Event Notification Report for May 02, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/01/2011 - 05/02/2011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46805
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID RENN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID RENN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/02/2011
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2011
Event Time: 06:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2011
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2011
Event Time: 06:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER TRIP
"At 0626 [CDT] on 05/2/2011, with BFN U1 in Mode 4, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, received an 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator output breaker trip for unknown reasons that de-energized the 'A' 4kV Shutdown Board, resulting in a loss of power to RPS 'A' and a subsequent half scram, 'B' CREV and 'B/C' SGT automatic initiation, and Primary Containment isolation for Groups 2, 3, 6 and 8. The PCIS isolation (Group 2) also caused a loss of Shutdown Cooling on U1 which was restored at 0723 following restoration of power to the 'A' 4kV Shutdown Board from offsite 161kV power.
"The general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is reportable as an 8 hour notification to the NRC IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv), as any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
"This is also reportable as 60 day written report IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified of this event.
"This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as PER# 362340."
"At 0626 [CDT] on 05/2/2011, with BFN U1 in Mode 4, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, received an 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator output breaker trip for unknown reasons that de-energized the 'A' 4kV Shutdown Board, resulting in a loss of power to RPS 'A' and a subsequent half scram, 'B' CREV and 'B/C' SGT automatic initiation, and Primary Containment isolation for Groups 2, 3, 6 and 8. The PCIS isolation (Group 2) also caused a loss of Shutdown Cooling on U1 which was restored at 0723 following restoration of power to the 'A' 4kV Shutdown Board from offsite 161kV power.
"The general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is reportable as an 8 hour notification to the NRC IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv), as any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
"This is also reportable as 60 day written report IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified of this event.
"This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as PER# 362340."
Part 21
Event Number: 46807
Rep Org: ABB INC
Licensee: ABB INC
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: ABB INC
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/02/2011
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2011
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
PART 21 E-MAIL GROUP
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
PART 21 E-MAIL GROUP
NOTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL DEFECT IN SOLID STATE RELAY
Identification of the subject component is as follows: SS5 Solid State Relay, Part Number 611130-T13-N.
"The instantaneous trip function of the relay may actuate at 16 times normal current instead of the design value of 24 times normal current.
"On 3 March, 2011, ABB was notified by Progress Energy - Brunswick plant that spare relays being tested prior to being placed in service were tripping at approximately 4700 amps instead of the expected 7200 amps. Brunswick stated that their applications require having a short time delay for all faults up to the 24 times instantaneous value is critical for system design and compliance with their design basis and licensing documents.
"Subsequent evaluation by ABB Engineering determined that the relay works as intended. However, if there is a fault at the same time the relay is energized, the instantaneous unit becomes more sensitive, and will operate at lower than expected current level.
"For conditions where a fault occurs downstream of an associated in-service circuit breaker, the relay works as intended, for single phase, phase to phase, and three phase fault conditions.
"Sales records show that only four orders of the subject relay were ever shipped, and each of these four orders was with Progress Energy, with the orders all being processed via ABB Medium Voltage Service, in Florence, SC. The order numbers and quantities are as follows, with the first three orders being shipped from ABB Coral Springs, FL and the fourth order shipped from ABB Allentown, PA: AA027730 qty. 10, AA319168 qty. 7, AA319152 qty. 7, and PC06895 qty. 3.
"ABB is taking, or has taken, the following corrective actions:
- Reworked Qty. 23 units for Brunswick to convert the units to Part Number 611130-T11-N, by removing the target circuit. This prevents the pre-mature trip at lower current.
- One additional unit has been retained at ABB Coral Springs to support continued testing to confirm the fault condition.
- Three units have not been accounted for, and are assumed to be in service. (Purchased by ABB Florence for Progress Energy Brunswick 4/11/08, Sales Order PC06895, Relay Serial Numbers 85948, 85949, and 85950)
- The 611130-T13-N relay has been obsoleted to prevent future sales.
- ABB Engineering is determining whether other similar relays of different ratings have a similar defect. Action to complete by July 1, 2011.
"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that the purchasers or affected licensees may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to º 10CFR 21.21(a).
"ABB recommends that the affected licensees evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the relays may be returned to ABB for conversion by removing the target circuit."
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO JOE O'HARA AT 1529 ON 9/28/11 * * *
This update information regarding the notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with the SS5 Relay, Part Number 611130-T13-N.
"The instantaneous trip function of the relay may actuate at 16 times normal current instead of the design value of 24 times normal current.
"Subsequent evaluation by ABB Engineering determined that the relay works as intended. However, if there is a fault at the same time the relay is energized, the instantaneous unit becomes more sensitive, and will operate at lower than expected current level.
"For conditions where a fault occurs downstream of an associated in-service circuit breaker, the relay works as intended, for single phase, phase to phase, and three phase fault conditions.
"ABB Engineering determined that other similar relays of different ratings may have a similar deviation from technical specifications.
"ABB is taking, or has taken, the following corrective actions:
- Affected relay part numbers have been made obsolete to prevent future sales.
- Stopped production of all affected relays until corrective action is implemented.
- The Circuit board assembly, 611856-T1, T2, T3, will be made obsolete and replaced by 611857-T1, T2, T3 accordingly, which do not exhibit this deviation.
- ABB acknowledges the response time for this report is beyond the required reporting window and has initiated a separate corrective action to address this problem.
"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that the purchasers or affected licensees may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to º10CFR 21.21 (a).
"ABB recommends that the affected licensees evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the licensee should contact ABB to determine appropriate corrective action."
Notified R2DO(Nease) and Part 21 GRP via e-mail
Identification of the subject component is as follows: SS5 Solid State Relay, Part Number 611130-T13-N.
"The instantaneous trip function of the relay may actuate at 16 times normal current instead of the design value of 24 times normal current.
"On 3 March, 2011, ABB was notified by Progress Energy - Brunswick plant that spare relays being tested prior to being placed in service were tripping at approximately 4700 amps instead of the expected 7200 amps. Brunswick stated that their applications require having a short time delay for all faults up to the 24 times instantaneous value is critical for system design and compliance with their design basis and licensing documents.
"Subsequent evaluation by ABB Engineering determined that the relay works as intended. However, if there is a fault at the same time the relay is energized, the instantaneous unit becomes more sensitive, and will operate at lower than expected current level.
"For conditions where a fault occurs downstream of an associated in-service circuit breaker, the relay works as intended, for single phase, phase to phase, and three phase fault conditions.
"Sales records show that only four orders of the subject relay were ever shipped, and each of these four orders was with Progress Energy, with the orders all being processed via ABB Medium Voltage Service, in Florence, SC. The order numbers and quantities are as follows, with the first three orders being shipped from ABB Coral Springs, FL and the fourth order shipped from ABB Allentown, PA: AA027730 qty. 10, AA319168 qty. 7, AA319152 qty. 7, and PC06895 qty. 3.
"ABB is taking, or has taken, the following corrective actions:
- Reworked Qty. 23 units for Brunswick to convert the units to Part Number 611130-T11-N, by removing the target circuit. This prevents the pre-mature trip at lower current.
- One additional unit has been retained at ABB Coral Springs to support continued testing to confirm the fault condition.
- Three units have not been accounted for, and are assumed to be in service. (Purchased by ABB Florence for Progress Energy Brunswick 4/11/08, Sales Order PC06895, Relay Serial Numbers 85948, 85949, and 85950)
- The 611130-T13-N relay has been obsoleted to prevent future sales.
- ABB Engineering is determining whether other similar relays of different ratings have a similar defect. Action to complete by July 1, 2011.
"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that the purchasers or affected licensees may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to º 10CFR 21.21(a).
"ABB recommends that the affected licensees evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the relays may be returned to ABB for conversion by removing the target circuit."
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO JOE O'HARA AT 1529 ON 9/28/11 * * *
This update information regarding the notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with the SS5 Relay, Part Number 611130-T13-N.
"The instantaneous trip function of the relay may actuate at 16 times normal current instead of the design value of 24 times normal current.
"Subsequent evaluation by ABB Engineering determined that the relay works as intended. However, if there is a fault at the same time the relay is energized, the instantaneous unit becomes more sensitive, and will operate at lower than expected current level.
"For conditions where a fault occurs downstream of an associated in-service circuit breaker, the relay works as intended, for single phase, phase to phase, and three phase fault conditions.
"ABB Engineering determined that other similar relays of different ratings may have a similar deviation from technical specifications.
"ABB is taking, or has taken, the following corrective actions:
- Affected relay part numbers have been made obsolete to prevent future sales.
- Stopped production of all affected relays until corrective action is implemented.
- The Circuit board assembly, 611856-T1, T2, T3, will be made obsolete and replaced by 611857-T1, T2, T3 accordingly, which do not exhibit this deviation.
- ABB acknowledges the response time for this report is beyond the required reporting window and has initiated a separate corrective action to address this problem.
"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that the purchasers or affected licensees may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to º10CFR 21.21 (a).
"ABB recommends that the affected licensees evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the licensee should contact ABB to determine appropriate corrective action."
Notified R2DO(Nease) and Part 21 GRP via e-mail
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46808
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK GREER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK GREER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/02/2011
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2011
Event Time: 20:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2011
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2011
Event Time: 20:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 47 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic RPS actuation (scram) on Monday, May 02, 2011 at 2051. Cause of the RPS actuation is not understood at this time. All control rods inserted to position 00. N1-EOP-2 entered due to low reactor water level following trip (expected plant response). Reactor pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig, reactor water level restored and maintained 53 to 95 inches. Automatic initiation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection system occurred following plant trip (normal actuation)."
The reactor is stable in Hot Shutdown. The licensee characterized the scram as uncomplicated. All rods fully inserted, normal feed water is supplying the reactor with decay heat being removed to the condenser. The unit is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup and the scram had no impact on Unit 2. All systems functioned as required. The unit was operating at 47% power at the time of the event due to feed pump maintenance.
The licensee does not have a first-out indication for the reactor scram and is still investigating the cause of the scram.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic RPS actuation (scram) on Monday, May 02, 2011 at 2051. Cause of the RPS actuation is not understood at this time. All control rods inserted to position 00. N1-EOP-2 entered due to low reactor water level following trip (expected plant response). Reactor pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig, reactor water level restored and maintained 53 to 95 inches. Automatic initiation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection system occurred following plant trip (normal actuation)."
The reactor is stable in Hot Shutdown. The licensee characterized the scram as uncomplicated. All rods fully inserted, normal feed water is supplying the reactor with decay heat being removed to the condenser. The unit is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup and the scram had no impact on Unit 2. All systems functioned as required. The unit was operating at 47% power at the time of the event due to feed pump maintenance.
The licensee does not have a first-out indication for the reactor scram and is still investigating the cause of the scram.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.