| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/12/2006 - 04/13/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42482 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/07/2006
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2006
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text LOSS OF OFFSITE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY - PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON SPDS AND ERDS SYSTEMS
"The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service for planned Preventive Maintenance on the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system. SPDS and ERDS are scheduled to be restored on 4/9/2006. During this period any out of service indication on the SPDS can be obtained from control board indications. The Emergency Notification System will remain operable. These conditions are reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Reactor is currently defueled while in a refuel outage. Reactor Coolant Temperature is 87 degrees and Div 2 RHR is in shutdown cooling."
The licensee maintains secondary indication capability via control panel indicators.
* * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN DAHM TO HUFFMAN AT 1152 EDT ON 4/12/06 * * *
SPDS and ERDS are now fully functional and have been returned to service as of 1130 EDT on 4/12/06.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Phillips) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42492 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALAN WOLFE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/12/2006
Notification Time: 09:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2006
Event Time: 02:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO WORK INSTRUCTION ERROR
"General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves.
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system checked above. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On February 28, 2006 at 02:50 EST the implementation of Work Order 1051442601, to perform a routine replacement of a relay 1C61-K86, called for lifting of wires related to the relay. During the evolution, the lifting of wires at CC-107 in panel 1 H11-P623 resulted in a daisy chain effect and the auto start of all four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans. Both the Unit One and Unit Two reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown and isolated. These actuations were a result of the loss of power to relay 1C61-K75. This relay initiates the logic for isolation of the reactor building and refueling floor ventilation and initiation of SBGT.
"Subsequent investigation determined that in order to prevent this daisy chain effect the wires should have been lifted at DDD-1 in panel 1H11-P623. This error was the result of inadequate work instructions.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans auto started and both Unit One and Unit Two reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown and isolated. The SBGT initiation and the ventilation system shutdown were both complete actuations.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"The above systems functioned successfully."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42493 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH GREWE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 04/12/2006
Notification Time: 14:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2006
Event Time: 13:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF THE "2B2" REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
At 1335 EDT the Unit 2 Reactor tripped from 100% power on a Flux/Flow/Imbalance on two (2) RPS Channels "A" and "D." The initiating event was the trip of the "2B2" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) for unknown reasons. I & E Techs were working in the RCP Monitoring Cabinets at the time. Immediately following the RCP trip, Unit 2 commenced a runback as expected for approximately six (6) seconds before the RPS actuation occurred. All rods fully inserted with an anomaly noted for CRD [Control Rod Drive] Group 3 Rod 7 API [Absolute Position Indication] indicating approximately 21%, however, the PI [Position Indicating] Panel light was on. The licensee suspects that the problem is related to a reed switch for the API indication and not the actual rod position. Shutdown Margin has confirmed that the Reactor is subcritical. The Pressurizer Code Safeties and PORV did not lift during the transient.
Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 discharging steam to the Main Condenser via the Turbine Bypass Valves using Main Feedwater for steam generator level control. Offsite power is available and stable. This event did not impact Units 1 or 3. RCP "2B2" will remain secured until the cause of the trip is identified and corrected. There is no known primary to secondary leakage for Unit 2. The licensee has completed EOP (Emergency Operating Procedure) subsequent actions.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 42494 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/12/2006
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2006
Event Time: 08:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
CHARLIE MILLER (NMSS)
| Event Text UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM FAILED DURING TESTING
"At 0813 CDT on 04/12/2006, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that immediately following routine test firing of the C-333 Unit 4 cell 7 UF6 Release Detection System (TSR surveillance requirement 2.4.4.1-1), smoke and sparks were observed coming from the UF6 Release Detection System control module and the system ready light was extinguished. The Area Control Room alarm locked in and the system was declared inoperable by the PSS. The cell and associated piping were above atmospheric pressure (Cascade Mode 2) at the time of the failure.
"The UF6 Release Detection System is a TSR system that is required to be operable per TSR 2.4.4.1, when a cascade cell and associated piping are in Cascade Mode 2. After discovery of failed system condition, a continuous UF6 smoke watch was initiated on the areas affected by the loss of detection capability in accordance with LCO Required Actions 2.4.4.1.B.1 and 2.4.4.C.1.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when:
a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident;
b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and
c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-06-1197; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2006-03."
There was no release from this event. The failure was shorted contacts in the alarm reset relay. | |