U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 04/28/2005 - 04/29/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41633 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV Licensee: SCHLUMBURGER TECHNOLOGY CORP Region: 4 City: HOUMA State: LA County: License #: LA-2783-L01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 04/25/2005 Notification Time: 14:23 [ET] Event Date: 04/21/2005 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/25/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4) RICHARD BARKLEY (R1) RICHARD CORREIA (NMSS) | Event Text TWO TRITIUM SOURCES LOST IN TRANSIT Two 1.6 Curie tritium neutron generator tubes licensed for well logging were picked up by FedEx at the licensee's facility in Houma, LA on 04/11/05. The destination was Princeton Junction, New Jersey. On 04/21/05 it was confirmed that the package was lost. The shipment was tracked to different locations within FedEx. No other information is currently available. | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41637 | Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH Licensee: OWENS GEOTECHNICAL Region: 4 City: LAS VEGAS State: NV County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: STAN MARSHALL HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 04/25/2005 Notification Time: 20:18 [ET] Event Date: 04/25/2005 Event Time: 16:00 [PDT] Last Update Date: 04/27/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4) JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS) | Event Text MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOST AT JOB SITE A Troxler Model 3440 moisture density gauge (S/N 33256, activity 8.8 milliCurie of Cs-137 and 44 milliCurie Am/Be) was lost at a job site after 4:00 pm on April 25, 2005. The gauge user did not check that the gauge was present in the transport vehicle before proceeding to the next job site. The fence around the jobsite was locked, and no other workers were present to determine whether the gauge was found and placed in the licensee's work trailer. Officials (local police, etc) will be notified if the gauge is not found at the job site on 4/26/05. Nevada Report NV-05-005. * * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY THE STATE (MARSHALL) TO NRC (HELD) ON 4/27/05 AT 11:23 * * * The following update was provided by the State via facsimile: "The gauge was found the same day the device was lost. The masonry contractor who found the gauge at the job site contacted a contractor who is also a gauge licensee and was working at the same job site. The gauge licensee/contractor then took possession of the gauge and notified Owens Geotechnical who took possession of the gauge on 4/26/05. This incident is considered to by closed." R4DO (Johnson) and NMSS EO (Essig) notified. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41640 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSLER HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/26/2005 Notification Time: 07:41 [ET] Event Date: 04/26/2005 Event Time: 07:31 [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/28/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): RICHARD BARKLEY (R1) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SPDS (SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM) IS DOWN FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE "At 0731 hours [EDT] on 04/26/2005 the Unit 2 SPDS system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The duration of work is expected to be 48 hours (scheduled for completion at 0700 hours [EDT] on 04/28/2005). "ERDS will remain operable during the work window but several points will not be available. For example 23 of 58 ERDS points will be unavailable while SPDS is out of service. However, the ERDS system will still be operable and transmit the remaining points. "Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability - A review of the ability of the emergency organization to function without SPDS was performed. Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS were identified and are contained on an Emergency Plan format in PICSY (plant integrated computer system). Those points not available from PICSY can be obtained from the control room. With these compensatory actions and the communications in place between the facilities, there will not be a major loss of emergency assessment capability. "Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE ON 4/28/05 AT 1412 EDT FROM RON FRY TO A. COSTA * * * "This is a followup courtesy notification to EN#4160. The Unit 2 SPDS system as noted below [above] has been restored to normal at 13:52 [EDT] on 4/28/05" The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Barkley). | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41645 | Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: HARDY FARRIS HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/28/2005 Notification Time: 00:28 [ET] Event Date: 04/27/2005 Event Time: 18:07 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/28/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION | Person (Organization): WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAY NOT ISOLATE "Based on an engineering evaluation it appears that the inboard and outboard secondary containment isolation valves (total of 2 air operated valves) on the Main Steam Line drain system may not adequately close under all postulated conditions. This evaluation is based on 'worst case' assumptions for parameters such as air pressure to the valve actuator and maximum expected differential pressure across the valve. Both valves were declared inoperable and closed per the Tech Spec action statement at normal 100% power conditions." The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41646 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: RON FRY HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/28/2005 Notification Time: 09:18 [ET] Event Date: 04/28/2005 Event Time: 07:19 [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/28/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): RICHARD BARKLEY (R1) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | M/R | Y | 75 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNIT 2 MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN TRANSFORMER COOLING "At approximately 0700 U2 B Main Transformer cooling was lost. Unit 2 reactor power was reduced from 100% to 75%. Attempts to restore the 2B Main Transformer cooling were unsuccessful, and Unit 2 was manually scrammed from 75% reactor power. RPV water level decreased to -30" due to the SCRAM and was restored by normal Feedwater and RCIC injection. The Main Condenser remained available as a heat sink and there were no SRV lifts. The low water level did result in receiving the Level 2 Division 2 containment isolation signal (-38"), and all expected isolations and initiations did occur. "This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for an RPS actuation when critical, and an 8 hour ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the injection from RCIC and receipt of the level 2 Containment Isolation signal. Additionally, a press release to the public will be issued, and requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)." All rods fully inserted during the manual scram. The electrical system is in a normal shutdown lineup. Secondary containment ventilation was momentarily disrupted in unit-1 and successfully restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the state and media concerning this event. | |