| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/29/2006 - 08/30/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42726 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS GAMMA RAY
Region: 4
City: State: TX
County:
License #: L05561
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB FREE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 07/25/2006
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BADGE EXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Dosimetry supplier reported 12 Rem exposure. Licensee determined that employee left badge in truck, in radiation field at several locations [various job sites] during the monitoring period."
TX Incident No. I-8348
* * * UPDATE ON 8/29/2006 FROM STATE OF TEXAS TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On June 20, 2006, the Licensee notified the Agency that on June 19, 2006, a courtesy call from their dosimeter processor informed them that a worker's film badge indicated an exposure of 12.355 Rem for the month of May, 2006. The RSO removed the worker from rotation to prevent any further exposure. An investigation by the Licensee indicated no abnormal self reading dosimeter readings. The worker could not think of any reason why he would have received that much exposure. The individual only performed work involving radiation on seven occasions in the month of May. During the investigation, it was revealed that the worker had routinely left his dosimetry in the glove box of their work truck at the end of the day. The RSO stated that all of his trucks are in use supporting radiography operations each day. It is believed that the badge was exposed to the majority of the indicated exposure while in the glove box. Individuals who worked with the individual stated that they were not aware of any reason why this worker would have received any unusual exposure. The Licensee assessed the worker's dose to be 59 mrem for the exposure period based on daily exposure records. No Notice of Violation was issued."
Notified the R4DO (Cain) and NMSS EO (Burgess). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42732 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID OAKES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 07/27/2006
Notification Time: 03:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2006
Event Time: 19:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 DEEMED TO BE NONCONSERVATIVE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.4 requires only one of two atmospheric dump valves (ADV) per steam generator (SG) to be operable. Palo Verde Unit 3 currently has one ADV inoperable on the #2 SG. All other ADVs in Unit 3 (and all ADVs in Units 1 and 2) are OPERABLE. On July 26, 2006 at approximately 19:00 MST, Palo Verde Engineering personnel determined that this LCO is nonconservative since it does not satisfy the single failure criterion for the safety analyses for the accidents that would render one SG inoperable, specifically steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) with loss of offsite power (LOOP) which utilizes both ADVs on the unaffected SG. In case of one SG inoperable due to the event, and single failure of one ADV fail to open, the plant cannot be brought to safe shutdown condition during those accidents and may result in exceeding the acceptance criteria. This LCO should have required two ADVs per SG to be operable in order to satisfy safety analysis assumptions.
"An administrative control in accordance with NUREG-1432, Standard Technical Specifications will be put in place for immediate compensatory action. NUREG-1432 LCO 3.7.4 Condition A, one required ADV line inoperable requires restoration of the ADV line to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Reperformance of the safety analyses is expected to be the long term solution.
"The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1727 ON 8/29/2006 FROM RAY BUZARD TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"The notification is being retracted due to further evaluation by engineering and licensing personnel which has determined that the license basis for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is bounded by a steam generator tube rupture with a stuck open ADV coincident with a loss of offsite power event. The safety analysis for this event relies on one ADV on the unaffected SG which, along with the stuck open ADV on the affected SG, limits the offsite dose consequences to within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.
"The safety analysis referred to in the initial ENS notification utilizes 2 ADVs on the intact SG to limit radiological doses to 10 per cent of Part 100 guidelines. However, as noted above, this analysis is not the bounding safety analysis for the SG tube rupture event.
"The administrative control identified in the initial notification will remain in effect until engineering and licensing personnel determine if a Technical Specification change is required to support ADV single failure criteria.
"The Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. "
Notified the R4DO (Cain). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42803 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: XENON CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: g0469
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/25/2006
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2006
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
TIM HARRIS (NMSS)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST OR MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On 8/7/06, licensee reports being unable to locate two NRD Model P-2021 In-Line Ionizers (S/N A2EJ536 and S/N A2EJ538) each containing up to 10 millicuries of Polonium-210 (138-day half-life). These stainless steel cylindrical items measure 0.5 inches in diameter and just under 3 inches in length. The items were purchased from NRD LLC of Grand Island, NY, in April 2005 (see Sealed Source Registry No. NY-502-D-107-G). The last known location of the items was in a stock storage area at the licensee's former facility in Woburn, MA. The licensee relocated operations from Woburn to Wilmington, MA, in September 2005.
"The licensee assumes the items were lost, and possibly disposed, during the Woburn facility cleanup and relocation effort. The licensee does not believe the items were stolen.
"In order to prevent recurrence, the licensee implemented a specific device use log and assigned an employee to be responsible for device inventory.
"The licensee's search and investigation is ongoing.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42813 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: T. BOLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 08/30/2006
Notification Time: 02:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 22:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC OIL LEAK
"On 8/29/06 at 2225 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 3 initiated a Manual reactor SCRAM due to EHC (Electro-Hydraulic Control) System Reservoir level lowering due to a EHC system leak. The leak was from #2 Main Turbine Control Valve. All Systems responded as required to the manual SCRAM signal. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) initiations occurred as a result of the manual SCRAM signal. Groups 2 (floor drains, etc.), 3 (Reactor Water Cleanup), 6 (Ventilation), & 8 (TIPs) PCIS isolations occurred at + 2 [inches] as expected as a result of the manual SCRAM with all systems isolating as required. The EHC leak rate lowered to approximately zero upon turbine trip. No indications existed of main steam relief valves (MSRVs) opening. Bypass valves controlled reactor pressure due to EHC system staying in service. Repair of the EHC leak is in progress.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System'; 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event that results in an actuation of the specified systems'. This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
Reactor Power was reduced to 78% before the reactor was manually scrammed and all rods fully inserted. The EHC oil is being cleaned up and the oil does not pose a fire threat. All ECCS and the EDGs are fully operable if needed and the electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | |