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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/26/2010 - 04/27/2010
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 45863 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: OXEA CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: BAY CITY State: TX
County:
License #: 06073
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 04/21/2010
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2010 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK SHUTTER
"On April 21, 2010, the agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that while performing a scheduled shutter operation check, the shutter on a Ronan model SA1 nuclear gauge failed to close. The gauge contains five millicuries of Cesium (Cs) 137, and was installed in 1995. The gauge is in its normal operating position and a radiation survey conducted by the licensee indicated that radiation levels are normal. The gauge was leak tested and the test sent for analysis. The licensee stated that there is no risk of additional exposure to their workers. The licensee is working with the manufacturer to schedule the repair of the gauge during a shutdown starting on May 3, 2010."
Texas Incident #: I-8733 |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 45864 |
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #: OH02110250037
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER |
Notification Date: 04/21/2010
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2010 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE TO A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC
"Ohio Department of Health (ODH), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BPR) was notified of a possible overexposures to a member of the general public which occurred on 4/20/10 at the Ohio State University located in Columbus, Ohio.
"A patient received a temporary implant of Cs-137 and Ir-192 seeds on April 16-18, 2010. The patient's visitor (her fiancÚ) was instructed by the licensee that he could stay no longer than 2 hours with the patient in a twenty four hour period, and must stay behind the bedside shield during these visitations. On Tuesday, April 20, 2010, the licensee was informed by the Assistant Nurse Manager that the fiancÚ spent the night in the patient's room on two consecutive nights. In addition, the initial investigation by the licensee indicates that the visitor told the Assistant Nurse Manager that he slept in the same bed with the patient both nights. Nursing Management personnel are in the process of interviewing staff members that were involved directly with the care of the implant patient to verify that the fiancÚ was in the room overnight with the patient.
"A preliminary and conservative worst case dose estimate for the visitor is 6 Rad (6 cGy) whole body exposure, based on a 16-hour stay time (8 hours each night for two nights). ODH BRP will continue to collect information of this event and conduct an investigation. The licensee has initiated an internal investigation."
Ohio Report OH100005 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45872 |
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: PHIL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 01:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL |
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
20 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING AN NI CALIBRATION
"This is a 4 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to an Automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation (scram). At 2126 hours [CDT] on April 25, 2010, Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped due to 2 of 4 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channels tripped. At the time of the trip, reactor power, as indicated by heat balance, was ~20%, while excore Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) indicated ~30%. The RPS high reactor power trip setpoint was 50% power. An NI calibration initiated an automatic withdrawal command to the control rod drive system. The rod withdrawal, resulted in one RPS channel tripping on high reactor power and another RPS channel tripping on high reactor coolant system pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core and no safety systems, other than RPS, actuated. Emergency feedwater did not actuate and was not needed. No primary safety valves lifted. Seven secondary safety valves lifted and subsequently reseated. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
The licensee also informed the State of Arkansas and does not plan a press release.
The Unit 1 reactor trip was uncomplicated. Current means of decay heat removal is normal feedwater to the Steam Generators with steam discharge to the Main Condenser through Main Steam Bypass. The Main Generator was online at the time of the trip and the plant is currently in a normal post trip electrical line up. There is no indication of primary-secondary tube leakage. All systems functioned as required. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45873 |
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER |
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 05:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL |
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
M/R |
Y |
14 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO HIGH TURBINE VIBRATIONS
"This report is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for inserting a manual reactor scram due to rising vibrations on the #6 turbine bearing. A planned reactor shutdown was in progress with reactor power at 13.8% when turbine vibrations approached procedural limits which would require a manual scram of the reactor.
"The scram was uncomplicated; all control rods fully inserted. The reactor is in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown. Cooldown has been established to the condenser using main steam line drains. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45874 |
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ANDREW TEREZAKIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 08:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"On April 25, 2010, at 11:30 EDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system on St. Lucie Unit 1 was declared out of service due to removing both Control Room Booster fans from service in order to support charcoal absorber replacement in the common filtration train as part of scheduled outage maintenance. The Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system is part of the Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system, therefore, the TSC ventilation system has been rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be returned to service on 4/26/10.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 45875 |
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR) |
Event Text
EMD JACKET WATER PUMP WITH INCORRECT IMPELLER ORIENTATION
The following is a summary of a report received from Engine Systems, Inc. via facsimile:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 03/23/10 following a corrective action request from Entergy - Grand Gulf. The request was written as the result of Grand Gulf having an EMD jacket water pump with an incorrect impeller. Specifically, the impeller installed in the pump was for rotation opposite of the pump housing. The evaluation was concluded on 04/26/10 and was determined to be a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21.
"EMD diesel engines utilized for emergency diesel generator sets use two engine jacket water centrifugal pumps (one for each bank) to circulate fluid throughout the engine for cooling. Each pump is mounted on the front of the engine and rotates in the opposite direction of the engine crankshaft. For single engine generator set applications (i.e. left hand rotation engine, viewed from the rear of the engine), the pumps used on each bank contain identical components; the only difference is the position of the impeller housing in relation to the pump shaft housing. When viewed from the front of the engine, these water pumps rotate counterclockwise (see Figure 1 below).
"For tandem generator set applications, one engine is left hand rotation and the other is right hand rotation. For each engine, the pumps used on each bank contain identical components and the only difference is the position of the impeller housing in relation to the pump shaft housing. However, for a right hand rotation engine the water pumps rotate clockwise when viewed from the front of the engine
In summary, because these pumps use impellers that rotate in both clockwise and counter-clockwise directions, it is possible that an impeller could be installed with a design rotation opposite that required for the associated pump housing.
"A review has been performed to evaluate the impact on past supply of EMD water pumps. Historically, ESI has supplied a quantity of over 280 water pumps under 17 different EMD part numbers dating back to 1988. The pump returned by the customer [Grand Gulf] was supplied in January 1997. After reviewing the history of dedication activities performed on the water pumps it was found that dedication reports for EMD water pumps have always contained an inspection requirement to verify the correct operational rotation; however reports written prior to 2000 did not include a clear visual depiction of what the correct operational rotation is. It appears that this was an isolated incident where the inspector made an error when performing the inspection. Since April 2000, all EMD water pumps shipped were inspected to a dedication report that included a clear visual depiction of proper impeller geometry. This one incident is the only known instance of an EMD water pump with the incorrect impeller.
"ESI recommends that as a precaution, all customers with an EMD water pump in stock which was supplied by ESI prior to April 2000 should perform a visual inspection to ensure the correct impeller is installed. A pump which has been installed on the diesel engine is considered acceptable based on successful operation of the diesel engine. The impeller inspection is easily performed, without disassembly, by looking into the inlet port of the pump to confirm the orientation of the impeller matches the pump housing. A listing of the various part numbers supplied prior to April 2000 is included in Table [below].
Listing of Water Pump P/Ns Supplied Prior to April 2000
Part Number Rotation Bank Type of Engine
40004235 LH RIGHT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
40004234 LH LEFT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
8347607 LH LEFT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
8364236 RH RIGHT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
8364237 RH LEFT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
8269664 LH RIGHT 12-645E4 & E4B
9336390 LH LEFT 12-645E4 & E4B
8269638 LH LEFT 12-645E4 & E4B
8324588 RH RIGHT 12-645E4 & E4B
8324589 RH LEFT 12-645E4 & E4B
NOTE: The ESI report did not provide an information on specific nuclear power plant licensees that may possess these components. |
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