| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/12/2004 - 10/13/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40973 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM DALTON
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 08/22/2004
Notification Time: 01:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2004
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | Event Text ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM FLOW CONTROLLER MALFUNCTION
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
"[The] High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) flow controller malfunctioned resulting in the inability of the HPCI to perform its safety function as a single train system under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). The failure mode for the flow controller is suspected to be a power supply issue, however, the cause has not been confirmed at this time. Unit 2 is in a 14 day technical specification [T.S.] limitation which if exceed results in a unit shutdown ( T.S. 3.5.1 Condition C)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/12/04 @ 0835 BY FOSS TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 8/22/04 at 0112 hours (EN# 40973).
Notification of the event to the NRC on 8/22/04 was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 2 High Pressure
Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine
control board checks of HPCI. Specifically, it was observed by the Reactor Operator that the HPCI flow controller
would not properly respond to faceplate manipulations. Initially, it was believed that the flow controller power supply
may have failed and therefore, the flow controller could not perform its intended function. The HPCI system was not
operating at the time of the discovery.
Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety
function. Although it was determined that the HPCI flow controller faceplate was defective, the set point of the flow
controller and the flow controller's ability to automatically control system flow for a design basis event was not
affected. A failure analysis of the faceplate was performed. It was determined that keypad contacts on the faceplate
were the cause of the degraded faceplate function, but these keypad Contacts did not prevent the flow controller from
performing its design function.
The flow controller faceplate was replaced by 1410 hours on 8/22/04 (CR 246290).
The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction.
Notified the Reg 2 RDO (Ogle) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41096 | Rep Org: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: RIVERSIDE TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 4
City: FAIRVIEW State: NM
County: RIO ARRIBA
License #: DM345
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WALTER MEDINA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/06/2004
Notification Time: 10:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2004
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
"Riverside Technologies notified the Radiation Control Bureau with the New Mexico Environment Department that one of their density moisture gauges was stolen sometime between Friday night, October 1, and Monday morning, October 4,2004. The locked storage room was broken into and the gauge was removed from its transport container and taken from the company office in Espanola, New Mexico. The gauge was a Campbell Pacific Nuclear, Model MC-3, serial number M30069661, and containing Cesium-137 and Americium-241/Be radioactive sealed sources. The gauge was locked in the safe position."
* * * UPDATE AT 11:32 HRS. EDT ON 10/12/04 FROM MEDINA (VIA E-MAIL) TO CROUCH * * *
"The density/moisture gauge (CPN, model MC-3, SN 30069691) reported stolen by Riverside Technologies (NM license number DM345) on 10/4/2004 has been found. The RSO, [DELETED], called at 8:45 a.m. MST today and reported that the gauge had been left near his vehicle at his residence in Espanola. There is no apparent damage to the gauge and the source rod was still locked. The RSO will leak test the gauge to evaluate the integrity of the sources. This gauge was not being used and had been in storage since acquired from another licensee. The gauge will again be placed in storage with additional security measures being implemented at the facility."
Notified TAS (Hahn), R4DO (Kennedy) and NMSS EO (Wastler). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41117 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BO BEYL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/12/2004
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2004
Event Time: 19:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION (UNUSUAL EVENT)
"During a review of post trip activities associated with MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A STEAM LEAK IN THE TURBINE BUILDING (Event 41110) on 10/10/04, it was determined that Technical Specifications actions requirements were inappropriately applied. With both loops of RHR in suppression pool cooling (necessary with SRV's controlling reactor pressure), procedural guidance requires that the affected loop of RHR be declared inoperable when in a secondary mode of operation. With both loops of RHR thus inoperable, the applicable Technical Specification Action TS 3.6.2.3 Action b requires that the plant be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
"In accordance with the Technical Specification, this action was entered on 10/10/04 at 1831. The required time to cold shutdown was incorrectly noted as 0631 on 10/12/04. The required time was based on the combination of the 12 hours to hot shutdown and 24 to cold shutdown (or 36 hours). Because the plant was already in hot shutdown, the action should have been to place the plant in cold shutdown within 24 hours or by 1831 on 10/11/04.
"As a result of this error, planning activities and cooldown to cold shutdown condition was predicated on a target time of 0631 on 10/12/04 resulting in the plant exceeding the 24 hour AOT. This constitutes a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. The plant achieved cold shutdown on 10/12/04 at 0509 hours.
"In addition, Emergency Classification Guide (ECG) Initiating Condition 8.5 states that the inability to reach required operational condition within Technical Specification Limits and requires the declaration of an Unusual Event if the plant is not brought to the required Operational Condition within the Technical Specification required time limit.
"There are no safety consequences associated with this error. There were no issues associated with the transition to cold shutdown that would have constituted an emergency condition requiring initiation of the Emergency Plan. The missed LCO and subsequent classification was based on an erroneous TS Action time and, as such, exceeding the specification occurred as a result of scheduling not plant conditions."
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. | |