| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/02/2003 - 10/03/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40134 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON E. ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 09/05/2003
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2003
Event Time: 09:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE.
"At 09:30 EDT, Unit 1 was performing the HPCI Quarterly Flow verification surveillance. Shortly after the initiation of the system an abnormally loud bang was heard. System flow of approximately 5200 gpm and discharge pressure of approximately 1300 psi was achieved at approximately 09:33. Approximately 4 seconds after reaching rated system flow HPCI discharge pressure increased to approximately 1675 psi and system flow dropped to approximately 2700 gpm. HPCI had been declared inoperable at 08:35 EDT to perform the surveillance and will remain inoperable until the cause of the loss of system flow is corrected. Because HPCI is a single train ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] safety system, this event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and the guidance provided under NUREG-1022, rev. 2.
"There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service."
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is fully operable and HPCI entered Tech Spec 3.5.1 (14 day Limiting Condition of Operation). All other ECCS systems are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WALSH TO CROUCH ON 10/02/03 @ 1548 EDT* * *
"On 09/05/2003, PPL Susquehanna LLC made an ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to an apparent loss of the HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] safety function. In the event, results of HPCI Quarterly Flow Surveillance testing did not meet acceptance criteria established for the system.
"Investigation into the cause of the failed HPCI surveillance revealed a 360-degree weld crack on the HPCI Test Line to Condensate Storage Tank [CST] Valve, HV155F008. HV155F008 is not in the reactor vessel injection flowpath. The impact of this crack, which was located between the valve seat cage assembly and the valve body, was that the HPCI Test Line to CST valve was not capable of throttling over the full range of HPCI system flows. Valve performance became erratic at higher flows because the valve seat cage was lifted out of the valve body into the flow path, increasing system resistance, and preventing attainment of design flow in the HPCI test loop.
"While the ability to effectively test the HPCI system using the test return path to the CST was compromised, the HPCI injection flowpath to the reactor vessel was not adversely affected by the damaged valve. Accordingly, the HPCI system maintained full capability for providing sufficient coolant to the reactor vessel in the event of a small break loss-of-coolant accident. Because the HPCI safety function was not compromised by the identified test path obstruction, this ENS notification is being retracted."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cobey). |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40207 | Rep Org: U.S. ARMY ROCK ISLAND, IL
Licensee: U.S. ARMY ROCK ISLAND, IL
Region: 4
City: TAHOE CITY State: NV
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS | Notification Date: 09/30/2003
Notification Time: 17:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
| Event Text PART 76.83 - TRANSFER OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
On 9/19/03, the U.S. Army Base at Fort Wainwright, AK sent a shipment of five M-119 Howitzers to the National Forest Service in California to be used for avalanche control. Prior to shipment, the Tritium fire control devices were removed from the Howitzers and placed in boxes. The boxes containing the fire control devices were inadvertently shipped along with the Howitzers. Two boxes, containing a total of 19.4 curies of tritium, ended up at the Alpine Meadows ski resort in Tahoe City, CA. Another 3 boxes, containing a total of 28.2 curies of tritium, ended up at the Mammoth Mountain ski resort in Mammoth Lake, CA.
The National Forest Service will keep the tritium fire control devices in a secure storage location overnight, and they will be picked up by the Radiation Safety Officer from Hawthorne Army Depot on the morning of 10/1/03.
* * * UPDATED VIA FAX ON 10/02/03 @ 1523 EDT* * *
"Fort Wainwright, Alaska was given authority to ship 5 ea M119 howitzers to the National Forest Service in California as part of the avalanche control program. Three of the M119's were to be shipped to Mammoth Lakes, CA and two to Alpine Meadows ski area in Tahoe City, CA. The howitzers were in storage and therefore had their tritium fire control devices removed and placed in their associated BII boxes.
"All of the fire control devices were properly stored in their BII boxes prior to shipment from Alaska. When the shipment was processed the shippers failed to remove the tritium devices from the Bll boxes (a grand total of 47.6 curies). Therefore the tritium devices were inadvertently shipped with the howitzers on 19 Sept 2003. On 29 Sept 2003, two howitzers, with BII boxes, were received at Alpine Meadows ski area, Tahoe City, CA and three howitzers, with BII boxes, were received at Mammoth Mt. ski area, Mammoth Lake, CA. Upon discovering radioactive commodities had been received, the National Forest Service called the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command [TACOM].
"The TACOM RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] contacted the RSO at Hawthorne Army Depot, Hawthorne, CA on 30 Sept 2003 and requested their aid in capturing the radioactive components. On October 1st, 2003 the Hawthorne Army Depot RSO took possession of all the tritium fire control devices. Wipe surveys are being evaluated and disposition of the components will be determined upon receipt of the results."
Notified R3DO (Lara), R4DO (Cain) and NMSS EO (Janosko). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40214 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM GILBERT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/02/2003
Notification Time: 11:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2003
Event Time: 09:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NEBRASKA GAME AND PARKS COMMISSION
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 0910 [CDT] on 10/02/2003, the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission were contacted to inform them of an injured Raptor (owl). The owl is caught in the razor wire located along the top of the fence surrounding the Elevated Release Point. Current plan is to remove the owl and turn it over to Nebraska Game and Parks Commission."
The Licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40215 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID COSEO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/02/2003
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2003
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY DUE TO ALL OPRM CHANNELS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.
"On October 2, 2003, Detroit Edison received verbal confirmation from General Electric of a potential Non-Conservative Analysis of OPRM Period Tolerance and Corner Frequency.
"All OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specifications 3.3.1.1 Action J requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. Alternate methods have been established to monitor for instability when operating in the Stability Awareness region, thus we are in compliance with the Technical Specifications.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition."
The Licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40216 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHUCK OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/02/2003
Notification Time: 20:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2003
Event Time: 17:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text RCS BOUNDARY LEAKAGE DUE TO SMALL CRACK ON DRAIN LINE WELDED CAP
"Safety injection tank (SIT) isolation valve (2CV-5043-2) has a drain pipe under the valve body with a welded cap. The welded cap has a small crack with boric acid residue. The welded cap does not have any threads and is considered RCS boundary leakage. There is a check valve between the reactor coolant system (RCS) and the SIT Outlet valve. The crack will be repair welded prior to coming out of the 2R16 outage."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40217 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ELI DRAGOMER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 10/03/2003
Notification Time: 02:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2003
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY DUE TO ALL OPRM CHANNELS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.
"According to information provided by Nuclear Fuels, Reactor Engineering and G. E. Nuclear Energy, a condition exists in the Oscillation Power Range Monitors (OPRM's) that could contribute to exceeding a Safety Limit. This condition involves excessive confirmation count resets attributed to both the conditioning filter cutoff frequency and period tolerance values. G.E. Nuclear Energy can not confirm that performance of the OPRM's with the conditioning filter cutoff frequency and period tolerance settings currently in use would prevent a condition whereby a Safety Limit MCPR could be violated during an anticipated instability event. The OPRM conditioning filter cutoff frequency and period tolerance are currently set as allowed by licensing documentation, and are calculated as specified in NEDO-32465-A, Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology for Reload Applications. As a result, all OPRM's at Nine-Mile Point Unit 2 are considered inoperable. This INOPERABILITY determination is based on information received from G.E. Nuclear Energy which evaluated the Nine Mile Point OPRM performance on July 24, 2003."
The licensee has taken action to address this condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation. The licensee has a procedure providing guidance for alternate methods to detect and suppress thermal hydraulic instability.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |