|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/06/2007 - 02/07/2007
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42962 |
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PACIFIC ECOSOLUTIONS (PECOS)
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0393-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKEL J. ELSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON |
Notification Date: 11/03/2006
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2006
Event Time: 10:20 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS) |
Event Text
WASHINGTON STATE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
This event was received via e-mail
"On November 1, three workers were involved in separating sources, lead pigs (shielded containers) and trash from a barrel. Work was being conducted in a ventilated enclosure within a PEcoS waste processing building. Two workers inside the enclosure were wearing respirators and the supervisor (not wearing a respirator) was immediately outside the enclosure directing the work. At the end of the day, the supervisor noted he was contaminated. The supervisor was scheduled for whole-body counting at the Battelle facility early the next day. An uptake of approximately 11.7 nanocuries of Americium 241 was confirmed. The preliminary dose estimate to the individual's lung was 97.5 Rem CDE. The individual was started on chelation treatment. The other two workers were sent for whole body counting on November 3.
"The operation included opening one lead pig that contained three Am-241 sources. Contamination previously had not been detected outside the pig or in the trash. Sources were surveyed for dose rate and separated from the lead pig without contamination smears being taken. No release to the public or the environment occurred. Operations in this and adjacent areas were stopped once the situation was known. An investigation was initiated by PEcoS. The area was evacuated and is currently being ventilated. DOH has an inspector on-site performing an incident investigation.
"Media is aware of the incident.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. One worker has an apparent over exposure of 97.5 Rem CDE to the Lung. No release to public or environment."
* * * UPDATE FROM WASHINGTON STATE (FRAZEE) TO HUFFMAN VIA E-MAIL AT 1746 ON 11/16/06 * * *
"On November 1, three workers were involved in separating sources, lead pigs (shielded containers) and trash from a barrel. Work was being conducted in a ventilated room, (previously reported as an enclosure within the room) within a PEcoS waste processing building. Two workers inside the room were wearing respirators and the supervisor (not wearing a respirator) was immediately outside the room directing the work. A very high contamination level was detected (greater than 2 million dpm/wipe) in the room at about 10:00, and the building was evacuated shortly after that. At about this time, an air sample that was in the area of the workers was counted and determined to have a very high alpha activity (10 E-9 µCi/ml). The supervisor and the workers were taken to a survey area and found to be contaminated on the face. Contamination was detected on the respirators. The workers were successfully decontaminated by the on site health physics department. The supervisor was scheduled for whole-body counting at the Battelle facility early the next day. An uptake of approximately 11.7 nanocuries of Americium 241 was confirmed. The preliminary dose estimate was 97.5 Rem CDE. The individual was started on chelation treatment. The other two workers were sent for whole body counting on November 3. Subsequent counts on the first individual were lower (about 9nCi), and the subsequent 2 workers follow-up counts decreased from about 6.9nCi to 3.2nCi and from 1.5nCi to 0.5nCi. The final dose received will depend on the efficiency of the chelate treatment and other factors. One additional person who was in the building was analyzed for internal Am-241 contamination, and was found to be <0.092nCi, below the detection limit of the instrument.
"The operation included opening one lead pig that contained three Am-241 sources. Contamination previously had not been detected outside the pig or in the trash. Sources were surveyed for dose rate and separated from the lead pig without contamination smears being taken. Operations in this and adjacent areas were stopped once the situation was known. An investigation was initiated by PEcoS. The area was evacuated and is currently being ventilated. DOH has an inspector on-site performing an incident investigation.
Update as of 14 November:
"The three employees are still being treated with a chelating agent. This week should be the last week. At this time, there is no update on the original activity or the activity left in the body, except that the amount of activity in the lung is decreasing. It will be several weeks before the final dose can be calculated by the licensee's consultants, which will be based on the initial lung count, the bioassay results (urine/fecal), and the effectiveness of the chelate at removing the americium from the body. At this point, we assume there are three individuals who may have exceeded their annual dose limit of 50 Rem to the bone. The final dose received by the three individuals will be calculated when sufficient information is accumulated. The three workers have returned to work exhibiting some emotional stress and slight effects from the medical treatments.
Plant Status
"The plant is being restarted incrementally after a safety shutdown imposed by the company. After DOH approval, two process lines have been restarted: the super compactor on the mixed waste side of operations and an inspection and sorting process, also on the mixed waste side. The licensee is completing items identified on the mixed waste thermal systems safety evaluation, and expects to restart those processes in the next few days. In addition, they are completing items identified on the low level thermal systems, but a restart date is pending. The low level processes that were affected by this accident are not being restarted, until the contamination in the building is controlled. The building that the material is in is being decontaminated, and continues to be a respirator area. The contaminated room is still inaccessible, however, a plan was completed to re-enter the room to assess the extent of the contamination. This initial entry was conducted on 11-14-06 by senior members of the Health Physics staff. As a result of the surveys conducted during the reentry, the extent of the problem they face is better understood. A plan is being developed to decontaminate the room.
"The investigation is continuing, and the actual cause of the event does not appear to be a single cause, but rather compounding mistakes, errors in judgment and complacency for the seriousness of this type material. Corrective actions that are being taken by the licensee at this time, are primarily based on self evaluation, using the workers and technical staff. In addition, at this time DOH is requiring the company to retrain the radiological technicians as well as the workers in the different waste processes prior to restart of any process. DOH is working with the company to identify the root causes of this incident.
"No release to public or environment. Air sample analysis results for a particulate sample in the building exhaust stack was 9.2E-3 µCi/ml gross alpha.
"The building is being decontaminated, and additional containment tents are being installed around the contaminated room.
"Media is aware of the incident. Tri-City Herald (Kennewick Washington) article was published November 4, 2006.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. The first worker had an initial internal deposition result of 11.7 nCi. Two additional workers have been confirmed as having an internal deposition: initial results were 6.9 nCi and 1.5 nCi. Subsequent counts of all three involved personnel were lower. All three workers were given chelating treatment. The final dose will be calculated by the Battelle internal dosimetry program, following extensive testing. Other workers who were in the area are being tested. The estimated dose to the endosteal (white bone matter) from 11.7nCi is about 95 rem CDE."
R4DO (Johnson) and NMSS EO (Camper) notified.
Washington State Report # WA-06-063.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/06/07 AT 1600 EST VIA E-MAIL FROM MIKEL ELSEN TO MACKINNON * * *
"Update as of 5 February, 2007
"From the Department of Health's investigation into this incident, it appears that the root cause of the event was failure to adhere to procedures and plans set forth for the project, and inadequate training. Preliminary corrective actions taken by the licensee to prevent recurrence are disciplinary action to the employees involved for procedure and policy violations, a functional Alpha CAM was put in service, training performed for all staff working with radioactive material, with follow-up testing. Additionally, a reorganization of the facility which relieves the RSO of numerous tasks not related to Radiation Safety has taken place, and the facility has made a new position Special Project Lead who is assigned to work with HP and Operations Staff on special projects and compile lessons etc. The final exposure to the individuals has not yet been assigned. When the DTPA treatments have been determined done then exposures will be able to be assigned. Currently it is anticipated that the final dose calculation will be assigned by the end of February 2007. The amount of Am-241 activity in the involved drum was manifested as 71 millicuries Am-241."
R4DO (Nease) & NMSS (Greg Morell) notified. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43129 |
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: AQUATERRA ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: RIDGELAND State: MS
County: MADISON
License #: MS-724-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOBBY SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON |
Notification Date: 01/29/2007
Notification Time: 12:31 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
ILTAB (e-mailed)) () |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
MISSISSIPPI AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE
Following Agreement State Report was received via e-mail
"Description of Incident: DRH received notification on 1-28-07 from Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) about a Troxler Model 3411 M/D gauge, Serial # 9533, that had been reported stolen. The gauge belonged to Aquaterra Engineering. The RSO was contacted and he stated that the gauge had been locked in a tool box. The tool box was not big enough to put the shipping container in it also, so the shipping container was in the bed of the truck. The RSO stated that the lock was cut on the tool box allowing the gauge to be removed. He also stated that the gauge's source rod was locked. Issued press release on 1-29-07.
"Date of Incident: Sometime between 1-26-07 and 1-28-07
"Isotope(s): Cesium-137, 8 millicuries; & Americium-241:Be, 40 millicuries.
"Describe clean-up actions taken by DRH: None required.
"List any other actions required of DRH: Licensee will be required to send a written report of stolen gauge within 30 days.
"List any actions taken to notify NRC, other Agreement States: Notified Meridian, MS, Police Department. Notified Lauderdale County Emergency Management. Notified NRC by E-mail. Notified Alabama Radiation Control by phone. Mississippi Department of Health issued press release.
"Case Closed: No
"Record of incident in RAM files: Yes
"Enforcement action taken: Investigation ongoing."
Incident No. MS 07001
* * * UPDATE ON 02/06/07 AT 1235 EST VIA E-MAIL FROM BOBBY SMITH TO MACKINNON * * *
"Gauge found on 2-5-07 by unidentified citizen in a garbage dumpster. Notified Meridian Police Department & DRH was contacted. DRH sent inspector to pick up device. Device was undamaged and still locked. DRH returned device to owner on 2-6-07.
"Describe clean-up actions taken by DRH: None required initially. After found device was retrieved by DRH so leak test could be done. No leakage or contamination detected.
"List radiation measurements taken by DRH: After found device was surveyed and determined normal readings @ 13 Mr/hr surface.
"List any other actions required of DRH: Licensee will be required to send a report of stolen gauge within 30 days.
"List any actions taken to notify NRC, other Agreement States: Notified Meridian, MS Police Department. Notified Lauderdale County Emergency Management. Notified NRC by E-mail. Notified Alabama Radiation Control by phone. Mississippi Department of Health issued press release 1-29-07.
"Case Closed: No
'Record of incident in RAM files: Yes
"Enforcement action taken: Investigation ongoing"
R4DO (Nease) & NMSS EO (Greg Morell) notified. E-mailed to ILTAB.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43144 |
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN FINCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON |
Notification Date: 02/05/2007
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/05/2007
Event Time: 04:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
98 |
Power Operation |
98 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF STACK EFFLUENT MONITORING CAPABILITY
"At 0430 on 2/5/07, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 determined that the capability to determine effluent radioactivity going out the stack has been lost. It is postulated that this is likely due to moisture in the primary and auxiliary sampling line which has frozen and blocking the flow of effluent to the sample analysis equipment.
"Compensatory actions include monitoring alternate indications of increased radioactivity in the plant effluent steams. A method has been proceduralized to sum systems that input to the stack. Portions of the systems required for monitoring plant effluents are currently out of service for preventive maintenance. It is expected that they will be returned to service by 1700 hours today." The State of New York will be notified of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
See similar event # 43125 reported by Nine Mile Point Unit 1 on 01/26/07
* * * UPDATE ON 02/06/07 AT 1615 EST BY BRIAN FINCH TO MACKINNON * * *
"The systems required for compensatory actions using alternate indications for monitoring plant effluents for the backup methodology previously reported out of service for preventative maintenance were returned to service as of 12:00 EST 2/05/07" R1DO (Bill Cook) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. |
| Hospital |
Event Number: 43145 |
Rep Org: UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA HOSPITAL
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTESVILLE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-00034-26
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBBY STEVA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON |
Notification Date: 02/05/2007
Notification Time: 13:56 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2007
Event Time: 18:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE |
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS) |
Event Text
MEDICAL EVENT - PATIENT RECEIVED AN UNDERDOSE
"A FS (Tandem and ovoid) device was loaded into a patient for Cs-137 brachytherapy of the cervix on Friday Feb 2, 2007. The written directive was for 3000 cGy to Pt A in 48.5 hours. Upon removal of the device on Sunday Feb 4, 2007 at approximately 5PM it was observed that the plastic tube used to hold the Cs sources in the tandem was not of the standard length: it was short by approximately 4 cm. The consequence of this would be that the tandem sources would not have been in the position planned. The patient received an underdose to Point A of 760 cGy vs. the 3000 cGy that had been prescribed. Follow-up treatment is planned to correct for this underdose. Clinically, according to the physician, the dose the patient received to distal vaginal would not be expected to cause adverse reactions. "
* * * UPDATE FROM FLANNERY (FSME) TO HUFFMAN VIA E-MAIL AT 1218 EST ON 2/06/07 * * *
This event has been reviewed by the NRC medical review committee and determined to be a reportable medical event.
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43146 |
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER |
Notification Date: 02/06/2007
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2006
Event Time: 21:43 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INVALID EFW ACTUATIONS DUE TO AN ISSUE IN SG DRYOUT PROTECTION CIRCUIT
"This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address two actuations of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System on Oconee Unit 1 on 12/8/06 by the Steam Generator (SG) Dry-out Protection Circuit. EFW is a system named in 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
"By design, the SG Dry-out Protection Circuit actuates whenever two Extended Start-up level indications (two of two actuation logic) in either SG are lower than the setpoint (i.e. below 21 inches) for more than 30 seconds. This start circuit is not credited in Oconee safety analyses as performing a required safety function, therefore this signal is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). Upon actuation, the circuit starts both Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pumps (MD EFWPs) on the affected unit. It does not send a start signal to the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump.
"Per the startup procedure, Condensate Booster Pumps (CBP) feed the SGs until a main Feedwater pump (FDWP) is placed in service. Operators begin startup of a FDWP when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature is between ~395 degrees to 475 degrees. The Unit is then maintained at ~ 475 degrees RCS temperature and 500 - 550 psig SG pressure until a FDWP is in service.
"On 12/8/06, a Unit 1 startup from a refueling outage was in progress. RCS temperature was approximately 475 deg. (Mode 3) when the RCS heat-up was suspended due to issues with the 1A FDWP Turbine which delayed placing it in service. Steam pressure was being maintained approximately 530 psig (in the procedural band of 500-550 psig) per the unit startup procedure. In addition, a 'SG Hot Soak' was in progress. For this evolution, SG level was raised to 75% (Operating Range) then Operators took manual control to individually blow down 1A and the 1B SGs to low levels (25 inches) while attempting to maintain level above 21 inches.
"During this evolution, 1B SG levels decreased below minimum level. Operators initiated actions to recover level but at 2143 the 1A and the 1B MD EFW Pumps auto-started on dry-out protection. From their observation of the level displays, the Operators thought that the actuation logic had not been met (i.e. level had not been less that 21 inches for 30 seconds). Therefore they considered the actuation to be spurious. Based on this understanding and concerns about possible overfeeding and RCS overcooling (due to the relatively low decay heat load starting up from a refueling outage), EFW was secured and reset at 2144.
"SG Blowdown activities continued per procedure. At 2207, in response to lowering 1A SG levels, the dry-out protection feature again initiated an auto start of the 1 A and 1 B MD EFW Pumps. Based on his review of SG levels, the CR SRO believed that the second EFW actuation was invalid and directed that EFW be secured. EFW was secured and reset at 2208. At 2241 hrs SG outlet pressure was lowered and maintained within a band of 490-520 psig.
"Subsequent review of computer data indicated that a dry-out condition (i.e. less than 21 inches SG level for 30 seconds) did exist for both actuations. Therefore both actuations were valid in that actual plant conditions satisfied the initiation criteria, but, as stated above, the SG Dry-out Protection signal is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).
"Additional review by Mechanical-Civil Engineering personnel determined that the Unit 1 CBPs operate at approximately 15 psig lower discharge pressure than the Unit 2 and 3 CBPs, apparently due to lower discharge pressures on the Unit 1 Hotwell pumps. That being the case, the Unit 2 and 3 CBPs, apparently due to lower discharge pressures on the Unit 1 Hotwell pumps. That being the case, the Unit 1 CBPs in service could not develop sufficient head pressure to maintain adequate flow to the SGs over the full operating operating band of 500 - 550 psig allowed by current operating procedure guidance. As steam pressures approached or exceeded 535 psig, the ability to feed the SGs using the CBPs was reduced, ultimately leading to the dry-out condition.
"The issue of these pump discharge pressures being slightly lower than expected had not been recognized previous to this event. The event investigation noted that during past startups, a main FDWP was normally placed into service promptly, which may have avoided using the CBPs to feed the SG above 535 psig. In this case, alignment of a main FDWP was delayed, which led to the event.
"Specific Information Required per NUREG 1022:
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated were the 1 A and 1 B Motor Driven (MD) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pumps and the associated A and B trains of EFW. The Turbine Driven EFW pump does not receive this signal and was not challenged by the event.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"Both actuations were considered complete (i.e. all necessary components responded to the start signal and associated control signals to provide EFW to the SG(s)).
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"In both cases, the system started and operated successfully until secured by Operations personnel.
"Initial Safety Significance: None, there was no significant transient.
"Corrective Action(s): As stated above, EFDW was secured and reset at 2208. At 2241 hrs SG outlet pressure was lowered and maintained within a band of 490-520 psig. Unit 1 continued startup and subsequently reached Mode 1. This event has been entered into the site corrective action program for resolution."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43148 |
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBIN BELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 02/06/2007
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2007
Event Time: 10:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY |
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
A licensed employee (currently inactive) had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43149 |
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 02/06/2007
Notification Time: 19:08 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2007
Event Time: 14:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"The Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable at 1957 on 02/03/07 due to W-14B, 'F-16 Control Room Charcoal Filter Fan,' being declared inoperable during monthly Technical Specification surveillance testing. Upon subsequent investigation of the inoperability of the W-14B fan, the W-14A fan was declared inoperable at 1415 CST on 02/06/07. The cause of the failure of the fans is under investigation.
"These fans are required to be operable to support operability of the CREFS System. This condition is covered by TS 3.7.9 'Control Room Emergency Filtration System' and both units have entered Action Condition A 'CREFS Inoperable,' with a Required Action to 'Restore CREFS to an OPERABLE Status' by 1957 CST on 02/10/07.
"Although the W-14 fans are redundant, CREFS is a single train system. Based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 for single train systems that perform safety functions, this condition was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' Additionally, the failure places PBNP CREFS in a degraded condition that significantly affects plant safety under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 'Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
|