| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/14/2006 - 06/15/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42638 | Facility: HADDAM NECK
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROSEMARY PEKAROVIC
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/14/2006
Notification Time: 15:01 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/2006
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned | Event Text STATE NOTIFICATION OF LOW PH RAINWATER DISCHARGE
"427 gallons of rainwater was discharged to the canal [onsite] with a pH of 4.2 which [exceeds] the [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] permit. This water went through a charcoal bed that contained water which had not been used in a year and a half."
The pH discharge limit is 6. The site notified the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 42639 | Rep Org: BATTLE CREEK HEALTH SYSTEM
Licensee: BATTLE CREEK HEALTH SYSTEM
Region: 3
City: BATTLE CREEK State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01354-04
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KELLY ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/14/2006
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2006
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text OVERDOSE TO PATIENTS THYROID
The patient reported to the hospital for treatment Monday, June 12 at 11 am and was given 2 millicuries of I-131 as a thyroid treatment dose. The patient then returned on June 14, 2006, for a survey. The prescribing physician reviewed and checked the orders as sufficient for a medistatic survey. The survey results revealed that there was a 96 percent uptake to the thyroid. Using the survey results, a discrepancy was discovered. During an initial interview of the patient it was not determined that the patient had no prior history of cancer or any prior history of operations on the thyroid. Since the patient had no prior history it was determined that a dose of 200 microcuries of I-131 should have been used.
The results of this overdose could include loss of thyroid function. The consequences and possible remedies have been discussed with the patient.
The hospital plans on changing their interview sheet to a checklist type format to help avoid this problem in the future. The hospital also plans on performing a root cause analysis on this issue. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42640 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN JOHNSTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 06/14/2006
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/2006
Event Time: 09:41 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ERDS INOPERABLE
"On June 14, 2006, at 0941 PDT, plant operators declared both Units 1 and 2 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) inoperable due to the failure to complete scheduled surveillance testing. The in-plant emergency response facility data system (ERFDS) and safety parameter display system (SPDS) are operating as expected, but data transfer could not be accomplished via the digital data transfer to the NRC Event Response Center.
"Plant personnel are actively investigating the cause of the data transfer failure, and will update this notice upon completion of troubleshooting, repair, and successful performance of the surveillance test.
"Plant management, emergency personnel, and the NRC Resident Inspector(s) will be informed of the condition, planned maintenance actions, and resolution of this condition." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42641 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/14/2006
Notification Time: 19:08 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/2006
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text LEAKING DECAY HEAT REMOVAL ISOLATION VALVE BYPASS LINE
"On 2-21-06, during a tour of containment during normal operation at 100% power, a small leak (one (1) to three (3) drops per second) was noted a 1/2 inch line connected to the decay heat removal (DHR) drop line. It was identified as being a body-bonnet leak on valve 1LP-167 subject to a TS limit of 10 gpm.
"At approximately 1400 hours on 6-14-06 following a shutdown for an unrelated issue, the source was identified as a leak at a weld in a "tee" joint adjacent to 1LP-167. This is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage, subject to a TS limit of zero leakage. The leak was isolated by closing a normally open valve in the 1/2 inch line and the leakage stopped.
"Initial Safety Significance: The leak is in a 1/2 inch line which provides over pressure protection from thermal expansion in the volume between 1LP-1 and 1LP-2 (the main pressure boundary isolation valves between the high pressure RCS and the LPI (DHR) system). The leak rate (1 to 3 drops per second) was not significant, except that it was RCS pressure boundary leakage. 1LP-1 is normally closed, but must be opened to establish a DHR path. Valve 1LP-167 is a 1/2 inch check valve which would have limited RCS leakage. Thus, if the leak had grown, it would have been limited to the amount of seat leakage past either 1LP-167 or 1LP-1. It would also have been limited by the 1/2 inch size of the line containing the leak."
Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13 applies to RCS leakage in modes 1 to 4. The licensee plans to fix the leak prior to entry into mode 4.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42642 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/15/2006
Notification Time: 05:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2006
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM WHILE SHIFTING POWER SUPPLIES
"At approximately 0300 hours on 15 June, the Susquehanna Unit One reactor automatically scrammed due to an apparent neutron monitoring trip while transferring Reactor Protection System power supplies. All rods [fully] inserted, and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to -38" causing level 3 (+13") and level 2 (-38")isolations, and was restored to normal level (+35") by RCIC and subsequently the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected.
"A reactor recirculation pump was restarted to re-establish forced core circulation. The reactor is currently stable in condition 3. An investigation into the cause of the shutdown is underway. Unit Two continued power operation.
"The NRC resident inspectors were notified. A press release will occur."
After the scram, HPCI automatically started but was manually shut down with RCIC maintaining vessel level. Decay heat removal is being maintained with main feedwater and the turbine steam dumps. The electrical grid is stable. No major LCOs were in affect at the time of the event. | |