U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 03/29/2005 - 03/30/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41521 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY Licensee: G.E. HEALTHCARE Region: 3 City: ARLINGTON HEIGHTS State: IL County: License #: IL-01109-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: DARREN PERRERO HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/24/2005 Notification Time: 11:48 [ET] Event Date: 03/24/2005 Event Time: [CST] Last Update Date: 03/25/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3) TOM ESSIG (NMSS) BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS) | Event Text MISSING SHIPMENT OF 105 BRACHYTHERAPY (I-125) SEEDS TOTALING 66 MILLICURIES GE Healthcare, also known as Medi Physics, reported that a package of radioactive material had not been received as expected by Northwest Arkansas Medical Center in Springdale, Arkansas. The package, which contains 105 brachytherapy seeds, was to be delivered on Monday March 21, 2005. The seeds contain approximately 0.63 milliCi of activity each, with a total package activity of 66 milliCi. The maximum radiation level on the surface of the package is less than 0.5 milliR/hr. The material was sent via FedEx on Friday March 18 and received at the FedEx facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma on March 19. No further information has been logged since. Medi Physics' customer service group has begun their investigation. The Arkansas Division of Radiation Control has been advised of the situation. IL report number: IL050022 *** UPDATE FROM STATE OF IL (G. VINSON) TO (J. KNOKE) AT 15:14 EST ON 3/25/05 *** The State of IL, Division of Nuclear Safety, called to indicate the missing package containing 105 brachytherapy seeds was located in the Fed Express facility in Arkansas. The package, which was estimated to be found about 11:30 EST on 3/25/05, was intact and in its original condition. The licensee believes the missing package was in the possession of Fed Ex at all times, with no third party intervention. The brachytherapy seeds are being returned to G.E. Healthcare to determine that all seeds are accounted for and to further investigate how the package was lost within the Fed Ex system. Notifications were given to R3 (Kozak), NMSS (Moore), and TAS (Sandler). | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41529 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM Licensee: PERKIN ELMER LIFE SCIENCES Region: 1 City: BOSTON State: MA County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: BOB WALKER HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 03/27/2005 Notification Time: 08:16 [ET] Event Date: 03/26/2005 Event Time: 04:14 [EST] Last Update Date: 03/27/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): JOHN ROGGE (R1) DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS) SUE GAGNER (PAO) JACK CRLENJAK (IRD) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL At 0414 on 03/26/05, a fire broke out in a laboratory of the Perkin Elmer Life Sciences in Boston, MA, that contained 8 Curies Carbon 14. The C-14 was stored in multiple locations. Local fire fighters and hazmat team responded. The fire was extinguished at approximately 0800. There was evidence of contamination inside the building and on the firefighters protective clothing. The levels were 3 - 4 times background. Two firefighters were treated at the hospital for smoke inhalation. The licensee has taken bioassay samples from the two individuals. Wipes outside the facility had no contamination. The cause of the fire is unknown. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41534 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: CRAIG INGOLD HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/28/2005 Notification Time: 15:27 [ET] Event Date: 03/28/2005 Event Time: 13:59 [CST] Last Update Date: 03/29/2005 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED | Person (Organization): KENNETH RIEMER (R3) HERB BERKOW (NRR) JACK CRLENJAK (IRD) FEMA () DHS () | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO HYDROGEN LEAK The licensee faxed the following information: "Following the Unit 2 trip, (due to a malfunction of the generator protection circuitry), a hydrogen leak was identified on the Unit 2 main generator. The leakage was sufficient enough to cause a flammable gas release affecting normal plant operation. The Unusual Event was declared under HU6 - Hazards and Other Conditions. The State and local authorities were notified at 14:09 CST. There is NO fire, it is a hydrogen release only." The licensee said the hydrogen totalizer, which indicated a flow rate of 100 cfm, may be a probable area of leakage. The hydrogen leaked directly into the turbine building. Air samples indicated personnel breathing apparatus was not required. The licensee expects to exit from the UE once the hydrogen system was purged with CO2. Estimated timeframe is 3-6 hours. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. *** UPDATE FROM D. BRAGLIA TO J. KNOKE AT 17:40 EST ON 3/28/05 *** The licensee terminated their Unusual Event at 16:40 CST, and the plant status is 0% power / Mode 3. The hydrogen leak was determined to be from a bushing on the main generator. The hydrogen leakage is believed to have lasted only 5 minutes. The licensee notified the State and NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer), IRD Manager (Crlenjak), NRR EO (Berkow), FEMA and DHS. *** UPDATE FROM J. GERRITY TO J. KNOKE AT 14:30 EST ON 3/29/05 *** Received Event Summary Report from Braidwood station. Corrected Unusual Event termination time from 16:40 to 16:23 CST. Notified R3DO (Riemer) and NRR EO (Brenner) | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41540 | Facility: LIMERICK Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: PHIL CHASE HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/28/2005 Notification Time: 23:56 [ET] Event Date: 03/28/2005 Event Time: 17:38 [EST] Last Update Date: 03/29/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION | Person (Organization): JAMES TRAPP (R1) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION TEMPORARILY INOPERABLE The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes): "Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [was] declared inoperable due to a loose control power fuse clip associated with the HPCI Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve HV-055-212041. The loose clip resulted in loss of control power to this DC motor operated valve and therefore rendered the HPCI system inoperable. The fuse clip has been replaced and the HPCI system returned to an operable status. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident." The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 41541 | Rep Org: DEPT OF NAVY RADIATION SAFETY CMTE Licensee: DEPT OF NAVY RADIATION SAFETY CMTE Region: 1 City: Crystal City State: VA County: License #: 45-93645-01NA Agreement: N Docket: NRC Notified By: COMMANDER FRAGOSA HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/29/2005 Notification Time: 09:54 [ET] Event Date: 03/23/2005 Event Time: 12:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 03/29/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | Person (Organization): JAMES TRAPP (R1) TOM ESSIG (NMSS) TAS (VIA E-MAIL) () | Event Text CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTORS MISSING FROM DEPARTMENT OF NAVY INVENTORY A representative for the Navy's master materials license reported a number of chemical agent detectors missing based on the two most recent inventory cycles. Specifically, 27 Chemical Agent Monitors (CAMs) that utilize a 10 milliCurie Nickel-63 plated source (SSND# NR-1129-D-103-S) are missing [270 millicuries of Ni-63 total]. In addition, 11 Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarms (ACADAs) with two 10 milliCurie Ni-63 plated sources in each detector (SSND# NR-1129-D-101-S) are missing [220 millicuries of Ni-63 total]. The majority of these detectors have been reported missing from Marine Core Logistics Base in Albany, GA. However, a number of these detectors have been distributed to Marine Expeditionary Units in the field. Details of the times, locations, and circumstances under which the detectors went missing are still under investigation by the Navy and will be reported in a followup 30-day written report. The licensee has contacted the NRC Regional Inspector (Masnyk-Bailey) and HQ contact (Bhachu). | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41543 | Facility: SEABROOK Region: 1 State: NH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: DAMON RITTER HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/29/2005 Notification Time: 15:24 [ET] Event Date: 03/29/2005 Event Time: 14:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 03/29/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | Person (Organization): JAMES TRAPP (R1) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | Event Text 24 - HR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT DUE TO T.S. NOT MET The licensee provided the following information: "On March 29, 2005, Seabrook determined that the requirements of T.S. 3.8.1.1 were not met when the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT), AC supply to the Bus E5, was removed from service on February 14, 2005. T.S. 3.8..1.1, Action a. requires that the operability of the remaining AC power source be verified within 1 hour, and at least once every 8 hours thereafter. This action requirement was not completed on February 14, 2005 when the RAT AC power supply to Bus E5 was removed from service. At the time of this event the unit Auxiliary Transformer AC power supply to Bus E5 and E6, and the RAT AC power supply to bus E6, were in service. This event is reportable pursuant to Seabrook Station license, Condition 2.G., as a violation of the Technical Specifications. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41546 | Facility: CALLAWAY Region: 4 State: MO Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: J. MILLIGAN HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/29/2005 Notification Time: 19:07 [ET] Event Date: 03/29/2005 Event Time: 10:57 [CST] Last Update Date: 03/29/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): GREG PICK (R4) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text ACTUATION OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM WHILE ESTABLISHING INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR LEAK TEST IN MODE 3. The licensee faxed the following information: "On 3/29/05, with the Callaway plant at 0 % power in Mode 3, Steam Generator (S/G) levels were being maintained using 'B' Condensate Pump. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature was being controlled using Condenser Steam Dumps. Preparation was in progress for performance of a leak test on Main Feedwater Isolation Valve AEFV0041. As part of the leak test, condensate flow was temporarily isolated to 'C' S/G and the Auxiliary Feedwater System was aligned to provide water to the 'C' S/G. When low was initiated to 'C' S/G using auxiliary Feedwater, level initially increased due to the injection of a small volume of warm water contained within the Feedwater piping at the S/G, then proceeded to rapidly decrease due to S/G shrink caused by the injection of Auxiliary Feedwater with a temperature of approximately 70 degree F. Level in 'C' S/G decreased until S/G Lo Lo Level reactor trip and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signals were generated. Performance of the leak test was terminated and RCS temperature and S/G levels were stabilized at normal parameters for Mode 3." The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41547 | Rep Org: GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR ENERGY Licensee: GENERAL ELECTRIC NUCLEAR ENERGY Region: 1 City: WILMINGTON State: NC County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JASON S. POST HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/29/2005 Notification Time: 19:17 [ET] Event Date: 01/28/2005 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 03/29/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | Person (Organization): JAMES TRAPP (R1) MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2) KENNETH RIEMER (R3) GREG PICK (R4) OMID TABATABAI (NRR) | Event Text PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL TO EXCEED LOW PRESSURE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY LIMIT The following is a portion of a facsimile submitted by GE Energy-Nuclear: "The defect is a calculation of an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO), which predicts that the Pressure Regulator Failure Maximum Demand (Open) (PRFO) transient will be terminated by a high water level trip as a result of level swell in the reactor. An improved (and approved) model predicts that MSIV closure will occur when steam line pressure reaches the low-pressure isolation setpoint (LPIS), rather than terminate due to a high water level trip. Depending upon the plant-specific response to a PRFO, including the value of the LPIS, reactor steam dome pressure could decrease to below 785 psig while thermal power exceeds 25% of rated, which would be a violation of SL 2.1.1.1. This constitutes a Defect as defined in 10 CFR 21.3, even though there is no safety hazard created. SL 2.1.1.1 was intended to protect fuel cladding integrity during startup conditions without the need to perform a Critical Power Ratio (CPR) calculation. The AOO of concern is a transient from normal operating conditions that causes CPR to increase, so the event produces additional margin to the Minimum Critical Power Ratio Safety Limit (SLMCPR) and does not threaten fuel cladding integrity. The LPIS should not be considered as a Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS) for SL 2.1.1.1 since it does not provide a 'significant safety function' with regard to protecting fuel cladding integrity. This indicates that SL 2.1.1.1 is overly conservative because an event that causes CPR to increase and does not threaten fuel cladding integrity, may result in exceeding a reactor core SL." Notified Plants: AFFECTED: Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Limerick 1 & 2, Peach Bottom 2 & 3, Perry 1, and Hope Creek. POTENTIALLY AFFECTED: Clinton, Oyster Creek, Brunswick 1 & 2, Nine Mile Point 1, FitzPatrick, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Dresden 2 & 3, LaSalle 1 & 2, Quad Cities 1 & 2, Cooper, Duane Arnold, Monticello, Hatch 1 & 2, Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3. | |