U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 03/30/2011 - 03/31/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46680 | Facility: MILLSTONE Region: 1 State: CT Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: WAYNE HARRELSON HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 03/18/2011 Notification Time: 05:32 [ET] Event Date: 03/18/2011 Event Time: 01:45 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION | Person (Organization): DON JACKSON (R1DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM BOUNDARY RENDERED INOPERABLE "On March 17, 2011 during a control room walk-down, it was discovered that a halon bottle located in the control room was removed from its associated piping for scheduled work. The open piping penetrates the control room boundary rendering it inoperable. "Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation System' is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 was entered. Since control room boundary was rendered inoperable, Dominion is reporting that this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon discovery the piping was capped re-establishing the control room boundary. "Further engineering review will be conducted to more fully evaluate the impact on the control room boundary. "This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)." Offsite power is normal and all emergency diesel generators are operable. There was no increase in plant risk. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE AT 1002 EDT ON 03/30/11 FROM WAYNE WOOLERY TO S. SANDIN * * * The Licensee is retracting this report based on the following: "On March 17, 2011 during a control room walk down at Millstone Power Station Unit 2, it was discovered that a halon bottle located in the control room was removed from its associated piping for scheduled work. Since the associated piping penetrates the control room boundary, operators declared the control room boundary inoperable. Upon discovery, the piping was capped re-establishing the control room boundary. "Operators made a report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). "Subsequently, an engineering evaluation has been completed that concludes that the piping opening created by the removal of the halon bottle would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, the condition reported in event report 46680 is being retracted. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R1DO (Powell). | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46686 | Facility: BYRON Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: MIKE LINDEMANN HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/19/2011 Notification Time: 16:21 [ET] Event Date: 03/19/2011 Event Time: 08:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION | Person (Organization): KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION RESULTS IN INDICATIONS ON TWO REACTOR HEAD PENETRATIONS "On March 19, 2011, during the Byron Station Unit 1 refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on two penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. Both require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. These indications are not in the reactor coolant pressure boundary; however they are very near the toe of the J-groove weld. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to ensure the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. The UT examinations continue for the remaining head penetrations. All of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage. Repairs are currently being planned and will be competed prior to startup. "This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." * * * UPDATE FROM BLAINE PETERS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0910 EDT ON 03/30/11 * * * "Ultrasonic examination [made on March 19, 2011] resulted in indications on two reactor head penetrations. "As mentioned in Event Notification 46686, reactor vessel head penetrations [In-service inspection] ISI examinations were still in progress. On Wednesday, March 30, 2011, two additional Unit 1 reactor head penetrations were found to contain indications that will require repair prior to returning the reactor head to service. The indications on these two penetrations are within the reactor vessel head pressure boundary." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. Notified the R3DO (Peterson). | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46707 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JOE KLEVORN HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/30/2011 Notification Time: 01:34 [ET] Event Date: 03/29/2011 Event Time: 20:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP | Person (Organization): HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL VOIDING IN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ALTERNATE SUCTION LINE "The design of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system is for the AF pumps to normally take suction from the condensate storage tank. If the condensate storage tank is not available, the essential service water system provides the alternate supply. Due to the AF system suction piping and valve configuration, a voided section of pipe could exist in the portion that isolates the condensate storage tank supply from the essential service water supply. A preliminary vendor analysis has determined that the void fraction to reach the pump in a dynamic scenario exceeds the acceptance criteria for AF pump operability. Based on past operation in this configuration, the event is being reported as a unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Further review of the void model and pump performance characteristics are planned. "In 2011, prior to the completion of this analysis, the void was refilled and verified full for the 'B' trains at Braidwood U1 and U2. Filling the voided piping of both 'A' trains at Braidwood U1 and U2 is in progress. Once filled, the AF systems are operable." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46708 | Facility: BYRON Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: ALAN GUSTAFSON HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 03/30/2011 Notification Time: 01:39 [ET] Event Date: 03/29/2011 Event Time: 20:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP | Person (Organization): HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL VOIDING IN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ALTERNATE SUCTION LINE "The design of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system is for the AF pumps to normally take suction from the condensate storage tank. If the condensate storage tank is not available, the essential service water system provides the alternate supply. Due to the AF system suction piping and valve configuration, a voided section of pipe could exist in the portion that isolates the condensate storage tank supply from the essential service water supply. A preliminary vendor analysis has determined that the void fraction to reach the pump in a dynamic scenario exceeds the acceptance criteria for AF pump operability. Based on past operation in this configuration, the event is being reported as a unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Further review of the void model and pump performance characteristics are planned. "In 2011, prior to the completion of this analysis. The void was refilled and verified full for both trains at Byron U1 and U2." Unit 1 is defueled. This condition affects both 'A' and 'B' trains of auxiliary feedwater for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46709 | Facility: MCGUIRE Region: 2 State: NC Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: TONY COOK HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/30/2011 Notification Time: 07:01 [ET] Event Date: 03/30/2011 Event Time: 00:10 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): MARVIN SYKES (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text CONTROL ROD MALFUNCTION DURING ROD TESTING RESULTS IN OPERATORS MANUALLY OPENING TRIP BREAKERS "Rod L-13 did not function as expected during control rod movement test. This rod is in Shutdown Bank C. When withdrawing this bank, rod L-13 did not withdraw and when the bank was manually inserted, rod L-13 began to withdraw. The [operating] crew went to Enclosure 13.2 of the procedure to deal with the misaligned rods. This enclosure has procedural guidance to open the reactor trip breakers, if desired. The reactor trip breakers were opened and all 211 rods are fully inserted. The reactor was not critical. This activity was performed twice [at the request of reactor engineering]." The licensee will remain in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) until troubleshooting and repair is completed. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 46710 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2) LEU FABRICATION LWR COMMERICAL FUEL Region: 2 City: WILMINGTON State: NC County: NEW HANOVER License #: SNM-1097 Agreement: Y Docket: 07001113 NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 03/30/2011 Notification Time: 09:07 [ET] Event Date: 03/29/2011 Event Time: 10:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION | Person (Organization): MARVIN SYKES (R2DO) TIM MCCARTIN (NMSS) | Event Text COMPLETION OF ISA ACTION PLAN CONVERSION MILESTONE "In response to a Notice of Violation (NOV), Global Nuclear Fuels - America (GNFA) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA Action Plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the first milestone (conversion) was scheduled for completion by January 31, 2011. This milestone was subsequently extended by approximately 60 days. "On 3/29/11, GNF-A completed the ISA review for the conversion area and has identified 87 existing safety controls that are now being designated as items relied on for safety (IROFS). Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS and application of management measures to the new IROFS will be completed within 90 days per the ISA Action Plan. "Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. "Safety Significance of Events: There was no event or plant condition that resulted in a degraded safety condition. "Safety Equipment Status: Existing conversion area safety controls have now been designated as IROFS per ISA Action Plan. Controls are available to perform their safety function. "Status of Corrective Actions: Conversion Area milestone complete. ISA Action Plan continues." The licensee intends to discuss this issue further with the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County, and the NRC Region 2 office. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46711 | Facility: SAN ONOFRE Region: 4 State: CA Unit: [ ] [2] [3] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE NRC Notified By: EDGAR DEGIOVANNI HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/30/2011 Notification Time: 16:24 [ET] Event Date: 03/30/2011 Event Time: 07:00 [PDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): RYAN LANTZ (R4DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO INADVERTENT SECURING OF POWER "City of San Clemente inadvertently secured power to 19 Community Alert Sirens. Trouble alarms were received at 0700 [PDT] but it is not known at what time specifically power was removed. All sirens were functional the day before when an inspection was performed on 3/29/2011 at 1213 [PDT]. Power was restored to the sirens at 1145 [PDT] 3/30/2011. This event resulted in 20 community sirens being non-functional for greater than 1 hour. "Siren State Parks 4 (SP-4) was also non-functional for unrelated reasons and remains out of service." Power was restored and all but the state park siren capabilities were declared operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46712 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: MIKE DEBOARD HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/30/2011 Notification Time: 17:00 [ET] Event Date: 03/30/2011 Event Time: 15:38 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | Person (Organization): HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) THOMAS BLOUNT (NRR) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION (UNUSUAL EVENT) "An extent of condition review of Braidwood Unit 2 unplanned loss of safety system annunciators Emergency Plan Unusual Event on March 24, 2011 (ENS number 46694) was performed for both Units of Braidwood Station. During this review it was identified that a previous unknown loss of annunciators had also occurred on August 10, 2010 from 1024 to 1136 CT on Unit 2. This condition occurred during planned maintenance on annunciator cabinet 2PA19J power supply capacitors. "The maintenance performed on August 10, 2010 would normally not cause a loss of all Unit 2 annunciators. During the work, it was expected to lose approximately one third of the annunciators. Latent annunciator system problems identified from the March 24, 2011 event caused a loss of all Unit 2 annunciators and contributed to this condition being unknown to Main Control Room operators. All Unit 2 indications and computer points to the sequence of events recorder remained available and Unit 2 was stable during this timeframe. "At 1538 CT on 3/30/11, it was determined that the August 10, 2010 condition met the threshold for Emergency Action Level MU6, UNPLANNED loss of most or all safety system annunciation or indication in the control room for greater than 15 minutes. This notification is being made as an undeclared Unusual Event Emergency Plan Classification per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii). "Per NUREG 1022, a 1- hour notification is required when a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of the discovery." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46713 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/30/2011 Notification Time: 19:57 [ET] Event Date: 03/30/2011 Event Time: 15:42 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | Person (Organization): MARVIN SYKES (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN INITIATED "On March 30, 2011 at 1443 CDT, during a refueling outage, Browns Ferry Unit 2 received an invalid Common Accident Signal (CAS) as a result of maintenance activities. All four Unit 1/2 diesel [generators] auto started and all four Unit 3 diesel [generators] auto started. Unit 2 received a full Reactor SCRAM and Core Spray pumps A, B, C, and D auto started and injected into the reactor. Unit 2 Division I RHR [Residual Heat Removal] system was in Shutdown Cooling with only the C pump in service. The A RHR pump auto started and Shutdown Cooling flow increased, as expected. Unit 2 Division II RHR system was tagged out for maintenance. HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] and RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] received auto initiation signals, however the steam isolation valves were tagged closed and the systems did not start. MSIVs [Main Steam Isolation Valves] isolated as a result of the CAS signal. "Unit 1 was at 100% power when the CAS on Unit 2 occurred. This caused initiation of the Preferred Pump Logic which designates Division I CS [Core Spray] and LPCI [Low Pressure Coolant Injection] pumps on Unit 1 (1A and 1C) and the Division II pumps on Unit 2 (2B and 2D) and prevents Unit 1 Division II pumps from auto starting. This resulted in the Division II RHR and CS pumps [being] inoperable for Unit 1. Unit 1 subsequently entered Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition H (two or more low pressure ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] injection/spray subsystems inoperable) which requires entering LCO 3.0.3 immediately. "Unit 1 entered LCO 3.0.3 at 1443, which requires that actions shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in Mode 2 within 10 hours; Mode 3 within 13 hours; and Mode 4 within 37 hours. At 1542 Unit 1 began lowering power in order to comply with LCO 3.0.3. "CAS logic was reset at 1812 and Unit 1 exited LCOs 3.5.1.H and 3.0.3. "This condition requires a four hour report in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(i) - 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.' "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Service Request #346544 was initiated in the Corrective Action Program." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46714 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN Region: 4 State: NE Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: (1) CE NRC Notified By: ERICK HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 03/31/2011 Notification Time: 11:17 [ET] Event Date: 03/30/2011 Event Time: 14:05 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/31/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY | Person (Organization): RYAN LANTZ (R4DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTRABAND FOUND INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA "While cleaning out portable toilets being used at the site, the waste disposal vendor employee discovered a two ounce (shot sized) liquor bottle in one of the units. The unit had been on-site since 2/25/11 and was staged in the Protected Area. The waste disposal vendor indicated that it is unlikely the bottle was in the portable toilet prior to delivery to the site." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |