| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/30/2008 - 07/01/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44186 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD BOHANAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/04/2008
Notification Time: 22:14 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2008
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"During the required quarterly oil sample taken following scheduled flow rate surveillance, the Unit 2 HPCI oil system was found to contain excessive amounts of water. HPCI declared inoperable.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.'
"Unit 2 remains at 100% power
"14 day TS LCO 3.5.1 has been entered and troubleshooting is in progress.
"NRC Resident has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED AT 1648 ON 06/30/08 FROM MICHAEL HUNTER TO JEFF ROTTON * * *
"ENS Event Number 44186, made on May 4, 2008, is being retracted."
"NRC Notification 44186 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when a required quarterly oil sample taken following a flow rate surveillance on the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System indicated that the turbine oil system contained excessive amounts of water.
"An evaluation performed in response to this report concluded that the HPCI System was capable of performing its intended safety function even though the turbine oil system contained more water than recommended in the TVA Lubrication Oil Analysis and Monitoring Program. TVA found through visual inspection and engineering evaluation that the amount of water contained in the turbine oil system would not impact the HPCI operation during its' mission time for the Design Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident.
"As such, the circumstances discussed in the report did not result in any condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures of system that are needed to remove residual heat. Thus, there was no impact on nuclear safety. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"TVA's evaluation of this event notification is documented in the corrective action program.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee has changed the oil and continues to monitor the oil reservoir monthly until the problem causing the excessive water (Turbine Admission valve) is corrected .
Notified R2DO (O'Donohue) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44323 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DONNA GUINN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 06/27/2008
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2008
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text GROUP PAGE VIA INTERACTIVE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM IS NOT OPERATIONAL
"On June 27, 2008 at 1430 CDT, Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) performed testing of the group paging system via the Interactive Notification System (INS) . The group page did not perform as designed. Further investigation and testing of the group page manually resulted in the same issue. It has been determined that the group page function is not operational.
"FCS has implemented backup manual callout process for the emergency response organization. Therefore emergency facility activation may take longer than normal. Troubleshooting efforts are ongoing."
Licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM GUINN TO CROUCH @ 1023 EDT ON 6/30/08 * * *
"Troubleshooting revealed a hard drive failure for the paging system. On June 27, 2008, the paging system was tested satisfactorily at 2145. System is fully functional. "
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Bywater). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 44325 | Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: CARL YATES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/28/2008
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2008
Event Time: 21:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2)
MICHAEL WATERS (NMSS)
IVONNE COURET (OPA)
BILL BRACH (NMSS)
DAVID PROULX (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
| Event Text CONCURRENT REPORT INVOLVING DERAILMENT OF TRAIN CARRYING WASTE FROM BWXT
The licensee was notified at 2112 EDT on 6/27/08 about a train derailment in Atchison, Kansas that was carrying some low level waste from BWXT. Among the derailed cars were 3 cars containing dried sludge from the final effluent pond classified as LSA-1. There was no release or damage involving the waste material. Each of the 3 rail cars contained approximately 3000 cubic feet (9000 cubic feet total) with a total rad content of approximately 60 millicuries Uranium per car (180 millicuries total). The cars never tipped over and have been placed back on tracks. Pending satisfactory results of a safety inspection of the cars, the waste will continue on to its final destination at the Energy Solutions facility in Clive, Utah.
BWXT does not plan to issue a press release at this time but notified the NRC based on the potential for public interest. Several local articles about the derailment have been posted on the internet but no direct inquiries from the press have been received by BWXT at this time.
The licensee will also notify NRC Region 2. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 44329 | Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 06/30/2008
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 20:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
RUSS BYWATER (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
| Event Text PREMATURE LOCKING OF INC IR-100 EXPOSURE DEVICE
"On June 23rd at approximately 8 p.m., at a temporary job site [located at a refinery in Sinclair, Wyoming] a Kakivik Asset Management radiography crew experienced the premature tripping of the automatic locking device on a INC IR-100 exposure device.
"During retraction of the source it was noted that the locking device had returned to the trapped position. When the crank handles were moved back and forth to insure that it had, it was noted that the source traveled back out of the exposure device. The radiographer immediately took control of the cranks and the assistant moved back to the unrestricted area. The source was returned to the collimator and the lock reset to capture the source. Upon retraction the event occurred again. This happened three times.
"The radiographer with help from other crew members established a secure unrestricted area. The Night Supervisor, the Lead Radiographer and RSO were notified. Prior to their arrival the radiographer on-site turned the key and this effectively left the source in the camera but not in the safe and secure position.
"The radiography was being performed at a fabrication shop during a turnaround and the RSO made the decision to have the exposure device placed in the lead lined transportation box and moved to a more secure location away from the General Public.
"The vehicle was surveyed and the radiation levels for the driver were < 1 mR/Hr. The vehicle was locked and placed under constant surveillance until INC [manufacturer] could be contacted. RSO contacted INC at 7 a.m. the following morning and explained the situation. Their RSO indicated that the Lead Radiographer under his guidance could reset the lock and secure the source in the safe and secure position. This was accomplished successfully.
"Kakivik's Material License (#50-27667-01) does allow for the retrieval of sources.
"At no time was the General Public in any danger of coming into the restricted area.
"The lead radiographer, radiographer and assistant radiographer received 80, 65 and 55 Mr on the 23rd of June respectively and 80, 25 and 5 Mr on the 24th. [Doses for the lead radiographer on the 23 and 24th June were accumulated during event response. Doses for the radiographer and the assistant radiographer were a mix of normal radiography and event response on 23 June, and doses on 24 June were due to event response.]
"The camera has been removed from service and returned to INC for evaluation. The camera received annual maintenance at the INC facilities November 5, 2007." | |