| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/22/2006 - 12/26/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 43061 | Rep Org: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
Licensee: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
Region: 1
City: BETHESDA State: MD
County:
License #: 19-00296-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT ZOON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/22/2006
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2006
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST VIAL CONTAINING PHOSPHORUS-32
"This is a report of the loss of licensed material in accordance with 10CFR20.2201.
"1. The licensed material consisted of a single packaged vial of Alpha-Adenosine Triphosphate (a-ATP) which contained 250 microcuries (9.25 MBq) of Phosphorus-32 (Half-life=14.3 days). The product is supplied by GE Healthcare, product number PT10160. The volume of the product was 25 microliters.
"2. On December 1, 2006 a box containing three separate shielded vials of the product described in (1) above was delivered to a technician in the Clinical Research Center, 5th floor, Room 3288. Some time later, the Authorized User [AU] unpacked the box, but only retrieved two of the three product packages from the dry ice within the Styrofoam chest, because the third package was below the remaining dry ice. The AU then defaced the radioactive materials labels on the delivery box and placed the box containing the remaining vial for pickup as regular trash. The AU did not discover the error until December 4, 2006, too late to attempt retrieval from the regular trash dumpster.
"3. The disposition of the material is to the regular trash stream through the Montgomery Country, MD refuse transfer station in Rockville, MD.
"4. We have no reason to believe that this loss of licensed material resulted in exposure to anyone. The P-32 labeled ATP is in a very small volume of liquid, shielded by a sturdy Lucite plastic vial shield, encased in a sealed vinyl plastic outer containment. Furthermore, that assembly was in a thick-walled Styrofoam box within the cardboard delivery box. It is highly unlikely that, during the process of transport to, and through the transfer station that the P-32 would have leaked out of containment.
"5. No action was taken to recover the material due the circumstances of loss and the time between loss and discovery of the loss.
"6. No procedures have been modified as a result of this incident. The package insert clearly delineated to the AU that there were 750 microcuries of Alpha-ATP-32 in the shipment, in accordance with what the AU ordered, indicating that three items should have been retrieved from the dry ice. The loss was the result of human error."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43062 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE GORDY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/25/2006
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/25/2006
Event Time: 05:39 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 64 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TRIP FROM NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM
"On 12/25/06 at approximately 05:39 an automatic reactor scram occurred on Brunswick Unit 2. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuated on Neutron Monitoring System (APRM/OPRM) trip for APRM 2 and 4. All control rods properly inserted when the scram occurred from the RPS signal. Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) and low level 2 (LL2) as a result of the scram. The LL1 signal causes a Group 2 (floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolation signal. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed. The LL2 [signal] causes a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system actuation, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system actuation, Group 3 (reactor water cleanup valves) isolation signal, a secondary containment isolation signal, a Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) initiation signal, a Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) initiation signal, Reactor Recirculation Pump trip and an Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) actuation signal. The low level 2 condition was reached momentarily and did not affect all instruments due to calibration differences. Initial assessment concludes that the appropriate LL2 isolations and actuations occurred as designed. Further evaluation of LL2 isolation and actuations will be conducted. The RCIC system actuation resulted in injection into the reactor as designed. The HPCI system actuated but did not inject because reactor water level was recovered. The plant is in a stable condition. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the Neutron Monitoring System trip."
RCIC started momentarily and then was secured. Reactor water level being maintained via normal feedwater system. Decay heat being removed through the bypass valves. Normal electrical lineup for shutdown. EDGs available. Unit 1 not affected by this transient.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |