Appendix E to Part 50—Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities
Table of Contents
- The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
- The Final Safety Analysis Report
- Content of Emergency Plans
- Implementing Procedures
- Emergency Response Data System
1. Each applicant for a construction permit is required by § 50.34(a) to include in the preliminary safety analysis report a discussion of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Each applicant for an operating license is required by § 50.34(b) to include in the final safety analysis report plans for coping with emergencies. Each applicant for a combined license under subpart C of part 52 of this chapter is required by § 52.79 of this chapter to include in the application plans for coping with emergencies. Each applicant for an early site permit under subpart A of part 52 of this chapter may submit plans for coping with emergencies under § 52.17 of this chapter.
2. This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency preparedness. These plans shall be described generally in the preliminary safety analysis report for a construction permit and submitted as part of the final safety analysis report for an operating license. These plans, or major features thereof, may be submitted as part of the site safety analysis report for an early site permit.
3. The potential radiological hazards to the public associated with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel facilities licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 and 70 involve considerations different than those associated with nuclear power reactors. Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning Zones1 (EPZs) for facilities other than power reactors and the degree to which compliance with the requirements of this section and sections II, III, IV, and V of this appendix as necessary will be determined on a case-by-case basis.2
4. Notwithstanding the above paragraphs, in the case of an operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power operations up to 5 percent of rated power, no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and the capability to implement State and local offsite emergency plans, as defined in this Appendix, are required prior to the issuance of such a license.
5. Each applicant for a combined license or early site permit under part 52 of this chapter whose application is docketed before December 23, 2011 may defer compliance with any change to emergency preparedness regulations under the final rule issued November 23, 2011. If that applicant chooses to defer compliance, it shall subsequently request to amend the combined license or early site permit to comply with those changes no later than December 31, 2013. An applicant that does not receive a combined license or early site permit before December 31, 2013, shall revise its combined license or early site permit application to comply with those changes no later than December 31, 2013. Notwithstanding any Commission finding under 10 CFR 52.103(g) regarding the combined license holder's facility, the combined license holder may not operate the facility until the NRC has approved the license amendment demonstrating compliance with the final rule.
6. The Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, holding a construction permit under the provisions of part 50 of this chapter, shall meet the requirements of the final rule issued November 23, 2011 as applicable to operating nuclear power reactor licensees.
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient information to ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans for both onsite areas and the EPZs, with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such considerations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, land use, and local jurisdictional boundaries for the EPZs in the case of nuclear power reactors as well as the means by which the standards of § 50.47(b) will be met.
As a minimum, the following items shall be described:
A. Onsite and offsite organizations for coping with emergencies and the means for notification, in the event of an emergency, of persons assigned to the emergency organizations.
B. Contacts and arrangements made and documented with local, State, and Federal governmental agencies with responsibility for coping with emergencies, including identification of the principal agencies.
C. Protective measures to be taken within the site boundary and within each EPZ to protect health and safety in the event of an accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out (e.g., in the case of an evacuation, who authorizes the evacuation, how the public is to be notified and instructed, how the evacuation is to be carried out); and the expected response of offsite agencies in the event of an emergency.
D. Features of the facility to be provided for onsite emergency first aid and decontamination and for emergency transportation of onsite individuals to offsite treatment facilities.
E. Provisions to be made for emergency treatment at offsite facilities of individuals injured as a result of licensed activities.
F. Provisions for a training program for employees of the licensee, including those who are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the event of an emergency, and for other persons who are not employees of the licensee but whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency.
G. A preliminary analysis that projects the time and means to be employed in the notification of State and local governments and the public in the event of an emergency. A nuclear power plant applicant shall perform a preliminary analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, noting major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions.
H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include facilities, systems, and methods for identifying the degree of seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the onsite technical support center and the emergency operations facility in assessing information, recommending protective action, and disseminating information to the public.
The final safety analysis report or the site safety analysis report for an early site permit that includes complete and integrated emergency plans under § 52.17(b)(2)(ii) of this chapter shall contain the plans for coping with emergencies. The plans shall be an expression of the overall concept of operation; they shall describe the essential elements of advance planning that have been considered and the provisions that have been made to cope with emergency situations. The plans shall incorporate information about the emergency response roles of supporting organizations and offsite agencies. That information shall be sufficient to provide assurance of coordination among the supporting groups and with the licensee. The site safety analysis report for an early site permit which proposes major features must address the relevant provisions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, within the scope of emergency preparedness matters addressed in the major features.
The plans submitted must include a description of the elements set out in Section IV for the emergency planning zones (EPZs) to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency.
1. The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for coping with radiological emergencies, assessment actions, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, recovery, and onsite protective actions during hostile action. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in § 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards.
2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC.
3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use NRC approved evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide the ETEs and ETE updates to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.
4. Within 365 days of the later of the date of the availability of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under § 50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this ETE analysis to the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.
5. During the years between decennial censuses, nuclear power reactor licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. These licensees shall maintain these estimates so that they are available for NRC inspection during the period between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis.
6. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the nuclear power reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or updated ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC under § 50.4 no later than 365 days after the licensee's determination that the criteria for updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.
7. After an applicant for a combined license under part 52 of this chapter receives its license, the licensee shall conduct at least one review of any changes in the population of its EPZ at least 365 days prior to its scheduled fuel load. The licensee shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. If the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ, to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the licensee's currently approved ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC for review under § 50.4 of this chapter no later than 365 days before the licensee's scheduled fuel load.
The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and the means for notification of such individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be included:
1. A description of the normal plant operating organization.
2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization (ERO) with a detailed discussion of:
a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the individual(s) who will take charge during an emergency;
b. Plant staff emergency assignments;
c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures.
3. A description, by position and function to be performed, of the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site to augment the onsite emergency organization.
4. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for making offsite dose projections, and a description of how these projections will be made and the results transmitted to State and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities.
5. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for coping with emergency conditions that may arise. Other persons with special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees of the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for emergencies shall also be identified. The special qualifications of these persons shall be described.
6. A description of the local offsite services to be provided in support of the licensee's emergency organization.
7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a description of the assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this appendix, "hostile action" is defined as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force.
8. Identification of the State and/or local officials responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protective actions, including evacuations when necessary.
9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.
B. Assessment Actions
1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or licensee and state and local governmental authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.
2. A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change. Licensees shall follow the change process in § 50.54(q) for all other emergency action level changes.
C. Activation of Emergency Organization
1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but also on readings from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall include: (1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further discussed in NUREG–0654/FEMA–REP–1.
2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to restore plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.
D. Notification Procedures
1. Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State, and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.
2. Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning information, such as the methods and times required for public notification and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency. Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident occurs.
3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first reactor at a site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and notification capability will range from immediate alerting and notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and notification system. The alerting and notification capability shall additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15-minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there is a decision to activate the alert and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities.
4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear power reactor site's alert and notification design report, including the backup alert and notification capability, as of December 23, 2011, then the backup alert and notification capability requirements in Section IV.D.3 must be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the alert and notification design report does not include a backup alert and notification capability or needs revision to ensure adequate backup alert and notification capability, then a revision of the alert and notification design report must be submitted to FEMA for review by June 24, 2013, and the FEMA-approved backup alert and notification means must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval. However, the total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup alert and notification means must not exceed June 22, 2015.
E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment
Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency facilities and equipment, including:
1. Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;
2. Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment;
3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of onsite individuals;
4. Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate emergency first aid treatment;
5. Arrangements for medical service providers qualified to handle radiological emergencies onsite;
6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment facilities outside the site boundary;
7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support of licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside the site boundary;
8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support center and an emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency;
(ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite operational support center;
b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s). An emergency operations facility may serve more than one nuclear power reactor site. A licensee desiring to locate an emergency operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an application for an amendment to its license. For an emergency operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the emergency operations facility must include the following:
(1) Space for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State, and local responders;
(2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency response personnel;
(3) Communication with other licensee and offsite emergency response facilities;
(4) Access to plant data and radiological information; and
(5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies;
c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, a facility having the following capabilities:
(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves;
(2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; and
(3) The capability to support response to events occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more than one site; and
d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an alternative facility (or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively having the following characteristics: the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be implemented no later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the capability for staging emergency response organization personnel at the alternative facility (or facilities) and the capability for communications with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security, which must be implemented no later than June 20, 2012.
e. A licensee shall not be subject to the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this section for an existing emergency operations facility approved as of December 23, 2011;
9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications system; each system shall have a backup power source. All communication plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup means of communication. Where consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these arrangements will include:
a. Provision for communications with contiguous State/local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such communications shall be tested monthly.
b. Provision for communications with Federal emergency response organizations. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.
c. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the emergency operations facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal State and local emergency operations centers, and the field assessment teams. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.
d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the emergency operations facility. Such communications shall be tested monthly.
1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel:
i. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency organization;
ii. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including control room shift personnel;
iii Radiological monitoring teams;
iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades);
v. Repair and damage control teams;
vi. First aid and rescue teams;
vii. Medical support personnel;
viii. Licensee's headquarters support personnel;
ix. Security personnel.
In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall be made available to local services personnel; e.g., local emergency services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel, local news media persons.
2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of emergency preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test the public alert and notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties.3
a. A full participation 4 exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in a full participation exercise required by this paragraph 2.a.
(i) For an operating license issued under this part, this exercise must be conducted within two years before the issuance of the first operating license for full power (one authorizing operation above 5 percent of rated power) of the first reactor and shall include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each state within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full participation exercise is conducted more than 1 year prior to issuance of an operating licensee for full power, an exercise which tests the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one year before issuance of an operating license for full power. This exercise need not have State or local government participation.
(ii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this chapter, this exercise must be conducted within two years of the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full participation exercise is conducted more than one year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. This exercise need not have State or local government participation. If FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness as the result of the first full participation exercise, or if the Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the provisions of § 50.54(gg) apply.
(iii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the site, an exercise, either full or partial participation,5 shall be conducted for each subsequent reactor constructed on the site. This exercise may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness as the result of this exercise for the new reactor, or if the Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the provisions of § 50.54(gg) apply.
b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this paragraph 2.b. The exercise may be included in the full participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this section. In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency response include activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, event classification, notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and offsite impact of radiological releases, protective action recommendation development, protective action decision making, plant system repair and mitigative action implementation. During these drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency response facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) would not be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives.
c. Offsite plans for each site shall be exercised biennially with full participation by each offsite authority having a role under the radiological response plan. Where the offsite authority has a role under a radiological response plan for more than one site, it shall fully participate in one exercise every two years and shall, at least, partially participate in other offsite plan exercises in this period. If two different licensees each have licensed facilities located either on the same site or on adjacent, contiguous sites, and share most of the elements defining co-located licensees,6 then each licensee shall:
(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite emergency plan;
(2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite biennial full or partial participation exercise;
(3) Conduct emergency preparedness activities and interactions in the years between its participation in the offsite full or partial participation exercise with offsite authorities, to test and maintain interface among the affected State and local authorities and the licensee. Co-located licensees shall also participate in emergency preparedness activities and interaction with offsite authorities for the period between exercises;
(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its onsite emergency plan in each exercise cycle; and
(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or partial participation hostile action exercise in alternating exercise cycles.
d. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion of exercises at least once every exercise cycle. In States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ, the State should rotate this participation from site to site. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness should fully participate in a hostile action exercise at least once every cycle and should fully participate in one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should rotate this participation from site to site.
e. Licensees shall enable any State or local government located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the licensee's drills when requested by such State or local government.
f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency or (2) determine that the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills specific to emergency response. The extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous exercises.
g. All exercises, drills, and training that provide performance opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills must provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak or deficient areas that need correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are identified in a critique of exercises, drills, or training must be corrected.
h. The participation of State and local governments in an emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant has identified those governments as refusing to participate further in emergency planning activities, pursuant to § 50.47(c)(1). In such cases, an exercise shall be held with the applicant or licensee and such governmental entities as elect to participate in the emergency planning process.
i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile action. Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate must emphasize coordination among onsite and offsite response organizations.
j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to implement the principal functional areas of emergency response identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each eight calendar year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary the content of scenarios during exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following scenario elements: hostile action directed at the plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public protective actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of offsite resources with onsite response. The licensee shall maintain a record of exercises conducted during each eight year exercise cycle that documents the content of scenarios used to comply with the requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile action exercise is conducted. For a site licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the initial exercise required by Section IV.F.2.a.
G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness
Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are maintained up to date shall be described.
Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed shall be described.
I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile Action
By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a range of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions of the licensee's emergency plan.
No less than 180 days before the scheduled issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor or a license to possess nuclear material, or the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel for a combined license under part 52 of this chapter, the applicant’s or licensee's detailed implementing procedures for its emergency plan shall be submitted to the Commission as specified in § 50.4. Licensees who are authorized to operate a nuclear power facility shall submit any changes to the emergency plan or procedures to the Commission, as specified in § 50.4, within 30 days of such changes.
1. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is a direct near real-time electronic data link between the licensee's onsite computer system and the NRC Operations Center that provides for the automated transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters. The ERDS supplements the existing voice transmission over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) by providing the NRC Operations Center with timely and accurate updates of a limited set of parameters from the licensee's installed onsite computer system in the event of an emergency. When selected plant data are not available on the licensee's onsite computer system, retrofitting of data points is not required. The licensee shall test the ERDS periodically to verify system availability and operability. The frequency of ERDS testing will be quarterly unless otherwise set by NRC based on demonstrated system performance.
2. Except for Big Rock Point and all nuclear power facilities that are shut down permanently or indefinitely, onsite hardware shall be provided at each unit by the licensee to interface with the NRC receiving system. Software, which will be made available by the NRC, will assemble the data to be transmitted and transmit data from each unit via an output port on the appropriate data system. The hardware and software must have the following characteristics:
a. Data points, if resident in the in-plant computer systems, must be transmitted for four selected types of plant conditions: Reactor core and coolant system conditions; reactor containment conditions; radioactivity release rates; and plant meteorological tower data. A separate data feed is required for each reactor unit. While it is recognized that ERDS is not a safety system, it is conceivable that a licensee's ERDS interface could communicate with a safety system. In this case, appropriate isolation devices would be required at these interfaces.7The data points, identified in the following parameters will be transmitted:
(i) For pressurized water reactors (PWRs), the selected plant parameters are: (1) Primary coolant system: pressure, temperatures (hot leg, cold leg, and core exit thermocouples), subcooling margin, pressurizer level, reactor coolant charging/makeup flow, reactor vessel level, reactor coolant flow, and reactor power; (2) Secondary coolant system: Steam generator levels and pressures, main feedwater flows, and auxiliary and emergency feedwater flows; (3) Safety injection: High- and low-pressure safety injection flows, safety injection flows (Westinghouse), and borated water storage tank level; (4) Containment: pressure, temperatures, hydrogen concentration, and sump levels; (5) Radiation monitoring system: Reactor coolant radioactivity, containment radiation level, condenser air removal radiation level, effluent radiation monitors, and process radiation monitor levels; and (6) Meteorological data: wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability.
(ii) For boiling water reactors (BWRs), the selected parameters are: (1) Reactor coolant system: Reactor pressure, reactor vessel level, feedwater flow, and reactor power; (2) Safety injection: Reactor core isolation cooling flow, high-pressure coolant injection/high-pressure core spray flow, core spray flow, low-pressure coolant injection flow, and condensate storage tank level; (3) Containment: drywell pressure, drywell temperatures, drywell sump levels, hydrogen and oxygen concentrations, suppression pool temperature, and suppression pool level; (4) Radiation monitoring system: Reactor coolant radioactivity level, primary containment radiation level, condenser off-gas radiation level, effluent radiation monitor, and process radiation levels; and (5) Meteorological data: Wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability.
b. The system must be capable of transmitting all available ERDS parameters at time intervals of not less than 15 seconds or more than 60 seconds. Exceptions to this requirement will be considered on a case by case basis.
c. All link control and data transmission must be established in a format compatible with the NRC receiving system8 as configured at the time of licensee implementation.
3. Maintaining Emergency Response Data System:
a. Any hardware and software changes that affect the transmitted data points identified in the ERDS Data Point Library9 (site specific data base residing on the ERDS computer) must be submitted to the NRC within 30 days after the changes are completed.
b. Hardware and software changes, with the exception of data point modifications, that could affect the transmission format and computer communication protocol to the ERDS must be provided to the NRC as soon as practicable and at least 30 days prior to the modification.
c. In the event of a failure of the NRC supplied onsite modem, a replacement unit will be furnished by the NRC for licensee installation.
4. Implementing the Emergency Response Data System Program:
a. Each licensee shall develop and submit an ERDS implementation program plan to the NRC by October 28, 1991. To ensure compatibility with the guidance provided for the ERDS, the ERDS implementation program plan,10 must include, but not be limited to, information on the licensee's computer system configuration (i.e., hardware and software), interface, and procedures.
b. Licensees must comply with appendix E to part 50, section V.
c. Licensees that have submitted the required information under the voluntary ERDS implementation program will not be required to resubmit this information. The licensee shall meet the implementation schedule of appendix E to Part 50, Section VI.4d.
d. Each licensee shall complete implementation of the ERDS by February 13, 1993, or before initial escalation to full power, whichever comes later. Licensees with currently operational ERDS interfaces approved under the voluntary ERDS implementation program11 will not be required to submit another implementation plan and will be considered to have met the requirements for ERDS under appendix E to part 50, section VI.1 and 2 of this part.
[45 FR 55410, Aug. 19, 1980; 46 FR 28839, May 29, 1981, as amended at 46 FR 63032, Dec. 30, 1981; 47 FR 30236, July 13, 1982; 47 FR 57671, Dec. 28, 1982; 49 FR 27736, July 6, 1984; 51 FR 40310, Nov. 6, 1986; 52 FR 16829, May 6, 1987; 52 FR 42086, Nov. 3, 1987; 56 FR 40185, Aug. 13, 1991; 59 FR 14090, Mar. 25, 1994; 61 FR 30132, June 14, 1996; 70 FR 3599, Jan. 26, 2005; 72 FR 49506, Aug. 28, 2007; 73 FR 42674, Jul. 23, 2008; 76 FR 72596, Nov. 23, 2011]
1 EPZs for power reactors are discussed in NUREG–0396; EPA 520/1–78–016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978. The size of the EPZs for a nuclear power plant shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gascooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal. Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than 250 MW thermal shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.
2 Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as guidance for the acceptability of research and test reactor emergency response plans.
3 Use of site specific simulators or computers is acceptable for any exercise.
4 Full participation when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. Full participation includes testing major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario.
5 Partial participation when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite authorities shall actively take part in the exercise sufficient to test direction and control functions; i.e., (a) protective action decision making related to emergency action levels, and (b) communication capabilities among affected State and local authorities and the licensee.
6Co-located licensees are two different licensees whose licensed facilities are located either on the same site or on adjacent, contiguous sites, and that share most of the following emergency planning and siting elements:
a. Plume exposure and ingestion emergency planning zones;
b. Offsite governmental authorities;
c. Offsite emergency response organizations;
d. Public notification system; and/or
e. Emergency facilities.
7 See 10 CFR 50.55a(h) Protection Systems.
8 Guidance is provided in NUREG-1394, Revision 1.
9 See NUREG-1394, Revision 1, appendix C, Data Point Library.
10 See NUREG-1394, Revision 1, section 3.
11 See NUREG-1394, Revision 1.