| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/17/2006 - 10/18/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42903 | Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: CAROLINA TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC
Region: 1
City: NEWBERRY State: SC
County:
License #: 558
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/13/2006
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2006
Event Time: 15:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on Thursday, October 12, 2006, at 3:45 p.m., that a CPN Model MC-1-DRP had been damaged at 3:40 p.m., on October 12, 2006. The RSO stated that the gauge had been run over by a dump truck during a soil compaction test. The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control Duty Officer responded to the scene and arrived at 5:15 p.m. and found the area properly roped off. The source rod was extended and the gauge had sustained considerable damage. The inspector and licensee personnel were able to retract the source rod to the shielded position and place the gauge in the transport container. The inspector advised the RSO to return the gauge to the storage location, secure it from further use, and to contact the gauge manufacturer for further instruction regarding disposal."
A typical CPN Model MC-1-DRP moisture density gauge contains 10 millicuries Cs-137 and 50 millicuries Am-241/Be. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42905 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2783-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/13/2006
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING ABANDONMENT OF TWO SEALED WELL LOGGING SOURCES
The following information was received via fax:
"Event Report ID No.: LA060019
"Event Date and Time: September 21, 2006
"Event Location: East Baton Rouge Parish
"Event Type: Abandonment down hole
"Notifications: LA DEQ
"Event Description: Schlumberger abandoned two sealed radioactive sources down hole. The AEA 63 GBq Cs-137 source, serial number A2371, was abandoned at a depth of 18,887 feet. The Gamatron 592 GBq Am-241:Be source, serial number G4040, was abandoned at a depth of 18,855 feet. Many attempts were made to retrieve the sealed sources from 9/7-21/06. The sealed sources are covered with Premium cement and a cement retainer was set at 18,246 feet. A whipstock was placed on top of the cement retainer at 18,246 feet. An abandonment plaque will be placed on the well. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42908 | Facility: LACROSSE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] AC (ALLIS CHAMBERS)
NRC Notified By: DAN TESAR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/16/2006
Notification Time: 09:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2006
Event Time: 07:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2006 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
TOM BLOUNT (IRD)
G GRAY (DHS)
M EACHES (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT - HIGH AIRBORNE PARTICULATE IN THE REACTOR BUILDING
Even though there have been no operations on going over the weekend, airborne activities have increased to above ten times the normal levels. Activity levels were increasing during work processes last week but did not reach abnormally high levels. The licensee is taking air samples and swipe surveys to determine the source. The element of interest is Americium. Workers entering the building are required to wear filter masks.
* * * UPDATE VIA FAX FROM LICENSEE AT 1250 ON 10/16/06 TO M. ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Conditions at time of incident: SAFSTOR, decommissioning work in progress involving saw-cutting of Upper Control Rod Drive Mechanism (UCRDM) seal inject supply and effluent lines, plasma arc cutting of metal in Reactor Vessel upper cavity, and welding of lifting lugs on Reactor Vessel upper cavity expansion joint structure.
"Description: Thursday afternoon October 12, 2006, air samples of Reactor Building indicated higher levels of Americium-241 (Am-241) than normal. As of Monday morning October 16, 2006, Reactor Building ventilation through HEPA filters had not reduced the level of Am-241 as expected. Unusual Event was declared and investigations commenced to identify source of contamination.
"Immediate evaluation/corrective actions: Upper cavity work was halted Thursday afternoon following the air sample results. It was believed that welding or plasma arc cutting in the upper cavity had created the airborne problem. Air sampling on Friday October 13, 2006, indicated Am-241 levels still remained higher than normal. At that time, all personnel entering the Reactor Building were required to wear respirators. Air sampling continued through the weekend. When Am-241 levels had not decreased to acceptable levels by Monday morning, October 16, 2006, an Unusual Event was declared due to the unexpected nature of the airborne activity, lack of identification of the source of the activity, and activity level being greater than 10 times normal for the nuclide Am-241. Following declaration, the Operations Review Committee (ORC) was convened. Various strategies for identifying the source of the contamination were discussed and established. Surveys were conducted in the Reactor Building basement and the source of the contamination was tentatively identified as effluent from the UCRDM draining that occurred on Thursday morning October 12, 2006. Further analysis and clean-up is in progress."
Notified the R3DO (Skokowski).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN TESAR TO W GOTT AT 0837 ON 10/17/06 * * *
The licensee secured from their Unusual Event at 0727 CDT. The licensee determined the source of the airborne activity, completed decontamination procedures and ventilated though a HEPA filter. Airborne samples are satisfactory.
Notified R3DO (R. Skokowski), NMSS (M. Burgess), IRD (M. Leach), DHS (G. Gray), FEMA (K. Biscoe), and NORAD-NC (Hardaway). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42912 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICKY ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/16/2006
Notification Time: 23:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2006
Event Time: 21:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2006 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
FREDERICK BROWN (NRR)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
HOLZ (DHS)
JIM DUNKER (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT - IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 25 GPM
"At 2126, PBNP Unit 2 had a inadvertent PORV (431C) lift. This was a momentary event, however, a PRT level change of 60 gallons was noticed. This event is classifiable per C.U.1.2 identified leakage greater than 25 GPM on Unit 2."
"This event has been terminated at 2139.
"This event was caused by a momentary loss of power to the PORV controller. Power was immediately restored."
The event was caused when a manually operated breaker (MOB) was inadvertently operated while the licensee was working inside the panels on the "B" train RHR system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local officials.
* * * UPDATE FROM R. RODE TO P. SNYDER ON 10/17/06 AT 1544 * * *
"Unit 2 was in Mode 5 at ~150 psig, ~112 degrees F and the pressurizer (PZR) was in a water-solid condition per plant procedures. The following is a timeline of the event for clarification:
"20:47:49 A manually operated breaker (MOB-281) inadvertently opened while removing a caution tag resulting in an increase of flow in the RHR system.
"20:48:43 MOB-281 was reclosed correcting the RHR flow perturbation, however the adjacent breaker (MOB-282) inadvertently opened due to the vibration of MOB-281 being manipulated. This resulted in the loss of power to the RCS pressure instrumentation providing an input to a power-operated relief valve (PORV) causing the affected PORV to open. The PORV opening provided a flow path from the PZR to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT).
"20:49:06 MOB-282 was reclosed resulting In the PORV shutting and isolating the flow path from the PZR to the PRT.
"20:55 The PRT level indication was checked on the Main Control Board, no change in level was observed as compared to prior to the event.
"While additional actions to stabilize the plant were being taken, the Shift Manager directed additional data to be obtained from the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) regarding PRT parameters as the amount of water transferred was not large enough to be identified on the control board level Indication due to meter resolution.
"21:26 Analysis of the PPCS data indicated that 62.5 gallons of RCS inventory had been transferred from the PZR to the PRT while the PORV was open. It was identified that this exceeded allowable RCS leakage limits, and the Emergency Plan was implemented.
"21:32 An Unusual Event was declared per EAL CU 1.2, identified leakage greater than 25 gpm. It was recognized that this was a transient event and would be promptly terminated as the leakage flow path had been secured.
"21:39 The Unusual Event was terminated.
"21:43 State and County agencies were notified.
"21:50 NRC Resident notified.
"22:15 1 hour ENS Notification for Unusual Event and subsequent termination completed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42913 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN RODE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 10/17/2006
Notification Time: 10:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2006
Event Time: 08:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - PRESS RELEASE
"On 10/17/06 at 0832 Nuclear Management Company, LLC issued press release concerning the Unusual Event at Point Beach Nuclear Plant that was declared on 10/16/06 at 21:26 CDT. The Unusual Event was previously reported via EN# 42912 and occurred as a result of a momentary loss of power to the power-operated relief valve (PORV) instrumentation which caused the valve to open. The valve opening resulted in reactor coolant leakage into the pressurizer relief tank. The tank is located in the Unit 2 containment building and is designed to collect water flow from the PORV's. At no time was reactor coolant released outside of the piping systems. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the press release and this subsequent notification." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42914 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY D. COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/17/2006
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2006
Event Time: 10:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"Unit HPCI system declared inoperable. During performance of the quarterly surveillance, HPCI pump operability, the HPCI system was secured when the "HPCI Turbine Oil Pressure Low" alarm was received and confirmed. Turbine governor end bearing oil pressure was 2 PSIG. The alarm setpoint is 6 PSIG and procedure limit is 10-12 PSIG. Pressure adjust valve was throttled open to raise pressure to 11 PSIG. The HPCI system was not immediately declared inoperable since an evaluation was being performed to determine if 2 PSIG turbine bearing oil pressure was adequate. Evaluation by the vendor will not be complete until 10/18/06. At 1655 hours, HPCI declared operable after a successful run with adequate oil pressure. HPCI is a single train system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NRC ON 11/06/06 AT 1106 EST DUE TO EVENT ENTRY ERROR * * *
Original report was entered in error on 10/17/06 with Unit 2 versus Unit 1. Changed EN #42914 to accurately reflect the affected unit (Unit 1). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42915 | Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SWEET
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 10/17/2006
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2006
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED DURING AN OUTAGE
"On October 14th V.C. Summer Nuclear Station shut down for a routine refueling outage. At 1415 on October 17, 2006 during an inspection of the reactor vessel upper head, personnel identified a small leak in a weld in the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS). This weld is located in a 3/4 inch stainless steel instrumentation line. The line is attached to, and is approximately three feet from the reactor vessel head. This leak resulted in a small amount of boron accumulation in an isolated area. There is no indication that any safety systems were affected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY ARNIE CRIBB TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1521 ON 11/04/06 * * *
"EN #42915 was submitted by South Carolina Electric & Gas Company based on the initial indication of a pressure boundary leak in the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS). South Carolina Electric & Gas Company retracts EN #42915 based on the following discussion.
"During subsequent cleaning and inspection of the suspect weld, which was preserved in its as-found condition for root cause analysis, no flaw in the analyzed RVLIS piping or pipe coupling was found. Further investigation was conducted of the area under the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) shroud near the RVLIS line. The source was determined to be leakage through the lower canopy seal weld of CRDM No. 25, which resulted in accumulation of boric acid on the suspect RVLIS line.
"Since the RVLIS line was not leaking and the CRDM canopy connection is a mechanical (screwed) fitting with a seal weld, there has been no pressure boundary leakage as defined by Technical Specifications. The canopy seal weld is neither a structural weld nor a pressure retaining weld comprising the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. A permanent plant design was developed and the canopy seal was repaired using a standard canopy seal clamping process.
"A 100 % bare metal visual inspection of the reactor vessel head was completed during this refueling outage. The results confirmed that there has been no degradation."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Evans) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42916 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SWEET
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 10/17/2006
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2006
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DEGRADED TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SUPPLY FAN
"At 1430 CDST on 10/17/2006 the Control Room was notified by the Site HVAC engineer that a condition existing in the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC called into question the habitability of the TSC under accident conditions. Specifically, the TSC HVAC Supply fan was noted on the previous shift to be putting out less air than normal. Engineering was asked to look into it and discovered that the fan belts were slipping and that the fan was currently running at approximately half normal speed. While this was sufficient to maintain the required positive pressure in the TSC at the present time, they were not confident of it's ability to maintain it long-term under accident conditions. Receipt of this information and consultation with Southern Nuclear Company Emergency Preparedness employees has led the Control Room staff to the decision to make this notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the uncertainty of the long-term habitability of the TSC. Preparations are underway for the repair of the affected fan, which is expected to be completed tonight."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42917 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE HELD
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 10/18/2006
Notification Time: 00:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2006
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text REACTOR VESSEL HEAD NOZZLE WELD AREA FLAW
"During the performance of NDE examinations of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 (BV-2) reactor pressure vessel (RPV) closure head Alloy 600 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) penetrations required by NRC Order (EA-03-009), indications were identified in penetrations #16, #56, and #61. The ultrasonic examination (UT) signal for the three (3) penetrations were in the J-groove weld area and extend into the CRDM tube base material.
"Confirmatory eddy current testing (ECT) was performed on penetrations #16, #56 and #61. Liquid Penetrant (PT) examinations were performed on penetrations #56 and #61 and displayed indications that required further investigation. Following minor excavation of the weld surface in the area of the indications on both penetrations (#56 and #61), additional PT examinations were performed. The result of these examinations on 10/17/06 at 2100 confirmed the presence of flaws in the weld that do not meet acceptance criteria. Penetration #16 is in the state of discovery at this time through PT examination techniques.
"Based upon the preliminary analysis, it is expected that these indications would not be acceptable under ASME standards. Although this condition does not exceed the specific 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) criteria since there was no leakage as addressed in ASME Table IWB-3410-1 acceptance criteria and the component structures defined in the ASME IWB-3600 acceptance guidance do not address the J-groove weld configuration, reporting under voluntary considerations is appropriate.
"BV-2 is planning to repair penetrations #56 and #61. Penetration #16 will also be repaired if warranted through the discovery process. All repairs will be completed prior to returning the RPV head to service."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42918 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF SCHWARTING
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/18/2006
Notification Time: 15:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2006
Event Time: 09:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 91 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - LICENSED REACTOR OPERATOR FAILS CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY EVALUATION
A licensed reactor operator has his access to the plant blocked based upon an adverse, chemical dependency evaluation and interview performed through the licensee's Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The individual was not scheduled to work when the evaluation interview was performed.
The individual was referred to the licensee by concerned colleagues via the licensee's Human Resources Office and is still employed by the licensee pending senior management review.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. | |