| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/10/2005 - 02/11/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41380 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PATRICK FALLON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 02/07/2005
Notification Time: 19:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/07/2005
Event Time: 17:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2005 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
KAREN CARTER (DHS)
MIKE EACHES (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION (UNUSUAL EVENT)
At 1734 on 2/7/2005, received an Area Radiation Monitor alarm in the reactor building basement airlock area at approximately 75Mr/hr. The valid alarm caused entry into EOP flowcharts for High Radiation in the Secondary Containment. Check of the relay room monitor showed 100 Mr/hr. Investigation showed that a failed open main steam line drain valve combined with placing hydrogen water chemistry in service caused the increasing radiation levels. A downstream steam line drain isolation valve was closed to isolate the steam flow path past the monitor. Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection rate was lowered. The Rad levels returned to about 4 Mr/hr (normal levels) following valve closure (at 1745). The EOPs were exited at 1755. After review of the event it was determined that an unusual event should have been entered at the time of the EOP entry (EAL AU2, Unexpected Increase of Plant Radiation Levels), 1734 and exited at 1745 when area radiation levels returned to normal values. This is an after the fact notification of a missed emergency classification.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/10/05 AT 1907 HRS. EST BY CROUCH * * *
This event notification reporting criteria has been changed to comply with the guidance provided in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR 50.72 and 50.73". There is specific discussion that states (in part) that if a licensee discovers that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of discovery, an actual declaration of the emergency class is not necessary. An ENS notification of the missed classification is an acceptable alternative.
The Headquarters Operations Officer notified R3DO (Duncan). |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 41387 | Rep Org: HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES
Licensee: HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DWAINE BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 02/08/2005
Notification Time: 19:21 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2005
Event Time: 11:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
GEORGE PANGBORN (R1)
LONNIE LACEY (DHS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
MR CREWS (DOT)
THOMAS YATES (DOE)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (STP)
JACK RAMSEY (IP)
JACK CRLENJAK (IRD)
| Event Text LICENSEE REPORTED A SHIPMENT THEY WERE TO RECEIVE IS UNACCOUNTED FOR
Halliburton Energy Services had shipped a well logging source and calibrating source containing 18.5 curies of Am-241 Be and .5 curies of Am-241 from Nizhnevartovsk, Russia to Houston TX. Both sources were in a 18" dia 23" long cylindrical type "A" container which weighed 83kg. The sources went through Amsterdam to JFK in New York and cleared customs in New York on 10/09/04. After clearing customs they have not been able to track the package to any of the transport companies that were scheduled to handle it. An ongoing search is still being conducted.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/09/05 @ 1751 FROM RICHARD ARSENAULT TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *
The licensee was notified at 1621 CT that the unaccounted for sources were located at the Forward Freight facilities in Boston, MA. It appears that they were trucked to Boston after a Boston label was inadvertently placed on the package at the Newark facility of Forward Freight. The licensee stated the package appears to be intact and the are sending a rep to Boston on 2/10/05.
Notified Regs 1 & 4, NMSS, PAO, DHS, DOT, DOE, IP, TAS, STP
* * * UPDATE ON 02/10/05 @ 1358 HRS. EST FROM ARSENAULT TO CROUCH * * *
A representative from Halliburton Energy Services has verified that the sources and packaging are intact and all source material is accounted for. Forward Air Freight is scheduled to ship the package to Halliburton in Houston, TX.
Notified R1DO (Cobey), R4DO(Whitten), R4 (Cain) and NMSS (Essig). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41388 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee:
Region: 4
City: Placentia State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGOR
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/08/2005
Notification Time: 20:36 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2005
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (FAX)
| Event Text CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- LOST RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The California Radiation Health Bureau reported that a radiopharmaceutical carrier had lost 112 milliCuries of Thallium-201. The shipment of thallium was picked up at the airport in Burbank, CA and was in transport to Loma Linda, CA when it was discovered missing. The carrier had made two stops after picking up the product in Burbank, CA. The carrier reported that when they left Placentia, CA, (the second stop) their truck tailgate was closed. When they reached Loma Linda, CA, they discovered that the tailgate was open. It is believed that the package with the thallium fell out on the interstate between Placentia and Loma Linda.
The carrier searched the route twice without success. The State of California did notify the California Highway Patrol of the missing package.
California incident number is 020805. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41394 | Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB SCARBOROUGH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/09/2005
Notification Time: 22:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2005
Event Time: 20:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
ELLIOT BRENNER (PAO)
VICTOR DRICKS (PAO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO PRESS RELEASE FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"STP [South Texas Project] Nuclear Operating Co. will be making a press release concerning the shut down of Unit 2. STPNOC will be sharing the press release with various locals and state government agencies and the media.
"NRC was notified of the TS [Technical Specification] required shutdown on 2/9/05 (EN# 41392)"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1700 EST ON 2/10/05 FROM KLAY KLIMPLE TO S. SANDIN * * *
"STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) issued a press release at 1503 today concerning the status of the shutdown of Unit 2. STPNOC has shared the press release with various local and state government agencies and the media.
"NRC was notified of the Technical Specification required shutdown on 2/9/05 (Reference EN# 41392)."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Blair Spitzberg). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41396 | Rep Org: FRAMATOME ANP
Licensee: EATON ELECTRICAL
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GAYLE ELLIOTT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 02/10/2005
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2005
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK FOSTER (NRR)
| Event Text REPORTABLE DEFECT IN SIS CONTROL WIRE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: The component which is defective is a SIS Control Wire.
Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Framatome ANP
"Nature of the defect: This issue concerns defective crimps associated with AMP Faston Flag Receptacles (with Tab-Lok features) utilized on SIS Control Wire which was supplied to STP [South Texas Project] Nuclear Operating Company. A failure of the crimp connection could cause an unwanted action or prevent a desired action that could affect the operation of a safety related system. A variety of safety related systems could be impacted depending on where the wires are used. This commercial grade product was manufactured/supplied by Eaton Electrical and dedicated/supplied by Framatome ANP for a safety-related application on DS Type Circuit Breakers. The defective wires were identified prior to installation in the plant.
"The date on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on February 8, 2005.
"In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: Framatome ANP supplied 50 SIS Control Wires to STP Nuclear Operating Company.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: Framatome ANP contacted STP Nuclear Operating Company and requested that all 50 SIS Control Wires supplied by Framatome ANP be returned. To prevent further occurrence of this problem Framatome ANP has taken a number of corrective actions in conjunction with the company supplying the commercial grade product, including additional inspection requirements in the dedication process to ensure crimps meet the manufacturers requirements." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41397 | Rep Org: DOMINION
Licensee: ALLEN-BRADLEY
Region: 1
City: GLEN ALLEN State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM SHAUB
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/10/2005
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2005
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
| Event Text PART 21 NOTIFICATION INVOLVING ABNORMAL ALLEN-BRADLEY 700RTC RELAY CONTACT RESPONSE
The following information was submitted via fax:
"Reason for Message: Report a Part 21 - Regarding the abnormal response of Alien-Bradley 700RTC relays when configured with the NC contact in the C5-C6 position.
"Event Date: 2/8/05
"Unit Name: North Anna Power Station
"Component Information (as applicable):
"Manufacturer: Allen-Bradley
"Part Number: 700RTC11110U1
"Description: Abnormal contact response was observed during pre-installation testing of Allen-Bradley 700RTC relays. The 700RTC relays are solid state timing relays used in several Safety Related applications at North Anna. The 700RTC relay provides a wide time adjustment. The relay has two timed contact positions and two instantaneous contact positions. The relays are ordered to a part number that specifies a certain contact arrangement, but the contacts are fully interchangeable and may be configured by the end user in any combination of Normally Open/Normally Closed (NO/NC). Removable contact cartridges mount in the contact slots. At North Anna, Allen-Bradley part number 700RTCI1110U1 is used, which is a contact configuration of NO, NC, NO, NC.
"The relays were setup and tested in a NO, NO, NC, NC configuration when it was discovered that the instantaneous contact (C5-C6 position), with a NC contact cartridge installed, behaved like a timed contact. The C5-C6 position changed state according to the setting of the timer. All other contact positions worked properly. With a NO contact installed in the C5-C6 position, the contact position behaved as expected (as an instantaneous contact). Different NC contact cartridges were installed in the C5-C6 position of the relay and the anomaly still occurred. Forty-five (45) relays were tested for this anomaly. Twelve of 45 relays failed testing (C5-C6 with NC contact behaved like a timed contact). The relays were returned to Allen-Bradley for failure analysis. Allen-Bradley has duplicated the anomaly using the returned relays and one from their stock. The root cause is still under investigation.
"The 700RTC relays are used as replacements for Agastat Relays in certain Safety Related applications. Over the past ten years, several 700RTC relays have been installed in various locations at North Anna. At North Anna, the 700RTC relays are purchased commercial grade then upgraded for safety related use using the commercial grade dedication process. The upgrade is performed by the North Anna Materials Verification Lab using an approved commercial grade dedication plan. Prior to identification of this anomaly, the dedication testing verified proper contact operation of the contact cartridges in the as-received configuration. The dedication process now verifies proper contact operation in all possible contact configurations.
"Current and planned 700RTC relay installations were reviewed. The majority of installed 700RTC relays are configured with the contact cartridges arranged according to the 700RTC11110U1 part number (NO, NC, NO, NC). In a few locations, the contact cartridges are configured NO, NO, NC, NC. North Anna does not utilize the C5-C6 position with the NC contact cartridge in any of 700RTC locations.
"Prior to installation, 700RTC relays are bench tested for satisfactory operation.
"Causes: The root cause is unknown at this time, although Allen-Bradley has indicated that the sensitivity of the contact cartridges may be a factor in causing this response.
"Corrective Actions: Nine of the relays that failed bench testing were sent back to Allen-Bradley for analysis. North Anna is working with Allen-Bradley to determine a cause.
"Industry Notification: OE notification No. 19273 - Abnormal response of Allen-Bradley 700RTC relays when configured with the NC contact in the C5-C6 position." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41398 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ETHAN TREPTOW
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/10/2005
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
JACK CRLENJAK (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION (UNUSUAL EVENT)
"On 2/10/05 at 13:35, the Shift Manager became aware of a condition that previously existed which met the Emergency Plan criteria for declaration of an Unusual Event. On 1/23/05, a Radiation Protection Technician released nitrogen into the RAF Countroom as part of an experiment. During the experiment, the atmospheric monitors in the room detected life-threatening levels of nitrogen (oxygen deficient atmosphere). This has been determined to meet the criteria for an Unusual Event per Emergency Classification Level Chart P for a release of toxic or flammable gas on site and portable monitors Indicate concentrations at life threatening levels."
Management became aware of the unauthorized experiment conducted by the Technician during a management review. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this incident.
The licensee will inform both state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41400 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE MAYO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/10/2005
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2005
Event Time: 17:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO TRITIUM SAMPLE EXCEEDING OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) REPORTING LEVEL
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 2/10/2005 with Watts Bar, Unit 1 operating at 100 percent Reactor Power, TVA plans to voluntarily notify the State of Tennessee's radiological and environmental health agencies and Department of Energy that a tritium sample obtained from a onsite monitoring well was confirmed to be above the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) reporting level for ground water samples. This result was for an ODCM required composite sample obtained over a month (12/29/04 through 1/25/05). On 2/8/2005, Chemistry confirmed this result and established a team to investigate the source of this contamination, the cause of the increased tritium levels, and the extent of where the tritium is found. Additional samples have been collected from selected monitoring wells, and the results of these tests are being analyzed. At this time, there is no indication of any offsite release, there is no threat to the public or company employees, and the situation does not pose a public health hazard. This notification is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, (b)(2)(xi), 'News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency'."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41401 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOONG KO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/10/2005
Notification Time: 22:56 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2005
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text RCS LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED DURING PLANT STARTUP WALKDOWNS
"On 2/10/2005, St. Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 3 returning from refueling outage SL2-15. At 0605 during plant startup walkdowns, 2 leaks were discovered on the instrument line to the 2B1 safety injection header. Closing the instrument root isolation valve to PT-3339 isolated one leak. The second leak was under the insulation and later upon evaluation it was concluded to be ASME section Xl RCS pressure boundary leakage based on its location between the reactor coolant system loop check valves.
"The leakage source is from the 2B1 safety injection tank and not directly from the reactor coolant system because the first reactor coolant system loop check valve is maintaining pressure isolation. As a result this is not Technical Specification pressure boundary leakage. The pressure instrument root is downstream of the Safety Injection Tank (SIT) isolation valve and between the two reactor coolant system loop check valves. Isolating the SIT from the header isolated second leak. An engineering response team was formed and repairs are being planned. RCS heat removal is being accomplished via the Steam Generators and the Atmospheric Dump Valves. Feedwater is being supplied to the Steam Generator by the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Plant electrical loads are supplied from offsite sources through the Startup Transformers."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41402 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID NIX
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 02/11/2005
Notification Time: 00:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2005
Event Time: 23:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
JACK CRLENJAK (IRD)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCES
"Event: At 23:00 [EST] on 2-10-05, Oconee Unit 1 initiated a plant shutdown as required by its Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition M, Required Action M.1 requires Oconee Unit 1 to enter Mode 3 by 03:06 on 2-11-05 due to Keowee Hydro Unit 2 and CT-1 inoperable. Keowee Hydro Unit 2 is inoperable due to a planned outage, with restoration in progress. CT-1 is inoperable due to experiencing a lockout at 12:12 on 2-10-05 during testing to restore Keowee.
"Initial Safety Significance: Oconee Unit 1 is being shut down in accordance with Technical Specifications. Unit auxiliaries will be powered from the Standby busses and a Lee Combustion Turbine. When the turbine is tripped, the Unit will enter into the natural circulation mode of cooling due to loss of Reactor Coolant Pumps.
"Corrective Action(s):
1) Restoration of Keowee Hydro Unit 2 is in progress.
2) A Unit Threat Team has been assembled and is investigating the cause of the lockout on CT-1. CT-2 cross connect is in progress to allow the unit, if tripped, to avoid loss of Reactor Coolant Pumps."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * UPDATE FROM D. NIX TO M. RIPLEY 0016 EST 02/11/05 * * * *
At the time of the initial notification, Oconee reported that, at 2346 EST on 02/10/05, the CT-2 cross connect has been completed, allowing the unit, if tripped, to avoid a loss of Reactor Coolant Pumps. The power reduction to enter Mode 3 by 03:06 continues. Restoration of Keowee Hydro Unit 2 and investigation into the cause of the lockout on CT-1 remain in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2 DO (M. Widman), IRD (Crlenjak), and NRR EO (W. Beckner).
* * * * UPDATE FROM J. COLLINS TO W. HUFFMAN 0045 EST 02/11/05 * * * *
At 0033 EST 02/11/05, restoration of Keowee Hydro Unit 2 to operable status was completed and Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition M, Required Action M.1 requiring Oconee Unit 1 to enter Mode 3 by 03:06 on 2-11-05 was exited. The power reduction was stopped with power at 85% at 0034 EST. Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition A, which was entered on 1106 EST on 02/10/05, requires restoration of CT-1 by 2306 on 02/11/06. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2 DO (M. Widman), IRD (Crlenjak), and NRR EO (W. Beckner). | |