| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/18/2008 - 11/19/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44626 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: THOMAS DITCHFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 11/03/2008
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2008
Event Time: 06:52 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text RECIRC LOOP TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FAILED
"On 11/3/08 at 0652 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) was lost on Dresden Unit 3 when the Recirc Loop Temperature Element (3-0260-13B) failed upscale. Unit 3 was in the process of initial cooldown for entry into a refueling outage. Actual Recirc loop temperature was about 217 degrees F based on alternate indications. The temperature element (3-0260-13B) remained upscale for several minutes before returning to its previous value. The failed element was jumpered out and SDC was restarted. This event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."
The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector.
RETRACTION ON 11/18/2008 AT 1214 FROM RANDY WROBLEWSKI TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"On November 8, 2008 shutdown cooling was lost on Dresden Unit 3 when the Reactor Recirculation System Loop Temperature Element (3-0260-13B) failed upscale. Plant operators immediately recognized the condition, and implemented an existing operations procedure to re-establish shutdown cooling flow and ensure that the Shutdown Cooling System continued to fulfill the safety function of residual heat removal. The Shutdown Cooling System is a manually initiated, non-safety related system that is not credited for mitigation of any event or accident in Dresden's safety analyses. The implementation of an existing procedure to restore shutdown cooling system flow in a short period of time (i.e., less than 10 minutes in this case), by the Main Control Room operators trained on the procedure, provides reasonable assurance that the system continued to fulfill its safety function. Therefore, Exelon Generation Company, LLC has determined that this event is not reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and is retracting ENS Report 44626."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (O'Brien). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44657 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: LUDLUM MEASUREMENTS
Region: 4
City: SWEETWATER State: TX
County:
License #: LO1963
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RUBEN CORTEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 11/13/2008
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/13/2008
Event Time: 10:49 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BREACHED 90 MILLICURIE CS-137 SOURCE
"Ludlum-Sweetwater just called [state] to report a breached source. A 90 milliCurie cesium-137 source was cut open in the machine shop about 45 minutes ago. [A company representative] believes most of the contamination was contained to the machine shop area with a small amount being tracked to different parts of the plant.
"Workers were machining a piece of metal and did not realize it had a source in it. The workers were using a grinder and cutting on what they thought was a spacer. The source was to be mounted into a pig and used as a calibration source.
"The licensee needs assistance [from the state] with the names of companies licensed to assist with clean up."
Texas Incident Number: I-8580
UPDATE ON 11/14/2008 AT 1427 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received from the state via e-mail:
"On 11/13/08, Ludlum Instruments, a Texas licensee located in Sweetwater, Texas, reported that an employee accidentally breached a small Cesium (Cs) - 137 source while modifying a piece of calibration equipment. An [State of Texas] agency inspector was dispatched to the scene to investigate. Initial reports were that 40 or more employees were involved and that contamination had been spread by foot traffic through the facility.
"The inspector provided the following information.
"Ludlum has contracted an out-of-state company (Energy Solutions) to perform assessment and decontamination activities resulting from the breach of the 90 mCi Cesium (Cs) -137 source. The company will perform initial assessments over the weekend and begin operations Monday. Our [State of Texas] inspector reported that contamination levels were fairly low with some spots reading approximately five times background levels. That would equate to about 10,000 - 15,000 counts per minute on a scintillation detector.
"Ludlum has also contacted the Department of Energy's Radiation Emergency Assistance Center /Training Site for guidance on assessing possible internal deposition of material. Urine specimens are being collected for analysis to determine the presence of Cs-137.
"Overall, it appears that Ludlum acted quickly and responsibly in reporting and containing the contamination once it was discovered. We will continue to monitor the situation as the assessment and cleanup progresses.
"Ludlum has issued a press release and the story is being reported in the D/FW [Dallas/Fort Worth] area.
"Conversation with the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Ludlum on November 14, 2008, provided the following information:
"The whole facility is currently posted and controlled as a Contaminated Area. The area is isolated and posted 'Do Not Enter.' There has been some decontamination done by Ludlum, but they are going to wait for the contactor to assess the areas before removing barriers. Energy Solutions is due to arrive at the facility this afternoon (11/14/08). They should start work as soon as they receive reciprocity from the State of Texas. The RSO stated that they were in contact with our [State of Texas] Radioactive Materials Group Manager to expedite the reciprocity. They anticipate allowing some workers to return to work on Monday.
"The RSO stated that they have four individuals of concern currently. Oak Ridge recommended 24-hour in-vitro bioassays samples for those four individuals. No one was sent home contaminated. Two individuals were concerned that they may have taken contamination home. The homes were surveyed and no contamination was detected.
"Ludlum will begin reenactments and dose studies for the workers involved next week.
"The source was a gamma gauging source, AEA technology Model number CDC.800 source. The Cs-137 sources is an inorganic pellet, fired at high temperature to bond the Cs -137 in the ceramic pellet. The serial number has not yet been provided. It is currently believed that 30 to 40 percent of the 90 millicuries contained in the source was removed by the grinding operation.
"The RSO stated that a group was working on some calibrations and noted the background in their area was slowly increasing. At first they thought someone who had received a medical procedure was the cause, but tracked the source of the elevated dose rates to the individuals grinding on the source.
"The RSO stated that they had not conducted any air sampling of the area as they do not have the equipment necessary to do so. They will rely on bioassay results for internal dose assessments."
Notified R4DO (Whitten) and FSME (Flannery).
* * * UPDATE ON 11/14/2008 AT 1603 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"The Radiation Safety Officer states that the source was cut in half and that no grinder was involved in the process. She also stated that the calculated decayed activity of the source before it was damaged was 80 millicuries. The remaining sections of the source were assayed and the activity remaining is 48 millicuries. It is believed that the majority of the activity released is in the area of the saw. The source is 0.24 inches in diameter and 0.32 inches long and a cumulative wall thickness of 0.05 inches."
Notified the R4DO (Whitten) and FSME (McConnell).
* * * UPDATE ON 11/18/2008 AT 1123 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following report was received via e-mail:
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Ludlum reported that the contractor should have a full compliment of workers and instruments today and that cleanup work should be in full swing later today. The RSO also stated that she had incorrectly stated that a cutter was used to cut the source in two. It was a grinder as first reported.
"The four workers identified as having potential body burdens have provided urinalysis samples and will receive whole body counts (WBC) at Comanche Nuclear Power Station on November 19, 2008. Ludlum currently intends to provide all of their workers with WBC.
"The facility is a 60,000 square foot facility. It is divided into several areas most having their own air handling system. Currently, the contamination appears to be mostly on the floor in areas out side the work area. No survey information is available in the work area where the source was breached."
Notified the R4DO (Cain) and FSME (Burgess). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 44664 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/18/2008
Notification Time: 13:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2008
Event Time: 03:08 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
| Event Text FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE
"At 0308 CST, on 11/18/2008, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that the C-337 High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) Sprinkler System D-9 had been inspected by Fire Services and six sprinkler heads had visible corrosion on them. The system configuration was evaluated using EN-C-822-99-047, 'Effects of Impaired Sprinkler Heads on System Operability' and determined that with these heads impaired, a portion of the building would not have sufficient sprinkler coverage. The HPFW system is required to be operable according to TSR LCO 2.4.4.5. HPFW system D-9 was declared inoperable and TSR LCO 2.4.4.5 Required Action B was implemented for the area without sprinkler coverage. Based on past testing results, there is a possibility that the heads would have been able to perform their specified safety function. Once the heads are removed from the system, testing will be performed to determine the true affect on operability.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
The site has implemented hourly fire patrols while this impairment is in affect. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44665 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY WROBLEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/18/2008
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2008
Event Time: 10:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text CONTROL RODS DRIFT OUT WHILE SHUTDOWN
"On 11/03/2008, with Unit 3 shut down and all control rods in, an unexpected drift of three control rods out from their full-in position occurred. The immediate cause of this event was high control rod drive (CRD) cooling and exhaust water header pressures as the final group of hydraulic control unit (HCU) valves were being isolated. At the time, Operations personnel were in the process of completing the isolation of the CRD HCUs by closing the (101) Insert Riser Isolation Valve and (102) Withdraw Riser Isolation Valve on each HCU with a CRD pump in operation and the CRD charging water header isolated.
"A control rod drift alarm was received in the Unit 3 control room, followed by several rod position indication system (RPIS) indications that the associated control rods had drifted from position 00 (full-in) to their 'over travel-in' position. Later, all indications returned to the full-in position, with the exception of three CRDs. These three CRDs settled at final positions 06, 16, and 18, respectively. Immediate corrective actions were taken to re-open the 101 valve for each of the three CRDs, allowing the control rod to re-insert to full-in. The 101 valve was then re-closed. Calculations by nuclear engineering identified that the reactor remained subcritical for the actual plant conditions and that there was no risk of fuel damage.
"Initial review of the event by Exelon determined that it was not reportable.
"After additional review and evaluation, the decision was made to conservatively report the event pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' A root cause investigation is underway to determine the cause. The industry has been notified via the operating experience process on November 7, 2008.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | |