| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/10/2010 - 05/11/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45827 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NEWTON LACY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 04/08/2010
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DIESEL GENERATORS WIRED INCORRECTLY
"Action F of LCO 3.8.1, 'AC Sources - Operating,' was entered at 20:57 EDT April 7, 2010 for the 2A-A and the 2B-B diesel generators (DGs) being inoperable. Action F has a two hour allowed outage time (AOT). The DGs were determined to be inoperable due to incorrectly implemented wiring changes made by personnel performing construction work on Watts Bar Unit 2. The impact of the change is that during [an] actual or simulated ESF actuation signal, if the diesel is in test mode, and the output breaker is closed in parallel with the board supply breakers, the DG would not return to a 'ready to load' state meaning the output breaker would not have opened as designed for this condition. This function is tested as required on an 18 month frequency as a part of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.17.
"The wiring changes which affected the DGs were made in accordance with Unit 2 Work Order (WO) 09-954447 and 09-954448. The WOs as developed would not have an impact on Unit 1 operations. A review of the Unit 1 Operator Logs from January 1, 2010 to present, did not find any entries establishing the Unit 2 work had been authorized by Unit 1. The proper technical specification entry would have been Action 8 of LCO 3.8.1 for this activity. Entry into Action B of LCO 3.8.1 requires the implementation of several actions including a verification of the operability of the offsite circuits. Since these Technical Specification required actions were not complied with, WBN is providing this 24-hour notification in accordance with Section 2.G of the Watts Bar Unit 1 Facility Operating License.
"During the review of work performed by Unit 2 it was identified that the wiring was initially lifted on January 6. 2010. At the time of this report, actions have been taken to restore the wiring to its appropriate configuration on both of the DG circuits. 2B-B DG wiring was restored at 22:18 on April 7, 2010 and the 2B-B DG was declared operable. Action F of LCO 3.8.1 was exited at this time and Action B was entered for the 2A-A DG (14 day AOT). 2A-A DG circuitry was restored at 00:37 on April 8, 2010, and all LCO actions were exited. This event has been entered into TVA's corrective action program and actions are being initiated to establish the reason the leads were incorrectly lifted and to verify that no other similar wiring issues exist."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WES DANIEL TO PETE SNYDER AT 1646 ON 5/10/10 * * *
"The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 diesel generators (DGs) were not inoperable."
"The Unit 2 DGs were initially declared inoperable because of an inappropriate wiring change that disabled a DG output breaker trip in the event of an actual or simulated ESF actuation signal while the DG is in test mode and the output breaker is closed in parallel with the board supply breakers. Because Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3-8.1.17 required verification of this function for the Unit 1 DGs, and TVA was uncertain of the impact of the loss of this function to the Unit 2 DGs, TVA conservatively declared the Unit 2 DGs inoperable because they would not be able to meet this SR.
"Upon review TVA determined that it was proper to exclude this surveillance requirement for the Unit 2 DGs. Since SR 3.8.1.17 only applies to Unit 1 DGs, inability of Unit 2 DGs to meet this requirement is not a basis for inoperability. TVA has concluded that the Unit 2 DGs and offsite power sources were operable, and WBN was in compliance with its Technical Specifications throughout the period that the wiring change was installed. Therefore, this event was not reportable under WBN License (NPF-90) Condition 2.G, 10 CFR 50.72, or 10 CFR 50.73."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45905 | Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: GEOTECHNICAL CONSULTING, INC
Region: 1
City: RICHMOND State: VA
County:
License #: 153-332-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 05/06/2010
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia via facsimile:
"On May 6, 2010 the licensee reported a missing Troxler portable gauge, Model 3430, Serial Number 36089. The utilization log indicated that a user had returned the gauge to the storage facility on April 23, 2010. On the morning of April 24, 2010 the user found the gauge was no longer in storage and assumed it had been sent for routine maintenance and repair and did not report it missing to the RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) or management. They became aware it was missing on May 6, 2010 while routine leak testing was being performed.
"The licensee's representative stated that procedures require the gauge to be secured by a chain with padlock inside a locked caged area in a warehouse. The chain was present with the open padlock and there was no reported vandalism or forced entry into the warehouse or caged area.
"The circumstances regarding the gauge are under investigation by the Virginia Department of Health Radioactive Materials Program. The licensee has contacted the Loudoun County Sheriff's Office and is conducting interviews with the user and other staff to determine if additional information is available."
This event is VA report #VA-10-03.
* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE WISE TO DONALD NORWOOD ON 5/7/2010 AT 1844 EDT * * *
The gauge was found in the trunk of an authorized user's car. The gauge is being returned to its normal storage location and will be secured there.
Notified R1DO (Cook), FSME EO (Suber), and ILTAB (via E-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45907 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: 01-39-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDY LAMBERT
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/06/2010
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2010
Event Time: 13:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER MALFUNCTION
The following information was received from the State of Nebraska via facsimile:
"The licensee uses fixed industrial gauges for measuring densities in fly ash hoppers at the station's precipitator building. The industrial gauges contain a Cesium 137 sealed source. The Cesium 137 sources were originally installed in 1975 and at the time contained 50 millicuries per source.
"The sources were manufactured and installed by Kay Ray Inc.
"The gauges are Model No. 7700-50.
"The licensee was attempting to close the shutter on the fixed gauge prior to performing maintenance. One of the external closure cables was found to be slightly bound up and only partially closed the internal source shutter. The cable closure was reopened, which reopened the source shutter up at the sealed source. Closure was tried again. This time the cable, which connects the handle at the floor to the sealed source shutter mechanism 20 feet above, bent instead of sliding the cable to the closed position.
"This event happened at 1346 [CDT] and was reported to the station's Shift Supervisor who in turn contacted the plant electricians to make repairs so the precipitator tag-out could continue. By 1353, the cable had been closed and the lab contacted to perform a survey to verify the source shutter was in the closed position. No personnel were exposed to radiation during this event." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45908 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CHEVRON USA PRODUCTS COMPANY
Region: 4
City: RICHMOND State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0490-07
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/07/2010
Notification Time: 02:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2010
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
MEXICO VIA FAX ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE LOST X-RAY ANALYZER
The following was received from the State of California via email:
On May 5, 2010 the California Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) was informed by the alternate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of Chevron USA that they may have lost a Niton, XLP 818, S/N 13354, containing a 30 mCi Am241/Be sealed source.
According to the alternate RSO, the Niton XLP was lost and was reported to him by the Material Inspection Group supervisor on April 29, 2010. This incident was not reported to RHB because the licensee was looking for the Niton XLP until the date of this report.
CA Report #: 050610
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45913 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHONG VU
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/10/2010
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 05:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text INADVERTENT STEAM ADMISSION TO AFW TURBINE
During maintenance on sliding links, the steam admission valve (SA-48) for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) turbine inadvertently opened. Inadequate isolation from the steam header allowed steam flow through SA-77 steam drain valve into the turbine. This small amount of steam caused the pump to rotate at approximately 1000 rpm for approximately 2 minutes. Due to the low discharge pressure, no water was injected into the steam generator during this actuation.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |