| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/05/2010 - 04/06/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45803 | Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 1
City: SELMA State: VA
County:
License #: 760-437-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/31/2010
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2010
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile from the Commonwealth of Virginia:
On Tuesday, March 30, 2010, a Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) employee was using a Model #3440 moisture density gauge (Serial #31899). This gauge was damaged when a compaction roller ran over it. The time of the incident was approximately 2:15 pm. The VDOT inspector had left the gauge unattended to go to her pick-up to get the gauge tools needed to perform a density test. Upon arriving back at the gauge, the inspector noticed that the gauge had been hit by the compaction roller. The location where this event occurred was at a construction site on route 696 in Selma, VA in the Staunton District area, on the South side of the bridge, at Abutment A, station number 101+ 75.
The inspector roped off the area, stopped the compaction roller, and called the District RSO from the Staunton District. The District RSO arrived at approximately 4:15 pm. The District RSO took a survey of the area and recorded readings of 1.2 to 1.7 mr/hr. The District RSO checked the source rod and determined that it was still in the shield. The gauge was transported to VDOT's home office at 6200 Elko Tract Road and is now in storage. No personnel were injured as a result of this event.
Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-10-01 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45804 | Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: TESTAMERICAN LABORATORIES INC
Region: 3
City: CEDAR FALLS State: IA
County:
License #: 3063-1-07-ECD
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDY DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/01/2010
Notification Time: 11:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCES IN GAS CHROMATOGRAPH
The following information was obtained from the State of Iowa via facsimile:
Two sealed sources in a gas chromatograph (electron capture device) were wipe tested and had removable contamination. The sources will be sent to the manufacturer for disposal.
Manufacturer: Agilent Technologies Incorporated
Model: G2397A
Sources: Each source contained 15 milliCuries Ni-63
(1) Serial: U12585 Leakage: 0.028 microCuries
(2) Serial: U12586 Leakage: 0.00549 microCuries
Iowa incident number: IA100002 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45811 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JARED SCHANK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/04/2010
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2010
Event Time: 15:42 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2010 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
SHER BAHADUR (NRR)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
ELMO COLLINS (R4 R)
VESTAL (DHS)
VIA (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO AN EARTHQUAKE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"An Event Classification of Unusual Event (HU1.1) was declared at 1549 MST for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station because of an earthquake that originated in Baja California, [Mexico] location 32.093?N, 115.249?W at 1542 MST. Per the USGS [U.S. Geological Survey] website, the magnitude of the earthquake was 6.9 on the Richter scale. Initial walkdowns of plant equipment and review of plant parameters have found no unusual conditions or damage to plant equipment. No abnormalities caused by the seismic event were observed. No Reactor Protection System (RPS) or Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations occurred and none were required. Palo Verde Unit 1 is in mode 5 for a scheduled refueling outage, and Units 2 & 3 are at 100 percent power with all offsite power supplies available.
"Initial analysis of the Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation system indicated a seismic event, below the magnitude of the 0.10g spectra Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and the 0.20g spectra Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM GORDON TIMOTHY TO VINCE KLCO AT 0003 EDT ON 4/5/2010 * * *
"Emergency classification termination was declared at 4/4/10, 2045 MST. All required power block inspections were completed with no deficiencies noted. No other conditions require an emergency classification, there are no challenges to fission product barriers or radiological release, and plant conditions offer no possibility of adverse impact on health and safety of the public. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of NUE termination."
Notified the R4DO (Okeefe), NRR-EO (Bahadur), FEMA (Via), DHS (Wallace) and IRD via email (Gott). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45812 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/04/2010
Notification Time: 20:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2010
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) INOPERABLE
"On 4/4/10 at 1245 [CDT], three RHR system snubbers were declared inoperable due to visual inspection identifying empty reservoirs for the snubbers. The inoperability of the snubbers rendered both trains of RHR cooling inoperable. On 4/4/10 at 1545, ultrasonic testing identified voided piping on the common RWST [Refueling Water Storage Tank] suction line to the RHR pumps. This condition also resulted in inoperability of both trains of RHR for the ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] mode of operation.
"At the time of these discoveries, Unit 2 was in mode 4, proceeding to mode 5 for a refueling outage. The inoperability of both trains of RHR represents a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Replacement of the snubbers is in progress. Following completion of snubber replacement, Unit 2 will proceed to mode 5 at which point ECCS capability is not required. Resolution of the voided piping will be accomplished following mode 5 entry."
The snubbers are in containment and were last checked during the previous refueling outage. The voiding in the RHR suction line only affects suction from the RWST and not when suction is aligned to the Reactor Coolant System.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DOUGLAS HOBSON TO DONG PARK AT 1604 EDT ON 4/5/10 * * *
"An eight hour report (EN #45812) per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) was conservatively reported because both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system were thought to be inoperable based on the initial visual inspection of three hydraulic snubbers. In addition, initial ultrasonic testing at the RHR suction line to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) identified what was thought to be voided piping.
"Subsequent visual inspections and testing demonstrated that all three snubbers had adequate oil to ensure that the snubbers would perform their intended function. In addition, the ultrasonic testing was reviewed and determined that the technique for the coupling gel application between the ultrasonic detector and piping was not adequate for an accurate test. The ultrasonic inspection was performed again using the correct detector to piping coupling technique and it was determined that the RHR piping had adequate water level. Therefore, based on more accurate subsequent results of snubber and ultrasonic testing, the RHR system was never inoperable.
"The three snubbers thought to be inoperable were removed and replaced with snubbers previously verified to be operable. After removal, the snubbers were visually inspected and tested. Two of the three hydraulic snubbers share a common oil reservoir. This common reservoir was found to be completely full of clear oil which made it difficult to determine reservoir oil level while installed in the plant. The third snubber oil reservoir was one-third full. The removed snubbers have been tested to confirm they would have operated as designed.
"The ultrasonic testing of RHR piping was started as a result of SNC's response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01. This testing requires a coupling gel to be used between the ultrasonic detector and the RHR piping to ensure accurate water level results. Based on the initial ultrasonic test results it was thought that the RHR piping had voids. However, when the coupling process was reexamined, it was determined that additional coupling gel was needed for accurate results. When the ultrasonic test was performed again with the proper coupling process, it was determined that the RHR piping had adequate water and that voiding did not exist. The second ultrasonic inspection technique was reviewed and confirmed the coupling process utilized was correct.
"In summary, a loss of safety function on both trains of RHR did not exist and the 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(D) report (EN # 45812) is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Moorman). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45813 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/05/2010
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2010
Event Time: 23:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION CAPABILITY
"At 1400 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 5, 2010, the Control Room was notified that the ability to activate the thirty-eight (38) emergency sirens within the 10 mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) radius of the plant had been lost for a period of 1 hour and 16 minutes from 2334 hours EDT on April 4, 2010, until 0050 hours on April 5, 2010. The event occurred when an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), supplying radio repeaters used to activate the sirens failed. Inoperability of the repeaters impacts the ability to actuate the emergency sirens from the New Hanover County and Brunswick County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) as well as from the Brunswick Nuclear Plant Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF).
"The failed UPS was reset and emergency siren activation capability was restored at 0050 hours EDT on April 5, 2010.
"The reportability requirement associated with the inability to activate the emergency sirens was not recognized by personnel who responded to the failure and, as such, the failure was not communicated to the control room. Emergency Preparedness personnel, reviewing emergency siren computer event logs on April 5, 2010, became aware of the failure and understood its impact. This resulted in notification of the event to the control room.
"The initial safety significance of the event is minimal. The Brunswick and North Carolina Emergency Response Plans include compensatory measures to provide warning to affected areas, if required, in the event of the loss of sirens.
"The ability to activate the emergency sirens has been confirmed. Investigations into the cause of the UPS failure, as well as interim and long term corrective actions are in progress.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45814 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: FRED POLLACK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 04/06/2010
Notification Time: 02:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2010
Event Time: 23:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text TRANSPORT OF A CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL OFFSITE
"On 4/5/2010, at 2244 [EDT], the Unit 1 Control Room was notified of an individual in the Unit 1 Containment Building complaining of chest pains. Offsite medical was contacted via 911 emergency call and the individual was transported, via ambulance, to Lawnwood Regional Medical Center at 2302. Radiation Protection personnel accompanied the individual to the hospital. The individual was admitted at 2335. Radiation Protection personnel determined that the individual was radioactively contaminated at a level of 3500 corrected counts per minute on his left ankle. The individual was successfully decontaminated. The transport of a radioactively contaminated individual to an offsite medical facility is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |