| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/11/2006 - 04/12/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42489 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSIER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 04/11/2006
Notification Time: 09:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2006
Event Time: 04:32 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
"On 03/11/06 at approximately 0432 hours, with Susquehanna Unit 1 in the Refueling Mode (0% power), the Unit experienced a partial isolation of Primary Containment isolation valves. The actuation occurred when a blown fuse disrupted power to a containment isolation logic relay. The inboard isolation valve to the 'B' Drywell Floor Drain Sump and the Containment Instrument Gas purge supply valve to the TIP indexer both closed. The 'A' Standby Gas Treatment system fan and the 'A' Reactor Building Recirculation fan successfully auto started during the event.
"This event constitutes an invalid system actuation and is reportable under 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The condition meets the criteria of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) because a general containment isolation signal affected containment isolation valves in more than one system. This notification is being provided via a 60-day optional phone call as permitted under 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of a written LER.
"As stated above, both valves affected by the invalid signal fulfilled their isolation function by successfully closing. At the time of the event, no other Primary Containment isolation valve was being maintained in a manner that required re-positioning. There were no challenges to the Reactor as a result of this event. The plant responded as expected.
"Following replacement of the subject fuse, the isolation logic was successfully reset and affected equipment was restored to the desired status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42490 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALAN WOLFE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 04/11/2006
Notification Time: 11:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2006
Event Time: 16:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY
A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42491 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HEWITT
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/11/2006
Notification Time: 12:37 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2006
Event Time: 09:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 65 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN
"At 0924 Unit 2 experienced multiple Fire Protection System Deluge Valve actuations for the Main Filter Banks, System Station Service Transformers (SSSTs) 2A and 2B, the Main Transformer, Condensate Polishing building ventilation charcoal filter and Decontamination building ventilation charcoal filter. The Transformers were unaffected by the spray actuation and remained operable.
"No actual fire occurred or was observed for these components or areas. The Motor driven and Engine Driven Fire Pumps automatically started upon the actuations. These above noted areas and components received water spray down until manually isolated.
"It was verified that both of the Charcoal Main Filter Banks (TS 3.7.8.1) had become wetted down by the spray actuation. With the charcoal main filter banks wet, their filtering capability becomes impacted and is being evaluated. These filter components were declared inoperable.
"At 0924, Unit 2 entered the actions of Tech. Spec. 3.0.3. The requirements of Tech Spec 3.0.3 are:
"Within 1 hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in Hot Standby within the following 6 hours, Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours, and Cold Shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours. At 1055 Unit 2 commenced shutdown at 20%/hr.
"The cause of the multiple actuations is not understood at this time. An Event Response Team has been formed to investigate the issue."
All other safety related systems are operable. The action required for the licensee to exit this Tech Spec required shutdown will be to restore the charcoal filter banks to operable status. The licensee estimates the investigation, troubleshooting, and repair efforts to last approximately 40 hours.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |