| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/13/2004 - 12/14/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Hospital | Event Number: 41253 | Rep Org: GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. MED CTR
Licensee: GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. MED CTR
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 08-00216-22
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASTRA BAIN-DOWELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 12/13/2004
Notification Time: 08:49 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)
| Event Text POSSIBLE INCORRECT READING OF WIPE SAMPLES FROM A SCINTILLATION COUNTERS
A radiation safety technologist on the licensee's staff recorded the liquid scintillation counting results of two package inspection wipe samples when the scintillation counter could not have produced this data. The technologist had no credible explanation for this, and has resigned to pursue a different career unrelated to radiation safety or radioactive material.
In this circumstance, it is highly unlikely that any measurable dose was received by anyone, since the lab staff handles each radioactive vial with great care, and stores it safely after pickup from the RSO lab or delivery by the RSO staff. Also, not one package received from 1/1/01 on, was contaminated above DOT's safety limit, or even 2% of that limit. Any box that is contaminated is kept in radwaste.
To prevent any recurrence of such undocumented records, the licensee has increased the direct supervision of the package opening procedure by the Radiation Safety Officer, who will also sign or initial the scintillation counter printout sheets of the wipe test results henceforward.
The licensee believes that the technologist's resignation, and the RSO review of the wipe test printout sheets, will prevent any inaccurate or undocumented entries in these important NRC records in the future. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41256 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL DUNTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/13/2004
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2004
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS NOT CLOSED DURING FUEL HANDLING OPERATIONS
Event:
"During refueling operations, containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere, closed by manual valves, was not maintained during fuel movement.
- On 12/4/04 the five containment closure valves in question were verified closed during the initial establishment of conditions to perform refueling.
- On 12/7/04 a steam drain valve checklist was performed in preparation for establishing vacuum which opened the five valves required to be closed by containment closure for fuel handling.
- On 12/12/04 during performance of the 100 hour refueling containment closure checklist five containment closure valves were found in the OPEN position. These five valves are to be tagged closed during the time when refueling containment closure is required.
- On 12/12/04 at approx 2100 a question as to if refueling containment closure was established on the steam generators was raised. It was investigated. And determined at 1245 on 12/13/04 that refueling containment closure was not established on the inside or outside of containment for the steam generators. "
Initial Safety Significance:
"This event is being reported as a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment.
"Section 15.11.2.2 of the Oconee UFSAR addresses a Fuel Handling Accident inside Containment. The 1977 analysis concludes that the worst case release is appropriately within 10 CFR 100 limits but does not take any credit for containment. For this event the potential flow rate would be restricted due to the size of the open valves, the diameter of the piping from one open 3/4 inch valve in the Containment building to the four open 2 inch valves and one 3 inch valve in the Turbine Building, and the absence of a significant differential pressure.
"Oconee wishes to note that a TS amendment incorporating Alternate Source Terms has been approved, but is currently awaiting implementation, which would only require refueling containment closure during movement of recently irradiated fuel (i.e. fuel moved within 72 hours of criticality). This event began on day 59 of the current refueling outage. Thus the potential for a significant release of radioactive material as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident during this time period was greatly reduced."
Corrective Actions:
"At the time of discovery fuel handling operations were no longer in effect. On 12/13/2004 at 1245 it was determined that refueling containment closure was not established, fuel handling operations were complete at 0358 on 12/13/2004."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |