| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/28/2010 - 04/29/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45870 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: KEYTECH
Region: 1
City: MANCHESTER State: NJ
County:
License #: NJ-507394
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL CSASZAR
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER | Notification Date: 04/23/2010
Notification Time: 09:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2010
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL/DAMAGE TO PORTABLE GAUGE
The following report was received from the State via e-mail:
"At approximately 11 a.m. [EDT] on Monday, April 19, 2010, one of KeyTech's portable moisture density gauges (Troxler Model 4640B, Serial No. 2008, containing 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241) was struck by a steam-roller. The incident occurred at the intersection of Manchester Boulevard and Manchester Road in Manchester, NJ. On Wednesday, April 21, 2010, the licensee filed a report with the Manchester Police. The Manchester Police then contacted the Trenton Dispatch. At about 11 a.m., RMP [New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection Radioactive Materials Program] personnel were notified by Trenton Dispatch.
"The RMP contacted Manchester Police and it was learned that KeyTech reported that while the gauge was damaged the radioactive material remained intact within the device. KeyTech's RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] and administrator were contacted. The RSO stated that only the keyboard portion of the gauge was hit and that there was no damage to the radioactive material within the gauge. When the gauge was hit, the source rod was extended. The technician was able to retract the source rod into the safe position. The gauge was moved to a safe location and away from the public. RMP personnel went to KeyTech on Thursday, 4/22/10, to speak with the licensee and to conduct an investigation. The investigation concluded that the material was intact within the gauge and determined the licensee took appropriate actions to protect personnel and the public."
New Jersey Report #C348104
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45878 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM TRAFTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/28/2010
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2010
Event Time: 05:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text INVALID ISOLATION SIGNAL CAUSED MSIV'S TO CLOSE
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 5, 2010, at 0539 hours, during the Unit 1 refueling outage (L1R13), the inboard and outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closed as a result of an invalid partial Group 1 PCIS (Primary Containment Isolation System) isolation signal generated during the performance of station surveillance LOS-TG-SR2 'Operability of Main Turbine Valves and Controls Following an Extended Outage.'
"Investigation revealed that during the resetting of the main turbine, the Group 1 PCIS logic received a signal that one of the Turbine Stop Valves (TSVs) was open. This caused the logic for Group 1 PCIS logic to be made up and the MSIVs to shut. Review of the data indicates that at no time did any of the TSVs open during the testing. This issue occurred as a result of the vibration seen by the relays in the trip logic during the resetting of the main turbine.
"The apparent cause of this event was attributed to a lack of questioning attitude during testing. The surveillance has multiple actions for cycling all the turbine valves, as well as performing various trips and resets of the main turbine. The surveillance has a prerequisite to ensure during performance of the various sections, that the MSIVs are shut or jumpers are installed to prevent an inadvertent closure of the MSIVs should the TSVs be cycled. The operating crew had concluded that the section of the procedure they were performing did not require the MSIVs to be shut or the jumpers to be installed.
"When the turbine was reset, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channels A1 and B2 actuated. Based upon these actuations, plant response to the partial Group 1 PCIS isolation signal was as expected. This actuation was invalid since the conditions required to bypass the low condenser vacuum Group 1 PCIS isolation were all met. With the mode switch not in run, the condenser low vacuum bypass keys in bypass and the main stop valves not full open, the Group 1 PCIS isolation is bypassed. These conditions were all met when the partial Group 1 PCIS isolation was received. The TSVs remained closed as indicated on the Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control (DEHC) system.
"Corrective actions include enhancements to the surveillance procedure and preparation of a case study on the circumstances, which led to this event. [Corrective actions also include presentation] to all operating crews in LORT [Licensee Operations Requalification Training] Cycle 10-4 and various site training advisory and curriculum review committees."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45879 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN OHRENBERGER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/28/2010
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2010
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RCIC DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO OIL LEAK ON GOVERNOR SYSTEM
"On 04/28/10, at 1400 EDT, with the reactor at 100% power, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was declared inoperable by the Shift Manager (SM) due to an oil leak on the RCIC governor control oil system that could have impacted the system performance during the accredited 24 hour mission time. The fitting where the oil leakage was observed was tightened and the machine was placed in service with no leakage identified. Currently the system is operable and in its normal standby lineup. The system was available for use during this time. At no time was there an impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |