| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/07/2005 - 06/08/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41675 | Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVE O'DONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/06/2005
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2005
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 9 | Startup | 9 | Startup | Event Text LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION ON REACTOR WATER CLEAN UP INSTRUMENTATION
"Report - Loss of Safety Function
"On 5/5/06 at 1130 [EDT] it was discovered test equipment was left installed in the Reactor Water System instrumentation that rendered both system delta flow isolation instruments inoperable.
"The test equipment was removed and both instruments were declared operable at 1455."
The system was in service at the time.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM K. RUSSELL TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1115 HRS. EDT ON 6/7/05 * * *
"Update to Event Notification (ENF 41675) Retraction:
"An 8-hour notification was made on May 6, 2005, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), for the loss of the safety function for the control of radiation release. This report was made when it was discovered that test equipment (a pressure gauge) had been left attached to the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) differential flow isolation piping. The gauge was removed and the system aligned for proper operation.
"An engineering evaluation determined the temporary tubing and gauge would have maintained their structural integrity during a seismic event. Therefore, there was no impact on the piping for the leak detection capability of the RWCU differential flow isolation. Since there was no loss of function for the RWCU differential flaw isolation there was no loss of safety function for the control of radiation release. Because there is no loss of safety function, this condition is not reportable. Since the condition is not reportable, ENF 41675 is retracted."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41744 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: L03875
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB FREE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/03/2005
Notification Time: 13:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The gauge was damaged by a construction vehicle while the moisture density gauge was in use. The probe was not extended at the time of the accident. There was no release from the radioactive source. The state will follow up with the licensee.
Troxler Serial 28753
Sources: Am-241 40milliCuries
Cs-137 8 milliCuries
Texas Incident Number: I-8235 |
| Hospital | Event Number: 41747 | Rep Org: NATIONAL NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: NATIONAL NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: BETHESDA State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: 19-08330-03
Agreement: Y
Docket: 030-0693
NRC Notified By: STEVE MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/06/2005
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
36.83(a)(1) - UNSHIELD STUCK SOURCE
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
TIM MCGINTY (IRD)
| Event Text IRRADIATOR SOURCE STUCK OUTSIDE OF WATER SHIELD
Testing was being performed on the panoramic pool irradiator (wet-source storage, cat IV). Two sources were pulled from the water for scram time testing. One of the sources fell back to its storage position however, the second source failed to return to storage. The source is a Co-60 source of approximately 180,000 Curies. The licensee expects to troubleshoot the problem and return the source to its storage location within the next four days (end of the week). The source is stuck eight feet below the water line and the irradiator room is locked.
* * * UPDATE FROM S. MILLER TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1103 HRS. EDT ON 6/7/05 * * *
Through troubleshooting efforts, the licensee was able to return the stuck source to its normal storage location. There were no exposures as a result of this event or the troubleshooting effort.
Notified R1DO (Jackson), NMSS EO (Hickey) and IRD (McGinty). |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 41750 | Rep Org: PENN STATE UNIVERSITY
Licensee: PENN STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: UNIVERSITY PARK State: PA
County:
License #: 37-185-4
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC BOELDT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 06/07/2005
Notification Time: 10:44 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2005
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Event Text LOST OR MISSING VILE OF PHOSPHORUS 32
"In accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201 Reports of theft or loss of licensed material [the Penn State University Radiation Safety Officer called] to report missing radioactive material in excess of 10 times the quantity specified in appendix C to part 20. The missing material is one vial of phosphorus-32. The vial contained a nominal 74 MBq (2 milliCuries) of P-32. The material in question was never in the possession of Penn State University.
"On June 4, 2005, a Type-A package containing three vials of radioactive P-32 was shipped from California to Penn State University via FedEx (tracking number 689818990843). When the package arrived at Penn State University on June 6, 2005, it only contained two of the three vials of P-32. When the vendor was contacted by Penn State University personnel, the vendor insisted that the material had been placed inside the package as was indicated on the shipping papers. The Penn State Health Physics Office staff member who opened the package reported that the security seal tape was properly attached and that the package displayed no evidence of tampering.
"The frozen liquid radioactive material that was not received was in the chemical form of Adenosine 5-Triphosphate (gamma P-32) End Labeling (P-32). Lot number J5E32. The package also contained dry ice.
"All other packages in the shipment were double checked to verify that the vial was not present in a separate package. The activity reported on the package's shipping label indicated the that the vial was within the package, the shipping papers indicated that the vial was within the package. The package was shipped by the vendor via FedEx in accordance with their normal procedures."
The licensee does not believe the box was opened or the material misdirected.
Vendor:
MP Biomedicals, Inc
15 Morgan
Irvine, CA |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41751 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 06/07/2005
Notification Time: 11:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2005
Event Time: 10:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 56 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - OIL SPILL AT PLANT LIQUID DISCHARGE
"An oil spill has been reported at the plant liquid discharge to Lake Wylie. The on-site Hazmat Team has responded to the scene. The spill is contained within the discharge cove and cleanup is on-going. The source of the spill is unknown at this time. South Carolina Dept. of Health and Environmental Control and the National Spill Response Center were notified at approximately 1030. Off-site assistance is being requested for cleanup of the spill.
The quantity of oil spilled has not yet been determined. The licensee has notified York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg Counties and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41752 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 06/07/2005
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2005
Event Time: 11:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | Event Text UNANALYZED POTENTIAL IMPACT ON EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY
"At 1125 on 6/7/2005 it was determined that the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B were out of service due to the possibility of Tornado Missiles potentially collapsing the D/G Fuel Oil Tank Vents. The Emergency Diesel Generators are required as a support system for RHR Decay Heat Removal and RHR was also declared inoperable at the same time. Technical Specification requirements for RHR Decay Heat Removal are, if less than the required number of heat sinks are operable, then corrective action shall be taken immediately to restore the minimum number to operable status. Actions are being taken to restore full operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B.
"Currently RHR is operating and providing decay heat removal and Emergency Diesel Generators are available as a support system for RHR. Event Report # 41528 had similar issues associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators exhaust ducts and their ability to withstand tornado forces."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41753 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW SCHIRMER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 06/07/2005
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2005
Event Time: 14:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2005 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
IAN JUNG (NRR)
TIM MCGINTY (IRD)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
AKERS (DHS)
AUSTIN (FEMA)
RAWLS (NRC)
WYATT (DOE)
DALZIEL (HHS)
BRZOSTEK (USDA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED DRYWELL LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM
"Hope Creek manually scrammed the reactor from 100% power at 1413 and declared an Unusual Event due to unidentified drywell leakage exceeding 10 gpm (EAL 2.1.1.b) at 1437. The drywell unidentified leak rate peaked at approximately 15 gpm and is currently 12 gpm and slowly lowering. All safety systems were operable prior to the transient and responded as expected. Drywell pressure peaked at approximately 0.5 psig and is steady using normal drywell cooling (the normal pressure band is 0.1 to 0.7 psig). Drywell and suppression pools sprays were not required to mitigate the drywell pressure transient. Reactor vessel level lowered to approximately -30 inches following the scram and was returned to the normal level band using the feedwater and condensate systems. The expected vessel level 3 (setpoint +12.5 inches) ESF actuations occurred. The plant is proceeding to cold shutdown to investigate the drywell leak."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE BY NRC (HOLIAN) TO HUFFMAN AT 0330 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *
As of 0330, Region I IRC in consultation with NRC/IRD (McGinty) secured from Monitoring Mode based on the plant being stable at about 55 psig (about 300 degrees F) and preparing to initiate shutdown cooling. The leak rate remains at about 8 gpm, and an initial drywell entry determined the source of the leakage to be from the A-loop of shutdown cooling testable check valve (50A ). The valve was found with the position indication failed/separated and an approximate 20 foot plume of steam/liquid coming out. Plans are to continue to cool down the plant, go onto the B-loop of shutdown cooling , and isolate valve 50A. The licensee has conservatively remained in the UE and plans to exit when leak rate is assured to remain below 10 gpm (EAL entry condition) or cold shutdown is achieved and the EAL is no longer applicable.
The licensee's outage center remains manned, and an NRC inspector remains on site around the clock.
DHS (Hoisington), FEMA (Sweetser), DOE (Turner) EPA (Crews), USDA (Pimmons), HHS (Williams) were notified.
* * * UPDATE BY NRC (MANGAN - RG 1) TO HUFFMAN AT 0500 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *
The licensee has placed RHR loop B into service and reached Mode 4 (cold shutdown) at 0455. Preparations are in progress to isolate the leak by closing manual valve 183.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (WILSON) TO HUFFMAN AT 0530 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0515 EDT based on reaching cold shutdown with the leak rate less than 10 gpm.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. DHS (Hoisington) and FEMA (Sweetser) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41754 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 06/07/2005
Notification Time: 22:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2005
Event Time: 18:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN STRATEGY DEFICIENCY
"This report is a result of an ongoing evaluation of a previously identified deficiency with the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Strategy with respect to use of charging pumps for a fire in Fire Area A06, 1B-32 480V MCC area.
"This issue was originally identified on April 8, 2005 during work on the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Project. This was entered into the Point Beach Corrective Action Program, and compensatory fire rounds were initiated.
"A postulated fire in the east side of the MCC 1 B-32 could damage both the power and the control cables for charging pumps 1 P-2A and 1 P-2B, and the control cables for redundant charging pump 1 P-2C. The resultant condition of the 1 P-2C charging pump control circuit could prevent operation of this pump as directed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis and FOP 1.2, Potential Fire Effected Safe Shutdown Components. The condition exists as the result of a lack of physical cable separation for power and control cables for the Unit 1 charging pumps. An Operability recommendation was performed for this issue and determined that the condition was Operable but Non-Conforming.
"Based on a continuing review of further information related to this condition, it has been determined that this condition is reportable based on the resultant effect on available charging pump capability. The condition could have resulted in losing the availability of all but a single charging pump operating at slow speed, which would not provide sufficient reactor coolant pump seal cooling, and thereby degrade the level of plant safety. The identified condition requires a revision to the Safe Shutdown Analysis.
"Plant fire mitigation procedure changes to ensure adequate charging pump capability, and reactor coolant pump seal cooling have been made. The Safe Shutdown Analysis will be revised."
The Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41755 | Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN WEBSTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/08/2005
Notification Time: 02:48 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2005
Event Time: 20:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TWENTY EIGHT EARLY WARNING SIRENS TEMPORARILY INOPERABLE
"On June 7th 2005 at 20:00 hours our EWSS System performed an automated poll of active Early Warning Sirens. Normally this action is completed in 15 to 20 minutes. This polling indicated not all sirens had responded to the automated signal. Emergency planning department. Personnel were notified and called to site to determine system status. Their attempts to manually poll the active sirens determined that twenty eight (28) sirens were not responding. Our EWSS system consists of one hundred six (106) sirens. A loss of twenty eight (28) sirens left our system at seventy three percent (73%) of its capacity. South Carolina state and the four (4) local counties were notified of the systems condition within one hour as required by our Nuclear Licensing procedure (NL-122). This same procedure requires an eight (8) hour telephone notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This requirement is based on 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"At 00:15 hours June 8th 2005 our communications department located the faulty siren and disabled its radio transponder, this action restored the other twenty seven (27) sirens to service. This restoration was verified by performing a manual poll of active sirens. The South Carolina state and local counties were notified of system restoration.
"During the evening hours of June 7th 2005 a thunder storm passed through the station's ten (10) mile emergency planning zone. One siren, Fairfield fifty two (F-52) had apparently been struck by lightning and caused is radio transponder to go into a continuous transmit mode. This errant radio signal blocked the polling signal from the other twenty seven (27) sirens. Based on communications department report had the EWSS system been actuated those twenty eight (28) sirens would not have sounded as required."
The licensee has notified State and local authorities as well as the NRC Resident Inspector. | |