| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/29/2004 - 11/01/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41147 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ATC ASSOCIATES
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #: 31210310000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 10/26/2004
Notification Time: 10:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2004
Event Time: 22:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (TAS)
CANADA VIA FAX ()
| Event Text OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"Stolen Troxler moisture density gauge. Model 3401B, Serial # 13437. Contains Cesium-137 (8 millicuries) and Americium-241/Beryllium (40 millicuries) sources. Ohio License # 31210310000. Gauge was stolen from back of pick-up truck outside a motel on west side of Cleveland, Ohio. Gauge was in locked transfer case with radioactive material labels on outside. Case was chained to bed of pick-up truck. Theft occurred sometime between 10 PM Monday, 10/25/04 and 7 AM Tuesday, 10/26/04. Theft was discovered when worker returned to truck in morning to begin work day. Police have been notified. Awaiting additional information and police report from licensee. Initial report made to Bureau at 8:40 AM on 10/26/04. Information is current as of that time."
Reference Number: OH2004-104 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41148 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RAYTHEON COMPANY
Region: 4
City: EL SEGUNDO State: CA
County:
License #: 1053-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/26/2004
Notification Time: 19:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILS TO FUNCTION
Summary report of fax provided by State of California
On August 2, 2004 at 5:00 pm PDT, a licensee employee was irradiating electrical parts using the Low Dose 142-MA Self Contained, Shielded Panoramic Irradiator. This device uses a Cobalt- 60 (Co-60) source with an activity of 2 Curies. The licensee employee was able to bypass the interlock to the chamber while the chamber was irradiating. The employee was wearing a film badge and holding his ring badge in his hand (not on finger) while working with the chamber. The film badge was first used on August 2, 2004. The ring and film badges were collected and immediately shipped for analysis.
The source of radiation within the chamber is a sealed Co-60 (2 Curies) source and is exposed by raising and lowering the source rod. Raising the rod activates the door interlock and exposes the source within the chamber. The licensee intended to place a product into the chamber and failed to notice that the source rod was up, and pulled open the door while the interlock was activated. The safety interlock failed and was unsuccessful in keeping the doors locked. The door was immediately closed (exposure time approximately 3 seconds)
On August 4, 2004, the licensee contacted a Health Physics consultant and performed a calculation to estimate the possible exposure level. They used the Gamma Constant for Co-60, the exposure time, distance, and activities that were involved.
During the afternoon of August 4, 2004, J. L. Shepherd inspected the equipment and determined that the interlock was defective and advised that they install an alternate interlock that is sturdier. They returned on August 5, 2004 and installed the new interlock.
Wear on the interlock arm caused the ultimate failure on August 4, 2004, and was most probably caused by repeated attempts by the operators of the irradiator to forcibly open the cavity lids while the source was in the "Irradiate" position. The replacement arm has been redesigned and strengthened to avoid the recurrence of a problem of this nature in the future.
California preliminary exposure estimate to the operator's hands is less than 200 millirem while licensee calculation showed exposure received to be approximately 2-3 millirem.
Incident remains open until receipt of documentation of monitoring device exposure and copies of the physicist's calculations. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 41158 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: THOMAS WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/29/2004
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2004
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Event Text CRITICALITY CONTROL REPORT
"At 0945 on 10/29/04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that NCSE/A 3972-11 did not establish the necessary moderation controls for the sump in the C-360 elevator pit to ensure that double contingency is maintained if a UF6 release occurs in the transfer room. The sump is an unfavorable geometry. The C-360 basement transfer room is small and relatively air-tight once placed in containment resulting from a UF6 release. A credible UF6 release in the Transfer Room could consume all moisture in the room and leave gaseous UF6 available to react directly with pre-existing liquids in the elevator sump. Over an extended period of time this reaction could support a uranium concentration that results in a critical configuration. The current configuration of the sump does not prevent less than an always safe slab depth of 3.5 inches of solution in the sump.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Stop fissile operations in the C-360 transfer room until the necessary NCS controls for double contingency can be ensured for the sump in the elevator pit."
The regulatee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41160 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HARDIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/29/2004
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DISCOVERED IN 480 VOLT SWITCHGEAR ROOM
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On October 29, 2004, at approximately 1600 hours, control room operators were informed by engineering personnel that raceways were located closer than 20 feet from the redundant division without being protected by a fire barrier wrap in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
"In 480 volt switchgear room E7, Brunswick is committed to maintaining redundant safe shutdown circuits by a minimum of 20 feet with no-intervening combustibles, unless the circuits are protected by a one-hour fire barrier wrap. Two conduits containing Division II circuits were identified closer than 20 feet to their redundant counterparts with no wrap installed.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. When the condition was recognized, impairments were established in accordance with the fire protection program and compensatory measures were implemented. In addition, fire detection systems in the affected area have been verified to be operable. The affected area is maintained as a combustible free separation zone.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
"Impairments have been initiated and appropriate compensatory measures established. The root cause and additional corrective actions are being documented in accordance with the corrective action program." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41163 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/30/2004
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2004
Event Time: 14:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
| Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text CONTAMINATED, INJURED PERSON TRANSPORTED OFFSITE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 1405 [hrs. CDT], Shift Manager was notified that a contract individual in containment had collapsed and needed EMT [Emergency Medical Technician].
"At 1410, Shift Manager called for an ambulance and individual was transported out of containment.
"At 1443, he [the injured person] was transported offsite to the hospital. Shift manager notified hospital of individual being contaminated. HP [Health Physics technician] identified minor contamination on the hair on the back of his head, ~200 cpm [counts per minute]. Shift Manager also contacted State Department of Health and Family Services [Radiation Protection Section]."
The patient's status is unknown at this time but appears to be heat stress related. The contamination appears to be the result of a co-worker catching the patient when he was falling down. Plant Health Physics personnel attempted to decontaminate the patient but were unsuccessful. The patient was transported to Two Rivers Hospital in Two Rivers, WI. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41164 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID CLYMER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 11/01/2004
Notification Time: 02:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2004
Event Time: 22:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text PLANT HAD AUTO START OF THE DIVISION 1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"Undervoltage conditions were experienced on Division1emergency switchgear with subsequent start and load of the respective diesel generator. A preliminary investigation indicates that an unexpected undervoltage signal was generated when technicians inadvertently contacted the wrong terminals during preparations for the respective division ECCS surveillance testing. All systems and equipment responded as required."
Power is still being provided (as of event reporting time) by the Div 1 EDG while they are working to restore normal power.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |