| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/25/2006 - 04/26/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42519 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: HAZEN RESEARCH, INC.
Region: 4
City: GLENDALE State: CO
County:
License #: 77-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/21/2006
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2006
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
ILTAB (EMAIL) ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS DISPOSED OF IN LANDFILL
"A licensee, Hazen Research, Inc., Colorado license # 77-02, notified the [Colorado Department of Health] that 4 generally licensed Tritium exit signs were accidentally disposed of in the sanitary landfill during a building repair project. Apparently, an electrical contractor disposed of the exit signs in a dumpster after they were removed and replaced with new signs in February or March of this year. The error was discovered on April 6. The signs, Isolite Model: 2040-50G-10BK, were purchased in May of 2001, and contained about 7.5 Ci of Tritium each.
"No other details are available at this time.
"The [Colorado Department of Health] has initiated an investigation of this incident."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42520 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: A SQUARED GROUP; METRIC ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #: 3727-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES E. ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/23/2006
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2006
Event Time: 11:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
ILTAB (e-mail) ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES RECOVERED
The following was received from the state via email:
"The duty officer was notified 1125 this morning of the theft and apparent recovery of two soil moisture density gauges in Miami, Fl at about 4 am this morning. Thieves broke into a locked Conex at a FL DOT job location on SR 826 between Bird & Flagler. They broke into the locked cabinet in which the gauges were stored. They then broke into the locked transportation boxes and took two gauges belonging to two licensees.
"The first licensee is A Squared Group, license # 3727-2. Gauge was a CPN model MC-3, SN 350808026, Cs-137/AmBe sources 10/50 millicuries.
"The second licensee is Metric Engineering, license # 1704-1. Gauge was a Troxler model 3440, SN 37243, Cs-137/AmBe sources 10/40 millicuries.
"Miami-Dade PD apprehended the thieves as they were departing the storage site. The licensees believe the gauges are in the vehicle which has been impounded by Miami-Dade PD. They are trying to get access to the car to confirm that the gauges are there, but the PD has denied them access to this point. Licensees will call when they have confirmed the gauges are in the car and when they have been returned to their possession. Licensees will also submit a written report on this occurrence.
"Florida continues to investigate this incident."
* * * UPDATE FROM ADAMS TO SNYDER AT 1358 ON 4/23/06 * * *
The following was received from the state via email:
"Both licensees have possession of their gauges. They appear undamaged. The gauges will be leak tested and checked for functionality."
Notified R1DO (Holody) and NMSS EO (Janosko).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42524 | Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN PRUSSMAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/25/2006
Notification Time: 12:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2006
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text SERVICE WATER PIPING FLOODING CONCERN IMPACTS RHR
"At 0500 hours on April 25, 2006 with the plant in mode 5 and RCS loops filled, Operations declared the 21 and 22 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps inoperable (see IP2-CR-2006-2133). This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as an event that at the time of discovery could have prevented the RHR pumps from removing residual heat. Residual heat removal is still available through the steam generators. The pumps were declared inoperable, but remained in operation, after a degraded horizontal section of Service Water (SW) line 405 was identified. SW line 405 is a non-ASME Section XI, non-Class A, seismically supported 24 inch return line routed through the Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBD) Tank room in the Plant Auxiliary Building (PAB) about 15 feet above the floor elevation of 51 feet. The ability of the pipe to withstand a seismic event has not currently been demonstrated. The consequence of a failure of this pipe is the flooding of the SGBD Tank room, cascading water down to the pipe case and then to the 15 foot PAB elevation. Water can drain to the transformer yard through a door at that elevation but the bottom of the RHR pump motors is lower than the door sill.
"Compensating actions have been implemented. These include provisions to open the door to the transformer yard with a security guard to monitor the open door, install sand bags at the entrance to the RHR pump room to prevent water entry, and install blocking devices to prevent backflow through the RHR pump room floor drains. A 24 hour watch is being provided for implementation of these compensatory measures. The watch will have a sump pump should it be necessary for leaks. The RHR pumps were declared operable at 1200 hours. Corrective action for SWS pipe 405 is being planned."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42526 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: COLEY CHAPPELL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/25/2006
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2006
Event Time: 05:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text INVALID EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 4, 2006, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 'Refuel,' Instrument Maintenance (IM) technicians were installing a Barton level indicator for reactor vessel level indicator 1B21-R452A as part of a system modification. At 0512 hours, momentary 'Reactor Vessel Water Low Level 2' alarms were received in the Main Control Room, and the Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Emergency Diesel Generator (1B EDG) auto-started. A Reactor Vessel Water Level Low 2 condition sends a start signal to HPCS and the 1B EDG; however, because the HPCS pump control switch was in pull-to-lock, the pump did not start and did not inject water into the reactor vessel.
"The initiating signal was reset, and at 0524 hours the 1B EDG was shutdown with the Maintenance Switch placed in 'Maintenance.'
"Investigation determined that the 1B EDG had auto-started approximately 15 minutes after the IM technicians had completed work and placed the 1B21-R452A indicator back in service. The computer point alarm typer data was reviewed, and it was observed that only a single set of alarm points were received. Typically, when an alarm is caused by improperly valving in an instrument, multiple alarm points are received due to 'ringing.' Based on the 15 minute time delay and the lack of ringing, the apparent cause was determined to be an air bubble that was introduced during the modification and then migrated to the level transmitter, resulting in an invalid low level signal and an auto-start of the 1B EDG. Corrective actions included reviewing the remaining Barton installation modification work packages for unusual piping configurations that could contribute to air entrapment, and-for adequate system isolation requirements; i.e., bypassing trip units or removing components from service in order to prevent inadvertent actuations.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of an EDG."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42527 | Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: STUART BRANTLEY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/25/2006
Notification Time: 18:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2006
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION - CONTROL LOGIC ERROR
"TMI Issue Report # 482679 identified an issue while performing reviews of fire abnormal operating procedures to assure compliance with the Fire Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR), in that a control logic error was identified in the circuitry elementary drawing for the isolation valves DH-V-6A and DH-V-6B between the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) and the Reactor Building (RB) sump. Plant circuitry was verified to be wired as per the elementary drawing. This circuitry design was to prevent a hot short, due to a fire, from opening the valve.
"However, the identified control logic error could allow a spurious opening to occur on DH-V-6A or DH-V-6B due to a fire. The FHAR credits these valves as being protected from spuriously opening due to a fire in AB-FZ-5 (Auxiliary Building 281' general area). If this protection is not provided, then spurious opening could result in draining the BWST inventory to the RB sump. This hot short condition would result in the depletion of the BWST inventory and loss of the High Pressure Injection (HPI) makeup capability, resulting in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' A 60-day LER is also required under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) for the same degraded condition.
"An hourly fire-watch has been established in the affected fire zone in the 281' elevation Auxiliary Building as an interim compensatory measure. Additionally, the control circuitry at the 1A and 1B ES MCCs will be modified to prevent the RB sump isolation valves DH-V-6A and DH-V-6B from spuriously opening due to a hot short."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |