| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/24/2009 - 11/25/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45477 | Rep Org: FLOWSERVE
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BARRY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 11/06/2009
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/06/2009
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
JOHN THORP (e-mail) ()
O.TABATABAI (e-mail) ()
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL FAILURE OF BONNET VALVE
The following is quoted selectively from the text of the original Part 21 notification received from Flowserve via fax:
"On September 8, 2009, Flowserve Corporation was notified by Exelon-LaSalle Nuclear Power Station of a failure which occurred and was initially communicated via Flowserve Complaint Report #4914.
"The Referenced Complaint Report describes an anomaly with a Size 3/4 Figure 848Y bolted bonnet valve at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station.
"The subject valve was in service at the time of disassembly. The disassembly revealed that the disk nut, which captures the valve stem in the valve main disk, had separated from the main disk.
"The valve in question is a manually operated, non-active valve. The safety function of this valve is to retain system pressure. This safety function was not affected by separation of the stem nut from the valve disk.
"However, other Figure 848 valves may have different safety related functions that could be affected by this type of failure.
"[Flowserve has determined that] the Nuclear Industry needs to be notified concerning the potential defect and encouraged to inspect the operation of their valves, especially if they have a safety-related function in the plant that may be adversely affected.
"The valves affected are Size 2 and smaller Edward Figure 848 valves manufactured by Rockwell International at the Sulphur Springs, Texas, and the Raleigh, North Carolina, manufacturing facilities prior to 1991. These valves may be tagged 'Rockwell', 'Rockwell Edward' or 'Edward'. The valves affected have the old design stem/disk assembly.
"Valves with Figure Number A848 incorporate the new design stem/disk connection and are not affected. The total number of valves affected and their installed locations are not known."
The original report contains more technical details and information.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT BERRY TO PETE SNYDER AT 1454 ON 11/24/09 * * *
"Upon further investigation, Flowserve has become aware that additional Figure Numbers, 849, 828, and 829 may also be affected by the deviation reported herein, as they share the OLD Stem/Disk Assembly Design."
Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Peterson), and R4DO (O'Keefe). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45517 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 11/24/2009
Notification Time: 03:40 [ET]
Event Date: 11/24/2009
Event Time: 03:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/2009 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
RAYMOND MCKINLEY (R1DO)
SAM COLLINS (RA1)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
SAMSON LEE (NRR)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
JOHN FROST (DHS)
WILLIAM BORDAN (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 25 GPM
"Beaver Valley Unit 2 declared an unusual event due to reactor coolant system unidentified leakage greater than 25 GPM into the pressurizer relief tank. Leakage occurred during shutdown of the residual heat removal system Train-A. The Train-A suction relief valve lifted due to pressure from the in-service Train-B residual heat [removal] system. The leakage has been stopped by isolating Train-A RHR from Train-B RHR. The duration of relief valve lifting was about 9 minutes. The pressurizer relief tank remained intact. All other systems functioned as designed and the plant is stable. Containment was closed at time of the event. No radioactive release occurred."
The licensee terminated the unusual event at 0404 EST.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE BY DAVID HASER TO VINCE KLCO ON 11/24/2009 AT 0707* * *
Licensee clarified that the event was due to identified leakage not unidentified leakage as stated in the paragraph above.
Notified R1DO. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45518 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEAN BROILLET
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/24/2009
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2009
Event Time: 11:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text AUTOMATIC CLOSURE OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DUE TO INVALID SIGNAL
"On Monday, October 19, 2009, Limerick Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. At 1105 hours, an invalid actuation of the 1B Reactor Enclosure Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor occurred. The actuation caused a Division 2 Group 6C isolation signal, which caused primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) to automatically close on the Containment Leak Detector Radiation Monitor (10-S182) and the Drywell Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzer (10-S205). The 1A, 1C, and 1D channels were unaffected and indicated normal ventilation exhaust radiation levels during the event.
"The cause of the event was a failure of a fuse holder in the 1B Reactor Enclosure Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor. The radiation monitor is designed to fail-safe on a loss of power. The automatic closure of the PCIVs placed them in their fail-safe position. The failed fuse holder has been replaced and the radiation monitor was declared operable on Tuesday, October 20, 2009 at 1348 hours.
"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The only equipment malfunction during the event was the failed fuse holder. The Division 2 Group 6C isolation was a partial actuation.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since isolation valves for the Containment Leak Detector Radiation Monitor and Drywell Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzer automatically closed due to an invalid signal."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |