| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/12/2005 - 01/13/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41314 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: ALBERTSONS GROCERY STORES
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0397
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 01/07/2005
Notification Time: 09:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The State of Nebraska reported that 19 tritium exit signs that were held under general license by Albertsons Grocery Store are missing from a store location in Omaha. The signs were manufactured by NRD, Inc., Model T-4001, with each sign containing 19.8 Curies of tritium in 1991. The State was informed in October of 2004 by Albertsons that the Omaha store had been sold to a "No Frills" supermarket chain. The State contacted "No Frills" in November 2004 and was informed that the signs could not be located. Investigation determined that the signs were removed by Albertsons in 2002 when the store was remodeled and replaced with electrical exit signs. The Albertsons store manager at the time of the remodeling was not aware of what was done with the signs. The State also confirmed that with NRD, Inc. that the signs had not been returned to the manufacturer. The State believes that the signs were probably sent to a landfill and plans to close the investigation. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 41325 | Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-16
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/12/2005
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text TWO LOST M43A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTORS CONTAINING AM-241 SEALED SOURCES
On 1/5/05 during maintenance activities at the Oregon National Guard Camp Withycombe located in Clackamas, OR, two (2) M43A1 Chemical Agent Cells [reg. device #1129-D-102S] were discovered missing. Each missing Chemical Agent Cell contained an Am-241sealed source of 250 microCuries. The serial numbers for the two (2) missing sources are Z03-C-12123 and Z03-C-05051. An exhaustive search of the maintenance area including the low-level waste disposal facility was conducted with negative results. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41326 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 01/12/2005
Notification Time: 21:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2005
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 24 HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT REGARDING HALON SYSTEM ACTUATOR PORT CONNECTION ERROR
"At 1330 on January 12, 2005, station personnel identified an error in connection of pilot lines to the manual-pneumatic actuator on halon bottles required for fire suppression. The vendor was contacted to confirm the configuration. The vendor indicated that the halon bottles would not properly discharge if the pilot lines were not properly connected.
"The system engineer inspected the halon systems. It was determined that five of six fire areas protected by halon systems were affected. Fire watches were implemented for the affected fire areas."
Affected areas:
A-27, Load Center/MG set Room, main - correct, reserve - 1 valve correct/1 valve incorrect
A-17, South Electrical Penetration Room, main - correct, reserve - incorrect
A-18, North Electrical Penetration Room, Main - correct, reserve - correct
C-9, ESF Switchgear room 1*, main - incorrect, reserve - incorrect
C-10, ESF Switchgear room 2*, main - incorrect, reserve - incorrect
C-27, Control room cable trenches/chases**, bottle 1 - correct, bottle 2 - incorrect
"The main bank is sufficient to suppress a fire in a fire area.
* One halon system protects both of the fire areas.
** One halon bottle will provide general area coverage. The second bottle ensures sufficient halon concentration for upper portions of the cable chases in the control room.
"The design and licensing basis for the fire protection system does not require consideration of a fire in more than one fire area at a time. No degraded fire barriers between the above fire areas were identified which would have allowed a fire to affect more than one of the fire areas at a time.
"Repairs were immediately initiated to correct the condition. As of 2010 CST, the repairs have been completed for the affected fire areas and restored to operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41327 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LANCE LANE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 01/12/2005
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2005
Event Time: 19:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 24 HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT REGARDING HALON SYSTEM- ACTUATOR CONNECTION ERROR
The following information was received via facsimile from the licensee:
"Based upon information provided by Callaway on 1/12/05, it was determined that the manual pneumatic actuators on the Halon suppression systems are piped incorrectly which may result in the inability to actuate the Halon suppression systems manually or automatically.
"Each manual pneumatic actuator has clearly marked "A" and "B" ports. Per the M-658 vendor manual series & drawing M-658-00025, the "A" port shall be connected to the actuation pilot manifold or top of cylinder valve and the "B" port shall be connected to the solenoid valve. A field walkdown was performed and in all but one case, the manual pneumatic actuator has been piped in the opposite configuration.
"This effects the Halon suppression system protecting the ESF switchgear rooms, the Rod Drive MG Set room, the North Electrical Penetration room, the South Electrical Penetration Room, the Switchgear & Switchboard rooms, and the Control Room cable trenches & chases.
"Based upon preliminary evaluation, it appears that the Halon suppression systems are inoperable."
Fire watches were implemented for the affected areas.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | |