| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/16/2008 - 07/17/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 44343 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: KELLOGG USA, INC
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0552
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 07/11/2008
Notification Time: 12:08 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM SIGNS
This report was submitted by Nebraska via e-mail:
"The general licensee, which is a large food processing facility, did its annual inventory in May of 2008. Four Tritium exit signs were discovered missing during the inventory. Sign 1 was in a high traffic forklift area. The sign was protruding from the wall at a right angle. The licensee thinks that it was likely knocked off and disposed of improperly in regular trash. Signs 2 and 3 were colocated in the same holder. They were in an area of construction and maintenance. The licensee can not find them. They may have been disposed of improperly in regular trash but the licensee was unable to determine how they were disposed of. Sign 4 was located in a warehouse overhead area and was likely knocked down via forklift traffic. It was improperly disposed of in regular trash. This general licensee will communicate to all hourly, salaried and outside contractors the importance of maintaining control of the exit signs and notifying appropriate people in the event they become dislodged, or need to be removed or relocated. The licensee will increase inspections on the signs in their current locations in order to verify that signs are still there. The general licensee will begin systematically changing out a set number of the signs each year with nonradioactive materials until all are removed from their facility."
Nebraska Event Date: 1/2/2008
Nebraska Discovery Date: 5/1/2008
Nebraska Report Date: 6/13/2008
Nebraska Report Number: NE080005
Activity per sign: 17.51 Ci
Manufacturer: SRB Technologies Inc.
Device Name: Radioluminescent Sign
Model BXU20SW S/N: 217815
Model BXU20SW S/N: 217885
Model BXU20SW S/N: 217886
Model B100U20S S/N: 220072
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44347 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: STEVE CARTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 07/16/2008
Notification Time: 09:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2008
Event Time: 06:24 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION OF DIVISION 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
"On June 2, 2008 at 6:24 a.m. CDT power was lost on the reactor protection system (RPS) bus 'A'. The plant was operating at 100 percent power at the time. The loss of RPS bus 'A' interrupted power to containment isolation actuation circuitry. This caused the Division 1 containment isolation valves in various balance of plant systems to automatically close, as designed. Plant operators implemented recovery procedures to shift RPS 'A' to its alternate power supply, and restore the systems affected by the isolation. The containment isolation valves were confirmed to have actuated as required. Plant capacity was not interrupted by the containment isolation signal.
"As their primary power source, each RPS bus is supplied by its own motor generator set. The investigation of this event found that two resistors on a circuit card in the voltage regulator on the 'A' RPS motor-generator set failed. This had the effect of causing the generator voltage to fluctuate significantly, resulting in a automatic trip of the generator output breaker and a loss of power on the bus.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of the Division I containment isolation actuation system."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44351 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DUANE HOFFSTRA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 07/16/2008
Notification Time: 23:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2008
Event Time: 15:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL FIRE PROPAGATION BETWEEN ROOMS COULD AFFECT APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN
"A potential exists for a fire in the South Area of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) room to propagate to the Vital Switchgear (VSG) room. A fire 4 in the South Area of the AFW room could cause a short circuit in a cable that traverses the AFW room and the VSG room, causing ignition of the cable. The Point Beach Safe Shutdown Analysis assumes afire in a single fire area. A fire in South Area of the AFW Room, credits AFW pumps P-38B & 2P-29 for providing AFW to both unit's steam generators. A fire in the VSG Room, credits AFW pumps 1 P-29 & 2P-29 for providing AFW to both unit's steam generators.
"A fire in both the South Area of the AFW room and VSG room could potentially cause three of the four AFW pumps to be unavailable, which does not meet the requirements for Appendix R safe shutdown.
"The potential for a fire affecting two fire areas is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures have been implemented. Licensee investigations are continuing."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |