AFFECT ACCIDENT RESPONSE
"On Monday, January 3, 2011, at 1344 EST, it was discovered by engineering that a single point of vulnerability exists at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station affecting both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
"A potential single HVAC control component has been discovered whose failure could result in a spurious Steam Leak Detection (SLD) isolation causing a loss of generation, loss of the normal heat sink (main condenser) and a loss of HPCI and RCIC. The SLD delta temperature (delta T) instrumentation is dependent on proper operation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RB [Reactor Building] HVAC heater temperature controller during cold weather operation. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 RB HVAC heaters are controlled by a single temperature controller which sends a signal to multiple step controllers. Failure of the temperature controller could cause the heaters to turn off. This would cause a significant decrease in RB HVAC supply temperature which results in a significant increase in measured SLD delta T during cold winter months. This could cause an isolation of the MSIVs, HPCI, RCIC and RWCU within a short period of time.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that at discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) for and event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TODD CREASY TO JOE O'HARA AT 1310 ON 2/28/11 * * *
"On January 3, 2011, SSES reported the discovery of a single point vulnerability that affected both Unit 1 and Unit 2 (EN # 46519). The vulnerability involved failure of a temperature controller that had the potential to result in a Steam Leak Detection (SLD) isolation causing a loss of generation, loss of the normal heat sink (main condenser), and a loss of HPCI and RCIC. The condition was reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that at discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition.
"SSES has further evaluated the condition and determined that the condition did not meet reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that at discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The level of judgment in reporting under this criterion Is a reasonable expectation of preventing fulfillment of a safety function. Alternately stated, the condition is reportable if there was reasonable doubt that the safety function would have been fulfilled if the system had been called upon to perform it. Technical evaluation of the condition concluded the following: there is reasonable assurance (high degree of confidence) that the HPCI, RCIC, Main Steam Isolation and RWCU systems will remain operable. The identified condition does not adversely affect the operability of the affected systems. The identified condition increases the probability that a failure of the Reactor Building HVAC temperature controller TC-17589 or TC-27589 could cause the MSIV's, HPCI and RCIC to isolate during cold weather operation. However, this increase in probability is very small and is not sufficient to erode the confidence in the reasonable expectation of operability. For a system isolation to occur, the heater controller had to fail and concurrently the outside air temperature had to be below approximately 10?F. The Reactor Building HVAC temperature controllers are highly reliable and the outside air temperatures required for this event occur infrequently (there have only been 11 instances of temperatures at Susquehanna dropping below 10 deg F in the past two years). Since both infrequent conditions have to occur concurrently, it is unlikely that this postulated failure would occur.
"As a result, reporting pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) is retracted; however, the condition remains reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)b)(3)(ii) as an event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (T.Dimitriadis)
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE BORGER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1220 EDT ON 6/7/2011 * * *
"On January 3, 2011, SSES reported the discovery of a single point vulnerability that affected both Unit 1 and Unit 2 (EN #46519). The vulnerability involved failure of a temperature controller that had the potential to result in a Steam Leak Detection (SLD) isolation causing a loss of generation, loss of the normal heat sink (main condenser), and a loss of HPCI and RCIC. The condition was reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that at discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition.
"On February 28, 2011, SSES retracted the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) portion of the report on the basis that there was reasonable assurance that the HPCI, RCIC, Main Steam Isolation and RWCU systems would remain operable. The reasonable assurance was based on the very small probability of system isolation that required failure of the highly reliable heater controller had to fail concurrent with outside air temperature below approximately 10?F.
"This notification is intended to revise the basis for retraction of the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) portion of the report. The revised basis is that the conditions required to prevent fulfillment of a safety function did not exist at the time of discovery."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Rogge). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46874 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM KONRAD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/23/2011
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2011
Event Time: 14:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SAFE SHUTDOWN OPERABILITY CONCERN ASSOCIATED WITH OFFSITE POWER CIRCUITS
"On May 22, 2011, at 1444 hours, the Fermi 2 Control Room was notified by the Central System Supervisor that the switchyard voltage for both the 345kV (Division II) and 120kV (Division I) offsite power circuits following a generator trip would not be sufficient to sustain operability of the safety-related loads. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 'AC-Sources Operating,' Condition E was entered at 1444 hours. At 1535, both offsite power circuit voltages were at acceptable levels and the offsite circuits were declared operable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Condition E was exited at 1535 hours. Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 20.300 GRID was entered. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) remained operable during the degraded voltage condition. The ability of the EDGs to fulfill their design function was not affected by this condition.
"The event is being reported per 50.72(b)(3)(V)(A), as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JEFF GROFF TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1458 EDT ON 6/7/2011 * * *
"This event is retracted. The original report was based on calculated unit trip voltage drop results reported to Detroit Edison by ITC Transmission Company that exceeded acceptance criteria. ITC has subsequently informed Fermi 2 that this notification was in error due to a software feature of their real time contingency analyzer that resulted in inappropriately high results. Based on the results of other similar real time contingency analyzers employed at that time, without the problematic software feature, none of the acceptance criteria were exceeded and both divisions of offsite power were capable of supporting operability of safety-related loads. Additionally, Fermi 2 has determined that even at the inappropriately high voltage drop originally reported, the Division II system could have performed its safety related functions. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46911 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: UNDERWOOD ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: BELLMAWR State: NJ
County:
License #: 456892
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHERINE BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/02/2011
Notification Time: 07:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2011
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT A LANDFILL
The following information was received via fax:
"The licensee's portable density gauge operator was performing compaction studies with a Troxler Model 3430 on the slopes of a landfill. The source was in the locked position and the operator was present and standing about 30 feet away. A bulldozer came up over the slope and impacted the gauge. The gauge was intact except for damage to the shutter. The operator immediately contacted the RSO who responded to the site with a survey meter within minutes. Readings were within guidelines. The gauge was returned to its case, and loaded for transport. The RSO surveyed the area to check for contamination. No elevated readings were found. The gauge is in its locked storage area pending instructions from Troxler."
NJ Report ID No. NJ11004
* * * UPDATE FROM CATHERINE BIEL TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/3/2011 AT 1530 EDT * * *
The gauge electronics and outside cover were crushed and the shutter was damaged. However the source housing and the source rod were not damaged and were intact.
Notified the R1DO (Conte) and FSME (Von Till). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46920 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BEVERAGE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #: G0024-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Category 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING DEVICES POSSIBLY MIXED WITH SCRAP METAL
The following information was sent by the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via email:
"[The licensee's two] fill detectors were bought in the 1990's and were not in use. The fill detectors were stored in a spare room full of scrap metal. The room was cleaned out in early May and the scrap sent to Alpha Metal Recycling, 2392 NW 147 Street, Opa-Locka, Florida 33054. The recycling plant manager said that the load has already been sent overseas to either China, Pakistan or India. Loss of the material was found when the application for license renewal was being filled out. The licensee will send a written report to Radioactive Materials. Any further action is referred to Radioactive Materials. This office will take no further action on this incident."
The two fill detector sealed sources each contained 100 mCi of Am-241 and were manufactured by Industrial Dynamics (Fil Tech; Model Number FT50; Serial Numbers 1296 and 126).
Florida Incident: FL11-045
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9) |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46922 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CITY PUBLIC SERVICE
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: 02876
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE
The following information was received via e-mail from the Texas Department of State Health Services concerning an event that occurred at the Calaveras Power Station in San Antonio, Texas:
"On June 3, 2011, at 1330 CDT, the agency [Texas Department of State Health] received a phone call from the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer reporting a fixed nuclear gauge failure. He stated that on Tuesday, May 31, 2011, the licensee's employees had closed the gauge shutter while they were calibrating the detector. When one of the employees attempted to re-open the shutter, the employee said he felt something 'sort of give' and the shutter would not open. The handle was loose. The RSO was called and he came to the location of the gauge. He checked the handle and it was loose, so rather than try to open the gauge he left it closed. He verified that the shutter was completely closed by performing a survey with a portable survey meter. The equipment the gauge was mounted to was not necessary to be in operation so it was shut down until the gauge could be repaired.
"On Friday, June 3, 2011, ThermoFisher Scientific (TFS) service came on-site and repaired the handle. The RSO stated that the TFS said the pin at the bottom of the handle had corroded and broke. The pin that holds the handle to the mechanism that opens/closes the shutter is inside the gauge housing. Gauge is a K-Ray Model, 7062BP, serial number 27118E, which contains a 50 millicurie cesium -137 source.
"An investigation by the licensee into the cause and potential corrective actions in underway."
Texas Report I-8860 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46932 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT KROS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/07/2011
Notification Time: 11:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2011
Event Time: 09:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2011 | Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
ART HOWELL (R4)
WILLIAM RULAND (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
BILL FLINTER (DHS)
PETE VITALE (FEMA)
ROBERT TURNER (DOE)
JOE DENNIS (HHS)
REGGIE JONES (USDA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text FIRE IN THE WEST SWITCHGEAR ROOM
"At 0940 CDT an alert (HA 2, EAL 1) for operating Mode less than 210 degrees F [was] declared for a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. Time of fire was 0930 CDT. Control room received multiple alarms [and] 480 V bus 1B4A amps were observed to be oscillating. Bus 1B4A was secured [and] buses 1B3A and 1B3A-4A were lost. Halon activated properly. [At] 0956 CDT all notifications to applicable personnel were completed. At 1000 CDT 4160v buses 1A2 / 1A4 were secured to facilitate fire fighting. Spent fuel pool cooling was lost [as a result of the de-energized busses and the licensee] entered AOP-36 for loss of SFP cooling. Heat up rate [was] determined by STA. Current time to boil for SFP is 88.3 hrs. Spent fuel pool cooling is currently back in service. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) for declaration of an emergency class specified in the licensee's approved emergency plan."
Plant was in AOP-1 for flood mitigation. The fire is not believed to be flood related. Plant remains in AOP-1.
At about 0930 CDT the licensee noted fire in the west switchgear room. The fire brigade responded and found a room filled with smoke but no active fire. Halon did discharge in the room. At 0956 CDT, offsite assistance was called and Blair Fire Department responded to the site. Blair Fire Department confirmed no active fire in the switchgear room. All offsite power remained available as well as the emergency diesel generators if needed. The licensee is currently attempting to ventilate the room. A thorough inspection of the affected area and determine the caused of the electrical fault will be facilitated once the room has been fully ventilated.
The licensee has notified appropriate State and local government. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. A media or press release is also anticipated.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KROS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1313 EDT ON 6/7/2011 * * *
"Entered Alert for HA 3, EAL 1 access to a vital area (Switchgear and Turbine Building basement) due to toxic gases present from the fire in the West Switchgear room."
The licensee entered HA 3 at 1144 CDT. Their exit criteria is that the switchgear room is cleared for unimpeded access.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4IRC (Kennedy)
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KROS TO WILLIAM HUFFMAN 1421 EDT ON 6/7/11 * * *
At 1315 CDT, Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station has exited Alert HA 2, EAL. It has been confirmed that no fire remained in the vital area. Plant shutdown cooling remained in-service and spent fuel pool cooling was restored and temperature verified to be lowering. The licensee has also exited Alert HA 3, EAL 1 after it was confirmed that the environmental conditions from the event and associated Halon discharge does not affect the ability to safely operate or safely shutdown the reactor due to being in Mode 5 and shutdown cooling remaining in-service. Fort Calhoun remains in Unusual Event HU 1, EAL 5 for River Level greater than 1004' elevation as reported under EN #46929.
The licensee has notified appropriate State and local government. The licensee has also notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC made notifications of the event termination to DHS, FEMA, DOE HHS and USDA. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46933 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/07/2011
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ERRORS IN METHODOLOGY USED FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
"On Tuesday, June 7, 2011, at 0800 hours, Pilgrim Station reviewed General Electric Hitachi (GEH) 10 CFR 50.46 Notification Letters 2011-02 and 2011-03. These letters indicate that certain errors were discovered in the methodology application and inputs used by GEH for nuclear fuel core configurations with GE14 and GNF2 fuel, and when corrected may increase the Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) limits in excess of 2200 degrees F under Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions. Pilgrim's core contains both GE14 and GNF2 fuel. 10 CFR 50.46 paragraph (b) defines the acceptance criteria for the LOCA analysis process. The Pilgrim licensing basis PCT is evaluated for compliance with the criterion 50.46(b)(1) and must not exceed a PCT of 2200?F.
"GEH had provided a compensatory measure in the form of multiplier to be applied to the MAPLHGR (Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate) limit so that Pilgrim operates within 50.46 limits. Entergy/Pilgrim implemented the compensatory measure and as a result the errors reported have no impact on current plant operation or public health and safety. This 8-hour notification is being reported for conservative purposes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Based on 50.46(a)(3)(ii) criteria, Entergy/Pilgrim will submit a report within 30 days.
"Entergy/Pilgrim has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector." The licensee also plans to notify the State of Massachusetts. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46934 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/07/2011
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2011
Event Time: 13:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO EXCESS OUTSIDE AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE
"Outside ambient air temperature exceeded the maximum analytical value for operability for Unit 1 D1 and D2 Diesel Generators at 1349 CDT. The calculated limiting outside air temperature needed for equipment in the D1 and D2 rooms to meet their temperature limits is 100.5?F. Outside ambient temperature exceeded this limiting value and both Unit 1 safeguards diesel generators were declared inoperable at 1349 CDT on 6/7/2011. If outside ambient air temperature is above the maximum analytical value, components within the D1 and D2 diesel rooms may not be able to perform their required functions thus preventing them from fulfilling their safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D)).
"Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Ambient outside air temperatures are at or near peak values for the day and expected to decrease approximately 1 to 2 degrees per hour which will restore ambient conditions to less than the maximum analytical value.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The outside air temperature has peaked at 101.4?F which is unusually high for this location and is expected to drop below the 100.5?F limit shortly. The licensee does not anticipate that this condition will be repeated again any time soon. | |