| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/29/2006 - 10/02/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42810 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL PLETCHER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/28/2006
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/28/2006
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION OVERSPEED TRIP MECHANISM FAILED TO RESET
"The High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) over-speed trip tappet did not reset as expected during the trip tappet test after securing from a successful HPCI operability run, thereby preventing a re-start of the HPCI system. The Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), Core Spray sub-systems, Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems are operable."
The unit is in a 14 day LCO for this event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MIKE PLETCHER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1130 ON 9/28/06 * * *
"NRC Notification 42810 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72 were met pending the evaluation of condition observed with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Overspeed Trip reset feature that was discovered while performing scheduled testing for the HPCI System.
"During surveillance testing on 08/28/06, the HPCI System was started and satisfied the Technical Specification requirements designed to demonstrate HPCI System Operability. Subsequently, while testing the specific components of the system, the HPCI Overspeed Trip functioned as expected, but would not reset when manually depressed (locally). The Shift Manager declared the system inoperable and remained in the Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) that was entered prior to commencing the testing activities.
"Subsequent investigation determined that the reset function of the HPCI turbine overspeed trip device is not required to support HPCI from performing the system safety functions as described in the station design and licensing basis.
"ENS Event Number 42810, made on 08/28/06, is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO(Hott) has been notified. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 42859 | Rep Org: MEDICAL PHYSICS CONSULTANTS
Licensee: WEST BRANCH REGIONAL MEDICAL CENT.
Region: 3
City: WEST BRANCH State: MI
County:
License #: 21-18892-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHELLE KRITZMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 09/25/2006
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2006
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text INCORRECT INITIAL PRESCRIBED DOSE
On 6/23/06 a physician wrote a prescribed dose of 10 microcuries of iodine-131 for a patient with graves disease. The physician meant to have written the prescribed dose to be 10 millicuries instead of 10 microcuries of iodine -131 for the patient. On 06/28/06 the dose was placed in a calibrator and measured at 10 millicuries with the physician present. After the dose was calibrated at 10 millicuries the physician signed, but forgot to date it, for the patient to receive the 10 millicurie dose. The patient received the 10 millicurie dose.
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42865 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FRANK G. GORLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 09/27/2006
Notification Time: 04:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2006
Event Time: 02:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HVAC REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"On 9/27/2006, the HVAC for the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) was removed from service for planned preventive maintenance and inspections and testing activities. These work activities are planned to be performed and completed within a 12 hour work shift. During the time these activities are being performed, the TSC air handling unit, TSC condensing unit, TSC filter train and the fan unit for the TSC filter train will not be available for operation. As such, the TSC HVAC will be rendered non-functional during the performance of this work activity.
"If an emergency condition requiring activation of the TSC occurs during the time these work activities are being performed, then contingency plans call for utilization of the TSC as long as radiological conditions allow. The site Technical Support Center activation procedure provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the TSC so that TSC functions can be continued.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED FROM ANDY DISMUKE TO JOE O'HARA AT 1014 ON 9/28/06 * * *
"The maintenance outage affecting the normal power supply for the TSC HVAC was not completed yesterday (September 27, 2006) as originally scheduled. The work schedule called for the normal power supply to the TSC HVAC to be returned to service within 12 hours; however, problems occurred in the functional test of the associated bus that provides the normal power supply to the TSC HVAC. During the functional test, the bus successfully swapped from normal supply to alternate supply, however the swap back to normal was unsuccessful. When the alternate breaker was tripped per procedure, the normal breaker indicated closed (green and amber lights extinguish, red light illuminated as expected, but the motor control center (MCC) was not energized. Maintenance has subsequently reenergized the MCC from alternate supply and TSC HVAC is now functional as of 0808 today (September 28, 2006). The total out of service time for the TSC HVAC was approximately 29 hours, 21 minutes.
"A repair plan is being developed to make necessary repairs to the breaker for the normal supply. Once repairs are completed, the breaker will be re-installed so that the MCC can be re-energized from the normal supply. This repair activity will require the TSC HVAC to be removed from service again in order to switch back to the normal power supply. An update will be provided when this evolution is expected to occur.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022 Rev 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO(Collins) has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/28/06 AT 15:02 FROM HATCH (DISMUKE) TO ABRAMOVITZ
"On 9/28/06, the HVAC for the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) is being removed from service to install the normal supply breaker in the MCC that supplies power to the TSC HVAC following breaker repairs. Estimated time for the TSC HVAC being out of service is 6 -8 hours. An update will be provided when the TSC HVAC is returned to service."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Collins).
* * * UPDATE 9/29/06 AT 0004 ET FROM HATCH (F. GORLEY) TO M. RIPLEY
"On 09/28/06 at 2329 ET, the HVAC System for the TSC was returned to functional status following the replacement of the normal supply breaker to the MCC and energizing the MCC that supplies the TSC HVAC. Walk-down of the HVAC System for proper operation was completed at 2335 ET."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ayres). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 42866 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/29/2006
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2006
Event Time: 18:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
| Event Text FAILURE OF AUTOCLAVE HIGH CYLINDER PRESSURE SYSTEM
"At 1802 CDT on 09/28/06, the Plant Shift-Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-333A Autoclave 3 South High Cylinder Pressure System (HCPS). During a normal cylinder heating cycle the operator noted that the cylinder pressure, as read on a local digital pressure indicator and on a digital recorder in the Operations Monitoring Room (OMR), unexpectedly fell from a steady 65 psia to a negative value on both instruments. A 14 ton cylinder containing 0.4019% U235 assay uranium hexafluoride had been heating (TSR Mode 5) for approximately 2.2 hours when the failure occurred. The PSS declared the HCPS inoperable and TSR LCO 2.2.4.14B actions were implemented to place the autoclave in Mode 2, 'Autoclave Open and Out-of-Service'. The HCPS is a TSR system designed to minimize the potential of primary system integrity failure (cylinder rupture) during a pressure increase event by tripping the steam supply to the autoclave prior to reaching the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of the cylinder.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident, b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
There was no release of radioactive material.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42867 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/29/2006
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2006
Event Time: 09:51 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID EECW PUMP ACTUATION DURING TESTING
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of an emergency service water system component that does not normally run and which provides an ultimate heat sink.
"At 0951 hours CDT on August 9, 2006, with Unit 1 defueled and Units 2 and 3 operating at 100% power, the B3 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pump was tripped when an undervoltage relay was manually operated during functional testing of relaying associated with the 1B Core Spray (CS) pump breaker. While operations personnel were responding to the pump trip, but before the testing activity could be halted, performance of subsequent steps in the functional testing activity resulted in an automatic start of this same pump and then another trip when a companion undervoltage relay was manually operated. Auto-starting of associated EECW pumps upon CS pump starts is part of the equipment logic and had been anticipated, and the B3 EECW pump had been placed in service prior to beginning the relay functional testing to avoid an automatic start. The potential for tripping loads other than the 1B Core Spray pump breaker was discussed in the pre job briefing, however, the actual test instruction steps did not provide detail sufficient to ensure only specific undervoltage relay contacts were operated. Rather than operating only specific relay contacts, test personnel operated the entire relay, resulting in the unplanned trip, restart, and trip of the B3 EECW pump.
"The logic downstream from the manually operated undervoltage relays and the B3 EECW pump responded in accordance with the plant design. No other plant equipment was affected during this event, though the 2B Core Spray pump would have also tripped had it been running at the time the undervoltage relays were operated. The B3 EECW pump was secured, and the testing activity was suspended. Other operating EECW pumps were not affected and no degradation of EECW system function occurred.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Reference corrective action document PER 108425."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42869 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 10/01/2006
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2006
Event Time: 08:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 60 | Power Operation | 60 | Power Operation | Event Text TEMPORARY SCAFFOLDING FOR UPCOMING OUTAGE RENDERS 'A' AND 'B' MSIV INOPERABLE
"Scaffold that was built for upcoming refueling outage work at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 may have prevented two Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) from reaching the full closed position.
"Scaffold was built on 9/29/06 and 9/30/06 for refueling outage work on the 'A' and 'B' MSIV's. The 'C' MSIV was not impacted. Some of the seismic bracing for these scaffolds were in the area of travel when closing the MSIV's. There is reasonable assurance these braces would have prevented the 'A' and ' B' MSIV's from reaching the full closed position. During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident, this MSIV interference may have prevented accident mitigation by not allowing the MSIV to properly close and cause additional release of radioactive material to the environment beyond that already analyzed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
"On 10/1/06 at 0835 the MSIV inoperability was discovered and Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 (MSIV Operability) and 3.0.3 were entered. The scaffold bracing was moved out of the valve closure path of the 'B' MSIV and at 0915 Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. At 0945 the 'A' MSIV was free to close and Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 was exited. This is being reported as a loss of a safety function for a Main Steam Line Isolation Valve which is required to control the release of radioactive material, and which is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Unit power remained constant throughout the event and no other safety systems have been compromised."
The licensee is currently lowering power for the Unit 2 refueling outage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |