Event Notification Report for October 9, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/05/2007 - 10/09/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43681 43682 43685 43691 43692 43693 43694 43695 43696 43697 43698 43699
43701 43702

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43681
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 3
City: FOND DU LAC State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERYL K. ROGERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/02/2007
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

WISCONSIN AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NDC GAUGE FOUND IN SCRAP YARD


The following Agreement State report from Wisconsin was received via Facsimile:

"License No.: Non-licensee

"Licensee: Non-licensee

"Event Location: Gorden Schneider Property

"Event Type: Scrap Yard Detector

"Notifications: Phone call from Sadoff yard on 9/28/07.


"DHFS was contacted on 9/28/07 concerning a rejected load from Sadoff scrap yard in Fond du Lac. The yard made the initial contact and had the individual with the load talk to DHFS before leaving the yard. A hand monitor (survey) gave radiation reading of 200 microR/hr on the outside of the trailer. A metal tank was observed where the reading was noted. He was told to off load and cover it with plastic until DHFS responds. The individual with the rejected load contacted DHFS on 10/01/07 requesting what to do about the load. Evidently, the individual had made a second attempt to sell the material to Sadoff. When contacted, he reported there were CRM labels on the device. It was reported to be about a foot long, with 8 prongs and 3 fins. A label stated that it was sold under Gen. Lic. No. CL 1933-70. The label for NDC listed Duarte, CA, 91010. The individual was requested to not handle the device and to place it in a secure location.

"No information on this device was in the DHFS GL database. DHFS contacted NDC and was informed that it was a Model 103 with 150 mCi of AM-241. The gauge had been sold to Sabee Co, 1718 West Eighth St, Appleton, WI on 12/12/85. The last contact that NDC had with the gauge was 11/20/95. A call was made to Sabee Co in Appleton. An individual there reported that the company was divided in 2002 and management changed in 2003. The company used to do film extrusion. The individual promised to follow up with someone who had been there for a long time and might remember more about the film extrusion process. Contact nos. were given to two former owners. DHFS plans to investigate on October 3, 2007."

Media attention: None


Event Report ID No.: WI070026.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43682
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: SPOKANE State: WA
County:
License #: WN-L035-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/02/2007
Notification Time: 11:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2007
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received via email:

"Subject: Event Report Number WA-07-084

"This is notification of an event in Washington State as reported to or investigated by the WA Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection.

"STATUS: new

"Licensee: Washington State Department of Transportation Eastern Region
"City and State: Spokane, Washington
"License Number: WN-L035-1
"Type of License: Portable Gauge Licensee

"Date of Event: 28 September 2007
"Location of Event: Spokane, Washington

"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (DOH) on-site investigation; media attention):

"The licensee's radiation safety officer notified Washington Department of Health (DOH) on 01 October 2007 their Troxler portable gauge, model 3430, serial number 36039 (containing maximum of 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241:Be) was run over on 28 September 2007 by a small roller during road repair. The gauge did not have the probe extended when struck. The gauge user immediately notified their radiation safety officer and the RSO's supervisor; radiation surveys detected no elevated radiation levels, so the licensee decided to transport the device to their storage area and inform Washington DOH the following workday, Monday 01 October 2007. It was reported that only superficial damage was done to the plastic case of the gauge. The gauge was put back in the transport case and sent back to its secured storage location. Department staff are investigating.


"Washington (DOH) on-site investigation underway.

"No known media attention.

"Notification Reporting Criteria:

"Per WAC 246-221-250 (2) (d) ~ Twenty-four (24) hour notice required for equipment failure or inability to function as designed.

"Isotope and Activity involved: one Troxler model 3430, serial 36039 portable gauge, containing two radioactive sealed sources, one 8 millicuries Cs-137 maximum, & one 40 millicuries Am-241:Be maximum.

"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Unknown but most likely not. The unit was functioning properly on 28 September 2007. Dose rate measurements by the licensee after the gauge was rolled over detected no elevated radiation fields.

"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): one Troxler model 3430, serial 36039 portable gauge, containing two radioactive sealed sources, one 8 millicuries Cs-137 maximum, & one 40 millicuries Am-241:Be maximum.

"Disposition/recovery: NA

"Leak test? Most recent leak test was collected on 18 January 2007 (no contamination, < 0.000002 microcuries).

"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) NA
"Release of activity? NA
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: NA Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: NA
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? NA
"Was written report provided? NA
"Was referring physician notified? NA

"Consultant used? No."

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Hospital Event Number: 43685
Rep Org: CARILION CLINIC
Licensee: CARILION CLINIC
Region: 1
City: ROANOKE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-25395-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE SURACE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/03/2007
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2006
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(3) - DOSE TO OTHER SITE > SPECIFIED LIMITS
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING HIGHER THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE

On August 31, 2006 a female patient received mammosite treatment for a breast lesion using a HDR with an Ir-192 source. The treatment consisted of placing a catheter into the treatment site, inflating a balloon with between 35-75 ml saline and positioning the Ir-192 source inside the catheter into the center volume of the saline balloon. This allows for a homogenous dose to the treatment site. While in the OR (Operating Room), the catheter was inserted and saline introduced through one of the two catheter connections to inflate the balloon. The patient was taken to the HDR location where the technologist inadvertently connected the HDR to the saline vice the HDR connector. This resulted in draining the saline balloon into the HDR unit. The technologist recognized that the HDR was improperly connected, broke the connection and reconnected to the proper port. When the prescribed 416 second treatment was commenced, the HDR automatically shutdown after 223 seconds retracting the Ir-192 source to the safe position. An evaulation by the licensee concluded that the incident was not reportable since it did not meet the criteria for an underdose.

During an inspection conducted 7/26/07 (Inspection Report No. 2007-001), the NRC Inspector noted that since the saline balloon had been inadvertently drained tissue in a .5 cubic centimeter volume adjacent to the source received a significantly higher dose (approximately 20 Gray) than prescribed. In a followup call from NRC Region I on 10/03/07, the licensee was requested to notify the NRC Operations Center of this finding.

The licensee informed the prescribing physician and the patient was also notified. No adverse effects to the patient have been noted.

A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43691
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: KEYMASTER
Region: 4
City: KENNEWICK State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0282-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/04/2007
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2004
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
NADER MAMISH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE

"Keymaster's Radiation Safety Officer reported they had recently (in September 2004) received a batch of eleven Cobalt 57, foil sources, Model PHI-0106, from Isotope Products Laboratory. One of the eleven sources failed its receipt leak test. The others were tested and were not leaking.

The State of Washington provided the following information via e-mail:

"The contaminated foil source had Serial Number B9-774 and had an activity of 437 megabecquerels (11.8 millicuries). When wiped, the level of contamination was about 500 counts per minute above background. The source may have been leaking or could have had residual contamination; this was never determined. The source was returned to the supplier.

"The work areas and personnel were surveyed and found uncontaminated.

"No media attention at present.

"Subsequent inspections by DOH performed 10/31/2005 and 9/21/2006 found no contamination and no additional reoccurrences of receiving contaminated sources.

"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250

"Isotope and Activity involved: Cobalt 57, 437 mBq (11.8 mCi).

There were no overexposures. The leaking source was an Isotope Products Laboratories XRF source Model PHI-0106, S/N B7-461. The leaking source was wiped down to 416 counts, placed back into its shield. It was returned to supplier.

There was minor contamination in the source storage area. The licensee has since cleaned the area. Wipe surveys performed by the licensee and DOH showed no contamination.

State of Washington Event Report # WA-04-042.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43692
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/05/2007
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2007
Event Time: 04:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 96 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF BOTH EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMPS

"On October 5, 2007, at approximately 0408, while attempting to open 480 VAC breaker 1B4234A/B for preplanned maintenance, a loss of bus 1B42 occurred. The preliminary cause of the bus trip was arcing of the bucket stabs/bus bars when opening the door to breaker 1B4234A/B. The arcing was a result of the breaker bucket inadvertently pulling away from the bus. At the time of this event, the 'A' Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump was out of service for preplanned maintenance. The loss of 1B42 resulted in a loss of the 'B' ESW pump. The 'A' ESW pump was subsequently returned to service at 0458 on October 5, 2007. Note that power was conservatively lowered approximately 4% at 0512. At the time of this power reduction, the plant was not in a Technical Specification that would require a plant shutdown.

"In addition to the loss of the 'B' ESW pump, the loss of 1B42 resulted in invalid Group 1-5 isolations on the 'B' side of PCIS (not including Main Steam Line Isolation Valves).

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Any event or condition that alone at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee has not yet determined if this is a mechanical failure of the breaker or a human error. However, they are looking at OE associated with this issue.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43693
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DARIN BENYAK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/05/2007
Notification Time: 17:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2007
Event Time: 09:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
MARVIN SYKES (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to Byron, Limerick, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom, and Three Mile Island has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector at the affected plants.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43694
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ALAN BROUGH
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/05/2007
Notification Time: 18:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2007
Event Time: 06:17 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43695
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE GORDY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/05/2007
Notification Time: 21:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2007
Event Time: 18:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
WYATT (DOE)
CASTO (FEMA)
AMANDA (USDA)
CDC-INFO ALAN (HHS)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL WHILE OFFLOADING A TANKER TRUCK

"At 17:20 the Brunswick Station control room was notified of a sodium hypochlorite spill. Approximately 300 gallons of a 15% solution was released to the environment through a faulty hose fitting at a tanker truck before it could be isolated. The state is required to be notified of any hazardous chemical release greater than or equal to 100 pounds (64 gallons of a 15% sodium hypochlorite solution corresponds to 100 pounds). The North Carolina State Division of Water Quality was notified of the event at 18:47 as required by 40 CFR 355.40. The US Coast Guard (report number 850864) and Brunswick County were also notified of the event.

"Minimal impact to the environment. No impact to the health and safety of the public. No impact to plant safety or operations."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 43696
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/06/2007
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2007
Event Time: 16:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
NADER MAMISH (FSME)

Event Text

PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION (PGLD) SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 1643 CDST, on 10-05-07 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that an alarm was received for the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 8 UF6 [Process Gas Leak] Detection (PGLD) System. Operators responded and found that the READY and MANUAL lights for this system were not illuminated. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover C-333 Unit 6 Cell 8 and Section 4 of the cell bypass piping. At the time of this alarm, unit 6 cell 8 and some areas of Section 4 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure."

Electricians are currently troubleshooting to determine the source of the potential short circuit that caused the problem.

"[Technical Safety Requirement] (TSR) 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell and in each defined section of the cell bypass are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 6 Cell 8 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required cell heads and only 2 of the required 3 heads in Section 4 of the cell bypass were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.C.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour.

"Engineering has determined that the system would not have been able to perform its intended safety function when this alarm came in. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when:

"a. The equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident;

"b. the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand; and

"c. no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-07-2655; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-15; Responsible Division: Operations."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43697
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN ARONSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/06/2007
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/2007
Event Time: 10:59 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO CONDENSER TUBE RUPTURE

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"On October 6, 2007, at approximately 10:59 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Unit 2 plant operators manually tripped the reactor from approximately 100% rated thermal power. The reactor was tripped when sodium levels in both steam generators reached trip criteria following a condenser tube rupture. Unit 2 was at normal temperature and pressure prior to the trip. All CEAs inserted fully into the reactor core. This was an uncomplicated reactor trip.

"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The offsite power grid is stable. No significant LCOs have been entered as a result of this event. There was no loss of normal heat removal capabilities, or loss of any safety functions associated with this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. "

No PORVs or MSSVs lifted. Decay heat is being removed with Auxiliary Feedwater feeding the steam generators steaming to the condenser. There are no primary to secondary tube leaks in the steam generators. Emergency buses are powered by offsite power with Emergency Diesel Generators in standby.

"The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector was informed of the Unit 2 reactor trip and this notification."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43698
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL DUVALL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/07/2007
Notification Time: 01:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2007
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF PROMPT NOTIFICATION MESSAGE SYSTEM

"Jacksonville National Weather Service does not have the capability to broadcast prompt notification messages due to phone lines or system problem at this time. Plant Hatch security notified the Operations Shift Manager at 0115 hour to notify NRC. Also, site Emergency Preparedness on call person has been contacted and security has notified the state and local agencies. Information Technology (IT) has been notified of problem."

Compensatory measures performed by the local emergency response agencies will be used if needed.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY BILL DUVALL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0345 EDT ON 10/07/07 * * *

The Jacksonville National Weather Service has restored the capability to broadcast prompt notification messages effective 0344 EDT on 10/07/07.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state and local emergency response agencies. Notified R2DO (Evans).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43699
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE HIMEBAUCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/07/2007
Notification Time: 05:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2007
Event Time: 01:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE EXCEEDED

"At 0114 EDT on 10/7/07, Fermi 2 feed water line check valves, B2100-F010B and B2100-F076B, failed their local leak rate tests. The leakage rate of the inboard check valve (B2100-F010B) was 297.3 SCFH and the leakage rate of the outboard check valve (B2100-F076B) was indeterminate due to leakage exceeding the capability of the leak rate monitor. Thus, the minimum path leakage through penetration X-9B is 297.3 SCFH. This leak rate exceeds the Primary Containment allowable leakage rate (1.0 La) of 296.3 SCFH per Tech. Spec. 5.5.12. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

The licensee is reporting a degraded safety function associated with the primary containment barrier. The licensee intends to repair the leaking valve and retest it prior to any mode change. There is no LCO associated with this condition because the licensee is in mode 5.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43701
Rep Org: AREVA NP INC.
Licensee: AREVA NP INC.
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERALD HOLM
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/08/2007
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2007
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
MARVIN SYKES (R1)
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
JOHN THORP (NRR)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - AREVA MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:

"The defect is in the calculation of steady-state core Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) by the core monitoring system when the SPCB critical power correlation is used for ATRIUM-10 fuel. Specifically, the defect is in the additive constants, a parameter used by the SPCB critical power calculation and based on test data." AREVA notified the affected plants.

Affected Plants:
Browns Ferry, Units 2 & 3
Columbia
Grand Gulf
LaSalle, Units 1 & 2
River Bend
Susquehanna, Units 1 & 2

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 43702
Rep Org: ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL
Licensee: ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 13-00133-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED WROBLEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/08/2007
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
NADER MAMISH (FSME)

Event Text

POTENTIAL PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE

A representative of Landauer (the optically stimulated dosimeter provider) reported to the hospital that a person on the hospital staff received a 113,165 millirem deep dose whole body reading for the reporting period of 8/1/07 - 8/31/07. The shallow dose reading was 107,506 millirem. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) contacted the individual with the high dose reading. The individual said that he had no ill health effects so he believed the reading was not correct. The individual said that he normally wears his dosimeter attached to a lanyard that he wears around his neck. He did remember one day when a therapist brought him his dosimeter from a linear accelerator room. The individual did not recall leaving his dosimeter in the room.

The RSO talked to a representative of Landauer about distinguishing between a potential dose from an accelerator and other doses the individual may have received from performing his duties but this could not be definitively done.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021