U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/26/2005 - 07/27/2005
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41752 |
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY |
Notification Date: 06/07/2005
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2005
Event Time: 11:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3) |
Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling Shutdown |
0 |
Refueling Shutdown |
Event Text
UNANALYZED POTENTIAL IMPACT ON EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY
"At 1125 on 6/7/2005 it was determined that the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B were out of service due to the possibility of Tornado Missiles potentially collapsing the D/G Fuel Oil Tank Vents. The Emergency Diesel Generators are required as a support system for RHR Decay Heat Removal and RHR was also declared inoperable at the same time. Technical Specification requirements for RHR Decay Heat Removal are, if less than the required number of heat sinks are operable, then corrective action shall be taken immediately to restore the minimum number to operable status. Actions are being taken to restore full operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B.
"Currently RHR is operating and providing decay heat removal and Emergency Diesel Generators are available as a support system for RHR. Event Report # 41528 had similar issues associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators exhaust ducts and their ability to withstand tornado forces."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM G. RISTE TO P. SNYDER ON 7/26/05 AT 1541 * * *
"Event Notice #41752 was initiated on 6/7/2005 to report an unanalyzed condition with the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B. The initial analysis for tornado missile strike probability results for the Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil tank vent lines indicated they could be damaged by a tornado missile to the point they would potentially adversely affect Diesel operability.
"Additional analysis was performed and it was determined that the original fuel tank oil vent line configuration was acceptable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Mark Ring). |
General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41840 |
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP EGIDI
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 07/13/2005
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2005
Event Time: 15:20 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (E-MAIL) (TAS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE - MEDICAL SOURCES STOLEN
"The theft occurred on June 26, 2005, at approximately 3:20 p.m. [The driver] had taken receipt of the cargo at the airport in Dallas (DFW), Texas, and he made the first delivery at a Cardinal pharmacy in Tyler, Texas. After the first delivery, he proceeded to the next stop, which was about one mile away. When he went to the back of the truck, he noticed that the canopy door had been pried open, but was still locked. When he looked inside, he noticed the box containing products for the Cardinal pharmacy was missing. The driver promptly notified [his] supervisor, who then contacted the Tyler Police and the Tyler Fire Department. The driver was personally interviewed that day by [Trade wind Enterprises - the shipper] and the Tyler Police Department. Efforts were made to locate the missing cargo, but police and the driver have been unable to locate the cargo or identify the person or persons involved in the theft.
"The materials stolen consisted of 6 boxes of sodium iodide capsules [I-123]." The activity in the missing capsules was 6.8 milliCuries."
Police Report case: 1-05-029925
* * * UPDATE P. EGIDI TO P. SNYDER ON 7/26/05 AT 1656 * * *
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Material found. Issue closed."
R4DO (Graves) and NMSS EO (Giitter) notified. E-mailed to TAS (Hahn) |
General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41859 |
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: PORT OF OAKLAND
Region: 4
City: OAKLAND State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK GOTTLIEB
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 07/20/2005
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2005
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SCRAP METAL CONTAMINATION
State of California provided the following information via email:
"[The] US Customs Service, Port of Oakland contacted RHB-Berkeley on the morning of 07-07-2005, reporting that a load of scrap metal bound for China had set off a radiation alarm. Mr. Kent Prendergast and Mr. Mark Gottlieb of RHB-Berkeley responded. Measurements were made of the trailer and the following readings were obtained using a Bicron FieldSPEC-N, sn 02f3/777, portable MCA:
"Dose Rates: Surface = 260 µR(microR)/hr; 1 foot from surface = 38 µR/hr; 1 foot to the left = 35 µR/hr; 1 foot to the right = 45 µR/hr; 1 foot above = 19 µR/hr. The radionuclide was identified as Am-241.
"On 07-08-2005, the Pleasant Hill Recycling Center was visited. The Port of Oakland determined that the load of scrap metal had originated there. [The Recycling Center] President and the Manager were interviewed. They stated that the load was lead scrap which had been accumulating for several years. They said that it would be very difficult to identify the source of the Am-241 if possible at all. They were uncertain if the scrap would be returned to them or handled by the Port of Oakland. [The Recycling Center President had] made contact with a health physics consultant as directed by the Port of Oakland to dispose of the Am-241. The area where the lead was stored was surveyed with both a Ludlum Model 3-98 survey meter with an external thin window, thin crystal Nal probe Mode 44-3, and a Ludlum Model 19 µR meter. The results of the survey were negative.
"Based on measurements and calculations performed on 7-19-05 and 7-20-05, the activity of the Am-241/ Be source at the Port of Oakland is from 50 mCi to 150 mCi." |
General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41862 |
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: IRBY STEEL, DIV OF STRUTHERS INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: GULFPORT State: MS
County:
License #: MS-750-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOBBY SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 07/22/2005
Notification Time: 12:47 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIALLY ABANDONED SOURCES
The following information was received from the State of Mississippi via email:
"Description of Incident: Received notification 7-20-05 from Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) that another State Agency (DEQ) had discovered the abandonment of a AEA Model 680 Cobalt-60 exposure device and a SPEC Model 150 exposure device containing Iridium-192. Division of Rad Health (DRH) personnel responded to location and determined that no devices were missing from the licensed storage facility. It had been assumed from other emergency responders that a overpack (Model 680-OP) for the Cobalt device may have contained radioactive material and was missing from the container. The event generated television and newspaper media attention. DRH personnel explained that the overpack was only used when the device was transported on public roads. All radioactive material was accounted for and secured in the storage area. Also, DRH and DEQ personnel went to Struthers Industries location at the 34th Street facility located in Gulfport, MS, where all radioactive material ( a Model 680 Cobalt 60 exposure device and a Model 660 Iridium 192 device) was accounted for and still secured in the locked storage vault. There was security concerns due to the companies being in bankruptcy and the new owners not knowing about the radioactive devices. DRH had investigated the security of the sources on 6-28-05 and found the sources safe, but met with the president of company who assured DRH he would properly dispose of the devices. On 7-21-05 AEA Technology was contacted to remove the sources. The sources were put in approved overpacks. Leak tests had been performed on the sources and determined that the sources were not leaking. AEA personnel also removed all radiation signs and associated equipment at the 2 locations. DRH personnel did closeout surveys along with AEA personnel to ensure no radioactive sources were left behind. All radioactive material that was licensed by the 2 licenses (MS-750-01 and MS-259-01) were accounted for and removed by AEA personnel. It has not been determined by DRH personnel if devices were abandoned and the investigation is ongoing by DRH personnel.
"Isotope(s)/Activity: Cobalt 60 (2 devices/sources) @ 23 curies in each device, Iridium 192 (2 devices/sources) @ 5 curies in each device
"Date of Incident: 7-20-05
"Date Reported To DRH: 7-20-05
"Describe clean-up actions taken by DRH: After determining all radioactive devices were accounted for, DRH contacted AEA Technology about the removal of the devices. DRH personnel stayed at location until all sources and devices were removed and caution signs and associated radiography equipment was removed.
"List radiation measurements taken by DRH: Highest readings were @ 30 mR/hr at surface of the Co-60 exposure devices. The readings on the Iridium-192 devices were less than 5 mR/hr.
"List any other actions required of DRH: Event is under investigation by DRH, EPA, MS DEQ, and FBI.
"List any actions taken to notify NRC, other Agreement States: NRC Ops Center notified by E-mail 7-22-05; NMED notified 7-22-05 by E-mail. Event was reported to EPA due to other hazardous materials that were discovered at the site. Also investigated by FBI and inquiries made from Homeland Security.
"Enforcement action taken: Investigation ongoing as to if devices were abandoned or if the owner was still in process of disposing of the devices." |
Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 41870 |
Rep Org: PROFESSIONAL INSPECTION AND SERVICE
Licensee: PROFESSIONAL INSPECTION AND SERVICES INC
Region: 1
City: FORT INDIAN TOWN GAP State: PA
County:
License #: 37-28744-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: INGRID KALB
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT |
Notification Date: 07/26/2005
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2005
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY |
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
CHARLES MILLER (NMSS) |
Event Text
DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
A track hoe ran over a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge (s/n 032770) with a 8 milliCurie Cs-137 (s/n 7508116) and a 40 milliCurie Am-241/Be (s/n 47-28967) source. The gauge was imbedded upside down in the ground. The source was still in the gauge and the shutter is half open. The area is roped off to limit access. The RSO made the report, is on scene, and is preparing to take radiation surveys. The RSO had not decided on how to remove the gauge. |
Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 41871 |
Rep Org: HARBINSON AND WALKER
Licensee: HARBINSON AND WALKER
Region: 3
City: LUDINGTON State: MI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN CROOKS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD |
Notification Date: 07/26/2005
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2005
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X |
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
M.HAHN (E-MAILED) (TAS) |
Event Text
LOST SOURCE FROM A LEVEL MEASURING DEVICE
Licensee reported that two 50 millicurie Cs-137 sources, used in level measuring devices, were found to be missing from a magnesium oxide producing facility that had been closed for two years. It was determined that two sources were missing after a review of their registration around the April-May time period. Since then, they located one of the two sources, brand new, in a crate on a shelf at the facility. They located the non-nuclear part of the device (the receiver) on a hopper which was at a scrap yard on site, but the sending unit (the nuclear part) was missing. They continued looking for the sender, but could not find it. |
Hospital |
Event Number: 41872 |
Rep Org: WINCHESTER MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM
Region: 1
City: WINCHESTER State: VA
County:
License #: 450158901
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KERI WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER |
Notification Date: 07/26/2005
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE |
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS) |
Event Text
MEDICAL EVENT - ADMINISTRATION OF LOWER DOSE THAN PRESCRIBED
On July 22, 2005 a patient was administered a dose of 2.64 rem from a 66 mCi (millicurie) source of Sm 153 versus the intended dose of 4.28 rem for bone pain therapy. This was discovered later when the medical technologist questioned the dose and raised a question with the supervisor. When the technologists checked the calibration setting of the instrument used to measure the source they discovered that the calibration setting was incorrect. With the incorrect calibration setting a source of 66 mCi of Sm 153 was used versus the intended 107 mCi source. The prescribing physician will notify the patient's doctor who will contact the patient. There was no known adverse affect on the patient.
The hospital took a corrective action of retraining and adding a check on their administration sheet that requires the technologist to check the instrument calibration setting. |
Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41874 |
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DUANE KANITZ
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER |
Notification Date: 07/26/2005
Notification Time: 19:35 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2005
Event Time: 16:35 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4) |
Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
3 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INOPERABLE SINGLE EMERGENCY SIREN
"On July 26, 2005 at approximately 09:07 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Emergency Preparedness Department was notified of an inoperable single siren (#42). While reviewing the siren monitoring computer log, an Information Services Technician received a no response signal on siren #42. Upon investigation, siren #42 was found inoperable. The siren was vandalized by destroying the battery case and stealing the internal battery. The affected siren is estimated to impact approximately 144 members of population (6.8%) in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) within 5 miles. Palo Verde's reporting criterion is a loss of capability to inform greater than 5% of the population within 5 miles (or 10% within 5 to 10 miles) for greater than 1 hour. This call is being placed due to the relatively large segment of the population affected and the uncertainty of the length of time that will be needed to restore the siren to operable condition. The Palo Verde Emergency Plan (section 6.6.2.1) has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) vehicles with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected area(s) when sirens are inoperable.
"The County was informed at 09:38 MST to implement the MCSO notification if a need arises.
"There are no events in progress that require siren operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the siren failure and this ENS call." |
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