| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/09/2004 - 07/12/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40854 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #: L-00485-000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 07/07/2004
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JEFFERY CLARK (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE
"On May 6, 2004, a leak test sample from a Hewlett Packard 5890 Gas Chromatograph, with ECD Model # 19233, was leak tested for source Serial No. L6180 [Nickel - 63, current activity 13.48 milliCuries]. The initial leak test resulted in removable activity of approximately 9250 disintegrations per minute (dpm) or 0.0042 microCuries, near leak test limits. A second test was repeated on May 7, 2004, which resulted in 194,000 dpm or 0.087 microCuries of removable activity on the vent tube, which was well above the leak test limit. Minor removable contamination (approximately 100 counts per minute (cpm)) was detected on the interior of the case, the inlet tube sample (approximately 100 cpm), and the vent tube cap (approximately 1750 cpm). The source was confiscated by the University's radiation safety staff to a secure location at the Radiation Safety Office. The last leak test was conducted on December 17, 2003, with results indicating no contamination. The source will be returned to the manufacture or disposed of as radioactive waste. The direct cause of the loss of the source's integrity is not known. The written report was received by this agency May 17, 2004, but was not delivered to Incident Investigation until July 7, 2004. No violations have been cited. This incident was closed July 7,2004."
TX Incident number I-8138 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40858 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS VAUGHN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 07/09/2004
Notification Time: 02:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 22:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE GENERATOR LOAD REJECTION SIGNAL
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 7/08/2004 at approximately 2232 hours CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 2 scrammed due to a Turbine Generator Load Reject Signal. All systems responded as required to the scram signal. No ECCS initiations occurred as a result of this event. Reactor Water Level lowered to the Low Level setpoint which generated a redundant SCRAM signal and initiated the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) function for PCIS groups 2 (Primary Containment), 3 (RWCU) [Reactor Water Clean Up], 6 (Secondary Containment), and 8 (TIP system) [Transverse Incore Probe]. As expected, Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) opened due to the high reactor pressure (maximum value observed was 1137 psig) as a result of the Main Turbine / Generator Trip. Reactor Water level was restored to normal via the Reactor Feedwater system and all PCIS isolations have been reset. The cause of the Load Reject Signal is still under investigation at this time.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical' and also under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B)'. This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
All control rods inserted during the scram. All Main Steam Relief Valves have properly reset. Decay heat is being removed from the reactor via main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Pressure is being maintained at normal operating pressure. The electrical grid is stable. Unit 3 was not affected by the scram on Unit 2.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 40860 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 07/09/2004
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
| Event Text 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL
"At 1550, on 07-08-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that three centrifugal compressor impellers were received as part of a shipment from Portsmouth GDP. The existence of the impellers was not recognized as being part of this shipment and, as a result, applicable NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] controls were not implemented. NCSA GEN-20 requires receipt of documented NDA [Non Destructive Analysis] inspections of equipment prior to receipt (unloading) in the shipping/receiving area and completion of a second NDA prior to removing the equipment from the shipping/receiving area to a location within the plant. The purpose of this control is to ensure that equipment containing greater than a safe mass will not be received from offsite.
"The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: NDA measurements have been completed and the results indicate less than a safe mass of uranium.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be present in the equipment in a configuration favorable for a criticality.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The group of equipment contains less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEMS) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency relies on the review of characterization results prior to receipt (unloading) at PGDP. Characterization results were not reviewed prior to receipt. The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U. Although, the NCS controls were violated, the parameter was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on an independent NDA measurement prior to release from the shipping/receiving area. NDA characterization did not occur prior to release from the shipping/receiving area. The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt% 235U. Although, the NCS controls were violated, the parameter was maintained.
"Although the parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED :
"1. Post equipment according to CP2-MA-MT1034. Completed 07/09/04
"The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-04-2682, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-18; Event Worksheet #40860 Responsible Division: Maintenance" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40861 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HOPE BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 07/10/2004
Notification Time: 08:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2004
Event Time: 05:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JEFFERY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF COMMUNICATION AT THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"During performance of planned maintenance, the Technical Support Center (TSC) will be without power. These maintenance activities, including electrical isolation and restoration are expected to last approximately 18 hours. Contingency plans for emergency [response] situations have been established.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this constitutes a loss of an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution.
"Region IV was notified of this planned outage."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY H. BRADLEY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1745 EDT ON 7/10/04 * * *
Maintenance in the TSC has been completed and power was restored at 1458 CDT.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Clark). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40862 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 07/11/2004
Notification Time: 01:31 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2004
Event Time: 22:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO AN UPSCALE TRIP ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS
"On 07/10/2004 at 2235 [CST], during Browns Ferry Unit 2 startup activities, as IRMs [Intermediate Range Monitors] were being ranged up, an upscale trip on IRM E (RPS [Reactor Protection System] A Channel) and IRM F (RPS B Channel) was received, resulting in a full reactor scram. Mode Switch was in STARTUP, Mode 2 at time of trip. IRMs were on ranges 6 and 7, and reactor pressure was approximately 950 psig. All systems responded as designed, all control rods are at full-in. No ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] or PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation System] actuation set points were reached. This is reportable as 4 hour ENS [Emergency Notification System] report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable as an 8 hour ENS report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B). (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: Reactor scram and reactor trip.' Also reportable as a sixty day written report per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"Mode Switch is presently in shutdown, Mode 3. Investigation is still on going. NRC Resident [Inspector] was notified at approximately 2310 [CST]." | |