United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

EA-96-089 - Indian Point 2 (Consolidated Edison Company of New York)

May 6, 1996

EA 96-089

Mr. S. E. Quinn
Vice President - Nuclear Power
Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, Inc.
Indian Point 2 Station
Broadway and Bleakley Avenues
Buchanan, New York 10511

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION 
         (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-247/96-01)

Dear Mr. Quinn:

This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted from December 31, 1995, through March 2, 1996, at the Indian Point 2 Station. During the inspection, the inspectors conducted an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding an event involving repair work to the central control room (CCR) roof which occurred on December 6, 1995. The event involved the removal of the roof expansion joint and the installation of a temporary membrane for a two month period. During the inspection, apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified, and were described in the NRC inspection report transmitted with our letter dated March 27, 1996. On April 24, 1996, a Predecisional Enforcement Conference was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions.

Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information you provided during the enforcement conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. On December 6, 1995, an expansion joint between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CCR Roof was removed. This condition existed for a 4 to 6 hour period until a temporary membrane was installed. The temporary membrane remained in place until February 9, 1996. The CCR dose analysis in your Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) assumes an in-leakage rate of 500 cubic feet per minute (CFM) in evaluating exposures to control room personnel under post-accident conditions. Testing performed in 1987 with the formerly installed permanent membrane in place resulted in a CCR in-leakage rate of 485 CFM, which left a margin of only 15 CFM to the in-leakage rates used in the CCR habitability analysis. With the CCR expansion joint removed and the temporary membrane installed, plant conditions differed from the previously tested CCR design configuration. We also noted that on May 24, 1994, Con Edison Nuclear Safety and Licensing (NS&L) approved Safety Evaluation Screening Checklist review 94-150-MM. This review indicated that the work to be performed on the roof would not introduce any new failure modes, impact any plant systems, or be affected by the mode of plant operation. NS&L further concluded that a safety evaluation was not required per 10 CFR 50.59, and that Station Nuclear Safety Committee approval was not required.

The NRC recognizes that the event had no direct adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel, and that procedures were available for control room staff to initiate compensatory actions in the event dose rates were to increase within the control room, such as the use of protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus. Nonetheless, the event was of significant regulatory concern, in that this event left the plant operating outside of its design basis and potentially in an unanalyzed condition with respect to the CCR roof in-leakage rate. Therefore, this violation has been categorized at Severity Level III in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because Indian Point 2 has been the subject of an escalated enforcement action within the last two years (namely, issuance of a Severity Level III violation on July 14, 1995; Reference, EA 95-155), the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identification and corrective action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit for identification is warranted because you identified the violations. Credit for corrective action is also warranted because your actions were both prompt and comprehensive. These actions, which were noted in your presentation at the predecisional enforcement conference, included, but were not limited to: (1) stopping work on the control room roof as well as other roofing projects; (2) revising the control room roof classification and modification to safety related; (3) performing a full 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation; (4) updating all applicable drawings associated with the CCR roof project; (5) conducting an operability/reportability review; (6) counseling individuals involved in the event; (7) conducting "group think" training for Station Nuclear Safety Committee and Daily Management Review Group personnel; (8) requiring that modifications to the nuclear facility be prepared only by Nuclear Power Engineering under the Nuclear Power planning program; and (9) requiring that all personnel initiating classification documents for modifications and all preparers of safety evaluations meet Engineering Support Personnel (ESP) training and qualification requirements.

Therefore, to emphasize prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations when they exist, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.

Also described in the Notice is a violation of 10 CFR 50.72 for failing to make a one hour report on February 7, 1996, upon discovery of a condition outside the design basis of the plant. This violation has been categorized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy at Severity Level IV.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective action and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR. If redactions are required, a proprietary version containing brackets placed around the proprietary, privacy, and/or safeguards information should be submitted. In addition, a non-proprietary version with the information in the brackets redacted should be submitted to be placed in the PDR.

The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96.511.

                                     Sincerely,




                                     Thomas T. Martin
                                     Regional Administrator

Docket No. 50-247
License No. DPR-26

Enclosure: Notice of Violation

cc w/encl:
C. Jackson, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
B. Brandenburg, Assistant General Counsel
C. Faison, Director, Nuclear Licensing
C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law
Director, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York
W. Stein, Secretary - NFSC
F. William Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority


NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.                   Docket No.50-247 
Indian Point 2 Station                                          License No.DPR-26
                                                                EA 96-089

During an NRC Inspection conducted from December 31, 1995, through March 2, 1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below:

A. 10 CFR 50.59 requires, in part, that the holder of a license authorizing operation of a production facility may (i) make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, (ii) make changes in the procedures as described in the safety analysis report, and (iii) conduct tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval, unless the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change in the technical specifications incorporated into the license or an unreviewed safety question. A proposed change, test, or experiment shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.
Indian Point Station Administrative Order (SAO)-460, 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation, Section 4.4 requires, in part, that the potential safety impact of a temporary repair be evaluated using Attachment II Part I to the procedure. For evaluations that affect the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (USFAR), Attachment IV, 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation Sections I - V shall be completed to determine if an unreviewed safety question exists, and a pre-implementation Station Nuclear Safety Committee (SNSC) review shall be performed.
Contrary to the above, on December 6, 1995, the licensee did not evaluate the potential safety impact of a temporary repair, in that the licensee made a temporary repair to the central control room roof, which was a change in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, without performing the required evaluations in Attachment IV of (SAO)-460. The licensee did not determine if the repair would place the control room ventilation system outside its design basis and if this involved an unreviewed safety question. Further, a pre-implementation SNSC review was not performed as required. Specifically, an expansion joint between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 interface in the Central Control Room (CCR) Roof was removed and a temporary membrane was installed. This condition resulted in an opening to atmosphere which existed for approximately four to six hours until the temporary membrane was put in place.
This membrane remained during the subsequent two months of unit operation. As a result the unit was operated with the CCR Air Filtration System in an unanalyzed condition. (01013)

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

B. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(ii) requires, in part, that the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of an event or condition of the nuclear power plant which results in the nuclear power plant being outside the design basis of the plant.
Contrary to the above, on February 7, 1996, the licensee did not notify the NRC within one hour of the occurrence of a condition which resulted in the nuclear power plant being outside the design basis. Specifically, the licensee determined on February 7, 1996, that the expansion joint between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 interface in the Central Control Room Roof, which had been removed for a modification on December 6, 1995, resulted in an opening to atmosphere that existed for four to six hours until a temporary membrane was put in place. The temporary membrane remained in place during the subsequent two months of unit operation. These conditions are not within the plant's design basis. (02014)

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I)

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is subject to this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR. If redactions are required, a proprietary version containing brackets placed around the proprietary, privacy, and/or safeguards information should be submitted. In addition, a non-proprietary version with the information in the brackets redacted should be submitted to be placed in the PDR.

However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support the request for withholding the information from the public.

Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
this 6th day of May 1996

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