| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/19/2008 - 06/20/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44291 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 06/12/2008
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2008
Event Time: 11:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2008 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A MAJOR LOSS OF RESPONSE AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY
"At 1130CDT on 6/12/2008, the Duane Arnold Energy Center was informed due to flooding in the local area that access to the Joint Information Center (JIC), the Offsite Radiological Analytical Laboratory (ORAL), the Offsite Relocation and Reassembly Area (ORRA), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) have been lost. This constitutes a reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the major loss of offsite response capability. The ORAL function will be maintained by the Iowa State Hygienics Lab. At the present time the remaining facilities are being relocated or moved to the Linn County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) located at the Kirkwood Community College Campus. Also, although multiple roads in the area are closed due to high water level, evacuation capability in the EPZ is being maintained. Also, at 1256CDT on 6/12/2008, Duane Arnold Energy Center was informed that local commercial phone service through the Palo phone system has been lost. This service also includes our ability to fax and access the internet. We have also lost our FTS2001 ENS connection. Again, per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) this represents a major loss of offsite communication capability. Offsite communications is being maintained currently thorough our microwave and cell phone systems. Onsite communications are possible through our in house PBX and page system. Contingency plans are in effect to setup a mobile satellite uplink that would include voice and data capability."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1629EDT ON 06/12/08 FROM DOUG PETERSON TO S. SANDIN * * *
"At 1430CDT on 6/12/2008, Duane Arnold Energy Center lost communications capability via commercial phone line, FT2001 ENS system and the microwave phone system. This meets the threshold criteria of an EAL classification of an Unusual Event. At 1440CDT the Shift Manager declared that Unusual Event and notifications were made to Linn County Emergency Management Agency, Benton County Emergency Management Agency and the Iowa Homeland Security Emergency Management Division. Currently, offsite communication is still possible via our installed cell phone and satellite systems and onsite communications remain possible via our PBX and page system."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified ET Member (B. Mallet), all IRD Management (B. McDermott, W. Gott, M. Leach), Commissioners' Staffs (D. Skeen, T. Hipschman, S. Baggett, J. Thoma, D. Coe), EDO Staff (J. Adams), PAO (E. Brenner), OCA (D. Decker), RDOs (R. Summers, B. Bonser, P. Louden, G. Miller), FEMA, DOE, USDA, and HHS.
* * * UPDATE AT 1428EDT ON 06/19/08 FROM MARK GILBERT TO J. KNOKE * * *
"On 6/12/2008 at 1444 FPLE-DAEC declared an unusual event (SU6.2) due to loss of all offsite communication. These systems included the FTS 2001, microwave phone lines, and commercial phone lines due to flooding of the Palo, Iowa phone station. Since that date FPLE-DAEC has reestablished two of the three offsite communication methods. The microwave telephone system has been restored and the commercial phone lines have been restored through a new exchange through the town of Shellsburg, Iowa, which was not affected by the flood. With these two lines of offsite communications reestablished the DAEC will de-escalate from the Unusual event from the loss of offsite communication.
"FPLE-Duane Arnold will be issuing a press release stating the unusual event has been cancelled. The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified and the state of Iowa, Linn County, and Benton county will be notified."
The licensee exited the Unusual Event at 1428 EDT on 06/19/08. Notified R3DO (Kunowski), NRR EO (Fred Brown), IRD MOC (Bill Gott), DHS, and FEMA. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44300 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CARLISLE SYNTEC INC
Region: 1
City: CARLISLE State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 06/16/2008
Notification Time: 19:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST OR STOLEN THICKNESS GAUGE
This information was received from the state via e-mail:
"A PA licensee, Carlisle Syntec, Inc. (CSI) in Carlisle, PA has reported that a NDC Infrared Engineering gauge model #102X, serial # 4076, GL#1933-70GL, containing a 80 milliCurie (mCi) (or 80,000 uCi) sealed source of Americium-241 (Am-241) was shipped via FedEx Ground and found to be missing from the transport container upon arrival at its destination. The gauge was shipped from the licensee's facility in Carlisle, PA, to the manufacturer (NDC Infrared Engineering Inc.) in Irwindale, CA on May 13, 2008. The empty box arrived in Irwindale on May 16, 2008. The manufacturer notified FedEx Ground and the licensee on May 16, 2008 to set up a trace; FedEx Ground claim [DELETED].
"The Commonwealth's Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) was notified of the incident at 4PM on June 13, 2008 by a CSI employee, with no details, other than a radioactive gauge was lost by FedEx. That employee noted the Radiation Safety Officer was out on sick leave. BRP followed-up on June 16, 2008 with CSI to ascertain the above information. CSI uses other NDC radioactive gauges, and a reactive inspection is being planned.
"This is the initial formal notification to DEP management, PEMA / state EOC, PA HS, PSP, PennDOT, NRC HQs Ops Center and Region I, et al. A NRC NMED report is being drafted."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44305 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MURELL EVANS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/19/2008
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2008
Event Time: 20:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text METEORLOGICAL MIXING CALCULATIONS UNAVAILABLE
"This is an 8-hour non-emergency event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. On June 18, 2008, at approximately 2015 PDT, the backup meteorological tower 60-meter air temperature indication failed. The primary meteorological tower is also unavailable. This results in a loss of the delta temperature function. This delta temperature function would be used to determine air mixing for offsite does calculations in the event of an emergency. Without actual delta temperature data, procedures specify conservative assumptions for determining air mixing.
"Other meteorological functions (10-meter temperature, wind speed and wind direction, and 60-meter wind speed and wind direction) remain functional."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44306 | Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICKY PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 06/19/2008
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2008
Event Time: 14:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 24-HR CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE VIOLATION REPORT
"Entergy discovered on June 18, 2008 at 1412 that, due to an error in the Cask Loader Database, four spent fuel casks were loaded in a manner not in compliance with the Certificate of Compliance (CofC). As discussed below, this event is not safety significant since all cask design limits (e.g., heat load, radiation levels, and criticality) continue to be met although some specific spent fuel assemblies loaded were outside of the conservative individual fuel assembly limits specified in the CofC.
"Specifically, during a data update of the Cask Loader Database, it was discovered that four HI-STORM 100 model casks had been loaded with spent fuel bundles that exceeded the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) limits. The four casks involved are F16D003AD, F16D003AE, F16D003AF, and F16D003AG. Verification of the database has determined that 34 of fuel assemblies loaded in these four casks exceeded the maximum allowed Decay Heat per Fuel Storage Location Limit and/or the Fuel Burnup Limit as specified in the CofC Section 2.4 when the assemblies were loaded into the casks. This condition is reportable in accordance with CofC Section 22.
"CAUSE: The preliminary cause is an error in the Cask Loader Database. The database had incorrect bundle exposures for these assemblies. The Cask Loader Database is used to select fuel to load in each cask. The assembly exposures in the Cask Loader Database are used to ensure assemblies selected for loading into fuel casks meet the applicable exposure and cooling time limits provided in the Certificate of Compliance.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: It has been verified that currently the decay heat loads for all assemblies are less than the CofC limits. All casks are below the cask total heat load limit of 28.19 kW and all cooling features for the casks are functioning properly. Since the total heat loads in the casks are below the required limits, the structural integrity of the casks is not challenged. A preliminary evaluation of the as loaded configurations was performed on the four casks. This evaluation concludes that fuel cladding in the affected casks is not adversely affected since the fuel cladding temperature will not exceed the fuel cladding design limit of 400 degrees centigrade.
"Furthermore, the fuel assembly exposure assumed in the dose calculations bounds the exposure of the loaded fuel assemblies. Radiation levels of stored casks are within Cask Technical Specification limits and there are no radiation anomalies. Reactivity parameters are not affected by the errors identified.
"There has been no impact on occupational dose and all surveillance parameters are within acceptance limits. All four casks are currently considered operable and performing their intended safety function."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44309 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE GORDY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 06/20/2008
Notification Time: 00:15 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/2008
Event Time: 17:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION INOPERABLE
"At 17:35 hours on June 19, 2008, the Control Room authorized post maintenance testing following replacement of solenoid valves affecting the 2B Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem. This testing was required to restore this Subsystem to OPERABLE following maintenance. This test inputs a Simulated high radiation signal into the logic for Control Building HVAC system and ensures that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation subsystem automatically aligns to the Radiation/Smoke Protection mode. During performance of this test, the Control Building Exhaust Fan Damper (2D) failed to close and the associated Control Building Exhaust Fan failed to trip as expected. These functions are required to occur to maintain a positive pressure in the Control Building during a high radiation in the Control Building ventilation intake plenum or during smoke intrusion into the Control Building. Since Brunswick has a shared control room, Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3,'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System,' Required Action B.1 (i.e., be in Mode 3 within 12 hours).
"At 1910, the 2A Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem was manually placed in the Radiation/Smoke Protection mode. This action fulfilled the Control Room Emergency Ventilation safety function and allowed the 2A Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem to be declared OPERABLE. Required Action B.1 of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 (be in Mode 3 within 12 hours) was exited.
"This report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition with the Control Building Exhaust Damper (20) is intermittent. The solenoid valve for this damper was recently replaced on 5/3/2008. The post maintenance test included ensuring this damper would close on demand and was completed satisfactory. In addition, this same test was performed on the other division of CREV logic on 5/17/2008, the Control Building Exhaust Damper and Exhaust Fan functioned as required. In addition, the exhaust damper and fan operated properly, when manually operated from the Control Room, while manually placing the CREV system in service.
"All systems functioned as required except for the Control Building exhaust fan.
"2A Control Building Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem placed in the Radiation/Smoke. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Repair options for the Control Building Exhaust Damper are being developed." | |