| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/03/2003 - 10/06/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40217 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ELI DRAGOMER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 10/03/2003
Notification Time: 02:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2003
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY DUE TO ALL OPRM CHANNELS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.
"According to information provided by Nuclear Fuels, Reactor Engineering and G. E. Nuclear Energy, a condition exists in the Oscillation Power Range Monitors (OPRM's) that could contribute to exceeding a Safety Limit. This condition involves excessive confirmation count resets attributed to both the conditioning filter cutoff frequency and period tolerance values. G.E. Nuclear Energy can not confirm that performance of the OPRM's with the conditioning filter cutoff frequency and period tolerance settings currently in use would prevent a condition whereby a Safety Limit MCPR could be violated during an anticipated instability event. The OPRM conditioning filter cutoff frequency and period tolerance are currently set as allowed by licensing documentation, and are calculated as specified in NEDO-32465-A, Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology for Reload Applications. As a result, all OPRM's at Nine-Mile Point Unit 2 are considered inoperable. This INOPERABILITY determination is based on information received from G.E. Nuclear Energy which evaluated the Nine Mile Point OPRM performance on July 24, 2003."
The licensee has taken action to address this condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation. The licensee has a procedure providing guidance for alternate methods to detect and suppress thermal hydraulic instability.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40221 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE EARLES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/03/2003
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2003
Event Time: 15:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM DEGRADED DUE TO BOTH TRAINS OF AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 10/03/2003, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 6 during a refueling outage with core re-load in progress. At 1516 [hrs EDT], the control room became aware that an activity in preparing for an upcoming test had placed the B Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) 480v Breaker in the off position. An operator was immediately dispatched to close the ABGTS breaker and the breaker was closed at 1521 [hrs], restoring the train to OPERABLE status. The opening of this breaker at about 1324 [hrs] caused the B ABGTS train to be INOPERABLE at a time when the A ABGTS train was available to start but technically INOPERABLE due to the emergency power supply ( A Train Diesel Generator) and a room cooler being out of service.
"The ABGTS system is required for the mitigation of a postulated fuel handling accident. Site emergency procedures require the operator to promptly confirm ABGTS is in operation, indication is provided in the control room on ABGTS status and breaker restoration can be quickly performed. In addition, with off site power available, the A ABGTS train would have immediately responded to an event and begun to perform the filtration function while the otherwise operable B train was manually restored. However, at the time of discovery, the system could not have performed its function in the event of a postulated accident coincident with a loss of off site power. Accordingly, TVA has determined this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40222 | Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL BANDHAUER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/04/2003
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2003
Event Time: 10:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"At 1032 [EDT] on October 4, 2003 while in mode 4 conducting a planned refueling outage reactor coolant system inspection, Crystal River Unit 3 identified two potential RCS Pressure Boundary Leaks located in Pressurizer penetrations associated with upper level sensing lines. Upon closer inspection of the first one inch penetration, indications confirmed a Pressure Boundary Leak. A closer inspection of the second penetration is planned after obtaining access to the location. The last unidentified leak rate that was completed prior to the plant shutdown was 0.15 gpm. This defect in the primary coolant system is not acceptable per ASME XI. This condition is REPORTABLE per 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A)."
Licensee reported that a small amount of boric acid residue and residual rust was identified during inspection in the vicinity of the upper level Pressurizer tap near the Pressurizer shell and the nozzle. A closer inspection is planned of the other two upper Pressurizer level taps.
The NRC resident has been notified by the Licensee. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40223 | Rep Org: GE NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 4
City: San Jose State: CA
County:
License #: Various
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON POST
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/04/2003
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2003
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
MARK LESSER (R2)
JULIO LARA (R3)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
MICHAEL TSCHILTZ (NRR)
| Event Text DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT
GE Nuclear Energy provided information concerning a reportable condition on the stability Option III Period Based Detection Algorithm (PBDA) for the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) installed at the affected Licensee plants listed below. The basic component with the defect is specification of the allowable values for the adjustable period confirmation variables in the PBDA used in Stability Option III. The defect is that certain values of period tolerance and conditioning filter cutoff frequency within the previously specified acceptable range could produce sufficient successive confirmation count resets such that Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (SLMCPR) protection might not be provided for all anticipated reactor instabilities.
This condition does not produce a substantial safety hazard and there is no threat of fuel failure. However, because the condition could contribute to exceeding the SLMCPR, it is a reportable condition.
List of Affected Plants:
Clinton
Brunswick 1 & 2
Nine Mile Point 2
Fermi 2
Columbia
Dresden 2 & 3
LaSalle 1 & 2
Limerick 1 & 2
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
Quad Cities 1 & 2
Perry 1
Susquehanna 1 & 2
Hope Creek
Hatch 1 & 2
Browns Ferry 2 & 3 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40224 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE NEVELOS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/04/2003
Notification Time: 20:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2003
Event Time: 17:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text RPS ACTUATION WHILE CRITICAL
"Hope Creek Generating Unit was manually scrammed at 1713 hours [EDT] on 10/04/03 due to an Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) System oil leak. Prior to the event the unit was at 100% power. The plant responded as designed for the scram, with lowest reactor level reaching -8 inches. Reactor level is currently being maintained between +12.5 inches and +54 inches with secondary condensate pumps. The unit is currently in Mode 3 - Hot Shutdown with reactor pressure being maintained between 500-600 psig with the main turbine bypass valves utilizing the main condenser as a heat sink. The EHC leak was validated to be associated with the #4 Combined Intermediate Control Valve (CIV) and has since been isolated. This report is being generated Law Event Classification Guide section 11.3.2 - Actuation of Reactor Protection System (RPS) when critical except preplanned. Current safety system status is normal with the exception that the `B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is inoperable as the result of a relay failure and the 'B' Control Room chiller is inoperable as the result of a failed economizer float. The 'B' EDG has been retested and validation of test results are currently underway to determine operability. Common mode failure testing is in progress for the remaining three EDG's."
All control rods inserted fully during the reactor scram. No relief valves lifted during the transient and there were no ECCS actuations or Primary Containment Isolation System actuations. The electrical grid remained stable during the event.
NRC Resident was notified by Licensee.
* * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY CLYDE BAUER TAKEN BY JEFF ROTTON AT 1728 EDT ON 10/05/03 * * *
During reactor level recovery following the scram, a second level 3 (+12.5 inches) RPS scram signal was received. The RPS system was still actuated upon receipt of this second level 3 signal. R1DO (Cobey ) notified of update.
NRC Resident will be notified by licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40225 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA | Notification Date: 10/05/2003
Notification Time: 06:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2003
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text INOPERABLE TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION AT HOPE CREEK
"While performing common mode failure testing of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), the 'C' EDG was declared INOPERABLE for planned installation of required test equipment. Concurrent with the inoperability of the 'C' EDG, the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System has been INOPERABLE for emergent corrective maintenance since 10/2/03 at 0502. Because the 'C' EDG is the emergency power supply for the 'A' CREF train, 'A' CREF was also declared INOPERABLE and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered as of 0300 hrs on 10/05/03. At 0430 hrs on 10/05/03, the test equipment was removed from 'C' EDG, thereby restoring it and 'A' CREF to an operable status, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. Testing did verify the absence of a common mode failure and all EDG's are operable. The Control Room Ventilation System provides heating, cooling, ventilation, and environmental control for the control room and adjacent areas. Under accident conditions, CREF ensures that the control room will remain habitable during and following all design basis accidents. Because the CREF system is required to automatically respond in the event of a design basis accident, having both trains of CREF inoperable at the same time impacted the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The plant is currently in HOT SHUTDOWN for repair of an emergent turbine hydraulic fluid leak, with decay heat removal to the main condenser via turbine bypass valves."
The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40226 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Willian D. Woodbury
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 10/05/2003
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2003
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation | Event Text OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITORS (OPRM) DECLARED INOPERABLE
See event # 40223, Part 21 reported on 10/04/03 by GE Nuclear Energy for background information.
"On October 5, 2003, Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. received notification from General Electric of a Part 21 involving the potential for numerous, unexpected confirmation count (CC) resets in the event of an instability condition. These CC resets may result in the inoperability of TS Table 3.3.1.1-1,'Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Function 2. f, OPRM Upscale.'
"All Unit 1 and Unit 2 OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Action I requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. The alternate methods of detection and suppression are currently in place.
"Due to the implementation of Technical Specification required compensatory actions, there is minimal safety significance."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Also see similar events reported by NMP Unit 2 (event # 40217) and Fermi Unit 2 (event # 40215) | |