Event Notification Report for April 20, 2011

POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE OF WELL LOGGING SUPERVISOR

The RSO for Weatherford International located in Benbrook, TX was provided the 2nd quarter dosimetry readings of 7545 mRem for a well logging supervisory in their Weston, WV office. The supervisor has been removed from activities involving radioactive sources pending results of an investigation. Preliminary findings are that the individual involved was returning a 1.5 Ci Cs-137 source to storage and had placed his dosimetry, a Luxel, about 1 foot from the source at which time he had to use the restroom. When he returned he discovered that the storage area door had automatically locked requiring him to contact the custodian to reopen the area to recover his dosimetry. He estimated that the time involved was between 1-1.5 hours. The licensee investigation is on-going.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM CAMERA

Radiography was being performed at a manufacturing shop and warehouse. The source became disconnected while in the guide tube. The radiographer unsuccessfully attempted to reconnect the source. The RSO was contacted and was able to reconnect the source and return it to the radiographic camera. The camera has been returned to service.

The radiographers pocket dosimeter read off scale high. His dosimeter was later read and indicated a dose of 950 mR. The RSO pocket dosimeter read 150 mR. The licensee estimated the extremity dose was 2 R for each individual. The state does not consider this an abnormal occurrence.

Camera: SPEC 150 serial number 0876
Source: 59 Ci Ir-192

WATERTIGHT DOORS LEFT AJAR SIMULTANEOUSLY DURING ROOM CHECKS

"During the performance of operator rounds in the Lake Screenhouse Safe Shutdown System (SX) pump rooms, two water tight doors were left opened simultaneously during the room checks. These two doors opened simultaneously [which] allowed for communication between the Division 1 SX room and Division 2 SX pump room. The operator was in constant attendance in the Division 2 SX pump room during the performance of the equipment checks.

"During site review, it was determined that a flood in either the Division 1 or Division 2 SX pump rooms would not be isolated to the initiating room, but potentially affect both trains of SX. This could result in a loss of cooling for both Residual Heat Removal systems, therefore, a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).

"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."

Offsite power is normal and emergency diesel generators are operable and available.

* * * RETRACTION FROM ED TIEDEMANN TO PETE SNYDER ON 6/8/11 AT 1141 EDT * * *

"A subsequent plant barrier impairment evaluation consistent with Exelon Procedure CC-AA-201, 'Plant Barrier Control Program' has determined that no loss of safety funct ion would have occurred. Each of the following door functions and related postulated events were reviewed for impact: ventilation; flooding, internal and external; high energy line breaks; missiles; radiation protection; and fires. For the condition with the SX pump room water tight doors being open with an operator in the area, the conclusion is an SX division remains protected to ensure that in any of the evaluated events the safety function of SX has been maintained."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP

"At 1734 EDT, [Vogtle] unit one automatically tripped from 100% power. No significant activities were in progress that should have challenged the Reactor Protection System. All control rods fully inserted. AFW system actuated as expected on S/G Lo-Lo-Level and AMSAC [ATWS Mitigation System Actuation]. System responses allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable and will remain in Mode 3 during cause investigation.

"Cause of the reactor trip is under investigation."

The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Decay heat is being sent to the main condenser through the turbine bypass valves. The steam generators are being fed from auxiliary feedwater. There was no effect on unit two.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO FEDERAL AGENCY REGARDING EXCAVATION ACTIVITIES

"On April 16, 2011, a suspected buried pipe leak was identified in the plant yard. Subsequent investigation revealed that the source of the water was a leak in the Unit 1 Condenser Circulation Water (RC) intake pipe. In order to perform a repair, the ground in the vicinity of the pipe, including the toe of the dike berm, required excavation. McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) site personnel recognized that excavating into the dike would require Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) involvement. Duke Hydro was contacted, and confirmed that the dike across the MNS intake is an extension of the Cowans Ford Dam and would require FERC authorization to dig into it. On the morning of April 20, 2011, Duke Hydro personnel contacted the FERC engineer assigned to Duke Energy's Cowans Ford Hydroelectric Development to seek FERC authorization for the excavation. Duke Hydro hosted a conference call later that same morning between FERC's Atlanta Regional Office and MNS site personnel to discuss the details of the situation and planned repairs. FERC later dispatched their personnel to the site to observe the repair effort.

"10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) requires a 4-hour notification to be made for any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. º50.72(b)(2)(xi) further states that such an event may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.

"Although a phone call to an outside government agency (FERC) was made, Duke Energy made the decision at the time to not make a 4-hour notification to the NRC. This decision was based on the belief that 1) the RC leak and impact on the dike had no safety significance, 2) there were no concerns regarding protection of the environment, and 3) the situation did not involve an on-site fatality or an inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials. However, based upon how the matter was characterized in discussions between NRC and FERC, the NRC is not in agreement with the Duke Energy position. Therefore, the purpose of this phone call is to provide the necessary 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) notification retroactively."