| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/22/2004 - 07/23/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40883 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: APEX GEOSCIENCE, INC.
Region: 4
City: PLANO State: TX
County:
License #: L04929-004
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 07/20/2004
Notification Time: 13:13 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2004
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (FAX)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
"Moisture density gauge believed to be stolen during a stop at Lowes, Plano, Texas, to pickup parts. The operator claims that the chain or lock was cut. The chain and lock were not left behind. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3440, Serial No. 33851 with two sealed sources: Cs-137, 8 millicuries, Serial No. 750-9505 and Am-241/Be, 40 millicuries, Serial No. 47-3391. Both sources were last leak tested June 1, 2004. Driver left Lowes and proceeded to a convenience store across the parking lot for a carton of cigarettes. Upon returning to the truck the gauge was noted as missing. The vehicle was a company truck: white, Ford Ranger, #51, with green logos on both sides.
"Media attention: None known. Licensee is contemplating offering a reward for return of the gauge."
The Plano Police Department was notified of this incident. Texas Incident No.: I-8144. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40890 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF KNISLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 07/22/2004
Notification Time: 00:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2004
Event Time: 20:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN: NON-VITAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER LEAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT
"On July 21, 2004, with Unit 1 operating in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at approximately 100 percent power, a non-vital component cooling water (CCW) leak was identified inside containment. It was conservatively concluded that the leak could potentially disable both vital CCW loops, and thus the LCO for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.7 "Vital CCW System" would not be met. Given there is no associated action for both vital loops inoperable, operators entered TS 3.0.3 at 1900 PDT, a unit shutdown was commenced at 20:20 PDT.
"The leak was identified at a cracked weld to the RCP 1-3 lube oil cooler, and is estimated at approximately 0.1 gallons per minute. While the leak is in the non-vital CCW loop and is stable, not currently a challenge to the function of the CCW system, and is not damaging plant equipment, based on the potential for the condition to rapidly degrade under loading such as a seismic event, operators applied TS 3.7.7.
"It is planned to place Unit 1 in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), restore both vital CCW loops to OPERABLE status by isolating the CCW supply to the RCP 1-3 lube oil cooler, and exit TS 3.0.3. The unit will be returned to service following repair of the cracked weld."
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-3 CCW pipe diameter is 3 inches. Leak was first noticed by increasing containment sump level. Personnel entered containment and discovered the cracked weld on the 3 inch CCW piping. The maximum leak if the CCW pipe completely shared off would be greater than 200 gallons per minute (CCW system can handle a maximum leak rate of approximately 200 gallons per minute). The other three Reactor Coolant Pump CCW lube oil cooling piping were checked and no leaks were discovered.
All emergency core cooling systems and the emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is also stable. At 2357 EDT Unit 1 was at a power level of 50% and decreasing.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40891 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: S. SAUER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 07/22/2004
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2004
Event Time: 07:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 23 | Power Operation | 23 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF POWER TO PRIMARY AND BACKUP OFFSITE SIREN SYSTEM
"At 0710 hrs on 7/22/04 it was discovered by the Salem County 911 Center dispatcher that the primary and backup Alert Notification System (offsite siren system) activation controllers (computers) had lost power. The Salem County Siren computers are the activation controllers for all 34 offsite sirens located in the New Jersey portion of tile 10-mile EPZ. The 37 Delaware Sirens wore not affected. As per instructions, siren technicians were notified at 0748 hours and responded to the 911 Center at 0815 hours. Power was restored to the primary computer at 0835 hours. Subsequent investigation and troubleshooting has determined the following:
"Exact time of power loss is unknown. Last know/verified computer availability was at 1104 on 7/21/04 when a biweekly siren test was successfully completed. An automatic siren poll scheduled for 0645 on 7/22 did not occur which indicates that the loss of power occurred sometime between 1104 on 7/21 and 0645 on 7/22/04.
"Cause of loss of power was determined to be a failed UPS unit that both the primary and backup siren computers were powered from. The failed UPS was removed and primary computer re-powered directly from 911-center normal 120-volt house power. A siren poll was done and. The siren system was declared back in service at 0835 hours on 7/22/04.
"Two separate UPS units will be connected to the Siren activation computers by the end of day today, 7/22/04."
The licensee notified State of New Jersey and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 40892 | Rep Org: DANVILLE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: DANVILLE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: DANVILLE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-151544-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE SHEROUSE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 07/22/2004
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2004
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
| Event Text LESS THAN PRESCRIBED DOSAGE TO ORGAN
A patient was prescribed placement of 74 seeds of Iodine 125 to the prostate. Only 38% of the volume of the prostate received the prescribed dose of 160 grays. The radiation oncologist used poor technique in placing the iodine seeds in the prostate. There were no other safety issues related to this incident. The patient has been contacted and will come in for consultation. The licensee will review this incident and will follow up with a written report, if required. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40893 | Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN McKAUGHIN
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 07/22/2004
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2004
Event Time: 09:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text GAP DISCOVERED IN CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE
"During Control Room Boundary investigations a gap in the control room envelope was discovered that exceeded the assumptions of the plant toxic gas analysis. The assumptions for the control room radiological analysis were met with the consideration for the use of Kl. The gap size was determined to be approximately 103 square inches versus an analysis assumption of 58.9 square inches. The gaps were immediately repaired."
The licensee suspects that the gap has existed for 20 or more years and was discovered during a control room heating, ventilation, air-conditioning (HVAC) upgrade.
The license has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event. | |