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113th ACNW Meeting U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 12, 1999

                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                  ADVISORY COMMITTE ON NUCLEAR WASTE
                                  ***

          MEETING:  113TH ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE

                        Alexis Park Hotel
                        375 East Harmon Avenue
                        Las Vegas, NV

                        Tuesday, October 12, 1999

         The committee met, prusuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m.

     MEMBERS PRESENT:
         JOHN GARRICK, Chairman, ACNW
         GEORGE HORNBERGER, Member, ACNW
         RAY WYMER, Member, ACNW
     .                         P R O C E E D I N G S
                                                      [8:30 a.m.]
         DR. GARRICK:  Good morning.  We want to welcome you to the
     Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste's first day of its 113th meeting.
     The entire portion of today's meeting and this evening's meeting will be
     open to the public.  Today's meeting will take place in the form of a
     round table discussion on the subject of the role and use of safety
     assessment in the Yucca Mountain regulatory process.
         My name is John Garrick, Chairman of the ACNW.  Other
     members of the committee include George Hornberger, Ray Wymer, and we
     have a consultant with us today, Milt Levenson.  The subject of today's
     meeting is safety assessment.  We're using this term interchangeably
     with terms risk assessment, total assistant performance, et cetera.
     This is appropriate because we are at a time of transitioning from a
     safety regulatory process, if you wish, to a risk informed regulatory
     process.  So, we will be using the words basically to mean the same
     thing.
         When we ask ourselves what do we mean by risk assessment and
     how we answer the question of what is the risk, we really, in the
     interest of using plain English, are asking three questions.  Those
     questions are what can go wrong, how likely is it, and what are the
     consequences.  The reason we're doing safety assessment, risk
     assessment, and the reason we want to understand it, and the reason we
     want to be able to communicate the risk assessment is that there has to
     be a decision made.  So, the emphasis here is on decision making.
         I recently read a paper in Physics Today that I thought said
     it quite well.  The observation was made that the key to effective
     decision making for any environmental problem lies in improving the
     decision environment itself with the goal of making good decisions
     rather than making good predictions.  Well, I think we'd like to do
     both.  I think we'd like to do good analysis and increase our confidence
     in the ability as citizens to put on our citizen hat and participate in
     the decision making process.
         Today we have asked our participants to be brief in their
     remarks and communicate what they have to say in plain, understandable
     English.  This was a message that came through to us very clear a year
     ago.  Our emphasis is on communication -- communication on how risks are
     evaluate; how uncertainties are determined, handled; how results can be
     communicated effectively; how the public can get more involved in the
     assessment process.  This is not the forum for informing the committee
     about the details of DOE's performance assessment program.  We have many
     questions about that, and we will cover those questions in later
     meetings.
         Based on what we heard from people in the Amargossa Valley
     community last year, we agreed we needed to be more creative in our
     public outreach, and to do a better job of gaining public participation.
     That is why we're here, and we're experimenting with a little different
     approach, hoping that it enhances the whole participatory process.  I
     indicated earlier that the reason we're doing safety assessment and want
     to understand it is that a decision has to be made.  We consider the
     public to be our ultimate customer and the ultimate final decision maker
     in the disposition of the nation's commercial nuclear waste.
         Also as a result of last year's meeting, we have made a
     commitment in our action plan; that is to say, the Advisory Committee on
     Nuclear Waste has made a commitment to seek better ways for the public
     to get involved and to help the NRC gain greater public confidence and
     respect.  We look forward to hearing your suggestions on how you would
     like to participate and how we can carry out our role more effectively.
         I will close by saying we are here more to listen and learn
     today than to preach and talk.  Now, in order to further enhance our
     attempt here at doing this thing right, we have acquired the services of
     a facilitator, who's going to handle the facilitation part of our
     meeting so that the committee members can focus on trying to capture as
     much of what we're hearing as possible.  That's Chip Cameron.  Chip will
     be followed in his remarks as to how we're going to conduct ourselves
     today, with comments from Lynn Deering of the ACNW staff, who's worked
     extremely hard to put this working group session together today and the
     public forum meeting tonight.  Chip?
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks a lot, Dr. Garrick.  My name is Chip
     Cameron.  I'm the special counsel for public liaison at the Nuclear
     Regulatory Commission, and I'd like to add my welcome to all of you to
     that of Dr. Garrick's and also would like to thank Dr. Garrick and the
     advisory committee for the opportunity to serve as your facilitator
     today.
         As Dr. Garrick already alluded to and as you can see, this
     is going to be a different format from the usual advisory committee
     meeting.  We have representatives of a broad spectrum of interests
     affected by the repository around the table with the advisory committee
     members, and in a minute, we'll go around and do some introductions.  We
     have citizen groups, state, local government, federal agencies here at
     the table.  In case you're wondering, we had these tables made specially
     for this event, but as Dr. Garrick also mentioned, the presentations by
     people today are not to provide a detailed explanation of the topic but
     rather to set the context for a discussion among all of you at the
     table.  The advisory committee members, Dr. Garrick, Dr. Wymer, Dr.
     Hornberger, are here with you around the table, and they want to listen
     to the discussion and ask questions about your concerns and
     perspectives.
         My role as a facilitator will be to provide the advisory
     committee members with an opportunity perhaps to relax and give their
     full attention to the discussion.  I'll also try to keep us relevant and
     focused and on schedule, make sure everybody has a chance to speak, and
     to keep track of various action items or recommendations that might come
     up from the discussions today that the advisory committee may want to
     consider.
         The ground rules for the discussion are fairly simple.  You
     all have a name tent in front of you.  Some are rustic and some are
     fancy, but when we have the presentation by the particular speaker,
     we'll go to the table for discussion.  If you want to speak, if you
     could just put your name tent up like that, that way I'll be able to
     keep track of who wants to speak.  You won't have to keep your hand in
     the air.  We'll go around and we'll take the cards.  I see Abe is
     practicing, and he's done it successfully, much to Judy's amazement I
     might add.
         I'll go around and when I call on you, if you could just
     give your name and affiliation.  As we get into it, I think the name
     might be okay, but we have a stenographer here who's going to be taking
     a transcript, so giving your name will allow us to keep a clean
     transcript.  I would ask that only one person speak at a time so that we
     can not only listen to what everybody has to say but that it will be a
     clean transcript.  In a minute, I'm going to ask some other people who
     have been waiting to come up to the table.
         Now, there's a lot of items on the agenda, as you can see,
     and they're complicated topics.  To just repeat Dr. Garrick's
     admonition, please try to be as brief, as concise in your comments,
     especially the presenters, as possible.  I know that it's hard to
     simplify some of these presentations, and I would just thank you in
     advance for attempting to do that for us.  Now, the focus of the
     discussion is going to be here at the table, but we do want to go to the
     audience for questions and comments throughout the day, so all of you
     out there will get a chance to comment on these particular issues.
         What I'd like to do now is go around the table, do some
     introductions, and then come back to Lynn Deering, who's going to do an
     agenda overview.  Then I just want to see if there's any comments on the
     agenda from your point of view.  I guess Abby, do you want to come up?
     Okay, let's do some introductions, your name and affiliation and if you
     have one sentence or a concern or interest that you want to express at
     this time, why don't you do that.  Dr. Garrick, why don't we start with
     you again?
         DR. GARRICK:  My name is John Garrick.  I'm a member of the
     Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, and my primary interest is to
     achieve our goal of enhancing public involvement in the process.
         MR. CAMERON:  Milt, go ahead.
         MR. LEVENSON:  I'm Milt Levenson.  I'm a consultant to the
     ACNW.
         MR. CAMERON:  Ray?
         MR. CLARK:  Ray Clark with EPA.  My main concern is the
     uniform that those of you who are not familiar with me might not know,
     I'm the public health service, which is not part of the Department of
     Defense.  So, the Navy is not involved in writing the standards for the
     waste.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks for that clarification, Ray.  Paul?
         MR. DAVIS:  I'm Paul Davis of Sandia National Laboratories.
         MR. BECHTEL:  I am not Fred Dilger, but I'm Dennis Bechtel
     with Clark County, Nevada.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Dennis.
         MR. HORNBERGER:  I'm George Hornberger.  I'm a professor of
     environmental sciences at the University of Virginia, and I'm a member
     of the ACNW.
         MR. REAMER:  I'm Bill Reamer.  I'm a member of the Nuclear
     Regulatory Commission's staff.  I want to thank Dr. Garrick and the ACNW
     for having this workshop on involving the public in risk assessment and
     risk communication, and I'm looking forward to participating in this
     today.
         MR. McCONNELL:  I'm Keith McConnell.  I'm also with the NRC
     staff.
         MR. MURPHY:  Mal Murphy.  I'm the regulatory and licensing
     advisor to the Niconi Nuclear Waste Repository Project Office.
         MR. VAN LUICK:  Dave Van Luick with the Department of
     Energy.  I'm the policy advisor on performance assessment to the project
     manager.
         MR. TREICHEL:  Judy Treichel, Nevada Nuclear Waste Task
     Force.  We're a public advocacy group that's totally supported by
     donations from the public.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  I'm Steve Frishman with the State of Nevada
     Agency for Nuclear Projects, and you'll hear plenty of lines from me
     later.
         MR. WYMER:  I'm Ray Wymer, member of the ACNW.
         MR. VASCONI:  Bill Vasconi, Nevada president affiliated with
     the CETI committee, which is a citizens organization, Nevada citizens
     organization believing that a thorough and scientific study ought to
     come out that is essential to insure the health and safety and
     environmental concerns of the people of Nevada and the nation.  Also,
     that the importance of the scientific studies provides a unique
     opportunity for Nevada to negotiate for equity benefits.
         MR. PHILLIPS:  I'm Bill Phillips.  I'm an old-time Nevada
     resident.  I was born and raised here.  I'm 50 years old now.  My
     parents immigrated here back in the 1800's, my grandparents, great-
     grandparents.  My mother and father moved here in 1931 along with their
     parents and worked on Hoover Dam.  I was educated here in the state of
     Nevada.  I got a master's degree in physics, another master's degree in
     radiological sciences at the University of Washington.  I'm a
     comprehensively certified health physicist for the American Board of
     Health Physics.  I spent 25 years with the EPA, and I'm not retired.
     So, I'm here representing my family, our interests, and as a CHP, and as
     an old-time Nevadan.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Bill.
         MR. ANDREWS:  I'm Bob Andrews with the management and
     operating contractor supporting the Department of Energy.  I manage the
     performance assessment work and also want to congratulate the ACNW for
     having this meeting as we try to learn how to better communicate all of
     those complex curves, and we'll learn from this presentation and
     discussion as well, I'm sure.
         MS. JOHNSON:  I'm Abby Johnson.  I'm the nuclear waste
     advisor for Eureka County, Nevada.
         MS. DEERING:  Good morning.  I'm Lynn Deering.  I'm an ACNW
     staff member.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, great.  Thanks, Lynn.  Why don't you go
     right to the agenda and give us a rundown on that and then we'll come
     back to the other people at the table.
         MS. DEERING:  Okay.  I first wanted to thank everybody at
     this table for their willingness to try something different and work
     with this alternative format, the round table style.  Thank you very
     much for your willingness, and somewhat experimental.  I also wanted to
     thank a few people especially for their ideas as this meeting took
     shape.  I just want to mention them by name in particular:  Abby
     Johnson, Steve Frishman, Paul Davis for the idea of the round table
     itself, Carol Hanlon and Chip Cameron, our facilitator.
         Steve Frishman is going to be our lead speaker, and he's
     just going to give us a brief overview about what he will be saying a
     little bit later in the day so that we can benefit from his comments and
     concerns early and throughout our discussions so that we don't wait
     until the end of the day to hear what he has to say.
         Next, Ray Clark of EPA will summarize for us the highlights
     of the proposed EPA high level waste standard and give a little bit
     about the philosophy and basis for that standard as to how it's
     protective of public health and the environment.  We hope to hear a
     little bit about the role of the public in shaping that standard.  It
     seems fundamentally, if the standard itself is so important in the
     safety assessment process, if we can't achieve buy-in on that, then it's
     unlikely we will get buy-in in the process itself later on down the
     road.
         After break, Bill Reamer will describe the NRC's licensing
     process and talk a bit about how the NRC uses safety assessment in its
     decision making process, hopefully a little bit about how the public
     participates in NRC's licensing process.  There are some issues that
     perhaps in the discussion that might come out.  For example, does the
     regulator need absolute certainty to make a decision and if not, how
     does the regulator decide.  Also, does the NRC anticipate requiring
     information beyond DOE's total system performance assessment to make a
     decision, and if so, what kind of information might that be.
         Following Bill will be Paul Davis of Sandia Labs.  He's
     going to talk about the role of uncertainty in safety assessment, issues
     such as how do we arrive at competence in the result of performance
     assessment and how should uncertainty be communicated; possibly even get
     into what does the performance assessment result actually mean?  Is it
     supposed to be a conservative estimate?  Is it a mean?  What is it?
     What do we do with it?
         Following lunch, Abe Van Luik and Bob Andrews of DOE are
     going to talk a little bit about how they decide in the total system
     performance assessment what is most important, what are the key
     uncertainties presently that are driving that analysis, and how are they
     going to make their results and their analysis clear and transparent so
     that the public and everybody else can see how each assumption impacts
     the final result and how the various components work together.  One
     possible issue in discussion could be is there a greater role for the
     public in the total system performance assessment process than is
     currently happening and if so, what might that look like.
         Transportation is the next topic.  Some of our people from
     the counties will talk about their concerns with transportation risk and
     how it relates to safety assessment. Then we'll have a break, and Mr.
     Frishman will talk to us about why people don't trust risk assessments.
     This is a really important topic to us.  Even if the best science is
     used and the best data and the best methods, is there still something
     missing, and is performance assessment or safety assessment the best
     tool to evaluate safety of a repository, and if not, what else do we
     have?
         Finally, George Stiles of the MNO will share with us some of
     his insights about the waste isolation pilot project site and public
     involvement.  How do we involve the public in that, and some lessons
     learned that we might all benefit from.
         John Garrick will be our last speaker.  He will describe
     ACNW's role in this whole process, how ACNW decides what to focus on,
     and the role of the public in the ACNW's process.  Then there will be a
     wrap-up with the audience and the participants up here.  We'll break for
     dinner and then we'll have a public meeting starting at 7:00 this
     evening.  Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Lynn.  We may be joined from
     time to time by others at the table, so depending on the particular
     topic, and we will be going out right before lunch to get some public
     comment before we break for lunch.  Questions around the table on
     agenda, Mal?
         MR. MURPHY:  Not a question.  I just wanted to reconfirm
     that during the afternoon session on transportation risk, Jim Williams
     will be replacing me at the table.  Jim is Niconi's transportation
     expert and is much more informed on that subject and would be able to
     participate much more knowledgeably in that discussion.  I'll be here
     the rest of the day and Jim will do transportation.  Is this microphone
     on?
         MR. CAMERON:  Yeah, I think it is.  Are we having any
     trouble around the table in hearing?  I guess I would just ask you to
     speak as much into the microphone as you can.
         REPORTER:  Chip, you project very well.  Other people speak
     very low.  So, if they could just speak out a little louder.  This man
     is trying to increase the volume.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right, thanks, Carey.  If we could follow
     Carey's instructions on that, I think that that would be helpful.  Any
     other comments or questions on the agenda?
         All right.  We asked Steve Frishman to do something that
     he's not really used to doing, which is to be provocative for us, and
     he's going to sort of give us some thoughts to think about for the rest
     of the day.  So, let's bring Steve up.  Steve?
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Well, I guess what I have to start out with
     in line with what John was saying is first of all, what's the risk that
     the table won't be round.  The unfortunate consequence is that 50
     percent of the table at all times have our back to somebody, but I think
     we'll try to overcome that.
         What I wanted to this morning, just to start things off was
     show you four viewgraphs, and you know it's uncharacteristic of me to
     use viewgraphs, so I promise they're not mine -- use four viewgraphs and
     just put them up one at a time, let you look at them, and then when I
     get to the last one, have just maybe a thought or two that should set
     the stage for the rest of today.  All right, Chip.
         We're already setting the stage.  Lawyers are good for
     something.  These will all be very familiar to you, and I won't even
     talk about them until we get to the end.  You've seen all of these many,
     many times.  This one isn't from DOE, but it is from a recent
     publication.
         SPEAKER:  Is that roughly the way the water flows?
         MR. FRISHMAN:  That's roughly what is expected to be the way
     the water flows.
         MR. CAMERON:  Just to keep in mind, we need to get all these
     questions if we're going to have any, on the transcript.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  All right now, this is essentially the way
     the department says a Yucca Mountain repository would work.  We're all
     very used to it.  I think we understand it fairly well, and we see the
     ultimate dose recipient, and we see that everything in that dose
     recipient's life would involve radiation exposure of some kind.  Now, we
     look at this and understand, and we can talk easily about pathways.  We
     can talk easily about groundwater flow directions.
         Now, the big question and the one that needs to linger all
     day today is if I went out in the hall and took someone from the jewelry
     convention, show them that same sequence, would they see it the same way
     we do.  I think the answer is obviously no, and I've had a lot of
     practice with these viewgraphs, and I have personal experience that the
     answer is no.  This picture scares the hell out of people because they
     understand that a repository at Yucca Mountain does not contain waste,
     and they understand that people are the ultimate recipients of the
     waste.
         We all work almost cavalierly all day, every day with a
     certain knowledge that the repository will release the waste.  Some of
     us have better knowledge of where it might go than others, but it all
     goes to the biosphere eventually.  People have been led to believe
     through time that geologic isolation means isolation.  In 1990, the
     National Academy of Sciences Board on Radioactive Waste Management came
     to the astounding realization that people's expectations of the safety
     of a repository are too high.  Well, this confirms that people's
     expectations might be too high.  People don't realize what a Yucca
     Mountain repository would do.
         We can talk about levels of containment.  We can talk about
     uncertainty.  We can talk about the new theory of a geological
     repository that emerged to me very clearly in what you will hear from
     Ray in the next presentation, and that's that the objective is no longer
     to isolate.  It's to delay releases.  That makes people even more scared
     when they look at a picture like this.  It's just a question of when,
     and then the uncertainty comes in.  Someone says it will be 10,000
     years.  Someone else says it will be 70,000 years, but we also have the
     very real possibility that from the outset, much of it won't work the
     way it was predicted to work.
         So, that's just something to sort of keep in mind throughout
     the rest of today.  Does the general public see things the same way we
     do when it comes to risk assessments and risk decisions, and I think the
     answer very often is pretty clearly no.
         Now, I'm not sure how many of you have followed the lore and
     literature of the nuclear business for a long time, but I found a
     statement in a book that I was reading the other day, and I don't even
     know exactly when it was made.  I think it was sometime in the late
     50's, but I think it's really appropo when we're talking about risk
     assessments and we're talking about risk decisions, and we're talking
     about involving the public in that process.
         There was a general atmosphere and attitude that the
     American people could not be trusted with the uncertainties, and
     therefore the information was withheld from them.  I think that there
     was concern that the American people, given the facts, would not make
     the right risk benefit judgments.  This was on the front page of a book
     about one of the attempts at plow shares, one that didn't go at Project
     Charriot.  I think that we're not very far still from the truth of that
     statement.  That may be provocative enough to get the rest of the day
     going.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thank you very much, Steve.  I put a
     couple of Steve's point up there -- public perception of risk and role
     of risk communication, which I think was brought out by his last slide.
     Steve said some things that were provocative, and I know there's people
     around the table who may have different opinions on some of the comments
     that he made.  I hope that we would bring those out during the
     discussion today.
         What I'd like to do now is give one additional member of our
     panel the chance to introduce themselves and then we'll go to Ray Clark
     to talk about the EPA standard.  Robert?
         MR. HOLDEN:  Good morning.  I'm Robert Holden with the
     National Congress of American Indians.  There was meeting in the area,
     and we had our largest convention of tribal governments in recent
     history where 150 tribal governments sat and talked about different
     issues impacting health, education, natural resources impacts and health
     impacts and cultural impacts of federal programs and other issues.  I'm
     here just to monitor what has been happening with the Nuclear Regulatory
     Commission and its oversight activities.
         I guess one of the things I just want to say briefly is that
     the NRC, as much as it's trying to include American Indian input into
     the process throughout the last few years as I've been acquainted with
     this program and the different programs in my work as a nuclear waste
     program director for the NCAI, there appears to be this selective
     sovereignty in terms of what the agency does, as does other agencies in
     terms of acknowledging tribal treaty rights, acknowledging indigenous
     human rights, acknowledging those lands that these activities are taking
     place.
         There are two types of land in our mind.  There's 80 in the
     country which has a designated definition, a statutory definition, and
     there's former Indian country, which all of this is, basically.  Along
     with these treaties, along with these areas, come with it the
     responsibility for NRC and other agencies to respond to the needs of
     these tribal governments that are still in place, to interact with them,
     to apprise them, and actually it should go further than that because
     what happens is that even though they may be apprised, it really doesn't
     necessarily have to -- it doesn't necessarily assume that the
     responsibility that is incumbent upon any agency through these treaties
     and so forth, that it's exercise.  It's delivered, which would in effect
     provide a little more outreach, provide a little more -- few more
     resources to provide these tribes with the wherewithal to respond to
     these types of meetings and attend these meetings.
         I see a few folks here that are from the area, and it's good
     to see them here, but I'm not sure whether, you know, the tribal leaders
     have the program folks that would be able to deal with the technical
     issues.  I hope to add something to this, and as I said, just here to
     monitor and get an overview of some of these things that are taking
     place.  I appreciate being here.  I appreciate the invitation.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks a lot, Robert.  I'm just going to
     make a note up here that a risk communication and involvement issue that
     some folks face is resources -- resources for participation.  I'd also
     like to note that we have Ian Zabarte from the Western Shoshoni National
     Council with us today, and I hope that we have the benefit of hearing
     from Ian during the session today.
         Ray, are you ready to tell us about the EPA standard?
         MR. CLARK:  Sure.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.  And your viewgraphs self-destruct
     after a certain number, but I'm not sure.  Lynn knows what number it is,
     but I don't.
         MR. CLARK:  I thing we pretty well know what the subject is
     on this, but I'll throw this up just for a formal introduction.  I will
     be quick with this.  I explained that the uniform is not Department of
     Defense.  I didn't explain what it is.  We're under the Department of
     Health and Human Services.  We are one of the uniformed services of the
     United States, but we're not defense related whatsoever.
         MR. CAMERON:  At least you're not wearing a tie.
         MR. CLARK:  That's the main thing.  Just a very quick
     background.  The Energy Policy Act in 1992 gave EPA the authority to set
     site specific standards for Yucca Mountain.  I realize there are
     acronyms all through this.  Hopefully that won't be distracting.  If it
     is, please ask me to explain.
         We're also required to contract with the National Academy of
     Sciences for technical input into the standards, and the NRC is required
     to issue their licensing regulations or to be consistent in their
     licensing regulations with the EPA standards.  We did finally propose
     the standards on August 27.
         Just very quickly, an outline.  There's two subparts.  You
     can see one, subpart A, is for storage.  Subpart B is for disposal.
     I'll run through each of these very quickly, but you can see there's
     individual -- well, the storage part is an operational standard.  The
     disposal part is more of a design standard in that you depend on
     projected performance more than you would monitoring generally, thinking
     anyway.  I have individual protection standards, human intrusion,
     groundwater protection, and then a couple of other considerations.
         The storage standard which I say is operational, meaning
     that it will be enforced with actual monitory, or at least I would
     anticipate it to be enforced with actual monitoring and the projections,
     similar to any other operating nuclear facility.  Of course, that's up
     to the Commission how they do it.  That's what I would anticipate.
         It's 150 microsieverts, which is 150 millirems per year.  It
     will include doses from both inside the repository and from operations
     outside the repository.  I won't get into the details of that.  It is
     consistent with Part 191.  Part 191 is our generic standards for spent
     fuel and high level waste which were originally issued in 1985.  The
     reference to this risk level is one in a million to one in 100,000 for
     fatal cancers.  This is the dose range, or risk range I should say, that
     was suggested by the NAS, albeit they addressed disposal, not storage,
     but it all comes out to the same kind of risk from radiation.
         Getting quickly into the disposal standards, again we're at
     150, and I apologize for the terminology, but microsieverts, committed
     effective dose through all pathways over 10,000 years.  That means there
     can be no projected annual dose higher than that within the first 10,000
     years after disposal.  That would be to the reasonably maximum exposed
     individual who is an individual who is -- I won't way is.  The concept
     of the reasonably maximum exposed individual is a person who is in the
     most highly exposed group of people.  We think it's similar to the
     critical group concept which was suggested by the NAS.  This person --
     projected dose -- I'm struggling for the right words here.  The
     projected dose accurate -- not accurately, excuse me, to project dose
     reasonably, meaning that some of the dose factors that are considered,
     some of the parameters, you use the highest values for those, but a
     number of the factors can stay at an average or median value.
         The two that we have specified in our standards is the
     location being near Lathrop Wells intersection, and we have a map later,
     although I suspect most of the people here know generally where that is,
     and the person would drink two liters per day of ground water.
         Groundwater protection standards, we proposed to be the
     maximum of contaminant levels which are applicable everywhere else in
     the country for various projects.  These are developed under the Safe
     Drinking Water Act, and they're listed there.  I won't go into them for
     time purposes.
         In your handouts, you'll see this chart which gives you four
     possible ways that we could set the point of compliance.  Now, the
     intent here is after the public comment period to choose one of these,
     not to just leave all four of them open for further choice.  To try to
     explain this a little better, this was that extra map that got -- it's
     on the back table if you didn't get one.  We have two alternatives which
     are what we call controlled areas.  That's a term that we first used in
     the generic standards as Part 191.
         The first alternative that we've proposed is this thinner
     line on your handout.  Now, granted that's a conceptual line that the
     department had been using under the generic standards before the new
     standards were proposed.  That's what we generally refer to as a five
     kilometer approach.
         The second controlled area is kind of a combination of the
     five kilometers in the Nevada test site boundary, and that's this
     thicker line on your handouts.  It's five kilometers, and obviously this
     is my hand rendering on a computer graphics with a mouse and so don't
     hold anybody to this line.  Roughly five kilometers from the footprint
     here except where it intersects the Nevada test site boundary, so you'd
     have a controlled area which looks something like this, with that
     alternative.
         The other two alternatives are designated points.  The
     roughly 20 kilometers here at the Lathrop Wells intersection which I
     referred to before.  The third would be somewhere in this area, and
     again, this is just estimation of where this box falls, but somewhere in
     this point, roughly 30 kilometers from the footprint.  That's intended
     to be where the majority of the farming takes place in the southern
     Amargossa Valley.
         This I'll just be real quick.  For individual protection,
     we've also proposed that if the peak dose occurs
     -- well, I'm sorry.  You must meet the peak dose limit within the first
     10,000 years.  You then need to calculate out whatever the peak dose is
     after 10,000 years, but you don't have to include that in the license
     application.  It does need to be put in the Yucca Mountain EIS for
     decision makers purposes and for public information.
         This limit on performance assessment consideration is again
     a carry-over from our generic standards.  You don't need to consider
     processes and events with a probability.  Well now, I said that
     backwards from what this slide says.  You need only consider processes
     and events for the probability of occurrence of one in 10,000 within
     10,000 years is what that means.
         For a very quick background that Lynn said I was supposed to
     talk about, I promised that I would save some of the philosophy behind.
        Again, Part 191, the generic standards, the waste isolation pilot
     plant certification and other chemically hazardous waste programs.
         Another concept which gets a lot of discussion is the
     reasonable expectation.  I was throwing out those numbers, like 150
     millirem, which are intended to be concrete numbers, but to reasonably
     project doses over 10,000 years is obviously very difficult to do with
     absolute certainty.  In fact, I think one could safely say it's
     impossible to do.  So we, in 191 and again continuing here, have used
     the concept of reasonable expectation.  Those take into account these
     greater uncertainties.  It's intended to be reasonable in the sense that
     it's less stringent than reasonable assurance that's used, for example,
     for reactor systems which are totally engineered systems and for which
     there are -- I don't know
     -- thousands of hours of experience.
         I would require that all the important parameters and
     processes be considered even if they're not precisely quantifiable.  In
     other words, if something helps with the performance or something hurts
     the performance, either way, you should consider it within reasonable
     bounds -- cautious but reasonable.  I think we could use that term, as
     the NAS has said.  The compliance determination, we believe, should not
     be heavily influenced by worst case assumptions.  In other words, use a
     full range of reasonable values for various parameters rather than just
     extremes one way or the other for whatever purpose that would be done.
         Finally, Lynn mentioned something about public involvement.
     Somehow I realized with horror that I hadn't used my updated slide for
     this one, but that's easy to fix.  We do have public hearings this
     month.  One is the 13th in Washington, which does indeed mean I will
     miss it, but we wanted to be here because we said we'd be here.  We
     wanted to know that this is an important function for us.
         The next one is Amargossa Valley on the 19th here in Las
     Vegas the 20th, 21st, and this is what didn't get updated,
     unfortunately.  Without looking at a calendar, I believe it's the 27th
     in Kansas City, Missouri.  The comment parade is open until November 26.
     We will then do a response to comments document, final technical
     background documents, and the target for final is August, 2000.
         We also have a web site where people can get information on
     this project.  We have an 800 number, which I shouldn't say because I
     don't know it right off the top of my head, but I can get it for you.
     It should be in the EIS -- excuse me, the Federal Register notices which
     were on the table as well.
         With that, I think I'll turn it over to Chip.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you very much, Ray.  As we all know, we
     could spend a day discussing this and indeed, there are going to be
     public meetings, as Ray noted, on this issue.  What we'd like to do is
     make sure that you identify any concerns or perspectives that you have
     for the advisory committee so that they can factor that into their
     analysis and evaluation.  I'm going to go to Steve Frishman first on
     this and then go over to Bill Phillips.  Steve?
         MR. FRISHMAN:  I think while I had control of the
     microphone, I took a pretty serious shot at this rule proposal.  We
     probably ought to go into that a little bit.
         First, what I said was in this rule proposal, we have a new
     concept introduced into geologic repository thinking.  I say that
     because I found it both in the proposed rule and the definition of
     barrier and in the definition of disposal.  The definition of disposal,
     I think, is the most telling.  Disposal means emplacement of radioactive
     material into the Yucca Mountain disposal system with the intent of
     isolating it for as long as reasonably possible.  Now, this is not the
     geologic isolation we have been talking about for a long time.  If you
     look at barrier, it goes through a reasonable definition of barrier,
     which is essentially prevents or substantially reduces the rate of
     movement or rate of release, but then it gives an example.  For example,
     a barrier may be a geologic feature, engineering structure, canister, so
     on, that significantly decrease the mobility of radionuclides or
     material placed over and around the waste, provided that the material
     substantially delays movement of water or radionuclides.
         Well, this is a whole new idea, and I think it's very
     important in the context of what we're talking about today.  Are we
     making a risk assessment on the likelihood that the waste will be
     isolated, or on the likelihood that release will be delayed?  That's why
     I point this up as an entirely new concept in the system.  Ray, am I
     being unfair?
         MR. CLARK:  In one way, yes, to call that a whole new
     concept.  This is the same, or at least generally the same as in Part
     191, which I don't have with me to quote, but the barrier concept is the
     same.
         MR. CAMERON:  Let me pose this question to the group.  I
     want to hear from Bill first, but the question that I would pose to all
     of you for the benefit of the advisory committee is do you agree or
     disagree with Steve that this represents a whole new concept in geologic
     disposal.  Bill, why don't you put your comment on the table, and then
     we'll come back to this point.
         MR. PHILLIPS:  I just had a real quick question.  I've been
     out of the loop for a few years, but you mentioned that on your third
     slide when you're looking at 20 to 200 microsieverts caused with risk
     assessment or risk possibility of ten to the minus 550 fatalities only.  The
     International Commission on Radiation Protection many years ago set up
     the standards, and when I was working for DOE and EPA, the standards was
     one in ten to the minus four per rem, but that was not just a fatality.
     That included morbidity and mutations in your first offspring and also
     mutations in their offspring for two generations.  So, a socially
     recognizable deformity in your children or their children was also
     considered in that risk assessment.  Is that included in this, too, or
     has that been dropped?
         MR. CLARK:  We didn't include it in 191.  It was discussed,
     but we've always based on fatal cancers, and in this case, this is based
     on the NAS suggestion.  I can't repeat exactly what their reasoning
     process was, but generally, they felt that fatal cancer was more
     detrimental to society than the other effects, so they based their
     recommendation on fatal cancer.
         MR. PHILLIPS:  And were these studies that came up with
     these numbers based upon the Hiroshima Nagasaki survivors, that
     population, too, primarily?
         MR. CLARK:  I would imagine, but I can't say that for sure.
         MR. PHILLIPS:  That's all.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  I would just note, I don't know if Bill
     put this in his introduction, but besides being a long-time Nevada
     resident, he's also a certified health physicist.
         Let's go back to the thought that Steve Frishman put on the
     table about the EPA standard represents a whole new way of thinking in
     geologic disposal.  Let's go to Mal and then we'll go to Abe.  Mal?
         MR. MURPHY:  Thanks, Chip.  First, Ray, I think you misspoke
     yourself a couple of times in your presentation when you equated 150
     microsieverts with 150 millirem.
         MR. CLARK:  Oh, did I say 150?
         MR. MURPHY:  You meant to say 15.
         MR. CLARK:  I'm sorry, yes.  You're absolutely right.
         MR. MURPHY:  Steve, I don't agree necessarily that the
     definition of disposals represents a departure in waste management
     thinking.  It seems to me if you look not only at the definitions but at
     the whole broad spectrum of the way the regulatory environment has
     addressed the Yucca Mountain project over the years, we've always
     anticipated that there would be some reasonableness associated with the
     disposal.
         From our perspective, from the Niconi perspective, it seems
     to me, you know, when you say, and this is what I think our public
     expects out of the program.  When you say that the waste should be
     isolated for as long as reasonably possible, to us that means that you
     must make every reasonable effort -- every effort possible consistent
     with today's available technology and technology which could be -- which
     you could reasonably develop in the near future to isolate that waste
     efficiently so that the additional burden on the population in Niconi
     would be zero.  If it's possible to get to zero, then we think that
     definition means that you need to get to zero.
         So, we would -- I don't think that's necessarily a
     departure, but we would read that definition as perhaps requiring a
     little more effort at, for want of a better description, 100 percent
     isolation than some other participants in the project would.
         Let me just make another point that I'm sure we'll be
     hashing out for the rest of the day, and that is the way that the EPA
     and the way that Ray expressed the risk standard.  You know, I don't
     blame the EPA for this.  I think the entire technical community has done
     this throughout the history of nuclear materials, I guess.  In my
     experience, many member of the public -- not all but many members of the
     public do not understand it when we express these risks in terms of
     probability.  If you say that EPA's acceptable risk is one times ten to
     the minus six, or one in a million, many people assume that to mean that
     one out of a million people will prematurely die of cancer and that if -
     - I don't remember what the exact figure is, but if the population of
     the United States, and let's assume the U.S. is the whole world, if the
     population of the United States today is 220 million, then some people
     assume that to mean that it is the policy of the United States
     government to accept 220 fatalities in their lifetime, in their
     generation, to accept 220 fatalities as an acceptable risk.
         Now, we all here know that that's not what that means, but I
     don't think over the history of nuclear activities, since the atom was
     first split, that that has as frequently as necessary, we've been
     clearly communicated to the public -- anywhere in the world, really, I
     would assume.  That is not what the risk standard is, but I think a lot
     of people still misunderstand that significantly, and that colors the
     whole broad spectrum of thinking about what is and is not acceptable
     risk and how government or utilities, state and local governments,
     everybody involved, approaches the idea of protecting the public health
     and safety.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Mal.  We really are perhaps
     discussing two risk communication issues here.  Going back to a couple
     of Steve's points, and we want to go to Abe and Bill Vasconi on this
     idea of what does isolation mean and what's the public's perspective on
     isolation.  Mal brought up another one that we may want to explore,
     about how best to express this risk in terms of public communication.
     Abe, go ahead.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  Two points.  The ICRP, that's the
     International Committee on Radiation Protection, in its rewrite of Part
     46, which is specific to disposal, I just happened to be in a meeting
     where some of the principals were discussing the definition section, and
     they said that we have to make a very strong point that geologic
     disposal is not permanent but it's an extremely slow release.  In the
     past, I think, we have sort of misled the public because we knew we were
     talking about releases over geologic times, but the public doesn't have
     that concept well in place.  So, I think there is a little bit of
     culpability on selling this thing back in the 70's as being something
     that's more than it really is, but I think as far as the standards, the
     international standards, et cetera, they have always assumed that you
     have to protect against the inevitable very slow release of materials
     from these systems.
         Another point on ten to the minus six, you know, we all
     breathe a sigh of relief and say that's not very important.  My mother's
     82 years old.  She detests gambling, even though she lives here in Las
     Vegas.  Every weekend, I drive her to California so she can buy the
     Lotto tickets.  I say Ma, that's a one in 140 million chance, and she
     says somebody's got to win.  I try to explain to her what I do for a
     living and the projections that we make, and she says you guys don't
     know what you're talking about.  See, it's almost impossible to explain
     to some people who even like you that there's merit in what you're
     doing.  So, I'm here to listen.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks a lot, Abe.  Let's go to Bill
     Vasconi.
         MR. VASCONI:  Yes, I'm not as learned as a lot of people at
     the table, so I just interject things.  I do have two ears and one
     mouth, and I fully intended to -- I felt that I should listen twice as
     hard as I talk.
         Isolation and risk.  Well, we keep talking on the 10,000
     years, but you know, common sense tells me we are building this, as Mal
     said, with today's technology, today's knowledge, today's alloys.  They
     do talk about transmutation, perhaps in 25 or 30 years.  Well, I give
     our educational system a lot more credit.  What we've done in the last
     hundred years, I'm sure within the next two or 300 years, perhaps the
     repository should be looked at as a stewardship.  You know, 10,000
     years, and we're talking about what kind of assessment we'll have then.
     I doubt very seriously if there will be any coal reserves, oil reserves
     left in the world in 10,000 years.  I can view what's happening at Yucca
     Mountain and possibly some other locations in the world as a definite
     reserves on natural resources.
         Yes, we do have health and safety concerns.  Yes, we do have
     environmental concerns, and they're all risk.  Here a couple of years
     ago, a politician did bring out some startling statistics running for
     office.  If you live in Las Vegas, there's a murder every two days.
     There's a rape every nine hours, and there's a car stolen every 40
     minutes.  There's a lot of risk living in Las Vegas.  That's all I have
     to say.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Bill, and I think that we're
     going to go to Steve, but I guess the point Bill raises is what should
     be included in the communication of risk.  Whose responsibility, how are
     benefits, at least perceived benefits, supposed to be communicated.
     Steve?
         MR. FRISHMAN:  I guess maybe I have to clarify sort of the
     underpinning of my argument, and that's I agree when Abe says we've all
     known for a very long time.  The reality is what we're really looking
     for is very slow release because zero release is, in reality, probably
     impossible.
         Well, the point that I'm making is that if we talk about
     very slow release or, as the primary definition, is substantially
     reduces rate of movement.  What we're talking about is a rate function.
     Very slow is a rate function.  Delay is a time function, and they're two
     very different things.  You can delay, and then you can slow, which is
     essentially what we're coming to with the type of package concept we've
     got now.  That's the distinction I'm making.  What's new is we're
     talking about only a time function.  We're not talking about a rate
     function, and it's the rate function that's important in this analysis.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks for that clarification, Steve.
     Judy?
         MS. TREICHEL:  I think one of the things that makes a lot of
     difference is whether or not you're taking a voluntary or you're being
     forced to take an involuntary risk.  Many, many things change.  There
     are a lot of things that you will do that someone would call risky if
     you believe that you're getting a benefit, either monetary or
     satisfaction or something, but when it's imposed upon you, it's a whole
     different thing.  I believe, as has been said here, that people have a
     different expectation.  When they say that it's worth the risk of having
     this waste transported past them to get to Yucca Mountain, it's worth
     the 25 to $50 billion to do the project, it's worth all of these things.
     They believe if it's worth it, it's because the waste is disposed of,
     and they see that as being absolutely gone forever and every.
         When Nevadans are faced with a risk for something that's not
     really what it appears to be, it seems to me you've got to get an
     agreement that people are willing to take that risk, whether it's in
     Nevada or along a transportation route.  You need to tell them what it
     is first and then find out if they'll accept the risk and not just keep
     trying to massage the way in which risk is described.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Judy.  I think Mal has
     -- Mal, do you have a follow up on Judy's?
         MR. MURPHY:  Just another additional point I want people to
     keep in mind.  Judy makes an excellent point, you know, where we have to
     keep in mind the very vast difference between voluntary and involuntary
     risk.  Very analogous to that is the fact that for this project, people
     have to remember that we are not creating a new risk of exposure to
     radiation.  We are transferring that risk of others in the country to,
     from our perspective, the residents of Nye County.  This is not a new
     risk that we're generating for the first time, but it's a risk that
     we're relieving some people of living with and transferring it to the
     people out here in Nevada.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Mal.  Perhaps we can go a little
     further and explore this whole idea of the acceptability of the risk.
     What's the role of risk communication in that particular decision?  I
     should ask -- we've heard obviously from the EPA and from DOE.  I'd like
     to see if the advisory committee members have anything to ask or say
     about this, but before I do that, Bill Reamer from the NRC, do you have
     anything that you want to add to this particular discussion or
     perspectives on the EPA standard?
         MR. REAMER:  Well, Chip, let me just mention three things
     because I think they may be on people's minds.  One, as people know, we
     proposed our proposed regulation for Yucca Mountain last March, and we
     do intend to complete our rulemaking on that.
         Secondly -- and we expect that will be completed probably
     the first quarter of next year.  Secondly, as Ray pointed out, the EPA
     standard is out for public comment, and we will be filing our public
     comments on that within the time frame.  When we proposed Part 63, we
     set forth at that time our view on what was a scientifically and
     technically sound standard for Yucca Mountain.  We expect that EPA will
     read our comments, when we file our comments, that they will read all
     the comments and that they will finalize their standard and issue a
     final rule.  Ray is saying that will take place in August of 2000.
         Under the law, we are required, as Ray pointed out, to be
     consistent with the EPA standard so when there is a final EPA standard
     that is issued, we will of course carry out our responsibilities.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Bill.  For those of you in the
     audience, we will go on to you before we close off this session to hear
     from you on this since it's a very important foundation issue.
         In terms of public acceptance, I wrote a question up there,
     what are the underpinnings of public acceptance?  What goes into that
     equation.  Let's go to Abby, and then if the advisory committee members
     have anything that they want to put on the table, please put your name
     tents up and I'll make sure that gets on.  Abby?
         MS. JOHNSON:  Abby Johnson, Eureka County.  The comment I
     would like to make is that when you look at risk communication, you also
     have to look at the risk communicators.  From the Nevada point of view,
     we've had a lot of people trying to communicate with us about risk and
     what it's going to do to us and what it's not going to do to us, and all
     those people have a vested interest in having this project be located in
     Nevada.  So, when they have that vested interest, you know, we're
     sitting around the table saying well, the public doesn't understand.
     Well, I think the public does understand, and the public understands
     that there's only one answer in this project, and it's getting to yes.
     It's never getting to no.  So, as long as this project is -- the mission
     of this project is to get to yes no matter what, no matter what the
     risks are, no matter what the site is like, then risk communication is a
     farce.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Abby.  I think that from a
     process point of view, one thing to put on the table now is that the
     advisory committee perhaps has a unique role to play in terms of being a
     communicator and that this opportunity that they're providing is to see
     if maybe they can use their unique role to do something in this area.  I
     think that that's why perhaps we're all here, so don't lose sight of
     that.  Dr. Garrick, did you want to say something?
         DR. GARRICK:  Well, I would ask if either of the committee
     members or our consultant would like to comment.  George?  Ray?
         DR. WYMER:  I won't say much that has any real substance to
     it.  We are here to listen and to carry the message back to the Nuclear
     Regulatory Commission through our reports that we give to the
     commissioners.  I don't want to appear to be patronizing, but I'm very
     impressed, as I was last year, with the sophistication and subtle
     thought that the people have presented.  So far, the depth of
     understanding of the issues and the problems, you know, it's a little
     surprising to find that, but maybe it shouldn't be.  So, we are here to
     listen, and that's our primary role today.  I think I could say with
     honesty that we don't have a position with respect to how this thing
     ought to go.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Dr. Wymer.  Just keep in mind
     this issue.  I think that we're going to get -- we're going to flirt
     around with it all throughout the day but we're going to come back to
     that for wrap-up, the unique role of ACNW here.  I'm just putting that
     up there for you to think about throughout the day.  I know that Fred,
     a/k/a Dennis Bechtel, over there wants to say something.  Go ahead.
         MR. BECHTEL:  I'd just like to point out, when you talk
     about risks, we're actually talking about two time frames, too.  We're
     talking about long term risk, and obviously health and safety risk is of
     primary concern to all of us.  Since we're potentially the end of the
     funnel for this project, in southern Nevada there are a lot of other
     risks, too.  There's risk to economy, livelihood, quality of life.
     People come to Nevada, southern Nevada, for various reasons and of
     course, if you're familiar with the EIS that came out, there's a lot of
     options that would transport waste through all of Nevada.  A number of
     options for southern Nevada we're concerned about, so I think you have
     to broaden your thinking about risks.  Short term may be more economic.
     Long term or maybe not long term health and safety, a range of risks.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Dennis.  I think that ties in
     with what the issue that Bill Vasconi raised for us earlier, is that
     what's included in the risk and do you think put a finer point on that
     for us.  Let's go to Bill and then go over to Milt from the advisory
     committee, the consultant.  Go ahead, Bill.
         MR. REAMER:  Well, my feeling, you know, being a physicist
     and a health physicist for the last 30 years of my life is that you
     can't really even talk about risk at 15 millirem.  You can't talk about
     risk at 100 millirem or even 1,000 millirem.  Yesterday I had some back
     x-rays, and I got 1,000 millirem a shot at my lower back.  A cat scan is
     8,000 millirem.  Dental x-rays are 200 millirem apiece, and the lawyers
     and EPA, and I've watched them do it my whole life because I was part of
     that process, because you can measure radiation down in annual doses of
     a tenth of a millirem per yea.  We have national emissions standards on
     hazardous air pollutants that regulate at one tenth of a millirem
     annually to residents in uncontrolled areas.  You know, the national
     standard for the MISHAPS is ten millirem per year.
         I think it's ludicrous to talk about 150 millirem or 15
     millirem a year or 25 millirem a year like the NRC does.  You have to
     keep in mind that you see no biological effects whatsoever until you get
     acute exposures up around to 30 to 40 to 50 millirem, and then you see
     lymphocyte drops in the blood.  What we're doing here is we're taking --
     there's never been an epidemiological study to prove that there's any
     risk for radiation workers that are receiving 5,000 millirem per year.
     There's no correlation.
         I know people who have worked in the radiation refueling
     industry their whole lives at 50 years old.  I know hundreds of people
     and have read hundreds of -- have seen the activities of these people
     and the reports and studies of.  These guys get burned out on refueling
     nuclear power reactors every year.  You don't see increased cancer risk
     with these people.  You know, the body has a tremendous capacity to
     repair itself from biological risks from ionizing radiation because we
     evolved on this planet where this was a common insult.  In fact, the
     planet was much more radioactive, you know, hundreds of thousands of
     years ago than it is now.  You have repair mechanisms.
         If I go out in the sun for eight hours, I'll probably die,
     but if I do it over a month's period, I'm not going to.  I won't even
     get burned because there's repair networks going on.  So, when you're
     talking 15 millirems a year, 25 millirems per year, I think it's
     absolutely ludicrous because we can measure so clearly and so
     effectively at this level to even try to set risk standards based upon a
     linear non-threshold model which is what we're using here.  We're saying
     that the risk goes all the way to zero.  One gamma ray can cause you
     cancer if it hits the right DNA molecule.
         So, 15 millirem is ludicrous.  I think EPA is just
     -- it borders on absurdity to try to regulate at these levels.  Now,
     that independent from Yucca Mountain.  That's just a technical point of
     view on my part.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Bill.  I think that was the
     point that Milt Levenson might have wanted to make.  I guess it does go
     back to the public acceptability, risk communication idea that Judy
     raised in terms of public acceptability.  Of course, there is a debate
     about the linear no threshold, as to whether that is actually the state
     of affairs.  Does the public understand the implications of radiation
     dose?  Does that play a role in public acceptance?
         Milt, you have your card back up again.  Go ahead.
         MR. LEVENSON:  No, I just wanted to comment and support Mel
     Murphy's statement about the public not understanding probability as
     it's used.  I think he's defining is much too narrowly.  It's not only
     the public at large.  Most technical people don't understand probability
     of risk.  I guess I don't understand it because I still drive a car.
     So, you know, we have to recognize that it isn't just some people out
     there that don't understand it.  It's a very unusual thing, and a large
     part of the technical community does not really understand it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Milt.  Ray, you started us down
     this road.  What do you want to say?
         MR. CLARK:  Just because Lynn arranged the agenda, I don't
     want to be blamed for starting us down the road.  No, I just wanted to
     say that yes, our standards are based on linear non-threshold model and
     now risk of losing general public here, but to defend what we're doing.
     That's correct, and I'm not -- I should say just right up front, we have
     a whole staff that looks at these issues, and I don't claim to be the
     expert on the staff by any means.
         We're not saying that that's the absolute predictor of
     what's going to happen.  In fact, in the preamble to this, you'll note
     we recognize that there could be no effect at that level or there could
     be effect.  There could be more effect at that level than linear
     threshold would predict.  At this point at least, and we're continually
     looking at this question.  At this point at least, we think it's the
     most prudent way to set public health standards without proof one way or
     the other on where the actuality of it is.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thank you, Ray.  Let's go to Abby and
     then we'll come over to Mal.  Abby?
         MR. JOHNSON:  I heard from other health physicists the same
     comment that Mr. Phillips just made, and I guess from the standpoint of
     the public, if -- and I don't disagree with that, but then from the
     standpoint of the public, we see the EPA and the NRC duking it out over
     these standards.  I'm going to alienate everybody at this table before
     the end of today I'm sure, but you know, I went to the NRC's meeting and
     heard them say that yes, you know, they would be happy to accept the EPA
     standard when it comes out, and then as soon as the EPA standard came
     out, they were not happy to accept the EPA standard.  So, from the
     public's point of view, if it doesn't matter if it's 25 or if it's 15,
     why are these two agencies fighting with each other, and what's the real
     story?
         Well, I know what the real story is, is that Yucca Mountain
     can't meet the standards, so then it throws the project out.  So, if
     Yucca Mountain can't meet the standard, then that's the getting to no,
     getting to yes thing -- all that.
         MR. CAMERON:  To make sure that there's no ambiguities here,
     I think we need to hear from Bill Reamer about the happiness of the NRC.
     I don't know if you were tieing those two thoughts together.  In other
     words, the NRC not being happy with 15 and the fact of getting the
     repository licensed.  If you were, I think that needs to be explored
     because that may not be the situation.  Were you tieing both of those
     thoughts together?
         MR. JOHNSON:  Chip has a way of taking what I say and
     spinning it into something that's really much more profound.  We work
     very well together.  Yes, of course I was.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, Bill.
         MR. REAMER:  What we said, Abby, was that we will implement
     the final EPA standard.  What's been proposed is a proposed standard
     which needs to go through a rulemaking process, comments made, your
     comments, our comments, comments from other Nevadans, comments from
     other experts, and then EPA needs to look at those comments and propose
     a final standard and by law, we will be consistent with that.
         When we were here in June, we tried to explain the basis for
     our proposal of 25, and we tried to explain it was based on what we
     thought the science and technology supported.  We are taking a hit
     because since we're at 25 and the EPA is at 15, you know, what I'm
     hearing is we're interested in licensing the repository.  That's, I
     think, an unfortunate conclusion that's a wrong conclusion, but it's a
     conclusion that people will draw.  We're not interested in licensing the
     repository.  We're interested in getting a quality application and
     running a process that includes everyone, the public as well, and
     reaching an unbiased objective decision based on the science and the
     technology.  That's what we're interested in.
         That's what I'll talk about in an hour, but unfortunately I
     think you're probably reflecting what other people may believe, which is
     that the basis for the NRC position on 25 is that it wants to license
     the repository, and that's not what we said in June.  That's not what we
     said in March, and that's what we -- and it's not what we're saying now.
     What our comments will say, you know, we'll have to wait until those are
     issued, but they will be rooted in what we think is the best
     information, the way we regulate across the United States, not just here
     but at all the other facilities that we regulate.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Bill.  I just, regardless of
     these connections, I think Abby's point is obviously a conflict or a
     disagreement between two federal agencies on standards probably doesn't
     do much to promote public understanding or acceptability.  Some of you
     may address this next question, but is 25 millirem versus 15 millirem
     going to be a crucial distinction in terms of licensing the repository,
     and if you could address that as you -- let's go to Mal and then Abe,
     and we'll come to Bill Phillips.  Mal?
         MR. MURPHY:  I want to address that last question right now.
     I'll be happy to do it at some point in time during the day, but I just
     wanted to suggest to Milt Levenson that from my non-technical, non-
     scientific perspective, it's precisely because you do understand the
     probabilities that you're willing to get in your car.  If, sticking with
     one in a million, if the probability of you being killed in an
     automobile accident every time you leave the house to drive to the drug
     store is one in a million, then the probability is overwhelming, you
     understand and I do, that nothing bad is going to happen to you.  So,
     I'll go to the drug store.  But if, as you're leaving the house you
     think hmmm, someone in my community is going to die in an automobile
     accident as a certainty, someone will be killed, do I want that to be
     me.  You may be more likely to go back in and do all your shopping on
     the Internet and just stay home, but it's because you understand, you
     know, what that probability means that if there's an overwhelming
     probability that nothing bad is going to happen to me today, that you're
     willing to get in your car and drive it down to the drug store.
         I think that's the kind of thing, and that's an
     oversimplification I'm sure, but that's, you know, that's the kind of
     thing that we, you know, the whole community, the whole scientific,
     technical, regulatory, legal community has not clearly communicated to
     the public for the last 50 years, I think.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, that's an important point.  Thanks, Mal.
     Abe?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  You know, on the 15, 25 issue, I know that,
     you know, there are different perspectives within the Department of
     Energy.  My perspective from a performance assessment point of view is,
     and this is taking us back to the whole issue of certainty, there's
     enough uncertainty in the system that if we come in somewhere between 15
     and 25, we're probably dead in the water.  We need to be well below
     that.  We need to be able to demonstrate that we will be and stay well
     below that.  So, from my perspective, from EPA perspective, 15 and 25,
     it's a trivial issue.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Abe.  Let's go to Bill Phillips
     for a last comment up here and go out to the audience for ten minutes
     before we take a break.  Bill?
         MR. PHILLIPS:  I think you asked a question of whether you
     can measure a difference between 15 and 25 in the environment.  Did you
     ask that?
         MR. CAMERON:  No, I just was wondering whether 15 versus 25
     would make a difference in the licensing of a repository.
         MR. PHILLIPS:  Well, it's certainly measurable, and it
     could.  You know, I mean, you could measure, like I said, down at one
     millirem per year or even a tenth of a millirem per year.  So, if you
     came in at 18 or something like that with your confirmatory
     measurements, that's hundreds of times above what our limits of
     measurability are.
         I have a question for Ray, and maybe even Bill Reamer.  If
     by your own admission EPA has no idea what these risk numbers really
     mean, that there may not be any cancers produced at 15 millirem, or
     maybe the risk assessment is ten to the minus four or five times ten to
     the minus fourth.  Then why is there an argument between EPA and the NRC
     at this minute, infinitesimal small level?  I mean, why is there not
     agreement between NRC and EPA at a level where you can't even determine
     if anything's happening?
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, fair last question for Bill.
         MR. PHILLIPS:  Historically there has been agreement.  It's
     really been relatively recently that the disagreement has developed.  I
     think perhaps maybe a process needs to be followed to resolve the
     disagreement, and of course, in this particular proceeding, it will be
     resolved by law, and this particular matter will be resolved by law
     because Congress has said by law, EPA sets the standard and we must be
     consistent with it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, Ray?
         MR. CLARK:  I don't know that I can comment on why there's a
     disagreement.  There's two main bases I can tell you why we're at 15.
     One is because that's the same as our generic standard which was issued
     in '85 and amended in '92.  The second is that, based on our analyses,
     and again this goes to LNT again, that falls within the risk range that
     NAS recommended to use.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Steve, I see you have your card up, but
     I want to see if we have anybody out here before we take a break.  Now,
     this is on the subject that we've been talking about here.  Let's go to
     Ian Zabarte.
         MR. ZABARTE:  Good morning.  My name is Ian Zabarte.  I'm
     the assistant to Chief Yaol of the Western Shoshoni government.  We have
     a formal legal relationship with the United States, and this is
     manifested through the treaty of Ruby Valley, which covers about 40,000
     square miles of the west in the Great Basin, four states, what you call
     states.  According to some of those laws, such as the enabling act for
     the territory of Nevada, our territory is not to be included into any of
     the boundaries of the state or territory of Nevada, and with that, some
     of these counties aren't even constitutional.
         That aside, with regard to dose, we don't even know what our
     dose is, being western Shoshoni.  I don't think anybody up there knows
     what our dose is, and we are investigating exactly what our exposure has
     been in the past.  It's going to take a lot of work, and we've gotten
     more funding recently to continue that work.  We're going to be the ones
     determining which standards are used for our people, and then we're
     going to go ahead and try to enforce that against all of the people who
     would destroy our health.
         We have a lot of work ahead of us.
         The Nagasaki studies are accurate, from what I'm
     understanding, until 1986 in the DS86, or dose system -- dosimetry
     system 1986.  New research has discovered that it wasn't accurate.
         Now, we have different lifestyles and because of that, we
     have different shielding from the environment, we have different
     exposure pathways, and with regard to the graphic Steve Frishman put up
     there, with the little man with the hat, I assume he's a cowboy.  Now,
     Indians aren't cowboys.  We're Indians.  So that didn't appear to be an
     Indian to me.
         And until about the 1940s, even 1950s, we would consistently
     move into, through the Nevada test site area and it was at that time
     that we started being forcefully removed and kept out by the United
     States military.
         But I think that it's safe to assume that as soon as all of
     you leave, including the counties, when you shut down all those gold
     mines, that we're going to be doing the same thing we've been doing for
     the last 10,000 years.  And that with regard to the group which is at
     risk, you need to consider Indians.  You have a Washington Indian here,
     but you don't have any Western Shoshonee at your table, and this
     gentleman over here doesn't represent the Western Shoshonee government,
     he doesn't represent our interests, and he hasn't in the past.  I just
     want to make that clear, in your formal round table stakeholder
     discussion.
         Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks Ian.  We'll visit on that
     particular issue.
         Let's go over to this side, then we'll come back here.  Mike
     Baughman, Lincoln County, who will be joining us.
         MR. BAUGHMAN:  Thanks Chip.  Just a couple of observations.
     Abby mentioned that it seems as though that these standards and perhaps
     controversy is a lot about getting TS rather than getting to know, and
     that we always work on getting TS.
         I would suggest that there is another side of that ideology
     which says no solution is the best solution, and there are certainly
     those around the table that would advocate that, as well.
         I guess what I wonder is with the controversy between the 15
     and the 25, is there a cost implication to the project of going from 25
     to 15, and if there is, it seems to me that we should all be considering
     that the primary source of risk in this project is transportation.  It's
     not the repository itself.
         Most fatalities will occur as a result of transportation
     operations.  And if the difference between a 15 and a 25 millirem
     standard really provides no significant public health benefit at perhaps
     a very large cost, then perhaps those of us that are responsible
     decision-makers ought to consider reallocating the cost of going from 25
     to 15, to making the transportation system safer, which will undoubtedly
     better protect public health and safety.
         Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you.  There is a creative thought.  I
     mean, we don't usually get too creative in this business, but perhaps
     taking the allocation of resources from one area where there is a lower
     risk and moving it over to where there is a higher risk might be
     something that should be considered.
         Mike, you got a couple of cards raised on that.  Comments?
     Let's take those quickly and go back out to the audience, and then take
     a break.  Judy, and then Mal.
         MS. TREICHEL:  Well, I think something has been missing here
     and I don't understand why it is, but it's not necessarily an argument
     between 15 and 25.  All the flares went up when there was a four
     millirem ground water standard and when Yucca Mountain, as Steve showed
     the plume coming from there, when the repository fails, it exposes
     people through ground water.
         So we're talking about a ground water release.  And there is
     a lot of disagreement and I have heard very different numbers and facts
     than what Bill Phillips gave as far as radiation exposure and one of the
     things that the public is aware of is that when risk and dose numbers
     are changed, when standards are changed, it's because there has been a
     dreadful discovery that people are dead and you find out as a result of
     something bad happening.
         And that's why the radiation exposure limits have come down.
     That's why, because of Alice Stewart's work, we don't X-ray pregnant
     women.  That's why a lot of things have changed and people know that
     they change because you prove that something bad happened to you, if you
     can.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Judy, for that caution.  Let's go to
     Mal quickly and then to Abe.  We're going to get set to close down now.
     Go ahead.
         MR. MURPHY:  What Mike Baughman said raises kind of a
     question or an issue, in my mind, that we might think about over the
     break and perhaps some people might want to discuss it after the break.
         Of course, neither the EPA standard, the proposed Part 197,
     nor the NRC's Part 60 or proposed Part 63 apply to transportation.  So
     the 15 -- the argument over 15 versus 25 millirem does not -- that
     argument is irrelevant to the transportation issue, which raises a
     question, in my mind, and that is why should there be different risks,
     why shouldn't it -- you know, just taking, for the sake of argument, and
     we may want it ultimately to be even lower, but for the sake of
     argument, assuming that the EPA's 15 millirem standard is the better
     one, why shouldn't that apply across the board to all aspects and all
     activities associated with the management of nuclear waste and
     ultimately disposal in Yucca Mountain.
         I'd just pose that question.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Mal.  Let's go to a final table
     comment.  Abe, go ahead.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  Just to respond to my neighbor Judy here.
     When we have looked at the ground water versus the total all pathway
     dose standard, it's specific to which isotope you're dealing with, of
     course.  When neptunium is involved, generally, the water pathway is
     one-tenth of the total all pathway dose.
         So a four millirem standard could be equivalent to as high
     as a 40 millirem all pathway dose standard.  So whether it becomes
     controlling or not is very specific to where the point of compliance is,
     when the point of compliance is, and what radionuclides come through at
     the point of compliance at that time.
         So to say that one is controlling and the other isn't is a
     little bit less sealed at this point.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks.  We're getting ready to take a
     break.  I want to go out to the audience for one comment.  And I would
     apologize in advance to the audience.  I'm going to have to ask you to
     make it brief and may have to ask you to summarize.
         Sally.
         MS. DEVLIN:  Thank you.  I want to thank everybody for
     coming to Nevada and it's so nice to see so many familiar faces.  Of
     course, I'm going to give Dr. Garrick hell for, again, sitting with his
     back to us, as I did in Amergosa, and being a toastmaster, you know you
     don't do that.
         Anyway, I didn't come to say that and I came here for very
     serious things.  And I want to thank Ray Clark for sending me the
     Federal Register, which I read.
         The first thing that really disturbed me was not only on the
     risk, but there is no stress, whether you want to use risk or dose or
     what.  My friends are still suffering from Three Mile Island.
         And the second thing is this meeting should be held in Nye
     County, because we're talking transportation and the EIS is absolutely
     vacuous on that.  We're talking risk.  We have no medicine, and that's
     what I came to tell you, in Nye County.  We have no hospital.  We have
     absolutely nothing at the test site, absolutely, at the Tonapot test
     range, nor at Nellis.
         We have the most dangerous highway in the world, which is
     95.  The report that says that there are a few pedestrians at Indian
     Springs, there are 3,000 locked-in prisoners there.  All of the numbers,
     all of the information is fallacious, is a good word.
         The second thing is I have sent the center to read a plan
     for virtual medicine for all of Nye County and this -- if you don't know
     what virtual medicine is, I am glad to give you a lecture on it.  We're
     trying to get virtual schools and virtual libraries.
         But the most important thing there is nothing, if there are
     any accidents or anything in Nye County, to do anything with it, and
     this is absolutely terrifying.
         There is not one mention of this in any of the literature.
     And, believe me, I read the 1,600 pages.
         So that's all I want to say and I hope I am provoking you on
     this because something has got to be done and said for us people.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you very much, Sally.  Maybe a virtual
     lecture on that stuff.
         Let's take a break.  We had a half-hour scheduled for you.
     I have 20 after ten.  Why don't we come back at 10:45, so that will cut
     a little bit off.
         Thank you.
         [Recess.]
         MR. CAMERON:  We're going to get to the next item on the
     agenda, which is NRC's use of safety assessment to support licensing
     decisions.  Bill Reamer, in about two minutes, but there was one quick
     comment that a member of the audience had that we want to go to and Mal
     Murphy has a quick overarching issue for us to consider throughout the
     presentation.
         Grant, do you want to make your point about probability?
         MR. HUDLOW:  Certainly.  The thing that I heard was that the
     one latent cancer death per million did not mean that every year one
     person in a million is going to be fatally infected with some
     radioactivity.
         Well, if it doesn't mean that, what does it mean?
         MR. CAMERON:  Mal, you have a point and maybe you want to --
     I don't know if you want to address Grant's point, since you brought
     this up, while you're making yours.  But why don't you speak and then
     we're going to go to Bill Reamer and get started.
         MR. MURPHY:  I won't directly address Grant's point because
     I'm not a qualified expert in that area, but it's certainly a good
     question and it's a question that the experts and health physicists have
     to -- and probabilities -- have to address.
         But I just wanted to make one point that I think everybody
     has to keep in mind, and it's, again, apropos to what Milt Levenson said
     about driving his car.
         That is, one of the reasons you are willing to get in your
     car every day, Milt, is because even though you recognize that there is
     some risk involved in that, you have some control over that risk.  You
     need to worry about what other people are doing behind the wheels of
     their car, but you can control what you yourself are doing behind the
     wheel of yours.
         The people who are -- I don't want to use the word exposure,
     but the people who are placed at risk as a result of the management of
     nuclear waste have no control whatsoever over that risk that they are
     being exposed to involuntarily by someone else.  So that's a big, big
     difference, in people's minds, it seems to me.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Mal.  I think that we need to give
     Robert a chance to perhaps respond to something earlier.  Go ahead,
     Robert.
         MR. HOLDEN:  Well, maybe not to beat a dead horse, but just
     kick it a couple of times anyway.
         That same analogy, I guess, holds true in terms of the
     choices, the options, the willful choices that you make daily.
     Concerning the circumstances of those folks who live in the Nevada area,
     what's now known as the Nevada area, the things that happen there, the
     testing, all the things that were heaped upon these lands in terms of
     radiation exposure, that was certainly not willful.
         Minimal testing was done to those populations and certainly
     not to the plants, the animals, and the water that these folks ingested
     for years.  And, also, even when testing was begun, just talking to some
     of the folks in those areas, that some folks may have been subject to
     health assessments, but those seem to stop at reservation borders, at
     reservation lines.
         So those things, when you consider the mistrust, the
     distrust that's out there, there's reasons for it and they're valid
     reasons, in my mind.  So we have to be careful as to what we think
     without putting ourselves in those places sometimes.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you very much, Robert.  Bill, are you
     ready?  Bill Reamer.
         MR. REAMER:  Okay, Chip.  I'm going to just stay among the
     group.  I don't have slides to present.  I do have four concepts that I
     want to present, however, that I think are important in understanding
     how NRC will use safety assessment.
         The first concept is that we will hold DOE primarily
     responsible for the safety assessment.  The second concept I will talk
     about is that we will independently oversee -- and by oversee, I mean we
     will monitor and we will assess and we will conclude, and that will be
     independent.  We're an independent agency -- we will independently
     oversee DOE, including DOE's safety assessment.
         The third concept I want to talk about is that we will
     rigorously review the safety assessment document that DOE prepares when
     they submit it to us.  The fourth concept I want to talk about is that
     we will involve the public throughout our process.
         So the first concept I mentioned is that DOE has primary
     responsibility for the safety assessment.  There are certain obligations
     we feel that go with that responsibility that DOE has, that primary
     responsibility.
         The first is the safety assessment must meet all our rules.
     Now, that means it must include all the information that we require it
     to include and we will review that, and, specifically, the information
     that is provided must be complete and accurate.  That's an affirmative
     obligation on the Department of Energy.
         Another obligation that DOE must bear is it must control all
     significant changes to the safety assessment, control meaning to review
     those and to reach conclusions about them and to document that.
         The third point is that DOE must, according to our rules,
     keep the safety assessment up-to-date.
         Another obligation that goes with DOE's primary
     responsibility is that they must prove that the public is protected.
     They have the burden to prove safety.
         The third point under the -- that I would make under this
     first concept is that DOE must carry out its safety assessment
     responsibilities with very high standards.  Some have heard the
     terminology "adopt the nuclear culture" and this is what I have in mind.
     It's the type of attitude that our other licensees, our reactor
     licensees, bring to bear in discharging their responsibilities, and we
     are going to expect the Department of Energy to do the same.
         The second concept I want to talk about that's important to
     the way we will use safety assessment is that we will independently
     oversee DOE throughout the process.  We will set the rules for DOE.
     It's our responsibility to set rules that are protective and we have
     proposed Part 63, which we have presented at various times in Nevada.
     We expect to complete our rulemaking, as I mentioned earlier, on
     proposed Part 63 in the first quarter of the year 2000.
         Those rules require, among other things, that DOE identify
     and evaluate what's important to the safety assessment.
         The second point I'd make under our independent oversight
     concept, under the concept that we independently oversee DOE, is that we
     will not license a repository at Yucca Mountain until we decide that the
     DOE's safety assessment proves that DOE will meet our rules and we will
     bring to that decision an impartial and objective evaluation of the
     evidence.  We'll weigh all the evidence and we'll make our decisions in
     a phased manner to reflect what we expect will be a growing body of
     evidence if this project proceeds.
         The third point I'd make is that we will oversee DOE
     activities to ensure that they comply with our rules.  We will require
     that DOE -- and oversee its performance.  We will require that DOE
     monitor repository conditions and repository performance and take that
     information and update their safety assessment, factor it into their
     safety assessment.
         If the DOE doesn't do these, if they don't follow our rules,
     we will cite them for violations.  We have that authority.
         The third point I would make is that we have the authority,
     if necessary, to require that the waste be retrieved, if there is a
     repository and emplacement of waste at Yucca Mountain.
         The third concept that I mentioned that's important to our
     use of safety assessment is that we will rigorously review the DOE's
     safety assessment at all stages.  We will verify that all the necessary
     elements are covered in the assessment.
         If the safety assessment is not complete, we will return it.
     If more information is required in order for us to perform our review,
     we will get it.  We have the power to ask DOE questions. We have the
     power to raise issues and we have the power to require that DOE respond.
         In our review of the DOE safety assessment, we will apply a
     broad range of expertise to our review.  That includes expertise that's
     available on our staff, as well as the staff of the Center for Nuclear
     Waste Regulatory Analyses.  This is a scientific center that we have
     funded that exists for the purpose of providing advice on high level
     waste matters in San Antonio.  We will bring that expertise to bear in
     conducting our review.
         We will review all parts of the DOE safety assessment that
     are important to protecting the public.  We will undertake that review
     in accordance with a systematic review plan and we will focus our review
     on what is important to protecting the public.
         The fourth concept that's important to understand in the way
     in which we will use safety assessment is that the public will be
     involved throughout our process.  We understand that it's our
     responsibility to take affirmative steps to involve the public and we
     will do this by establishing a relationship for the long term that
     creates opportunities for the public to be involved in our process.  We
     will listen to and we will hear and we will respond to public concerns.
         Tonight is a good example, where we will hear public
     concerns.  And when we hear and respond to those concerns, we understand
     and we will respond in language that the public can understand.
         Public involvement will take various forms.  We will create
     opportunities for informal dialogue.  Our next meeting, as I mentioned
     to some people, in this area, will be on November 2, where we will
     discuss the regulatory concept of defense-in-depth.  This really stems
     from a comment that the State of Nevada made in meetings that the
     Commission held in March on the viability assessment, in which it
     questioned the way in which the Commission was proceeding in using this
     regulatory concept defense-in-depth.
         It's a concept we have discussed in our public meetings in
     March and in June and it's another concept -- and we will be holding
     another meeting on the second of November on this.
         Other forms of participation can include participation in
     formal -- in our formal process, in the public hearings that the NRC
     will hold if there is a license application from the DOE.
         In addition, we're working to improve our public access to
     the safety assessment information that we have.
         So in sum -- and let me make one other point; that all of
     our activities will be documented and they will be open to public view.
         So in summary, I felt it is important in understanding how
     we will use safety assessment to really emphasize four points; that we
     hold DOE primarily responsible for the safety assessment, that we will
     independently oversee them, that we will rigorously review the documents
     they prepare and submit to us for review, and that we will involve the
     public throughout our process.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks a lot, Bill.  We're going to go to Bill
     Vasconi, and then Judy Treichel.  But first, let me do something I
     should have done earlier and introduce Mike Baughman, who joined us.
     Just give your name and your affiliation.
         MR. BAUGHMAN:  Mike Baughman, Lincoln County.
         MR. CAMERON:  See, that wasn't hard.  Thanks, Mike.  Bill?
         MR. VASCONI:  Yes.  Bill, I appreciated your comments.  The
     NRC, which has been around for a considerable -- nice going, guys.
         MR. CAMERON:  I hope we don't have to get this table remade
     now.
         MR. VASCONI:  One would think, with the involvement we do
     have coming to these meetings, and several of us participate in any
     number of them, we could afford to have a little more elbow room, et
     cetera, on this round table discussion.
         Most of my comments are all wet anyway, so we'll start
     there.
         Bill, I did appreciate your four comments as far as safety
     assessment.  One of the things that has repeatedly come to my mind in
     meetings where Lake Barrett, Russ Dryer, et cetera, were representing
     the Yucca Mountain project, a good many folks would find the project
     more acceptable to their communities, to their way of thinking, by use
     of the word retrievability.
         You know, at one point in time, we were going to cover that
     back up and plant natural vegetation, put a granite stone on top of it
     in 40 different languages telling folks what's buried under there, like
     somebody was going to forget.  But we use the word retrievability.  I
     don't know why that word retrievability could not be extended beyond a
     50-year period of time.
         I have heard periods here lately of 100 years, I've heard
     periods of quite possibly 300.
         Why can't we have it monitored?  Why can't we have
     temperature probes?  Why can't we have moisture probes?  Why can't we
     leave it retrievable for the near future?  If we're talking 10,000
     years, what's wrong with it being retrievable for 500?
         And, again, with further education, et cetera, maybe we can
     resolve and solve some of the problems that may show up within that
     first 500 years.
         Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks a lot, Bill.  Let's get Judy.
         MS. TREICHEL:  First, I just had a question.  You said that
     there was going to be a long-term relationship with the public
     established and that tonight was a good example.
         How was the public invited to the thing tonight?
         MR. CAMERON:  Lynn?
         MS. DEERING:  What we did was advertise, I think, three or
     four times in several newspapers and I sent out a public announcement to
     as many people I could through the counties.  I tried to use my county
     contacts to get the word out and I got some mailing lists, with several
     hundred people on it.
         We did then make special -- we tried to contact universities
     and we tried to just get the word out to -- reasonably, in the timeframe
     we had, to everybody we could.
         MS. TREICHEL:  Okay, because I didn't see anything in the
     paper and I usually watch that pretty closely.
         MS. DEERING:  Really?  It was -- my understanding was it was
     to be ran at least two or three times before the meeting, starting about
     two weeks before, and I know we advertised -- it was supposed to have
     appeared in the Las Vegas Review Journal and the -- I think it was --
         MS. TREICHEL:  The Sun?
         MS. DEERING:  It might have been Times.
         MS. TREICHEL:  That as just a curiosity.
         MS. DEERING:  But if it didn't show up, I need to know that.
     I really need to know that, if, for whatever reasons, that didn't run.
         MS. TREICHEL:  Maybe we have somebody here that can tell us
     how we can check it, check with the reporter.
         MS. DEERING:  We'll follow up on that.
         MS. TREICHEL:  My actual question for discussion here and I
     guess one that I want to keep coming up and for people to keep thinking
     about was the issue that Abby had brought up earlier about everybody is
     inclined to think that successful public communication means that the
     public suddenly agrees with the project and that if you educate them
     correctly, then they will go for the project.
         And as was pointed out in a paper that I heard delivered
     earlier this year, educating people means that they then have tools to
     make their own decisions and they may not agree with you, but they'll
     know they don't.
         And I would like us to be thinking and I'd like to pose the
     question how can the public get people to say no, to not do the
     repository.  And just as an example, I mentioned to somebody recently
     that maybe it's like buying insurance, that you buy insurance if you
     want to avoid a risk, and they said, well, no, that's a mitigation.  You
     buy health insurance, you might get sick, but your health insurance
     helps mitigate.
         And the only other thing I could think of was when the mob
     was very prominent in Las Vegas, people bought protection and that did
     avoid the risk.
         So how would Nevadans go about getting out of this?  Would
     there be a price to pay or -- and that sounds like a joke, but it's
     really not.  How do you get out of this thing if you don't want it?
         MR. CAMERON:  Judy put a number of issues on the table, one
     of which is -- all of them are important, but the first one was that
     what's the goal of public education and communication.
         In other words, it shouldn't be equated to public
     acceptance.  It should be giving the public the information to make a
     decision, and that's one point, I think.
         MS. TREICHEL:  And that decision has to be able to be for or
     against.  It doesn't matter if you say yes if you're not allowed to say
     no.
         MR. CAMERON:  Right.  And if it's -- then I think that --
     then you sort of made an assumption that if it's no, how is that
     communicated, and that is an assumption about what this what Nevadans
     feel about it.
         Can we try to explore that, Bill?
         MR. REAMER:  Well, let me just make a couple of points.
     One, my goal and the goal of the staff in communicating and involving
     the public is not to obtain public acceptance.  We are not a supporter
     of the project and we don't expect that our public involvement would
     lead to anyone becoming a supporter of the project.
         What we do want, what we hope that we will get is a clear
     understanding of what the public concerns are, because they can drive
     our review, for example; they can help us to focus on certain portions
     of the safety assessment; if we know there are concerns related to
     earthquakes, that these are important concerns.  When we come out, we
     hear these concerns.
         They can inform our review and we can present the results of
     our review and focus on that, so that people perhaps learn more about
     this particular issue.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you, Bill.  How about some other
     perspectives, Mal, on Judy's comments?
         MR. MURPHY:  One of the things I think that's always driven
     Nye County's program in this respect is the unfortunate need to
     acknowledge that there is no way of saying no, that the ultimate
     decision with respect to whether or not nuclear waste will be emplaced
     and hopefully isolated in Yucca Mountain would be made by someone other
     than the citizens of Nye County or the elected leadership of Nye County.
         We sort of have to accept that in a representative democracy
     and, therefore, our program and our policy has always been to exercise
     our oversight responsibilities to ensure that the decision is made on
     the right bases and not made for political or for other purposes.
         But I think the answer we have to appreciate and
     acknowledge.  I mean, we may not like it, it may make us individually
     uncomfortable, but we have to acknowledge the fact that in a -- on a
     public policy decision such as this, individual members of the public do
     not have the right to say yes or no, but they certainly have the right
     to express their feelings and their fears and their concerns or their
     support and enthusiasm, if they want to, and they have the right to
     insist that the people who do ultimately make that policy decision on
     their behalf take those concerns into account and to do what is fair and
     equitable to accommodate and mitigate and compensate the people to whom
     that risk is being transferred, in many cases against their ultimate
     wishes.
         MR. CAMERON:  That's sort of following up on Bill's point,
     that outside of the political process, obviously, the emphasis is on
     make sure the decision is made on the right basis.
         MR. MURPHY:  Right.  I mean, we've always insisted that the
     site characterization be thorough and complete and based on conservative
     and accurate science and that the standards, whether adopted by the NRC
     or the EPA, are based on conservative science, that the process is open
     and all encompassing and allows for a complete and full airing of the
     issues both by litigants in a licensing hearing, as well as by members
     of the public, et cetera.
         But we really have to acknowledge the fact that there are no
     individual citizens in Nye County or elsewhere who are ultimately going
     to be able to say yes, I choose this risk, or no, I don't.
         You can always move away, I suppose, but that's not an
     answer.  That's not an acceptable way to vote, in my judgment at least.
         That's always been our position, is that because we didn't
     go out looking for this risk, Nye County didn't volunteer for this
     program, isn't volunteering for it now, and we recognize that we are not
     going to ultimately have the veto.  We don't even have the right of
     filing a notice of disapproval that the state has, for example,
     enforcing that ultimate decision to be made at the Congressional level.
         So our position has always been to insist that when this
     decision is made, it be made on the correct conservative bases.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you.  Let's go to Bill Vasconi, then
     Abe, and then we'll come over to Robert Holden, and then Dennis Bechtel.
         MR. VASCONI:  One of the things I would like to point out is
     although you see the political side of the story and you know there's a
     number of people that are totally against the repository, there are a
     good many Nevadans that feel that it is a national issue.  There's
     probably some 75 percent of Nevadans that feel whether we want it or
     not, the repository will be built, Yucca Mountain will be utilized.
         There's also a number of us that would like to see some
     equity entitlements come into the state, whether through our roads,
     through grants to the universities, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
         But the bottom line on it, who would vote on yes or no as
     far as the citizens of Nevada, I would assume, in the rural counties,
     you'll find a great, a larger percentage of second, third and fourth
     generation Nevadans, that here in Clark County, and these are statistics
     that are available, 50 percent of the people now living in Clark County
     have been here less than ten years.  We've got a great influx of people.
         Well, less than ten years, they've been here from someplace
     else, then, haven't they?
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks.  Thanks, Bill.  Abe?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  And there is nothing wrong intrinsically in
     having come here less than ten years ago from somewhere else.  I insist.
         It's been my unfortunate experience, as a Department of
     Energy employee, to have learned a few things in the recent past. One
     thing is I thought that I could actually go into a roomful of the public
     and say something that would persuade them.  Very quickly, I learned
     that is not the thing to do.
         In fact, the thing that I asked for help on is how to
     inform, but not, at the same time, inflame, and even that is sometimes
     not easy to do, because you're dealing with the people who are saying
     why are you doing this to me.
         And you can explain all you want about the equity of the
     risk and how you're moving it from one place to another, very nicely
     done, by the way, but the point still is that it's a very personal thing
     for most people that are in your audience.
         However, one of the more -- one of the better things that we
     did is, not too long ago, we went around the country and we randomly
     sampled and brought in people in focus groups and talked to them about,
     for example, the VA performance assessment curves and how they could be
     explained, and it was refreshing to see that when you randomly sample
     people, we did have some people that were dead set against this, but
     most people said I don't know what you're talking about, tell me about
     it.
         And when we did tell them about it, using ways of talking to
     them, they said, well, basically, as long as it's not in my backyard, I
     don't have any objection.  But even the people that we talked to in
     Nevada, we got comments like I'm going to look through your document
     when it comes out, the VA and the EIS, and if I can think of something
     that you haven't thought of, I will have no confidence whatsoever in
     what you're talking about; but if you've covered this, this and this
     base, then I will think, yeah, you're pretty well on.
         Because we showed them curves, we showed them equations, we
     showed them what the kind of stuff that we were doing, and they said,
     huh, what are you trying to pull here.  But if I can think of something
     you haven't thought of.
         And in communicating risk, you have to go to that -- and
     it's not a lower level, it's a level at which people work.  It's a level
     that you and I work on when we're dealing with something we don't
     understand.  Like when somebody comes in and says this is your risk of
     getting a cancer from sunlight or something like that.  You say okay.
         Anyway, my point was I have given up and I think DOE, as a
     unit, has given up in seeking public acceptance.  It is our job to
     inform and it is our duty to inform in such a way that it's actually
     informative rather than inflammatory.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you, Abe.  There is a comment off the
     record that we won't pick up.  Let's go to Robert and then to Dennis.
     Robert?
         MR. HOLDEN:  Once in a while I have actually a good excuse
     for being late, and such was the case this morning.  I was on the phone
     with some folks regarding notification of some tribal leaders to see if
     they wanted to participate in radiological emergency preparedness
     exercises and activities, which have been going on for a number of
     years.
         Most states have that infrastructure in place.  They have
     radiological health officers.  They have state departments of
     transportation trained, as well as response teams trained in rad
     response.  But such is not the case with the tribes, even though they've
     been impacted, even some live next door to a utility, the closest
     neighbor is the border of some of the utilities where all this hot stuff
     will be coming from.
         But what it's taken is that it's taken a whole change of
     mind set, the way FEMA did business, most of the folks came from the
     states or go back to the states from FEMA.  And I guess my point is that
     that's something that the NRC needs to be mindful of in terms of what is
     safety and what does that mean to the risk that's out there.
         Are these folks going to feel safe?  Is there going to be an
     accident?  Will they be protected?  What are the different pathways has
     been discussed as to where they take some of this material, exposed
     materials, exposed animals, plants and so forth.
         And in doing so, you're going to have to go the extra step
     and that's always been the basis of not doing many things by the
     agencies.  It's going to take too much time, it's going to take too much
     money to contact each of these tribal governments, which, by the way,
     we're speaking of thousands of years in the future, which have been
     there thousands of years in the past and they're still there, and, as
     was expressed here earlier, plan on being here when that few thousand
     years comes around.
         So it's going to take a way of interacting with those tribal
     leaders to apprise them of, as I said a while ago, and I don't want to
     be too redundant here, but to interact with them.
         I'm glad to see -- believe me, I'm glad to see that some of
     the county and the local folks, residents, in these lands are able to
     sit here at the table and in the audience, but the tribal folks don't
     have that luxury.  They don't have the infrastructure.  They don't have
     the resources, and they're beginning to rely on -- and it's taken this
     long to rely on some of the county folks to extend that cooperative
     relationship and it's working in some cases, but that's not the way it
     should be.
         And that's -- the NRC can say, well, that's not our fault.
     Well, it may not be your fault, but you do have some oversight over DOE
     activities and the DOE has not seemed to provide the same resources to
     the tribal governments as they have some of these other governmental
     entities.
         So that's something that needs to be changed, as well as in
     terms of protection.  There is an interesting and -- and they talked
     about the cultural impacts of Yucca Mountain.  It was done by non-Indian
     anthropologists, archeologists, certainly not from this area, who met
     some folks here and talked with them and wrote what they wanted to
     write.
         But also contained in there are passages from some of the
     cultural and spiritual leaders in this place and they talked about what
     would happen, as well as talked about what's out there and how it's
     alive and the viable continuation of life itself based on interaction of
     those tribal people in that community.
         This is still one big community.  I see biosphere stuck up
     there in several places.  This is one biosphere.  It's one -- so it's
     going to recur, it's going to come out.
         So you also have to -- we also need to be mindful of those
     cultural impacts and that's part of safety, because that culture is
     intermingled.  You can't separate the culture from the social or from
     the political and so forth.
         We're also subject to the political whims in terms of what
     Congress allows the tribes and what Congress allows in terms of funding
     or programmatic areas, but that's part of the administration.  That's
     the treaties that were made with the United States Government.  That
     means every agency.  There's executive order and executive memorandums
     regarding this, how to interact with tribes, and drop those barriers and
     ensure that those things are taken care of.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Robert.  I think you see that
     the discussion on the NRC's role in safety assessment is taking us back
     to risk communication again.  Judy started us off with risk
     communication, the goal should not be to convince the public of
     something.  I think Abe seconded that and gave us the phrase how to
     inform without inflaming.  I think Robert is raising the issue of how do
     you give people assurance of safety.
         Sometimes you may, depending on the group or the situation,
     have to take extra steps, and, also, his point from this morning about
     how do you assure that people have the resources to participate in these
     types of decisions.
         I don't want to lose focus on what can the advisory
     committee do about all this, so we're going to be revisiting this risk
     communication idea throughout the day.
         So let's not lose sight of perhaps providing them with some
     recommendations.
         Let's go to Dennis, and then over to Steve.  Dennis?
         MR. BECHTEL:  This will be the last time I pose this -- Fred
     Dilger, the real Fred has arrived.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank God, we can get rid of this guy.
         MR. BECHTEL:  Just a couple of rambling comments here.  I
     like what Bill has to say about involving the public, that's important,
     although I feel the conditions have to be present to make sure that it's
     a meaningful experience.
         I didn't quite care what maybe Abe said about the informing.
     I think it needs to be more than informing.  There needs to be a lot of
     interaction and you're not going to like everything you hear and as the
     public, and I work for local government and I get involved in a lot of
     other public issues, so I know the public doesn't always like what I
     like to hear, but I think it's important to get that flavor.
         I would like to think that the counties have an oversight
     role, the state does, and I would like to think that, getting back to
     the yes-no about Yucca Mountain, I would like to think that perhaps the
     process is open enough that if there is something really flawed with
     Yucca Mountain, that the country decides to do something else.
         I think that the counties and the state, I think, feel as if
     we're very much protective of the public, we're also conscious -- the
     conscious -- if I'm saying it right -- of the process, to make sure the
     process is done properly; if there are smoking guns out there, that they
     are discovered and we decide DOE has the intestinal fortitude to go back
     to Congress and say, okay, this is not going to work.
         So I think we have to keep in mind that this is not a done
     deal.  Politically, living in Nevada, we get the impression that, for
     many reasons, that's probably the case, but I think we feel compelled
     because it's our responsibility to ensure that if there are some great
     problems, that this -- we're able to have the ability to convey it as
     the public in a reasonable way and the fact that perhaps these things
     are changeable.
         The other thing, within the range of risks, there are a
     number of risks out there that we talked about earlier and that
     involving the public, we're able to deliberate local problems and maybe
     there's some corrections that can happen because of the interaction.  So
     I think that's important.
         And the NRC is a valuable part of protection of the public.
     You are the regulator and I know the counties had a meeting with the NRC
     earlier in the year where we talked about the EIS, environmental impact
     statement, and our concern about how NRC will treat DOE's view of the
     EIS, given the fact that we have a lot of problems with it.
         And we're hopeful that all these things are sensitizing the
     NRC to the fact that you are kind of the bottom line and kind of holding
     the fort on problems either with the site itself or problems that are
     part of community concerns.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks a lot, Dennis.  Let's hear from Steve
     and then we'll hear from Mal.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  I was trying to put some of this into the
     context that you mentioned and that we brought up right at the
     beginning, and that's the unique role of the committee.
         I guess what comes to mind now, because of just current
     activity and how controversial it is, the potential role of the
     committee in these rulemakings that are going on.  I think what may make
     it important, and I'm not sure of even the mechanism for it, is with the
     proposed Part 63, I gather that the response was maybe greater than
     expected and some of that response having to do with a controversy
     between the Commission and EPA.
         And a lot of the comment, I would imagine, is sort of beyond
     the nuts and bolts of rulemaking.  It's much more at the level that is
     questioning how risk decisions get made, because that's what these two
     rules are all about.
         What they're trying to do is setting what the department
     then says is an acceptable standard and, also, setting not only the
     standard, but how you determine whether the standard has been applied
     properly and whether compliance is there.
         But it seems to me that the committee could have some type
     of a role beyond the early advice to the Commission that, yes, this is
     worth publishing to get comment, it seems to me that you might be able
     to go the next step and look at the way the staff deals with comment,
     and especially because of the controversial nature of this particular
     rulemaking, and, also, the importance of this rulemaking, given it
     represents, for the Part 63, it represents quite a departure from the
     very hard thinking that went into Part 60.
         And even the suggestion that it's a new approach to
     rulemaking, because we have learned so much since Part 60.  That's a
     statement that's out there.
         I'm not sure really what it is that justifies that statement
     or certainly justifies a change in the approach to the rulemaking.  So
     maybe sometime during the day, any of the members of the committee or
     staff might have some ideas for, first of all, whether it's within your
     unique role to look at the moving rulemaking and where your advice may
     fit back into the picture.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks a lot, Steve.  Hopefully we can put a
     finer point on that and come up with some other ideas.  But as I
     understand what you're saying, that the ACNW might play a unique --
     might play a role in the review of the NRC staff evaluation of the
     comments on proposed Part 63.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Right, because that's what takes you to a
     final rule.
         MR. CAMERON:  Well, we're going to note these and we will
     come back to that.  John, did you want to say anything?
         DR. GARRICK:  I just wanted to comment on that, because I
     think Steve makes an important and excellent point.  Clearly, the
     committee is in the path of the evolution of Part 63 and I think we have
     every intention of continuing to have a presence in how it evolves.
         So I think that's a very good comment and we've noted it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Great.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Can I just make sure you that understand that
     sort of built into this would be the need to go deep enough to
     understand what the varying range of public comment was all about.
         MR. CAMERON:  Yes.  Yes.  Okay.  Thank you.  Mal?
         MR. MURPHY:  Thanks, Chip.  A couple of quick points.  I
     want to associate myself with some of the remarks that Dennis Bechtel
     made.  I hope I didn't leave the impression earlier that when I said
     that Nye County acknowledges that we have no ultimate yea or nay
     authority over the project, that that means that we're fatalistic about
     it, as is the case with Clark County, as Dennis pointed out.
         We think school is still out on whether or not Yucca
     Mountain is licensable as a repository and we don't think that decision
     has yet been made.
         One of the other things that drives our oversight program is
     to ensure that if DOE -- if there is a fatal flaw and if DOE doesn't
     find it, then somebody else should, and we're going to do whatever we
     can to make sure that it's found either by us or by the state or by the
     department or somebody, if indeed one exists.
         Then secondly, I'm not sure, help me out here if I need
     help, Robert, but I'm not sure that you wrote down Robert Holden's
     concern broadly enough, Chip, and it affects our position, as well.
         I think what Robert was saying, in part, at least, is that
     safety means more to some people than are you going to cause me to have
     a premature cancer.  Safety can also mean are you going to negatively
     impact my cultural heritage, without having any impact whatsoever on my
     health.
         If you deny me the ability to practice my cultural heritage,
     that's harm.  And from the perspective of many residents of Nye County,
     for example, safety certainly means public health, it certainly means
     latent cancer fatalities, but it also means are we going to be able to
     maintain our agricultural lifestyle in the Amergosa Valley.
         Now, everybody has to recognize that things change over time
     and perhaps 10,000 years from now the Amergosa Valley will not -- the
     people in the Amergosa Valley won't be able to maintain that same
     agricultural lifestyle, but I think we have a right to insist that if
     the agricultural lifestyle disappears, it not be as a result of Yucca
     Mountain.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks for articulating that, Mal, that we're
     talking about broader implications than public health.  I guess the
     question that people need to think about is where in the regulatory
     arena do those types of impacts -- where are those types of impacts
     taken into account.  Indeed, from what I hear around the table, people
     are very definite that those types of impacts have to be taken into
     account in the decision-making somewhere.
         It's a question of where is the mechanism to consider that.
     The environmental impact statement, whatever.  But thank you.
         Abe?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  I wanted to give my impressions of when I was
     listening to Bill Reamer give his talk.  I kept thinking to myself this
     even gives DOE some level of comfort that there is going to be an
     independent agency that's going to be tough, it's going to be intrusive,
     it's going to make sure that we do everything correctly.
         That gives us a measure of comfort and another thing that it
     does, when it comes to communicating risk, it is a lot easier to
     communicate with the NRC who does their independent calculations and
     understands how these things go than it is to communicate with other
     bodies of either political origin or any other bodies, Indian tribes,
     whoever, people who are not as steeped in these types of activities as
     the NRC is.
         So to me, dealing with the NRC and the license application,
     even though that's going to be a very tough process, is probably not as
     great a challenge to communicating risk as it is to communicate with the
     people in this audience and other audiences.
         I'm almost looking forward to the licensing process as being
     a relief, because we know exactly how to talk to each other on those
     kinds of issues.  They understand probability.
         MR. CAMERON:  That's that old saying about where angels dare
     to tread or something like that.  Bill, and then we'll go to Mike
     Baughman.
         MR. REAMER:  Chip, I just want to say to Dennis, I did hear
     your comments and I agree with them.  My third concept of a rigorous
     review, I think, says if there is a fatal flaw, we, the NRC, better find
     it.  People are depending on that.  And we will carry that out.  That's
     what a rigorous review, to me, means; one that goes beyond just the
     words and examines the accuracy of the information, the quality of the
     information, really everything about it.
         And it is independent, it's an independent review.  And the
     other comment about communication -- I'm sorry -- another comment that
     was made -- Abe, your comment that was made.  I think it's important for
     the NRC to recognize that what we say and what we do has to be
     understood by the public and although communications can go on between
     the NRC and the DOE, and that's important and they will go on, and they
     will go on in a public fashion, it's our responsibility, it's the NRC's
     responsibility to make sure that people understand what we're saying and
     what we're doing.
         That means we need to put it in terms that everyone can
     understand.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Bill.  Let's go quickly through the
     cards that are up, so that we can get to the very important next topic,
     which is how you manage uncertainty in all of this.
         I'm sorry, Bill, you've had your card up for a while.  Why
     don't you go, and then Mike, and then Steve, the we can go to Paul
     Davis.
         MR. PHILLIPS:  Mal mentioned that some of the perception of
     risk assessment is, for instance, the Indian nation to practice their
     cultural heritage.  Well, I'm Scotch and Irish and I like to practice my
     cultural heritage in making money here.  My family has extensive
     landholdings in Clark County and in Nye County and I perceive a lot of
     this risk as something which could cause environmental -- or cause
     financial impact upon my family and our real estate holdings.  That's
     another form of risk.
         My home where I live is about 600 feet from where the
     proposed beltway is going to go by Lone Mountain and if there were to be
     a major transportation accident out there and I have major landholdings
     in that area, that could be high affected.
         So much of what I try to do with my education and my
     background is look at this thing from a financial point of view.
         It's a big risk when my family has virtue its entire wealth
     tied up in land and real estate in this county and in Nye County.  So
     there are many of us in the State of Nevada who live there, that are
     old-time residents, that if we find a showstopper anywhere along the
     way, we'll jump right on the bandwagon with the NRC or the State of
     Nevada or anybody else who wants to stop this project and we'll get
     very, very vocal about it, because there are millions and millions and
     billions of dollars in real estate holdings here that could be affected
     by a big transportation accident or any other kinds of accidents that
     may occur from the mountain.
         So I don't see it as a done deal at all.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you, Bill.  Let's go to Mike, and then
     Steve.
         MR. BAUGHMAN:  I was just going to suggest, with regard to
     licensing, because this discussion has to do with safety assessment and
     perhaps its role in licensing, and perhaps a prospective role for the
     ACNW.
         I think there are those of us in the state, local
     governments perhaps in the state, as well, that has concerns that the
     NRC will not impose any conditions upon this project or the license for
     this project that are not addressed within or emulate out of the DEIS.
         In fact, I have had conversations with staff that have
     perhaps suggested that.  So that has led to some of the concerns we have
     had about what's in the scope of the EIS, but I guess I would certainly
     encourage both the NRC and the advisory committee to consider that the
     possible conditions to the license should not be constrained in any way
     by what might be addressed within the scope of the EIS, both in terms of
     its final form and any record of decision.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Mike.  I'm going to note that up here
     under unique role of the advisory committee is mitigating, a broad look
     at mitigating conditions and perhaps we can come back to these and
     discuss them in more detail.
         Steve, you want to give us a final comment on this?
         MR. FRISHMAN:  I just wanted to go to a specific that is in
     the -- in today's reality, having to do with -- since we're on Bill's
     time, having to do with the Commission's risk communication approach.
         That's that the Commission members themselves have been
     absolutely adamant about a standard not containing ground water
     protection and the Commission's position on that I don't think has ever
     been communicated to those who are most interested in the question.
         It also raises a question that is, I think, fundamental to
     risk communication in this country and that's that it becomes -- the
     first question that comes to mind when the Commission is adamant that
     ground water not be provided is why is everyone else in the country
     afforded ground water protection, when, for purposes of this one
     project, the ground water protection standard is so adamantly opposed.
         That's me communicating the question that I hear so often
     and I've never -- I've lived 24 hours a day in this business and I have
     never heard a convincing or even clear statement from the Commission
     about why they so adamantly oppose ground water protection in the rule.
         MR. CAMERON:  I think in fairness to the NRC, we'll give
     Bill a chance to respond to that.  But I note and I'm going to put this
     up here under the advisory committee section, ensure a better rationale
     on the ground water protection position.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Right, because the committee itself is, in
     one way or another, involved in that.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Steve.  Bill?
         MR. REAMER:  Well, I think I hear Steve saying is the
     Commission hasn't adequately communicated its position with respect to
     ground water, because in the meetings that we presented in March and
     June, we did set forth, at that time, the staff's explanation, and the
     staff's explanation is the gist of which is we understand that ground
     water is important.  We understand that it's very important to the
     citizens of Nevada.
         Our view is, however, that when one sets a radiation
     protection standards, not a standard to protect a resource, but a
     standard to protect people, that that should be an all pathways standard
     and that's what the basis of our position is in proposing an all
     pathways standard.
         We will have more detailed comments that we will provide on
     the EPA rule.  We will be here again next year when we promulgate our
     final Part 63, to explain it, and we will continue to try to answer
     Steve's question as best we can.  But that's the gist of what we
     presented in March and June.
         MR. CAMERON:  And is the NRC's position on ground water
     unique to the repository?
         MR. REAMER:  This is the way we regulate every facility that
     we regulate.  We regulate through an all pathways standard.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you.  Before we go to Paul, I thank you
     and the public for your patience on this, we're going to get Paul Davis'
     presentation in on uncertainty, because I think it sets up a lot of
     issues about performance assessment.
         But, first, I just want Lynn to clarify what she learned
     about the newspaper ads.  Lynn?
         MS. DEERING:  Right.  This is just getting back to Judy's
     question with more definitive information.  We paid for ads that should
     have been placed in the Las Vegas Sun, Las Vegas Review Journal, and the
     Valley Times.  So we better look into that and make sure it happened.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you.  Mary, do you have a clarification
     on that for us, before we go on?
         MS. MANNING:  Not only do I have a clarification, I have a
     copy of the ad with me that was tacked on my computer by my editors, to
     make sure I wouldn't miss this meeting, because we're going to so many
     of them.  But it was about the size of a three-by-five card and I have
     no idea on what day it ran or anything else, but I can bring you copy of
     it.  I have to hike to my car.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Mary.  We're going to go to Paul
     Davis, who is an expert on the subject of the management and role of
     uncertainty in safety assessments in lots of different forums, I think.
     Paul, do you want to come up here?  All right.
         Paul, can I mention that you're from Sandia National Lab?
     Paul is Sandia National Lab.  All right.
         MR. DAVIS:  First of all, let me confess some embarrassment
     as to this title of expert.  Sorry, I don't like it.  It reminds me of
     what Mark Twain said, which is an expert is really just an idiot from
     another county.  Being New Mexico, maybe that's what I feel being here.
     Or maybe an expert in uncertainty means I'm really uncertain.  That may
     be true, definitely true.
         Because when Lynn asked me to do this talk, I said
     certainly.  I've done talks like this a number of times over the last 18
     years or something like that, dealing in this subject.  But actually, I
     hadn't given one in some time, so what I did is go back and draft a
     series of viewgraphs, but then when I looked at them, I really didn't
     like them, because what had happened in the meantime is that I had
     learned a lot more.
         And in this business, learning more means you have more
     uncertainty, and it absolutely means that in the repository sense, if we
     look at any of the repositories we've ever had, the more we learn, the
     more uncertainty increases.  And please keep that in mind as one of the
     guiding principles here.
         The other fundamental problem I had was really just
     redefining what these terms mean and what uncertainty means, what's the
     role of uncertainty and how do we manage uncertainty.  And those are
     very difficult concepts and we have not done a good job of explaining
     what they are and how we do this process.
         But I didn't feel so bad when I reread the 197 rule and the
     10 CFR 63 and listened to discussions this morning.  They don't know
     either what it is, and, sorry, it's not a criticism, but it is meant to
     incite some discussion, I hope.
         No, they don't.  When you hear things like we want a rule on
     the 50th percentile of the doses, because it's the expected performance
     of the system, and then, on the other hand, you hear statements that we
     really can't quantify all the uncertainties, and we really have to go
     for something called reasonable assurance or reasonable expectation,
     those statements don't go together.  We don't understand uncertainty if
     we think we can actually do the expected performance of the system and
     rule on that.
         They don't match.  There is some fundamental
     misunderstanding of uncertainty.
         The other one is, for example, statements in there that
     Monte Carlo methods minimize uncertainty, things like that.  Those tell
     me that there's a fundamental misunderstanding of what uncertainty is
     and what we're trying to do for a living here.
         So now another premise here was that when I did throw away
     the viewgraphs, I threw away a lecture, too, and so that was -- you
     won't hear a lecture on uncertainty analysis and how we do it, but I
     certainly would like to lead you through a discussion on some of those
     issues.
         So then I went back to the title of the talk, which I still
     felt I was stuck with because that was what Lynn put in the agenda, and
     I'll talk about that, what is the role of uncertainty analysis.  That
     sounded so simple at first, but then when I thought about it, it was
     what really is it at the end of the day.
         Well, at the end of the day, it defines the meaning of the
     answer, that's it.  At the end of the day, when DOE gives you a dose
     that Abe says they hope would be down in the eight millirems, four
     millirems, some tiny number, it's the background to say what does that
     number really mean, and that's then role of uncertainty analysis.
         And I'd always say in this, if you get confused in all the
     terminology and everything else about these kinds of assessment, go to
     the end.  Go to the answer and say what does it mean, what is somebody
     trying to tell me about the site and how did they get there, because to
     me, when I think about what the answer means, I can only come up with a
     couple of thoughts.
         One is it depends on how I got there and it depends on who
     took the journey with me.  That, to me, is the issue of defining the
     answer and treating uncertainty.
         So next, I want to get some other very fundamental things
     out on the table.  This morning you heard some comments that I've seen
     before for a long time in this, comments I used to believe, that at the
     end of the day, you'll have a technically defensible analysis.  At the
     end of the day, you'll have complete site characterization.  That's what
     we'd like.  At the end of the day, we'll have, quote-unquote, correct
     science, accurate science, and that's what we'll have at the end of the
     day and that will be the basis for the decision at Yucca Mountain.
         It won't.  It won't be.  I'm sorry.  It's just not going to
     be there.  What you're going to have is belief.  You're going to have
     belief, you're going to have expert judgment, you're going to have
     engineering judgment, you're going to have scientific inference, but at
     the heart of this analysis is belief, not science.
         I know we'll get a good argument about that around the table
     and I hope to.
         But actually I went through a long exercise with another
     repository program, doing work all the way from the field, site
     characterization work, to ground water modeling, to risk assessment, and
     then leading a major public effort in getting their involvement in risk
     assessment.
         And the answer at the end of the day was fundamentally based
     on belief, very little based on science.
         Now, is that bad?  No.  Not in any sense of the word, and
     it's not meant to say that.
         It's meant to say that when we talk about decisions about
     the future, we base them on belief.  We certainly try to constrain them
     by facts, we try to constrain them by consistency with science, that's
     our goal to do those things and to do it well.  When we talk about this
     frequency of having a car accident, we want to constrain that by what we
     know in the past of car accidents.  We don't make up the fact that we're
     scared today that we'll get in an accident and we won't go out of the
     house.  We don't do that.
         So the two messages are we actually do this process very
     similar to any other decision we make about the future and the other
     side of that coin is we operate on belief when we talk about the future.
         However, when we talk about belief about the future here,
     let me point out something, another fundamental flaw that we get into in
     thinking in this business, that this idea of probability, we can equate
     it to gambling, we can equate it to car wrecks, we can equate dose to
     risk.  Those are all not true.  They're absolutely different concepts.
         If you're putting them in the same box, then we're not
     playing the same game when we do safety assessments.
         We really have to make assumptions about processes over long
     timeframes, where we have no independent measurements of those processes
     for the long term.  We don't have repositories that have operated over
     the last 10,000 years that we can go back and get frequency data on how
     often they failed, how much they released, where did the stuff go.  We
     don't have that information.
         So we're not playing the game of rolling the dice over and
     over and finding out the probability of getting a six or a seven or a
     three.  That's not the world we live in.
         Next, given that, that I fundamentally believe belief is at
     the heart of this process, what things can we say about that to address
     this issue?  You must recognize, as I think Judy said this morning,
     quite correctly, belief is a function of bias.  I'll believe something
     because I'm biased, and I am biased.  There's no question about that.
     We all sit around this table and have different biases that we bring to
     the table.
         So that's, to me, why the process has to have this multiple
     involvement of people with different biases if we're to come to
     conclusions that are meaningful.
         The second issue along this line is that believability is a
     function of trust.  Whether or not I believe Abe and his analysis and
     the presentation of these doses, I'll be as honest as I can, relies on a
     high degree of how much I believe him as a scientist, as an honest
     person, as somebody that I think is out there doing the best job they
     can for the country.  That's absolutely crucial to the process.
         Then, finally, that believability is a function of process.
     That is, whether or not I also can believe somebody maybe that I don't
     know, like how much access did I have to the process, how much was I
     included in the process as we went along toward getting the answer, how
     much were my concerns addressed as we went along.
         The difficulty here is that the only other option, which no
     one has, is to completely do your own site characterization, completely
     do your own safety assessment and come to your conclusions.
         If you heard the words even at the NRC, they won't be doing
     that.  They don't have those resources.  They essentially will be
     relying, to a huge degree, on information collected and analyzed by DOE.
     So therefore, the process is the key.
         Now, what is that process?  Because we've heard some
     different takes on that process today.  We have heard that our job is to
     inform the public.  Certainly that's part of it and I would agree.  I
     would say that informing the public does nothing to build trust, or very
     little.
         We've heard that our job is to listen to the public.  That's
     one more step along the path, which is an improvement.  We really
     haven't heard that we'll include the public.  And when I talk about the
     concept of including the public, I'll go to the extreme so that it
     really makes sense; that is, that somebody in the public raises their
     hand and says, you know, this value of this parameter in this model is
     wrong and here's why, and DOE changes it or NRC changes it.
         That, to me, is inclusion.  When you're part of the process,
     going along with it, and you raise an issue that somebody doesn't say we
     thought about it, we dismissed it for the following reasons, but
     absolutely says if we can't refute it, we need to include it, and that
     we have a public process that includes that level of discussion and
     discourse.
         Now, I think historically, being involved in this process,
     we kind of had this Aristotle type view that the knowledgeable people
     should be making the decisions in this process.  What we heard today,
     and I think we heard it by one of the ACNW members early on, is the
     public is really smart.  They aren't what we take them to be, as so
     different from us that do the job that we can't explain what we do in a
     way that they understand it and then can provide us meaningful input.
         When we did an exercise in the project I was involved in, a
     lawyer from the state actually changed the way we model colloids.  I
     won't go into that, but colloids is certainly what we would consider a
     very detailed technical issue, a very difficult issue to make people
     understand.  But he more than understood it, and he more than found out
     where the weakness in our argument was and pointed it out to us.
         So I don't believe that there is this view that the experts
     can make the decisions or need to separately from the public.  I believe
     the public can be involved in any level that you have the patience and
     energy to get them involved.
         Now, that also says fundamentally, I haven't decided the
     answer, because I don't know what they're going to say.  So their bias
     comes into the system, with the DOE bias, with the NRC bias, and you
     follow a path together, no one predetermining the outcome.  To me,
     that's a much more solid approach to doing safety assessment.
         Now, the other thing I'd like to raise just for discussion
     and to make sure that I'm a good target here for Abe -- just kidding, he
     was picking on me earlier -- some other common misconceptions about risk
     that not only find their way into the analysis, but have found their way
     into the regulations.
         Number one, that uncertainty increases with time.  I don't
     know what that means.  I've tried and I've tried, and I can't understand
     what people that are saying that think they mean.  I have listened to
     the arguments, I have read all the arguments, and uncertainty does not
     increase in time.
         Now, the number of things that could occur at the repository
     may increase in time.  If the window of time gets bigger, I may have to
     consider other things that I really believe will happen.  Not that I
     don't believe, but that I really believe will happen. That's variability
     maybe increasing in time, but not my uncertainty.
         Next, is a really difficult issue, and that is that when we
     talk in safety assessment and you get dazzled in equations and
     probability distribution functions and things like that, you get the
     feeling that we're spending our time on the largest uncertainties.  We
     aren't.  When humans get to the largest uncertainties, they ignore them.
         I'll give you two examples in this business.  When we get to
     uncertainties that discuss the future projection of populations in the
     area, we run from them.  We decide that's just too complicated for us,
     we can't think like that and we can't project.  Now, what do we do?  Do
     we say, well, then we give up Yucca Mountain because we can't do that,
     which would be an option, or do we say we'll standardize it at today's
     population?  That's the approach taken now.
         Second, for example, is the issue that was brought up on how
     we actually equate dose and risk.  As was eloquently stated this
     morning, there's a large body of science that is uncertain that there's
     argument about, at low doses, what's the risk.  There's people all over
     the map on that issue and there's large debates on that issue.
         And the approach we have always taken in this business is,
     again, to just standardize it and ignore the uncertainty.  So our
     analysis really doesn't do the full risk calculation that includes the
     uncertainty of that information.  It says we'll go to this international
     committee, who has standardized the relationship, and then, in a
     separate room, discusses its uncertainty.
         So when you see risk at the end of the day here, we don't
     have all the risks in that.  We have part of the risks in that.  Maybe
     we have the most important ones, maybe we don't.
         The other final misconception that I really would like to
     bring out is that you've heard a lot of discussion this morning of dose
     and risk as if they were in some sense equal or you just multiply by
     dose and you get a risk.
         That has been a misconception in this kind of business.
     When we think that way or talk that way, what we're really saying is
     that if this glass has a certain concentration of radionuclides in it
     and I drink it, then there is a probability I'll die.  There's a huge
     missing part from that in the Yucca Mountain equation, which is what is
     the likelihood it will ever get contaminated, which is actually where
     most of the energy is spent in this business; what's the likelihood that
     there would be a release from the facility and what's the uncertainty
     with where it goes.
         So we really don't want to live in that same world and make
     sure that you understand the difference.  They are not the same at all.
     At the end of the day, the Yucca Mountain one should have both of those
     in it.
         However, at the end of the day, the NRC has standardized the
     last one out of it, and EPA, by saying it's 15 millirems or 25
     millirems, we really don't go all the way to cancers.
         So in closing, I actually had to address the other part of
     the title, sorry, but I couldn't change the title then, so I did this.
     I will just briefly tell you how we do deal with uncertainty.
         That is, first of all, how do we manage risk?  The first
     effort is to quantify risk.  Now, we can't do that in all cases.  In
     fact, the most fundamental one was discussed this morning, and that is -
     - and Abe said it quite well -- is that people are saying, well, those
     are all nice equations, those are all nice answers, but give us the big
     picture, what can go wrong here.
         So if I return to what John Garrick said this morning on how
     do we look at this problem, it fits so well to say the first big
     question people care about is what can happen at this site, what can go
     wrong.  That's the first major question.
         Well, how do we deal with that?  Well, we're back to belief.
     We don't have any way to deal with that in some rigorous mathematical or
     scientific way.  What we really do is get people together to think about
     it.  We list things that can go wrong, try to be complete as they can,
     and then go from there to screen out things that would not occur at
     Yucca Mountain.
         So the answer there is how do we deal with it?  We deal with
     it with a process, not with a scientific measurement.
         Second of all, how do we quantify risk when it comes to the
     performance of the system, once we say something has gone wrong?  Well,
     the first step in that process, you should all be aware of, is really a
     conceptualization.  It's not a quantification.  It says that I'm a
     geologist and I'm a hydrologist and I look at the information and my
     concept of the system is that it has so many layers, that those layers
     have certain properties, that the boundary conditions, the recharge are
     such and such, but that's my concept.
         Now, the goal here is that my concept is not inconsistent
     with any facts.  But the end result is we can have as many conceptual
     models of Yucca Mountain as there are people in this room, and, in fact,
     certainly from the hydrology community.  We always joke that if there's
     two hydrologists, we'll have four conceptual models at least.
         That's not bad.  How do we deal with it, is the question.
     Now, how do we deal with that uncertainty is the real issue.  Well,
     that's a great difficulty in the process, because there has been efforts
     to validate those models in the international community, national
     community.  Those efforts have not succeeded.  Valid meaning prove the
     model that gives you true results.  That's not the world we live in.
         But the second one is then how do you assign likelihoods to
     each of those?  If we really wanted to maintain the rigor of a
     probabilistic analysis, and I did work like this for some time until it
     just, to me, hit a wall, which was trying to assign beliefs, level of
     beliefs to conceptual models, so that I could say this one is more
     consistent with the data than this one is, and therefore, I believe this
     one more than this one.
         At the end of the day, the belief system was just yes or no.
     It wasn't degrees of belief.  It was either this assumption is right or
     wrong, and today I don't have the evidence.
         So now I'm left with I have multiple conceptual models, what
     do I do with them.  That's an issue that's still being wrestled with.
     It doesn't have a solution, that I know.  I know we've heard terms from
     DOE, NRC and others of we'll use the preferred hypothesis, which is the
     one we believe.  We will certainly hear others from the stakeholders
     saying we only want to use the one that gives you the worst answer.
         And then the mistaken assumption by some others has been
     that that's a conservative model.  It is not.  Now, there's other ways
     to treat that uncertainty, but fundamentally, when you look at the
     analysis, at the heart of this is the belief of scientists.
         Now, once I've formulated that model, then the next step is
     that I would like to define the parameters that go into that model, and
     this is where you get this kind of glory and rigor that we really liked
     of quantifying uncertainty, where we say that we have measured
     parameters in the range and that value is from one value to another and
     those of us in the real world realize those orders of magnitude things
     are not too shocking, but that is the way we know nature.
         The uncertainty, as my direct measurements, have to be
     interpreted by an expert to be representative measurements in the model.
     That is, I'll measure something literally in this project that has a
     diameter of the coffee cup you're holding and then at a minimum scale, I
     will infer how that represents this entire room.  That's scientific
     inference.  It's not scientific knowledge.  It is essentially belief.
         Then the next step in that is to propagate those
     uncertainties through to the end.  When I propagate those, the first one
     essentially -- that is, what can go wrong -- you will see in the
     regulations a formal treatment, where I assign a probability of what
     will go wrong, what's the probability the climate will change, what's
     the probability that volcanism will occur, and then what are the
     consequences if it does, in addition to this parameter uncertainty.
         So I come up with these things that Abe is absolutely right,
     I've never put one up in front of an audience that anyone understands,
     which is here is the distribution, the probabilistic distribution of
     future doses.  Those are difficult to understand.
         Once I have done that, the question now is a really
     difficult one, which is that we like to live in this world that that's
     not the total answer.  So we live in a world where DOE, for example, has
     produced curve after curve that all comply, and then, in another room
     down the hall, talks about going out and measuring things to reduce
     uncertainty.
         Those don't agree.  There is no sense in that.  If I
     captured uncertainty in the analysis in the first place, then there is
     nothing left to measure.  If I didn't capture uncertainty in the first
     place, then I better be in the room with Abe discussing why those curves
     were wrong.
         So the questions about how do we reduce uncertainty, first
     of all, have to deal with do we need to.  We don't reduce uncertainty
     just because we like to live with less uncertainty.  I may have total
     uncertainty about some parameter at Yucca Mountain and it may not
     matter.
         The other issue with this idea of reducing uncertainty and
     managing uncertainty that I feel needs some explanation is, is it
     possible to reduce it.  There are some things, and, in fact, we live in
     a world sometimes that thinks that sensitivity analysis is done on the
     answer and we go measure those things.  There can be things that are
     incredibly sensitive, but I'm not going to change them.  But at the end
     of the day, I won't change the gravitational constant a bit, but it may
     be a very sensitive parameter in the analysis.
         So those are the questions that need to be faced as we go
     forward.  First of all, did we get to an answer that's defensible; that
     is, shows compliance and shows it with confidence.  If so, my position
     is we're done.
         If we go to an answer that doesn't comply, though, and here
     is the other side of the coin, it doesn't mean it's a bad site.  It may
     mean we haven't reduced uncertainty enough yet and that the goal should
     be to focus our resources on showing why that analysis is not valid, is
     not consistent with the information.
         So that is all.  You can have my viewgraphs, if you want
     them, but they have nothing to do with what I just said.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks a lot, Paul.  That's a pretty candid --
     I don't want to say -- maybe stark discussion of uncertainty and you
     talked a lot about belief and assumptions and bringing together a lot of
     different biases and credibility, also, of the scientists and you
     brought us back to process and not just informing, educating, but the
     process where the public can influence the result.
         And we're going to start our discussion with a member of the
     committee, Dr. Wymer, but I guess I would ask everybody to keep the
     question in mind and including Paul in terms of examples from his
     experience, is there -- how do you design a process that allows
     influence around these particular issues.
         But let's go to Dr. Wymer.  I'm glad that Bill lent you his
     name tent, since it would be hard for you to turn yours upside down, but
     go ahead.
         DR. WYMER:  I'm not exactly sure what I am to respond to
     here.  I've heard more than -- probably more than I understand.  I'm not
     an expert on uncertainty in these processes.  I leave that more to the
     chairman, John Garrick.
         Am I supposed to be responding specifically to --
         MR. CAMERON:  I have to apologize.  I saw that Bill's card
     was up in front of you and I thought that you wanted to say something,
     but I think it's Mr. Vasconi who wants to say something.
         DR. WYMER:  I don't think you really meant that, but that's
     a gracious out and I thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.
         MR. VASCONI:  I am uncertain who is going to buy me lunch,
     but I am certain I'm hungry.
         MR. CAMERON:  Bill always gets to the bottom line.  Thanks,
     Bill.  Mal?
         MR. MURPHY:  Just a couple of quick points.  I thought that
     as an excellent presentation.  I don't think anyone -- I mean, certainly
     I have never labored under the misassumption that belief was not an
     integral part of or an overwhelmingly large part of this decision.  But
     it's always been our position that that belief be informed by good
     science.
         And just to take the coffee cup example, for example, if
     you're trying to determine the volume in this room by measuring a coffee
     cup or more than one coffee cup, our position is that you measure the
     right coffee cup or a sufficient number of correct coffee cups and that
     you measure them accurately.  And we do have some control over those
     variables that go into the ultimate conclusion.
         And then based on the correct decision as to which coffee
     cup to measure and an accurate measurement of that coffee cup, sure, we
     agree that you then form a scientific inference as to a belief with
     respect to the volume of area in the room.
         Bias, sure, biases are fine.  Everybody's got biases.  You
     can't completely remove biases from processes such as these, but I think
     even Paul acknowledged that the bias is fine as long as it is apparent
     or transparent, as long as it's acknowledged by everyone, and so long as
     the ultimate decision takes those biases into account.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you, Mal.  Paul, after we hear Abe and
     Judy, we may come back to you to see if you have some comments on what
     they said.  Abe?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  Judy actually had her flag up before me.
         MS. TREICHEL:  I always do.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  And we'll have --
         MR. CAMERON:  It's an interesting relationship you got.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  I must complain that Paul both preempted and
     destroyed the talk I was going to give this afternoon.  So I have to ask
     for a full lunch hour so I can re-prepare.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.  Judy?
         MS. TREICHEL:  Everybody's pretty obsessed with lunch.  I
     really enjoyed your presentation and one of the reasons I did was
     because it seemed much more honest, I believe it was more honest than a
     lot of the presentations that I hear, and I hear a great many.
         To me, there is a contradiction between the things that you
     brought out, which I enjoyed hearing, that decisions are made on the
     basis of belief and that involves a certain amount of trust in the
     belief, and that uncertainty can't always be reduced.
         And if I hear that, at the same time that Bill Reamer is
     saying that DOE must prove the public is protected, DOE will require
     that -- or NRC will require that DOE prove.
         Well, if decisions are based on belief, trust, and an
     acknowledgement that there's a lot of uncertainty out there, I don't
     know who gets -- who accepts proof or to whom it's being proven.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Let's keep that question on the table
     for people to address.  Bill?
         MR. PHILLIPS:  I have to agree with Judy completely.  I
     think that it's impossible to prove anything in these ways.  I think
     that your presentation was absolutely magnificent and I agreed with
     every single word of myself, as a scientist.
         One of the problems that I've had even as an instructor in
     the universities is that in an age of computers, where we have computer
     models, a lot of times the students and even the public confuse computer
     models and predictions with data.
         And we really will not have any data on Yucca Mountain as to
     the thermal loading and volcanism and the down-range types of things
     temporally until we put fuel rods in there.  Until spent fuel goes into
     that mountain and we measure what's coming out of that mountain,
     everything else is just supposition.  We can do our best to try to cover
     ourselves and "what if" ourselves to death.
         As a hobby, I build experimental helicopters and I test fly
     them and when I walk around a helicopter with a micrometer and I spin it
     up and I balance the blades and I do everything I possibly can to
     guarantee that I'm going to live through a test flight, what it boils
     down to in the end is I've made every measurement I can, but I don't
     have the empirical evidence.  I have not run the experiment.
         And we're not going to have any kind of evidence in the long
     term to answer most of these questions until we run the experiment, if
     we ever do run an experiment.
         What it boils down to in most experiments is that you get
     into that helicopter with belief and you take off in it, because you
     think you've covered yourself.  You may have, you may not have, but
     there is no computer models, there's nothing that you can "what if" to
     take the place of true empirical data.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Bill, for that analogy.  I was going
     to ask if everybody who was pretty impressed with Paul's presentation,
     it was very illuminating about what goes on, and I guess the question
     is, and we're going to go to Robert next, but the question is what do we
     do about all this.
         Robert?
         MR. HOLDEN:  I enjoyed the uncertainties and the certainty,
     as well.  A few years ago, actually it was here in Vegas, I was talking
     with someone, a scientist, who was -- we were talking about cultural
     impacts and the things that the native peoples in this area believe.
         And as a scientist, I asked him, well, you cannot
     necessarily prove them, but is it a scientist's job to disprove, because
     true science leaves all options open, in my understanding.  I'm not a
     scientist, of course.  But it leaves all options open; that there is
     still the possibility that these things exist, these relationships exist
     and these spirits and these things that have been here for thousands of
     years and interact with the people there do exist.
         So they're out there and we believe them.  We believe them
     beyond the shadow of a doubt, and I believe as -- and we believe that
     belief has kept us in existence for all these years, regardless of
     whether it's in Nevada or in Oklahoma or in Mississippi or whatever part
     of the world indigenous people come from.
         But in terms of ambiguities, there is something that's had
     its origination in the law regarding Indian cases, Federal cases, and
     that's that all ambiguities are to be held in favor of the Indians.
         Basically, what that says is that because it's a foreign
     law, because the laws of the United States and the courts of the United
     States, the issues with Indian nations resolved in these foreign courts
     basically, foreign to us, it's their law, it's their language and so
     forth and their interpretation, that if there was something that was
     ambiguous, it's to be resolved in favor of the Indians, because
     obviously we didn't understand those things.
         So that comes and goes.  That's sort of like a political
     statement that some Supreme Court Justice uses now and then, if they
     want to do the right thing.
         But I guess that brings me to what I'm saying is that if
     there is something ambiguous, if there is something that is uncertain,
     that that uncertainty is resolved in the favor of the DOE people in
     terms of progress, in terms of proceeding.
     If there is a view in the minds of the people that here are these
     interpretations, and, as was said, there are experts and you can get
     experts on both sides of the fence and in the middle if you want, just
     depends on who you pay for and who is paying them perhaps, but I guess
     those things that people want to accept that is that these things may
     not be safe or should not proceed, that ambiguity, that uncertainty is
     resolved in favor of proceeding, it seems.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Robert.  I guess the analogy is one
     that if you're going to be conservative in terms of the scientific
     conclusions, to be conservative, in a sense, in terms of this important
     belief system in resolving any uncertainties in favor of what would not
     negatively impact the indigenous people.
         Fred.
         MR. DILGER:  Thanks, Chip.  I have to apologize for being
     late today.  We were actually shuffling different Commissioners around
     this morning, and so our entire staff has been pretty tied up.
         But I want to speak to your point about how to actually
     implement this and one of the things that we don't see is we don't see
     Paul's comments taken into consideration when we get down to regulatory
     documents, like the draft environmental impact statement, like the
     generic environmental impact statement for nuclear power licensing
     renewal that the NRC recently released.
         The issues of -- one of the persistent criticisms of risk
     analysis in the past has been that uncertainty is not documented and
     expressed clearly in the risk assessments and here, again, we -- Paul's
     information doesn't appear in the DEIS, certainly not in the
     transportation section.
         I think there is probably a disconnect there that deserves
     some comment.
         MR. CAMERON:  We're going to go to Dr. Garrick next, but at
     least for a starting point in terms of processes, express and document
     uncertainty and when you look at some of the regulatory documents, you
     don't see any expression of that uncertainty, which would at least be a
     starting point.
         Dr. Garrick.
         DR. GARRICK:  I have to first say that this is a wonderful
     experience of observing different perspectives that people give on
     specific issues.
         I suspect that most of the people in this room would view
     what Paul says about risk assessment as a bashing or a negative on risk
     assessment, whereas my perspective on it was quite the opposite, and I
     just wanted to make that observation.
         I think that the seasoned and genuine practitioner of risk
     assessment would not disagree with some of the fundamental observations
     that Paul said, and yet I suspect that there's a lot of people that
     believe quite the opposite.
         The whole issue of uncertainty is one of the reasons that
     risk assessment came into being.  It was an attempt to get explicit
     rather than implicit about measures of safety, measures of risk.  And
     when I look upon the industries that have employed this concept in the
     most aggressive manner and I see the impact that it's had on those
     industries, obviously I get very encouraged about the progress that has
     been made.
         The whole concept of reactor safety has been revolutionized
     by application of probabilistic risk assessment.  Our ignorance level
     has been reduced tremendously in terms of what has -- what are really
     the underlying drivers of the safety of nuclear power plants, and it's
     been manifested not just on paper, but it's been manifested in an
     industry that has quietly and somewhat without pounding on their chest
     become perhaps the safest industry of all time.
         So I think that the focus really maybe ought to be on what
     it has provided rather than what it hasn't accomplished, and what it has
     provided is a process by which we can develop insights into the safety
     of complex systems, unlike we've ever been able to do so in the past.
         And when people talk about that we don't talk about the
     uncertainties, part of the problem of that is institutional.  In the
     early application of probabilistic risk assessment, most of the energy
     was given to displaying the uncertainties associated with the parameters
     that characterize the critical measures of risk.
         Part of the reason that the emphasis on displaying the
     uncertainties in the risk parameters was diminished was because of the
     complaint that the uncertainty could not be understood and that we need
     to go back to point estimates and what have you.
         So I think there is this continuous problem of trying to
     decide the best format for getting public understanding and public
     acceptance, if you wish, of the process, on the one hand, and providing
     the necessary tools and analytical processes to have confidence in the
     numbers on the other hand.
         But I just couldn't let the topic or the discussion go
     without commenting that my -- I was not disturbed by anything that Paul
     said.  I have been preaching a lot of the same things as far as
     application of probabilistic risk assessment.
         Chances are, I have probably been involved in more real
     world applications than anybody in this room and maybe everybody
     combined.  So I'm not talking about this as a zealot or an advocate of
     probabilistic risk assessment, but as a practitioner that has seen a
     very chaotic situation change into a much more visible and organized
     process that has served, in my judgment, mankind extremely well.
         And we have a long ways to go.  We are talking about a
     physical system here that is unlike that has been analyzed before.  I
     have been spending the last three weeks heavily involved in trying to
     use the same techniques to decide how the space shuttle should be
     upgraded.  The National Aeronautics and Space Administration for many
     years was a strong opponent of probabilistic methods and have just, in
     the last few years, begun to be one of the most active and principal
     users of the thought process, and I think it is helping a great deal to
     give us the added confidence in that program as well.
         So I think that the practitioners would say, well, okay, it
     has its problems, what are the alternatives.  If there's an alternative
     that's going to do the job better, obviously we ought to be scientists
     enough to accept it and to jump on board.
          But at the same time, the evidence has been
     overwhelming in terms of the contribution that is made to
     the safety of complex systems in all fields, in shipping, in
     chemical processing, in refineries, in pipelines, in just
     about everything we have done.
         So I think we want to acknowledge that this is a discipline
     that's imperfect, but it's the best we have at the present time, and the
     focus ought not to be on so much what's wrong with it, but what's right
     with it and how we can make it better.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you very much, Dr. Garrick, for the
     benefit of your years of experience on that.  We're going to take one
     more card up here, and go to the audience for a few minutes, and I guess
     I would just leave you with the question over lunch, except for Abe and
     Bob, who are going to be trying to redo their presentation.
         But is there anything that the ACNW, in its unique role,
     should do in regard to the use of this tool to make sure that all of the
     value is brought out?
         Ray, do you want to give us a last comment?  And maybe I
     should allow Paul to say something after you talk.
         MR. CLARK:  It's hard to follow Dr. Garrick on this
     discussion.  But I was just going to say our concept of reasonable
     expectation, and I don't want to talk for Bill Reamer, but my
     understanding of reasonable assurance, as well, I think we agree in the
     aspect that proof is not to be had.  This is what Judy said, in the
     sense of -- well, whatever the sense of proof means.
         But, yes, indeed, there is a factor of belief that comes
     into both concepts.  Bill said, well, no, no, I'm interpreting now what
     Bill said, when he said proof, I suspect he meant convincing the
     Commission or whoever will do the licensing that it's licensable or non-
     licensable, whatever.
         Another comment that I heard Paul say, at least I think I
     did, was that EPA doesn't go all the way to cancer.  It just set a dose
     limit, is that --
         MR. DAVIS:  No.  I meant to say that you don't propagate
     uncertainty all the way to there.
         MR. CLARK:  Okay.  I'm --
         MR. DAVIS:  You relate dose to cancer based on the linear
     non-threshold model, without addressing the uncertainty in that model.
         MR. CLARK:  I'm not the expert in our group for that.  I
     don't know how to take that into account.  Okay.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Ray.  Paul, do you have any final
     words for us before we go out to the audience?
         MR. DAVIS:  Actually, after the nice compliments, I really
     just should keep my mouth shut, I think.  But I don't want to leave a
     misunderstanding and John Garrick raised some very interesting issues.
         Put the whole talk into perspective.  My title is I'm a
     department manager, the department is called Environmental Risk and
     Decision Analysis.  It is what I do for a living.
         The points I was trying to bring out is why I think in some
     of the areas we're doing it wrong.  Not to ever reverse what we're doing
     in risk.  To me, that just -- I'll say that one of my religions is risk
     in the treatment of probability and treating it the right way.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you very much, Paul.  Thank you for that
     presentation.  We have had two presentations since we have visited you
     in the audience and we have a few minutes before we go to lunch.
     Anybody on this side have any comments or questions?  All right.  Let's
     go over here and see -- let's go to Mary.
         MS. MANNING:  I'm Mary Manning, and I'm speaking as a
     citizen, not as a reporter, right this minute.  I'm also a Ph.D.
     candidate and public participation is my topic.  This is one of the
     things that has driven me insane over the last 15 years over this
     particular issue, Yucca Mountain.  My master's thesis was an analysis of
     the ethics or lack of ethics in Yucca Mountain.
         I have a couple of things to follow up on what Paul Davis
     said, which I think were very important.  The sociologist Kai Erickson,
     in his studies of risk assessment and how people perceive risks, said a
     very profound thing in one of his papers, and this sentence has not left
     me since I read it.
         That is, public perception is as real as scientific fact.
     And what I would like to discuss with Mr. Davis, because you did give
     the knowledgeable citizen, the lawyer that came and changed the way you
     were thinking, same thing happened in a civil action.  A lawyer went out
     and figured out Darcy's Law and figured out how the aquifer could be
     contaminated under those factories.
         What I'd like to find out is how the citizen participates in
     this process to the very end and has a voice at the table at the end.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Mary.  It's an issue that can be
     addressed by all of you at some point during the day.  Paul, do you have
     any answer or any thoughts on Mary's question right at this point or do
     you want to think about it?
         MR. DAVIS:  I actually think it would be a good topic to
     introduce in this evening's discussion, if she's going to be present.
         MR. CAMERON:  Great.  Okay.  Let's hold that and, Mary,
     we'll go you then.  Sally?
         MS. DEVLIN:  I just have a quickie.  At the last NWGRB
     meeting, the verbiage that Lake Barrett used was assumed uncertainty.
     Now, that got to me.  I don't -- and I asked for an explanation and, of
     course, I got none.
         And as the public, and I've been hearing this for all these
     years, when I see your numbers and when I this and when I that, the one
     in a million, I'm not going to be that million.  The one in 10,000, the
     five kids that are going to die of cancer, this and that and the next
     thing.
         In the EPA Federal Register, they talk about 20,000 people
     are going to die of cancer deaths and only 5,000 from this project.
     Now, I rather resent that and I think it should be addressed.  I don't
     believe in assumed uncertainty.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you very much, Sally.  And I think Ray
     noted that comment from Sally.  Grant?
         MR. HUDLOW:  I'd like to thank Lynn from the start of this,
     mentioning something about the process.  Of course, she's talking about
     getting public involvement, that's the way you get trust from the
     public.  Telling the public that you're going to take care of all the
     safety issues and when you don't have the resources to do that is the
     way you get distrust from the public.
         And I think -- I don't know whether any of you have watched
     any of the Peter Drucker seminars or not, but the number one rule is
     that if you're going to inform somebody of something, they're not
     listening.  If you ask them what they think and how we can do it better
     and whether it needs to be done and so forth, you're going to get
     comments like, well, I think we ought to put an outhouse out in the
     middle of Highway 160, of course, that's the first comments you get.

         Then you have to go on from there and keep probing deeper
     and deeper and deeper.  It's not something that you can do without
     practicing.  It's not something you can read a book and do it.  It means
     it's something that you have to go out and actually do it.
         I practice by using the two-foot rule.  Lynn got a kick out
     of that.  When I'm working on something that I need public input and I
     need their trust, I tell everybody within two feet what I think about it
     and ask them and so forth.  Eventually, by looking at their eyes, I'll
     see, ah, I said that right, and then I don't have to listen to, hey,
     wait a minute, Grant, you've got to think about that.
         But that's the -- the principal that we're talking about is
     the process that's missing here except for what Paul said.  Paul is
     hitting right in the middle of that.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you very much, Grant.  Let's go over to
     this gentleman right here.  Just make sure you identify yourself for the
     transcript.
         MR. McCULLUM:  I'm Rod McCullum.  I work at the Nuclear
     Energy Institute.  We are the nuclear industry's trade association.  I
     came here from Washington today, as I often do, over the last eight
     months to hear these meetings, and I guess that kind of makes me the bad
     guy.
         I really appreciated everything that I've heard so far about
     beliefs and uncertainty and we -- and processes to address those.  We in
     the nuclear industry, of course, believe that the arguments in favor of
     the repository, that doing this repository is the right thing to do, are
     quite compelling and that they're in things like the viability
     assessment and the environmental impact statement.
         Of course, that's what we would believe.  We're the nuclear
     power industry.  Would you expect us to say anything else?  And we know
     a lot of people believe otherwise, and that is typical of every decision
     that this nation has to make.
         The reason people have different beliefs is because people
     have different values.  We in the nuclear industry happen to think that
     providing electricity for 20 percent of this nation is a very noble
     thing to do.  Others may believe differently about that technology,
     certainly.
         But that's why we have something in this country called
     democracy.  Democracy is really the most effective process the world has
     ever come up with for addressing the different beliefs of people who
     will and should have different values.
         And all of the agencies that you're seeing represented up
     here, from the NRC to the EPA, to the grass roots organizations, are all
     functions of that democratic process.  These meetings and these meetings
     we continue to have are functions of those democratic processes.
         This is a very serious national decision we're undertaking
     and that's why we have so many of these meetings.  So I think that when
     we're groping for a process out there, I think a process does exist and
     I think we are employing that process.  And we don't know what the
     answer is going to be.  Obviously, we in the nuclear industry know how
     we'd like to see it come out, but we're concerned.  It's not a done
     deal, we know that and I know that from being inside Washington.
         This process does need to continue and it does need to
     continue to address these issues.  However, one thing I'd like to point
     out here is that in spite of all this, in spite of all these questions,
     some of which will have answers, some of which will not have answers,
     none of which will have answers everybody likes or believes, the fact
     that we're asking the questions is in itself very meaningful.
         On this project, we are endeavoring to do something that
     mankind has never done before.  We are talking about protecting future
     generations of people 10,000 years in the future.  Granted, it's a
     hazard, it's a hazard that makes us think that.  Our belief about the
     nuclear hazard.
         But there are other things we're putting into this world and
     other things we're doing to our environment.  We don't even ask the
     questions.
         So it is a very good thing that these questions are being
     answered and these questions are being debated in this democratic
     process.  No matter what the answer comes out to be, I think it's
     important to remember that this country has not gotten to be the nation
     that it is and that the city has not gotten to be the city that it is,
     and the state has not gotten to be the state that it is by failing to
     act and by failing to make decisions in the face of uncertainty.
         Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you very much, Rod.  We're going to take
     a break for lunch.  We're a little bit behind, but given the subject and
     the amount of participants, I don't think that that's a problem.  We can
     always go a little bit later this afternoon.  Maybe Bob and Abe will
     come back and wave the white flag, I don't know.
         But I think that you should all be heartened.  I was struck
     by how much all of you are listening to each other in the conversation,
     not only around the table, but in the audience, so that's great.
         I have 12:45.  How about -- do you want an hour?  Okay.  Be
     back at 1:45.  Thank you.
         [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the meeting was recessed, to
     reconvene at 1:45 p.m., this same day.].             A F T E R N O O N  S E S S I O N
                                               [1:45 p.m.]
         MR. CAMERON:  We're a little bit behind, but I still think
     we're doing well with the schedule.  But I would like to make up some
     time, if we could, because for those of you who don't know it, there is
     a public meeting tonight with the advisory committee members and we're
     sort of short with the audience in terms of question opportunities this
     afternoon.
         Be assured that we can make all that up tonight, hopefully
     you'll be able to be with us.  But we still will go out, but I guess the
     biggest motivation to get done on time is Mal Murphy said that he was
     going to come up here and take over for me.  And we don't want that.
     The only consensus that we'll arrive at today.
         MR. MURPHY:  Only if you encroach as much on my dinner hour
     as you did on my lunch hour.
         MR. CAMERON:  Food is important.  Okay.  Sorry about that.
     Well, let's get rolling with Bob Andrews and Abe Van Luik of DOE about
     determining what elements of the safety assessment are most important,
     managing uncertainty, making results understandable.
         Abe, Bob?
         MR. ANDREWS:  With that title, can you see why I felt a
     little bit both preempted and undercut by Paul Davis?  Basically, I have
     no problem with what Paul said.  There are certain nuances of what he
     said that I think need some airing, but as he himself said, there wasn't
     time to do that.
         In the interest of time, I'm willing to forego any questions
     or comments.
         MR. CAMERON:  Now?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  From the context of what was said this
     morning, it's obvious that what I had focused on to talk about in my few
     minutes that I'm going to then pass over to Bob for a few minutes, was I
     was going to talk about process and it's already been pointed out very
     clearly that you've got to have more than process.
         Process is something required, process is something that can
     help you, but society has to make a decision in the face of uncertainty;
     there is no way that you can resolve some of that uncertainty, a lot of
     that uncertainty.
         One thing that Paul said that I found interesting, because I
     have observed it myself, that as repository programs do work, the
     uncertainty actually goes up.  But we shouldn't forget that the
     knowledge base also goes up.
         If you look at the work that we were doing back in 1985, we
     were very sure of ourselves because we had made assumptions and we were
     modeling those assumptions.  Now that we have data, observations, and
     some data that counters some of the observations, we have -- yes, we
     have introduced uncertainty, but we have also introduced a lot more
     complexity and specificity to the problem.
         But what does DOE need to do?  And Bob will get to some of
     the nitty-gritty, but as an overarching thing, we need to ourselves have
     confidence in the evaluations that we're doing.  When I was in Bob's
     position many years ago as the M&O PA manager, I got myself in hot water
     by saying to the analyst, if you believe your own calculations, you're
     in the wrong place.  And what I meant by belief was that the bottom line
     that fell out of those calculations, that it could be reality.
         The point of doing the calculations at that time was to gain
     insight and to see where we would go for more information, and I think
     we have moved a little ways beyond that now, because we're moving
     towards making a determination of whether or not this is a safe thing to
     do, and society makes that decision.  DOE makes the recommendation.
         We need to be able to communicate the results of our work
     and also communicate the fact that we have confidence and the basis for
     that confidence, and that is kind of the whole hierarchy of things that
     Paul Davis was talking about.  We have to state a safety case, which is
     more than just a safety assessment.  There is a total system performance
     assessment, however, within that safety case.  That total system
     performance assessment uses models, data, analysis and judgments all
     rolled up together.
         The safety case includes a robust repository system concept,
     with a demonstrable margin of safety, something that should be
     demonstrable outside of the realm of quantitative calculations.  There
     should be something intuitive about the way that things fall together.
     I think Paul pointed out correctly that your first step in modeling is
     to look at the system you're dealing with and conceptually model it.
     This is how it works and then the mathematics and all the data and the
     other things come in.
         A lot of times, as the data come in, you revise your
     conceptual models and you eventually, for some data, you have competing
     conceptual models that you just can't decide which one is correct, and
     so you include them both.
         But there is a process involved here that gives us some
     confidence.
         The safety assessment must be comprehensive.  Paul also
     talked about that, talked about comprehensiveness in terms of features,
     events and processes and making sure that enough people have come in
     with their biases to give you a good feel that you're complete.
         Need to include a well defined assessment approach and you
     have to ensure transparent and traceable analyses.  You have to
     evaluate, not just make a declaration of confidence, you have to
     evaluate the basis for having confidence in those models that
     significantly contribute to the demonstration of safety.
         You have to disclose the uncertainty in present knowledge,
     including showing that opposing views have been considered.  And you
     have to identify and discuss potential approaches to addressing the
     remaining uncertainty, if that is possible and if that is necessary.
         But there is more to it than just being comprehensive.  It
     must also be documented so as to illustrate the system and its
     components and discuss importance of components to safety.
     This is a long speech on traceability and transparency, but what we have
     learned over the years, I think, and I think the TSPA/VA is the best
     example, is that you have to make your arguments in such a way that they
     can be logically thought through and walked through.  You can't just
     write the document the way that the calculation is actually performed.
     You have got to show people what your system looks like, what the
     conceptual basis is, and what the technical basis is for doing the work
     that actually leads to a result.
         Now, one of the things that we're to talk about here, or at
     least grope about, is communicating not only the safety case that you're
     making, but the confidence, the degree of confidence and the basis for
     that confidence.  We have found, and I think most other worldwide
     programs have found that you have to have a hierarchy of documentation.
         I said this morning that Bill Reamer is basically saying
     that we're going to be tough, we're going to be thorough, we're going to
     be independent, et cetera.  I personally welcome that and this is
     something I think we can deal with, because we ourselves know how to be
     tough, independent thinkers and do the work in such a way that people
     will agree with us that that was the right thing to do and that they
     will agree with the results, although there are always variations of
     belief and legitimate variations of opinion.
         But there's a non-technical audience and we usually say the
     non-technical audience is the public.  The non-technical audience is
     also our management within DOE at the higher levels.  They may be
     scientists, but often they're also political appointees who are not.
         A very important non-technical audience is the decision-
     makers in the governments at all levels, all the way from Indian tribes
     and counties, through states to the Federal level.  So there is a lot of
     opportunity to talk to people not only -- I think the normal public,
     when they see a notice for this type of meeting, they say, hey, I've got
     a life and there is something playing over at the X and we'll go there.
         But these other audiences who are non-technical are very
     interested because their careers could be on the line for the decision
     that's coming up.  Other things make them very interested.  Their
     constituencies could be very interested, they could be affected.  Their
     business holdings could be affected.
         So we have to write in terms of people who are really
     interested.  So the level of complexity that we use in that non-
     technical writing can be pretty deep.
         Now, we are attempting to meet this challenge basically by
     writing a hierarchy of documentation and, also, we are moving into the
     world of multimedia presentations, where we will have, for example,
     films or little movies that show how a process actually works and what
     the result would be of an expanding plume or expanding heat output, and
     we are looking at creating a simple system simulator that, in a meeting
     such as this, we could set up at a table and people would be able to
     walk through it themselves, if they know how it works, or someone could
     walk with them and they could say, well, what if it rains three times as
     much, we could plug that in and see what the outcome would be.
         That way people get an intuitive feel through illustrations
     of what the system would look like and feel like.  Those must not,
     however, ever take the place of the formal compliance argument that we
     make to demonstrate safety.  You can't cartoon your way through
     licensing, in other words.
         I think I've probably said way more than I should have, but
     the point is that we're acutely aware of the need to communicate.  I
     realize, as the gentleman to my left, who is no longer there, said, that
     there should be more than just communicating, there should also be an
     involvement.
         Frankly, I am all ears, because I do not know how to
     legitimately involve public in the kinds of decision-making that goes
     into formulating and running a model.  It just escapes me at the moment.
     I think the examples that were used before, where someone had an idea of
     how to model a process differently, that's a wonderful example, but the
     few places where I have seen public involvement in decision-making that
     then went into modeling, I would say that the product that was created
     was probably okay for the public that was involved, but basically it
     introduced other problems such as that the logic flow was interrupted,
     but these things were thrown in to basically, I think, in some way, to
     buy off the public, making them believe they were involved, as long as
     the result was not exceeding some kind of a predetermined outcome.
         In other words, I'm just as jaundiced as any other member of
     the public about how you would do this in such a way that it would be
     genuine and if you got some ideas, I'm listening.
         Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Abe.
         MR. ANDREWS:  Let me try to build on what Abe said and try
     to -- one of the advantages we have of going after lunch is everybody is
     full and satisfied and not necessarily looking at their watches.  But
     also we can benefit from the discussions that occurred this morning and
     try to build off of those, especially in the free-for-all forum that's
     been specified in this presentation.
         Normally, of course, we have 20 or 30 viewgraphs, and, in
     fact, we did have 20 or 30 viewgraphs that we were ready to go with, but
     --
         MR. VAN LUIK:  Thirty-four, I think.
         MR. CAMERON:  But reason told us that was not the best way
     to go forward, so we come with zero.  But we learned a lot, we learned a
     lot this morning, and I think that the department and the contracting
     team, the labs, the USGS, learned a lot on some of these aspects that
     are germane to the discussion here with respect to risk, risk
     communication, uncertainty, uncertainty communication, within the
     viability assessment and the subsequent release of that and comments
     received during its production, comments received after its release.
         A lot of those comments were from people around these tables
     or agencies that they represent and we had, of course, our own internal
     comments, a wide range of them, not only the labs and the GS reviewing
     the work that went into the viability assessment, but an independent
     peer review panel that provided some 150 pages of comments on the -- not
     only the scientific underpinning for certain assumptions, beliefs, if
     you will, that formed the basis for the performance assessment within
     the viability assessment, but also how that scientific basis and the
     uncertainty in that scientific basis was propagated through the system
     to ultimately come up with this curve or family of curves that relate to
     -- in the viability assessment, it was dose that was the performance
     measure that was addressed.
         And there's a number of other reviews, expert elicitations
     that were used to probe the validity of the science in particular
     aspects of the system.  Steve, this morning, had four slides, two of
     which were taken from the viability assessment.  The first one that he
     had up there showed all the myriad -- myriad is maybe not the right
     word, but the number of individual processes, individual components,
     those features and a number of events that can impact the long-term
     isolation of waste at the Yucca Mountain facility.
         Each of those components on that slide has a certain bit of
     science that underpins it.  Some of that science is laboratory-based,
     some of that science is field-based.  Is there uncertainty in every one
     of those boxes on Steve's first viewgraph?  Yes.  Was that uncertainty
     addressed in the VA?  In most cases.  Not in every case was the
     uncertainty in every one of those boxes fully addressed.
         And I think a large number of the reviewers pointed out
     those areas where either, A, the scientific underpinning for some of
     those assumptions, some of those models was insufficient at the time of
     the VA to make reasoned assessments of whether that was a valid or
     appropriate model for use in a long-term projection of ultimately to
     dose, and, B, in some cases, they identified areas where uncertainties
     in that particular model or part of the system may not have been fully
     and adequately addressed.
         In some cases, they thought the uncertainty was larger than
     what was being addressed in the VA models, and, in many cases, they
     thought it was smaller.  They thought there was more understanding than
     the uncertainty that was being addressed.
         So I think we've tried to go forward with the comments that
     we have received, the comments received from NRC, the comments we have
     received from ACNW, from TRB, the other comments are more or less coming
     in with respect to the draft environmental impact statement, which also
     used, as a basis for long-term post-closure projections of dose, the
     same models.  It was the same basis as used in the viability assessment.
     So comments received on the draft environmental statement will help make
     the scientific basis and the approach for incorporating uncertainties
     into the future work, including the site recommendation analyses, I
     think, more transparent and traceable.
         That brings me to the last part of the transparency and
     traceability issue.  That is and remains still -- and I think it's
     embodied in what we're talking about here, the communication aspect.
     One of the major challenges, to document in a way that is clearly
     understandable, not only the technical basis for every single assumption
     for every single component, but how all of those assumptions, and with
     their corresponding technical basis, propagate through the system for
     all the varying barriers, of water contacting waste, and ultimately for
     waste leaving the repository, and to do that in a clearly demonstrable
     way.
         We tried some things in the VA to do that, some of those
     worked, some of those didn't work.  We're continually evaluating, as Abe
     pointed out, graphical ways of depicting this and for varying audience
     that would portray how we believe the system performs and how those
     uncertainties are used.
         I do want to point out that the issue of uncertainty and how
     you're addressing them and how do you quantify them and how do you
     determine something is important; in the VA, we use a number of
     different techniques to evaluate what was important and those techniques
     essentially resulted in a prioritization of work that was documented
     within the viability assessment and, in fact, is the basis for the
     department's and moving forward with additional scientific
     investigations at the labs and in the field.
          In addition to those individual analyses, which are
     more quantitative-based, there was an understanding by all
     of us that that was necessary, but not sufficient to define
     the full range of possible uncertainty and full basis for
     prioritizing work forward.
         So there were, in fact, some after the fact, in addition to
     the quantitative analyses, some judgments, some beliefs of the
     scientists working on the project, but taking into consideration
     comments received from external bodies and internal reviewers of how
     work should be prioritized to address those uncertainties, and I think
     that's a rational way to move forward, not to base it solely on a wide
     family of curves, but incorporate some of those beliefs or judgments
     into the assessment of what makes a difference, what is significant to
     performance.
         So with that, I'll stop also and have some discussion, I
     guess.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Abe.  Thanks, Bob.  I think you
     covered a lot of ground in terms of substantive aspects of actually
     performing a safety assessment, for example, the prioritization.  Both
     of you, I think, talked about some of the attributes of making the
     safety case comprehensive, transparent, traceable, documentation, the
     need to communicate.
         Abe sort of hit the process, underlined the process element,
     again, which goes back to what Paul was talking about, how important
     process is and how can the public not only be informed, but influence
     the process, have some confidence in the decision-making that's being
     done.
         Do we want to start with trying to examine the process
     question?  Remember Mary's question, related question from this morning.
     Is there a way that the public can be more meaningfully involved in the
     safety assessment process?  Dr. Garrick.
         DR. GARRICK:  I don't have the answer.  I just have a thought, a
     suggestion, based on experience.  This question of how to involve the
     public in the performance assessment process, in a risk assessment and a
     safety assessment is a question that is being addressed in all arenas,
     where they're trying to employ more quantitative methods.
         I just want to mention one specific application, where they
     went a little further than what I've seen in some cases.  You're all
     familiar, of course, with the Exxon Valdez event and the tremendous
     impact that had on the shipping industry and the oil industry, and they,
     following that accident, made the decision to upgrade their approach to
     safety assessment and called on the risk assessment community for help.
         And the underlying objective here was to involve
     stakeholders and I am not proposing this as a model, but it might be
     something you ought to look into.  So they organized a stakeholder
     steering committee that really was well represented by all of the people
     that were impacted, affected by, even interested in the shipment of oil
     from Alaska down the coast or elsewhere, and the consequence of this was
     to do the first of a kind comprehensive risk assessment of the Prince
     William Sound.
         And this was a major step and change in the whole culture of
     the shipping industry, of the oil industry, in terms of how to do safety
     assessment.  So they were very eager to want to do it right.
         And the steering committee that was put together was made up
     of all elements of society, including tribal nations and they
     essentially met with the risk assessment team and on a frequent basis,
     not only reviewed what was going on, but participated in the whole
     process of the kind of model, the kind of analysis that was to be
     performed.
         Now, I don't know, I'm sure there are other examples of
     where there were major attempts to exercise public participation in
     something as abstract and complex as probabilistic risk assessment, but
     this is one I'm aware of and it was rather successful and it's something
     that could be of help.
         MR. CAMERON:  That's an excellent idea.  People often think
     that the wheel hasn't been invented somewhere else, but maybe we should
     follow this thread.
         Are there other -- I'll call it a model, just for a
     shorthand term.  Are there other models that have been developed in
     other areas that people know about and what are your thoughts about a
     stakeholder steering committee?  I mean, we've heard about the peer
     review, expert elicitation.
         We have expert technical advisory committees.  What about
     something that was used, as Dr. Garrick pointed out, in the Exxon
     Valdez.  Comments on this.  Judy?
         MS. TREICHEL:  I always seem to be in charge of cold water,
     but I have really serious thoughts about stakeholder advisory group or
     whatever you wanted to call it.
         In the case of the Exxon Valdez and in the case of many of
     the Defense facilities around the country where there have been
     radioactive messes left, everybody agreed they wanted those messes
     cleaned up and the people at Prince Edward Sound all had a common goal.
     There is not, at Yucca Mountain, a common goal and one of the problems
     that we have is that you're attacking this problem with public
     involvement at the back end, at the end of the train, and people --
     we're now dealing just daily, almost 24 hours a day with people trying
     to do their comments on the draft EIS.
         And one of the very difficult things is that this is a lousy
     EIS and it's partially lousy because of the way Congress set it up with
     no need to consider the need.  And everybody says, well, but how do you
     make a decision if you don't even determine whether you need a
     repository.  Well, that's all water over the dam, as are a few other
     things.
         So in discussing whether or not people will be here this
     evening, I doubt that there will.  If there is a notice that says come
     on out and hear the NRC, that's probably not any more attractive than a
     notice for a church that you don't want to go to.
         There has to be something shown where, when people come,
     when they get a babysitter, when they put aside something else that they
     really want to do and they come out, that something is going to happen
     because they did that and there is nothing to show that and the fact
     that we've got people sitting here at the table who actually represent
     other people saying that we all know we can't change this, we all know
     that this is going to happen anyway and maybe we want benefit, that's
     not good enough.
         If that idea is prevalent, and it certainly isn't here, I
     will never accept that.  I think this thing is going down, but agree
     with me or not, but I don't put any stock in that opinion.  But if other
     people do, I don't see any reason in the world why they would come and
     play a part in either something they don't want or something that they
     can have absolutely no influence in business the timing is wrong and
     Congress sort of lays this thing out and they sure don't recommend
     public involvement in any of the bills that I've seen.
         MR. CAMERON:  Let's explore Judy's cold water in terms of do
     you need a common objective here to make this work.
         While you're thinking about that, let's go to Fred.  Fred, I
     don't know if you want to offer something on this or something else, but
     go ahead.
         MR. DILGER:  Actually, I've got five or six different
     things, but I just want to make one point to build on the discussion
     we've had.  That is, I would refer everybody to a book called
     "Understanding Risk" by the National Research Council.  It contains a
     lot of the things that Dr. Garrick just talked about and a lot of
     different examples of successful processes that just are similar to the
     ones we're talking about now.
         The NRC, I believe, received a briefing on it at a meeting
     in Karump some years ago by Paul Stern and it's becoming -- it's
     controversial in the risk assessment community, as I understand it, but
     it's also becoming fairly widely accepted.
         A question I have for Abe and Bob, if they could.  I don't
     want to interrupt the thread of the conversation right now, but at some
     point, I would like you to talk about -- you've laid out this process
     and I'd like you to talk about how well you think you implemented the
     process in the development of the draft EIS for Yucca Mountain and if
     you feel you've been successful.
         MR. CAMERON:  I guess that's the second reference to the
     EIS, and I don't want to necessarily disrupt the thread, because I think
     we should explore this idea.  But since it's probably a relatively
     simple answer, I'll just ask Abe and Bob what they think about that.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  One of the things that we did not want to do
     at this meeting is turn it into a discussion of the draft EIS. There are
     a number of public meetings and there is a forum for putting your
     comments in on the draft EIS.
         My personal opinion is, I have read a few DOE EIS.  I have
     been involved in a few of them.  I think this one reads very well and
     it's a nicely done piece of work.
         If you're against this project, you would not share that
     opinion whatsoever, but this is one of the few that hangs together
     actually and it makes sense from one discussion of the topic to another
     discussion of the topic, with a couple of small exceptions.
         If you have comments on the EIS, we urge you to come to
     either the comment meetings or --
         MR. DILGER:  How would you relate it to the process that you
     lined out?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  The process that I lined out is the specific
     process for doing the safety assessment and explaining the safety
     assessment, which has been partly imported into the EIS, which is really
     published separately as the TSPA/VA, for example.  That is specifically
     what I was talking about.  The draft EIS has a lot on its plate and a
     minor amount of that is the total system performance assessment and its
     results.
         So the explanation of the TSPA and the EIS, if people want
     to know what TSPA is all about, I would refer them to the TSPA/VA
     instead.  However, that said, I think that if you look carefully at the
     TSPA description and the appendices in the draft environmental impact
     statement, you get a pretty good idea how we did it and what was
     involved, but the details are in the VA and its supporting documents.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Abe.  Let's go over to Paul
     Davis maybe on the thread that we were following.
         MR. DAVIS:  To respond to Abe.  There was a process laid out
     called system prioritization, which was designed to do that exactly.
     That is, get the public involved at the ground level to build the PA, in
     essence, from scratch, but not from scratch in terms of knowledge, but
     in terms of agreement on where we were at.
         So that process exists and we can talk about that process.
     But when you said that, what came up, in my mind, was an integral part
     of that process was actually WIPP, like Yucca Mountain, a very large
     team of scientists and experts working on the problem and one of the
     first steps was actually to normalize them and say did they all buy into
     what was in performance assessment and that's not to say that anything
     behind the scenes was going on or imply that at all.
         Just professional, honest differences of opinion about what
     the data said.  So one of the more interesting things was a process
     outlined to come to a consensus of what the team actually would believe
     and present to the public as the first step.
         So I'm very curious, in Yucca Mountain, how that process is
     done when you come up with the viability assessment or the EIS, how do
     you get the full breadth of experience and knowledge and differences of
     opinion in the scientific team that works on Yucca Mountain.
         MR. CAMERON:  Go ahead, Abe.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  The process that we have in place, and Bob
     knows the process inside out, because he suffers through it.  I watch it
     and enjoy it from a slight distance.
         We actually have meetings that before every total system
     performance assessment is planned that involves basically the parties
     that are doing the work on the process level modeling.  Every discipline
     comes together with the other disciplines and says this is what we can
     do, this is the basis for what we can do and this is how it will work
     out, and then they go ahead and follow the mission that is outlined in
     their statement and part of their mission is what their handouts and
     feeds will be to performance assessment.
         So it's basically every time, building from the ground up,
     the basis, using that whole team.  Now, when the final product is done,
     sometimes there is a dissenting opinion among the scientists, saying not
     disagreeing with the outcome of that total system performance
     assessment, but saying the importance that you're assessment shows for
     my area, I need to do some more work because I think we may not have
     captured it correctly.
         So those kinds of discussions go on and it is basically a
     rather collegial, but a heated and passionate process of coming to that
     final determination.
         But when we're done, I think TSPA/VA, you can go to any
     entity within our organizations, plural, and find that people generally
     will buy into what it has and what it has in it, but they will always
     caveat it by saying, yes, but in order to improve our understanding of
     this area, we will have to do some more in this area, which is usually
     the area that they're personally involved in, and that's the way it
     should be.
         Scientists should be always generically pushing for more
     knowledge and capability.
         MR. DAVIS:  There was great difficulty that I found in that
     we were presenting answers that always complied and then we had
     experimentalists that said but you haven't considered or but you haven't
     done it exactly right or we need more research in this area, and that
     quandary just was incredibly difficult.
         The way you just stated it was the way PA would state it, in
     general, which is we've captured your concern, and we've done the
     analysis and everybody would stand behind the analysis, and we comply.
     On the surface, that says we're done.  That says unless we're making the
     statement, unless we're making the statement that you have an
     uncertainty that's not quantified, that hasn't been investigated and has
     the potential to show that the site is not safe.
         Can you clarify that, where that world sits?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  Yes, and I would love to have some help from
     Bob on this, too.  But I think the point is that there are parties that
     would say we were done years ago, because the results for the 10,000
     year case always looked compliant, except 91 and 93, when we purposely
     almost twisted the system to see what would make it break.
         I think the real point is, and this is a point that I was
     trying to make in my little talk, is we have to have confidence
     ourselves that this analysis, even though the bottom line is okay, that
     this analysis actually has enough of a basis that we have confidence
     ourselves in this work, and I think that's where a lot of the drive
     comes from to now finish up certain lines of evidence gathering, for
     example, in seepage, longevity of waste package materials, et cetera.
         And that drive comes not because the bottom line says we
     need to do it, but because our belief in the defensibility of that
     bottom line is still lacking something.  So I think it's -- if you get
     fooled by believing the bottom line without any regard to its basis, I
     think there is a problem there, too, but that was never the case at
     WIPP.  I know we watched the pain in the system as you went toward
     licensing and at some point in time, which is coming up pretty soon, we
     will also severely curtail some of the activities of scientists who
     basically are more interested in furthering the science than they are of
     having the project succeed.
         I'm not saying that that's a bad thing.  Those are the kinds
     of people you want to have working for you, because those are the people
     with integrity, independence and insight and they're not yes-men.  I
     don't think we have many yes-men on the project, or yes-women for that
     matter.
         MR. CAMERON:  Bob, do you want to add anything to what Abe
     said?
         MR. ANDREWS:  No.  I think Abe covered it pretty well.  It
     does bring a very interesting point, and that is something related to
     like scientific consensus.  Is such a thing possible either within the
     project, with all of the varied groups of people who are looking at
     particular aspects, or external to the Yucca Mountain project, and they
     looking at the science and having comments on it.
         If I focus on the internal project, there are numbers of
     differing opinions about conceptual model A, B, C, for some process
     component and there are advocates, if you will, for each of those
     conceptual models based on their individual experiences, which, in fact,
     might be -- I think Paul had a good example -- in fact, might be really
     to scale, to the scale that they're used to thinking in or the
     timeframes they're used to thinking in.
         And somebody thinks outside of that scale or outside of that
     timeframe and they come up with an alternative representation that
     adequately explains the observations.
         Where we strive for consensus is that the uncertainties
     within each of those models have been adequately addressed and perhaps
     all three of those models, or four, however many it is, are incorporated
     and the impacts of that uncertainty, the significance of that
     uncertainty, if you will, addressed within the context of either some
     subsystem measure of performance or, if appropriate, the overall system
     performance.
         So to say that there is consensus at the lowest level that
     this is the most prefect model and it explains everything and there's no
     other alternatives that explain reasonably the observations, that
     doesn't happen very much.  But the reasonable range of alternatives,
     that does occur.
         MR. CAMERON:  Go ahead, Abe, and then we'll go to Steve.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  They just handed me this piece of paper which
     describes the meeting in the Federal Register, the meeting we're
     attending today, and tomorrow's meeting has a presentation on DOE's work
     reprioritization, which will explain that the reprioritization heavily
     leaned on the results of the performance assessment, which is your
     experience, also, but then we also had input from the experts, which Bob
     was alluding to a moment ago, saying but you also need to consider this,
     that and the other, because it may not be captured in the modeling.

         So as long as that dialogue internally is alive and well, we
     will move forward, and I have confidence that this is the right way to
     go.
         MR. CAMERON:  So you will probably revisit this process
     again tomorrow.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  We will revisit it also when we're done with
     the site recommendation.  We will get copious inputs from all parties on
     the site recommendation and that will feed into repeating this whole
     process again for the license application, unless, of course, Congress
     says let's not do this, as Judy predicts.
         MR. CAMERON:  Steve.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Let's go back to the cold water of Prince
     William Sound for a minute.  It has to do with what has been going here.
     John, I think probably what you saw as a successful process in
     developing a risk assessment for that particular area and maybe for the
     larger issue of petroleum shipping in that area and so on was that
     probably the real value of that advisory group was in doing just what's
     being discussed here, but at a different level, and that's asking the
     question to the people who have the most hands-on or direct experience,
     did we think of everything.
     I think that that's probably why you felt some measure of success there.
     They were able to tell you things about that that you may not have
     otherwise known or may not have been the subject of any scientific
     inquiry, but they knew things about it.
         It's like the development of the San Francisco Bay model,
     which is an extremely comprehensive model and is tested essentially
     every day.  There are people who can tell you things that need to be
     considered in models like that that you otherwise wouldn't know.
         So now what I'm seeing here is an internal process where
     you're asking yourselves did we think of everything, and if you
     remember, this morning, relating to the -- referring to the focus
     groups, that seemed, in your mind anyway, to be sort of the big trip
     point where you said that you had this one person that you were sort of
     impressed with, where they said if I'm convinced you've thought of
     everything, and that's a pretty tough test.
         Now, back to the cold water part, and that is that this
     program has been consistent in not accepting even the ungeneral public's
     offers to get at the questions of have we thought of everything, and
     I'll just give two examples that I think are both really notable in the
     program and suggest to me, also, that we're beyond the point of being
     able to get a constructive system.
         The first example was in 1983, just shortly after the
     Nuclear Waste Policy Act passed, a group of state geologists went to the
     program leadership and offered to serve as essentially an advisory
     committee for purposes of looking primarily at criteria that should be
     involved in site screening and further down the road in what things you
     have to get at in site characterization.
         They were summarily refused and the answer was just we don't
     need your help.  I know about that only because I worked for one of
     those state geologists at the time.
         The other example came about ten years later and that was
     when there was a short-lived interest in whether people outside of the
     Yucca Mountain project had any alternative conceptual models that were
     of merit.  There was a meeting on it and we and others presented an
     alternative conceptual model for the unsaturated zone that today is
     essentially the model that's being used, but there were a lot of years
     and a lot of dollars in between when our presentation was, in essence,
     ignored.
         MR. FRISHMAN:The program has not been willing to do what you saw of
     merit in the Prince William Sound system, or at least what I'm
     interpreting to be that.  The question of, have we thought of everything
     needs to go beyond the walls of the work house.  And in taking this
     little bit of time to go through all this, actually it's a real benefit
     because now I don't have to later on my time.  I think that's a question
     that maybe people can pursue a little bit more, but I think that's
     really the essence of it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Well, let's explore that.  Steve's making the
     water a little bit warmer here in terms of is there a value of following
     some model like that which was used in the Exxon Valdez for either the
     performance, or it could be broader than that.  Steve characterized it
     as, have we thought of everything?
         I think it would be useful to get some other opinions around
     the table in terms of pros and cons, potential constraints,
     opportunities, perspectives.  Mal, do you have anything you'd like to
     say on that?
         MR. MURPHY:  I think Steve and Dr. Gerrick have good points.
     I don't know that you could accomplish as much as you did at Prince
     William Sound with that kind of public involvement, but it certainly
     would be useful, it seems to me.
         As Steve was talking I was sitting here -- I'm sorry I can't
     bring back into my memory the exact details.  May Nick Stelevato could
     help out.  But I recall, in discussing something -- whether it was the
     proposed NRC regulations or earlier versions of the EPA standards or a
     model.  But at some point in time, I recall specifically at a meeting in
     Amarbossa Valley when one of the Federal agencies, DOE, NRC, EPA or
     someone else, was making decisions or, or posing, you know, had a model
     that was based on certain assumptions with respect to the level of the
     ground water some place.  I don't remember exactly where.
         It went, two or three members of the public stood up and
     said, now wait a minute.  My well is 500 feet away from there and it
     only goes 300 feet deep.  You know, something to that effect.  There's
     an example of where the public input, almost unsolicited public input,
     probably changed some of the scientific parameters that the program
     dealt with.
         Another area that I could think of was, was the, you know,
     the description and definition of the Amarbossa Valley biosphere.
     Nobody has ever convened a meeting of the people who lived in Amarbossa
     Valley to talk about how they live.  And that, it certainly couldn't
     hurt.  It may not be the be-all and end-all of performance assessment,
     but it sure wouldn't hurt to do it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Let me go to Paul Davis.  Paul, you, you
     talked about process.  What do you think about this idea?  Have you had
     any experience with this type of steering committee approach?  Do you
     have any thoughts on this?
         MR. DAVIS:  The process that I referred to earlier was less
     of a steering committee than it was a really open invitation to anybody
     to participate in building the performance assessment from the ground up
     and having their input at every step of the way.  I think it is a
     valuable approach.  I think it builds trust.
         Let me say a couple of the attributes of it that I found
     interesting.  One was an unexpected consequence, which is if you really
     put the scientists doing the work in front of the public, then the trust
     level went way up.  And that is, when they were hiding behind their
     desks and in Sandia Labs and publishing reports and journal articles,
     that was a pretty mystical experience to the public as to what went on
     in that process and who did it.
         When you saw that these were honest people trying to do an
     honest job, very concerned about the issues, the trust level in the
     people went dramatically up.  That was certainly the good side of the
     process.  Even separate from what they said -- we believe in that
     person; they obviously are trying to do the best thing that they can.
         But now the downside, which really I should have recognized
     when I started the process and defined the process but didn't -- too
     naive -- was that any process that you employ like that, if it is
     serious in getting the public involvement, it means fundamentally you
     give up power.  I don't know anybody at this table that wants to do
     that.  And it turns out at WIPP, people didn't want to give up power up
     either, who did -- let's say, the middle ground gave up power.  The
     middle ground on both sides of DOE, Sandia, for example, were willing to
     give up power in the belief that the right answer would just come out.
         And the middle ground of the environmental community are the
     stakeholders who are willing to play in this game and give up power.
     Giving up power from their end meant that if at the end of the day the
     answer complied and we had resolved their concerns, it really complied
     and they were done with their comments and concerns about their
     repository.
         Now the extremes didn't want to do that.  The extreme of the
     environmental group essentially opted out after the first meeting,
     realizing that, you know, if they bought into the process and the answer
     was not what they wanted, which was that WIPP shouldn't, they didn't
     want to be part of the process.  They didn't want to lend credibility to
     the process by being in it.
         The extremes at the other side of DOE quite honestly didn't
     like that.  They didn't want the process being driven by the public
     because in their mind, they already knew WIPP was safe.  It was a done
     deal.  Now it was a process of demonstrating safety; not assessing
     safety.  So they bought out of it.
         And those were the great difficulties of any meaningful
     process.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thank you.  That's very insightful on
     this, and John, do you have something to say on this?
         DR. GARRICK:  I just wanted a little clarification on the
     Prince William Sound risk assessment, and Judy really beat me to the
     punch on wanting to be heard.
         The first thing I want to say is that this risk assessment
     was not analyzing the Exxon Valdez accident so much as it was to
     quantify the future risk of the Prince William Sound operations.  That's
     just a point of clarification.
         The other thing I wanted to say is that the process was not
     perfect and it wasn't without its critics.  They worked very hard to
     have what would appear to be a total public representation and input
     into the process.  But there were some people that accused the steering
     committee of being bought out, so to speak, by the operators, etc. etc.,
     which we did not think was the case.
         Third thing, my involvement in that was as a member of a
     national academy committee that was reviewing it, reviewing the Prince
     William Sound risk assessment and some of the operations up there.  I
     was not a member of the team that actually carried out the risk
     assessment.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you, John.  And before we go to Judy, I
     think you've followed some of the points that Paul made about, it's not
     going to be perfect in the sense it's going to please everyone.  There
     has to be the correct focus for what this Committee looks at.  Steve has
     characterized it as, have we thought of everything?
         It seems like there's some feeling around the table that
     there might be some usefulness.  But am I being too simplistic in terms
     of wondering why, if this is a good idea and we've come all this way --
     all this way is maybe relative -- buy why hasn't it been done before?
     Is it the fear of giving up power, as Paul Davis mentioned?  Judy?
         MS. TREICHEL:  No, it came dreadfully close to having been
     done before because at one point, Hazel O'Leary ordered that it be done
     and the entire AUG, the affected units of government, stood up in unison
     and refused, and put -- I think Russ Dyer at that time at that time was
     the acting director -- and put him in a real bind because he couldn't
     deliver and the edict had come down.  But there's a huge difference in
     coming up with a citizen advisory board and -- I don't want to use that
     word "stakeholder" because everybody who's used it around the table here
     has meant something else -- allowing the public in, as you described it,
     where you just open the door and let them come in and take suggestions
     from whoever.  When you put together an advisory board, you're adding
     another layer of bureaucracy and something else that's just a real
     hurdle for real people out there.  So I think that's a mistake.
         But it does come down to the power thing.  And in many of
     the foreign programs, you see, you hear about things like raw data being
     available to people who are not part of the program.  All sorts of
     openness that really does take away the power and leaves the thing as
     vulnerable as it's supposed to be, if it's not already been deemed a
     repository.
         MR. CAMERON:  Often these citizens' advisory board meetings
     are open to the public so that -- you can try to, I guess, use the value
     of having this focused organizational look and still have the public in,
     like Paul was talking about.  But maybe it is just another layer of
     bureaucracy.  Abby?
         MS. JOHNSON:  Well, I have several thoughts.  One is that t
     o a certain extent, each of these regulatory agencies is a closed
     system.  And I heard Abe say, gosh, thank goodness we can interact with
     the NRC, and they'll understand what we're talking about when we talk
     about risk -- implying that the rest of us, it's much harder to talk to
     and get your message across.
         I've heard, not today but in general, that the NRC is going
     to accept, will accept the environmental impact statement to the extent
     practicable, and that their interpretation of that is basically, we'll
     take what they give us.
         In terms of the stakeholder advisory board kind of stuff,
     Judy's absolutely right.  Ms. O'Leary ordered the creation of a site-
     specific advisory board for Yucca Mountain and it did not happen.  It
     was an unworkable kind of a thing.
         My concern is that when we start to get in this area, we
     just have some kind of forum where people can listen.  Well, I have yet
     to see where, when people have ideas, they get incorporated into the
     system and anything changes.  You know, a first step of faith building
     would be to say, gee, I think we'll wait until the thermal tests are
     done before we build the repository -- but no, we're schedule-driven so
     we're going to do the thermal test at the same time we build the
     repository.  Just as a small example.  I don't see that there's any
     openness in terms of having the system wait, the process wait, until
     more information comes in.
         On the other hand, if you listen to Paul Davis enough, you
     realize that it doesn't really matter anyway because in the end it is
     uncertain.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CAMERON:  And maybe we'll, when we hear the presentation
     on WIPP, maybe there's some lessons there.
         We really have managed to maintain our 45-minute delay.  So
     I would like to -- I think it would be good to hear from Abe and Steve
     quickly, and maybe do the transportation panel and go to the public
     quickly, after that, although there may be some different ideas out
     there.  Go ahead, Abe.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  Yeah, I think this illustrates one of the
     difficulties in explaining our perception of risk versus the typical
     public perception of risk, including my wife's and my mother's.  Say,
     well, if you're doing these tests, why don't you wait until they're in,
     until you make decisions.  And the point is, you make decisions in the
     face of uncertainty regardless of these tests.
         The NWTRB has already pointed out to us that we need to
     repeat some tests in different rock units to have more confidence in the
     kinds of things that we're talking about.  The point is that the risk
     that we are facing in obtaining a license to build a repository is a
     huge fiscal risk.  The radiological risk for which we're doing these
     calculations, from which to protect ourselves, don't come in for at
     least 5, probably 10 years after that.  So the licensing process as it
     is written in 60 and 63 allows for decisions to go forward at certain
     points, and for the basis for those decisions, the basis for the
     confidence statement in your repository safety statement has to rise
     with each level.  And as soon as you begin to take on radiological risk,
     that's when really, you know, some of these things need to be nailed
     down pretty well.
         But I think that's a hard thing to convey.  I'm just telling
     you it's a difficult thing to convey -- that we think we know enough to
     go forward to this step, but we will know more, quite a bit more,
     especially when we start excavating a lot of tunnels, before we take the
     next step in assuming risk, which is to actually receive waste.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  there still seems to be this item of
     faith that things might, some things might change that seems to need to
     be demonstrated somehow.  Steve, you want to give us a final comment on
     this, and we'll quickly go out here to the audience.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Just a very quick observation, and that's
     that, Paul, I think your analysis of the power system is entirely
     correct.  And it shows in the DOE's repository program to the extent
     that they've never been able to pull together a public involvement plan.
     They've got a plan for everything else but they've never been able to
     make that one work.  And it -- in my experience, because I think I've
     been involved in it, let's see?  Well, I've been involved in it since
     passage of the original act.  What happens, each time there's any
     discussion of it, is the DOE managers very quickly leap to the point, we
     cannot give away our statutory authority.  And that's the end of the
     conversation.  And that's, you know, that's the power system one level
     above where you experience it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you.  We're going to go on to the
     audience very quickly for a couple of comments, and we're going to do
     our transportation panel.
         MS. MANNING:  All of you need to read the book "Risk
     Assessment", by Howard Margolis, because he wrote the book on how to get
     public participation into nuclear waste, site-specifically, at other
     high-risk sites.  And it's very important because he, he suggests
     getting a paid consultant for the public.  In other words, the
     perpetrator of the risk pays for an expert to represent the public, and
     the public gets to choose.  The non-technical stakeholder gets to choose
     the expert.  That's another way you could go about solving this problem.
         My question to Abe Van Luik is, why didn't you twist Yucca
     Mountain to the breaking point?  That's a very important piece of public
     information.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thank you, Mary.  Sally, very quickly
     please.
         MS. DEVLIN:  I'm just wondering -- show of hands -- if
     anybody here knows Lisa Crawford from Fenauld?  All right.  Anybody that
     knows Lisa knows that the Government poisoned the town of Fenauld,
     12,000 people, denied it.  They were sued in court for $300 million and
     they settled for $42 million.  This made the town bond.
         They had the strongest group of any place I know of in the
     nation.  They count the cancer deaths.  They count this.  They count
     that.  They were intelligent enough to say, we do not want to dump
     everything on the test site, and they went and got a company from Texas
     that transmuted the dirty soil, or whatever you call it, so that 90
     percent will reusable; only 10 percent will come to NTS.
         Now this is not what we have in Perump or Bahey or
     Amarbossa.  We don't have intelligent leases.  There're not a lot of
     silos across the country, but there are a few of them.  And we get utter
     disrespect.  The leases get respect because they learned how to go to
     court.  Remember -- WIPP took 15 years to get there.  How many years
     it's going to take Yucca Mountain with litigation?  I said 20; it's
     probably going to be 25.  Things change in 25 years, and a lot is
     learned.  And I haven't heard you say anything alternative regarding
     transmutation or any of these things for Yucca Mountain, because it's
     there if you want to find it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you, Sally.  Grant, please make
     it quick.
         MR. HORNBERGER:  The, what we're talking about is results
     management that Congress put in.  And Leah Deaver tried to learn how to
     do that, and as a result, those of you that are dragging your feet and
     don't want to learn how to do it, she now has four Yucca Mountains under
     her command.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Grant.  And for those of you
     who want to explore that or don't know who Grant is talking about,
     please talk to him at the break.
         Let's do our panel on transportation now.  I think we're
     bringing Jim -- right?  Jim Miller?
         MR. WILLIAMS:  Jim Williams.
         MR. CAMERON:  Jim Williams, okay -- up to the table from Nye
     County.  Excuse me -- Fred is up here from Clark.  Abby's with us from
     Eureka.  And Mike Boffman from Lincoln.  Is there anybody else?  Okay.
     Anybody, who would like to lead off?  Jim, we haven't heard anything
     from you today.  Why don't you go ahead.
         MR. WILLIAMS:  I very carefully arranged that.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. WILLIAMS:  Well I can start briefly.  The topic here is
     analyzing the risk of transporting high-level nuclear waste.  And I'm to
     provide a few of the perspectives of Nye County.  The topic might be
     transformed a bit and say, well, is the probabilistic risk assessment
     included in the EIS, sufficient as a basis for policy decision?  And the
     EIS says explicitly that is.  And Nye County says that it is a
     sufficient basis for all key decisions of mode, route, equipment and
     operations.  And Nye County says that the technical analysis is not
     irrelevant, but neither is it sufficient.  And to proceed as if it is
     sufficient is a bad and costly policy, potentially costly policy.
         Nye County's perspective is based on, is sort of colored, I
     think, by things that tend to be outside the discussion, like the
     history of NTS; and the history of NTS within the DOT complex; and Nye
     County's own aspirations for its future in the aftermath of the cold
     war.  So let me give you a few examples of that, if I could.
         One is that Nye County very much sees itself as the target
     for not one, but two major national shipment campaigns, one of which
     involves low-level waste shipments in numbers up to about 30,000 from 25
     or more sites around the country, of 4-1/2 million curies, up to 4-1/2
     million curies, which compares to about 2.7 million slated for WIPP over
     about 20 years.  Then you add to that the prospective high-level, which
     comes from 72 to 75 sites, 50- to 75,000 shipments; 14 billion curies
     over 24 years.  Fourteen billion compares to about 500 million released
     in all of the weapons, NTS.  So Nye County's sort of saying, well, hmm,
     disposal is this massive transfer of radiological burden around the
     country to one rural community in Nevada.
         Second, Nye County sees this, the prospective campaigns, as
     additional to the past radiological impositions.  The NTS weapons
     testing is key among them.  It was about 500 million curies over 40
     years.  It was a commercial site for low-level waste disposal that
     operated for 31 years.  It was very controversial.  And then there was,
     has been NTS disposal of low-level waste, which is involved in 22,000
     shipments and 3.6 million curies over the last few years.
         So Nye County's observations are that the Congress and DOE,
     in their behavior, view this site as just a dump, which Nye County
     doesn't want to be.  And the DOE clean-up effort at NTS is a small
     portion of what it is in other DOE sites -- as low as six percent; as
     high as twenty percent.  But never equal.
         And the community development effort that has gone on in Nye
     County as related to NTS has never been in any way comparable to what
     has occurred in DOE's flagship communities -- Oakridge, Richland, and so
     on.  That's point two.
         Point three is that the use of NTS in Nye County has had
     major benefit for others.  A recent study indicates that low-level waste
     disposal at NTS, prospectively, will save the Federal Treasury somewhere
     between $2- and $7 billion in avoided costs compared to other
     alternatives.  And you can just look at the no-action and proposed-
     action alternatives in the EIS and observe that the Yucca Mountain is
     worth about $28 billion in the difference between them.  Those savings
     accrue to the Federal Treasury to nuclear utilities.
         So the theme is that there's an exploitation here and that
     there's been a consistent under-representation of the value of the, of
     this site to the Nation. It's extremely valuable but treated like it's a
     dump.
         Regarding transportation, Nye County feels that it's the
     rural destination county affected by politically powerful communities,
     and that the mode routing decisions are blatantly political, and that
     the decision criteria are inappropriate to a very large-scale campaign -
     - two of them, prospectively -- long-term and focused on a single
     location.
         There's been another interesting study on low-level waste
     that can be used to compare two alternatives for intermodal shipment of
     low-level waste to NTS.  The alternative that meets California's
     preference not to have waste intermodally transferred at Barstow, and
     Lincoln County's preference to have it intermodally transferred at
     Caliente -- what does it do?  It increases radiological risk by 14
     percent nationwide; accident risk by 10 percent; total risk by over 10
     percent; system costs by about 8 percent; and in the process, increases
     the same risk in Nevada by 45 times, 5 times, 10 times.
         Another, same study has two alternatives for legal waste
     shipment to NTS.  The one that meets Clark County's understandable
     preference that it not go through Clark County -- what does it do?
     System-wide, it increases radiological risk by 9 percent; accident risk
     by 13 percent; total risk by 12 percent; total cost by 10 percent; and
     the increases in Nye County are dramatic, dramatic.
         Now the decisions -- this is almost my last point.  The
     decisions in this on the low-level waste are being made by 25 or more
     DOE generator sites and their carriers.  The understanding is that they
     make these decisions on their own, consistent with DOT and NRC
     regulations.  On spent fuel, the decisions will be made in the future by
     4 regional service contractors who will make their decisions, consistent
     with DOT and NRC regulations.  So the decisions here are being made by
     others and from prospective origin sites, without considering the scale
     or the long-term or the single focus of this prospective campaign.  And
     with no notion between integration between DOT stovepipes for low-level
     and high-level waste.
         So my few thoughts are that there needs to be equity in this
     process, and at minimum, there should be a destination state and county
     formal role on a more acceptable process.  There should be a kind of
     commitment.  The DOE needs to put their proposal as to how this should
     be done right on the line and negotiate it.
         There is precedent.  There has been the successful
     campaigns.  I'm thinking of WIPP and Mabel Fuel have gone well beyond
     the DOT and NRC regulations that are guiding these two campaigns.  And
     the integration -- a plan that has an integrated notion between two
     major campaigns that focus on NTS and Nye County needs to happen, and it
     probably cannot happen without some external push.  It's likely, in my
     view, that DOE is not set up to resolve those two stovepipes on its own.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Jim.  Let's hear from the rest
     of the panel, and then we'll open it up to the group.  But I think one
     point I heard there is there's no centralized, integrated, systematic
     decision making on how this happens.  All right.  And we'll see how
     others think about this.
         Let's go up to Lincoln County, to Mike Brougtman.
         MR. BROUGTMAN:  Thanks.  I actually have a handout but I
     don't have enough copies for everybody.  So if you could work these
     around the table and share and be sure the Advisory Committee members
     get those.
         If I could Chip, I'd like to run over this overhead
     projector.
         MR. CAMERON:  Yeah, do you want to use it?
         MR. BROUGTMAN:  This is the Price is Right segment of the
     show.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. BROUGTMAN:  And I apologize to the folks in the audience
     that I don't have more copies of these hand-outs, but we can get them to
     you if you'd like.
         I guess the first question I would pose with regard to
     trans-station risk is will transportation risk influence spent fuel
     disposal policy?  The numbers that I'm gonna put up here are all out of
     the draft environmental impact statement.  What this table shows you is
     a summation of the risks, or basically the fatalities, total fatalities
     from the different alternatives, from different sources, both
     radiological and non-radiological.  And then you see some conclusions on
     the bottom half of this.
         And if you review all of this, I think what it clearly
     suggests is if we want to reduce public hazard, reduce the loss of life,
     certainly we ought to consider on-site storage for the first hundred
     years and see if there isn't a better solution, because most fatalities
     will occur during the first hundred years.  And over ninety percent of
     the fatalities associated with this program will be associated with
     transportation, and that's a point I made earlier today.
         And so, I just wonder if transportation will influence waste
     disposal policy and I would suggest that to date, transportation has
     seemingly had very little influence on disposal policy and we are
     focused very heavily on the risks associated with repository, when they
     seemingly pose the least amount of our concerns, certainly in the
     shortrun.
         Now when you go to the very longrun, on-site disposal under
     the assumptions in the EIS clearly is not the preferred option.  And
     going to centralized repositories seems to make a lot of sense.  And I
     believe those assumptions are subject to some challenge.
         But I would also suggest that this kind of underscored Jim
     Williams' point about equity.  This is another table. This table is
     right out of the draft environmental impact statement. The previous one
     was data that we compiled from the EIS.  This is an analysis of all the
     different routes for legal weight trucks.  And the point I would make
     here is that the, the base case which is coming in on I15 under highway
     road control quantities regs., if you go over to Wynn Dover v. U.S. 95,
     that's an alternative that comes in at the state line of northern
     Nevada, comes down through White County into Nye.  That's the route that
     the state has identified as a candidate for the Governor to designate,
     if the Governor elects to keep the waste out of Las Vegas Valley.
         Given that the Governor has elected to acquiesce to
     shipments of low-level waste along this very same route, rather than
     have that waste come through Las Vegas Valley, it seems plausible to us
     that the Governor may in fact designate this as an alternate route.
         Well, if you look at the numbers of this alternate route,
     the risks are greater.  We will not minimize risk by coming down from
     the North.  What we may minimize the potential stigma impacts to the Las
     Vegas area and the resulting economic and fiscal consequences.  Those
     kinds of things are not addressed at all in the EIS.
         So it does raise some questions about how have we treated
     transportation risk, certainly within the context of this document, but
     also perhaps how we're treating it with regard to the decisions we're
     making about how to manage waste, how to, you know, bring it to Nevada,
     and things of that nature.  And again, I would suggest that all of these
     points are very important with regard to equity.
         Let me -- I'm not going to belabor all the points in this
     hand-out.  So the two first obvious questions are, what role does
     transportation risk play then with both disposal policy and also routing
     decisions.  You've had some discussions earlier today on factors, on
     different issues in terms of communication of risk.
         I'm not going to go through the factors affecting the
     application of risk, but Mary Manning and I go way back, and it's not
     always been a cordial kind of relationship.  But the availability
     heuristic in terms of how the media reports the risks, how the state
     interprets risks, how all responsible parties interpret and report risk,
     does have a very significant impact on perceived risk and how people
     view risks.  And I think the availability heuristic is one we ought to
     pay a lot of attention to.
         I would also suggest that emergency mismanagement is an
     issue that has not been addressed really in the EIS, has not been
     considered as perhaps a component to risk, and the assumption is that we
     will be effectively able to respond to incidents or accidents involving
     the transportation or even things happening on-site.  And if we're
     wrong, that mismanagement can in fact serve to amplify the risk.  And I
     certainly think that we have not probably gone far enough to look at
     that.
         With regard to how we estimate transportation risk, I would
     note that the use of rad-tran, and in particular the derivation of
     population densities along the transportation corridors, uses an
     algorithm which basically takes the population within the census areas
     and comes up with an average population density for that census.  Those
     of you who are familiar with rural Nevada will know that most population
     is concentrated immediately adjacent to the transportation
     infrastructure.  So within that 800-meter corridor, you have a much
     higher population density perhaps than what a normal kind of rad-tran
     distribution would provide.
         And just in terms of how stakeholder influence influences
     the process, we in Lincoln County hired the University of Nevada-Las
     Vegas, did our own rad-tran risk assessments, using rad-tran; provided
     that information to DOE; alerted them to this problem with estimating
     populations along these corridors.  And as far as I can tell, our advice
     was not heeded.  I think that's problematic.
         You'll note at the bottom of this second page, where it says
     "factors affecting the acceptance of risk."  You had quite a
     conversation about that this morning.  Again, I would just encourage you
     to consider benefit-cost analysis with regard to transportation in all
     sources of risk.  I for one think that we are spending way too much time
     in the wrong areas if we're truly concerned about public health and
     safety.
         And then finally, the risk of transportation-induced
     stigmatization.  I know this is a scenario the State has spent a lot of
     time looking at.  I know the agencies have had difficulty with this one.
     It does posit some rather significant impacts, economic and perhaps
     fiscal impacts.  But I do think that there is merit in trying to
     understand the likelihood that an area could be stigmatized, and what
     the consequences of that stigma would be, and perhaps have in place a
     contingency plan that deals with that.
         Again, Lincoln County took a look at the accident at Three-
     Mile Island.  We looked at the impacts to tourism in the region
     immediately following the accident.  It's one of the only studies I'm
     aware of that was done really in that regard.  We then took a look at,
     in our area, were the public to respond in the same way to the perceived
     threat of exposure radioisotopes from an accident, that we would lose
     during peak seasons perhaps $500 to a $1 million a year.  And this is a
     very small county, so those are big numbers to us.  But we would lose
     that much in economic activity.
         Our point would be that we ought to have in place a
     contingency plan that says, if we ever had an accident on the UP main
     line, approximate to one of the five state parks in our area, that there
     would be no questions asked.  The contingency plan that would deal with,
     for example, tours and promotion would kick in immediately.  It's a very
     small cost to put that together to fund it, to have it just sitting
     there with the money in the bank ready to go, such that if ever it
     happens, we've addressed it.  Our concern is the EIS is silent on these
     matters, and these are elements of transportation risk which I think are
     very important.  We have made the responsible parties aware that they
     are important to us, and I think the fact that they are not address gets
     back to this issue of trust.
         And I will just close by noting that for the ACNW, I'll
     circle all the way back around to my earlier comment that I would
     encourage you to, one, challenge the staff to not simply adopt the final
     EIS on its face because it's very likely that it will not address many
     of the issues that you will see the stakeholders coming to the
     Commission around as prospective conditions to a licensing.  And a
     contingency plan for an economic impact is one of those, perhaps.
     Thanks.
         Should I give this to Fred?
         MR. CAMERON:  Why don't we go to Abby next, and we'll finish
     up with Fred.  I'm putting your last point on the Advisory Committee
     challenging the Staff to take a real hard look at that EIS in terms of
     transportation up here under the Advisory Committee potential
     recommendations to consider.
         Abby, do you want to --
         MS. JOHNSON:  Sure.
         MR. CAMERON:  -- go ahead.
         MS. JOHNSON:  I only have six copies of this, so those of
     you who know what Crescent Valley, Nevada looks like keep going around,
     and those of you that are from somewhere else take a look and share.
         My name's Abby Johnson.  I'm the nuclear waste advisor to
     Eureka County, Nevada.  Eureka County is in north central Nevada,
     bounded by Interstate 80 -- not bounded, but Interstate 80 runs through
     it, as well as the Union Pacific railroad tracks.  And our primary
     concern, direct concern is that one of five proposed rail alternatives
     to take waste to Yucca Mountain would be a rail line built through our
     county starting from the UP and proceeding southwest through Crescent
     Valley, which is a valley, and also the town site of Crescent Valley,
     which is that little kind of cross-hatched box that you can see near the
     route.
         So, I'm not going to talk in social scientists' terms or
     anything.  I'm just going to tell you what it's like for the people in
     Crescent Valley and the kinds of questions that I get and what, what,
     how we're trying to kind of deal with the risk questions that come from
     people who live in Crescent Valley related to this project.
         This is in the context of a very small town that's at the
     mouth of the nationwide transportation funnel, potentially.  The
     existing rail is 20 miles away.  People live in Crescent Valley because
     they want to get away from the Federal government, primarily.  One of
     the hardest things in my job is that there's a small group of concerned
     citizens who are really wanting information and wanting to know what
     they can do to get more educated.  Most of them don't have telephones,
     let alone the internet, let alone, in some cases, power.  And so it's
     quite a challenge to bring this information to them.  And I can't just
     pick up the phone and say to them, hey, I just got this thought.  It
     doesn't happen that way.
         As with many people who live in small towns, and as in the
     overall discussion of risks, there's risks that they choose to assume by
     living in Crescent Valley.  You know, people that don't have phones,
     they don't have any ready access to the limited emergency response
     capability that is there should they have a heart attack or whatever.
     Those are the risks they're assuming.  The risk of living in a valley
     with nuclear waste transportation is -- a ranch with a hot springs.  And
     it has the vision of developing a bed and breakfast, hot springs,
     mineral bath, retreat, you get the drift, and is absolutely horrified to
     learn that she might have, instead of just hot springs in the back yard,
     a rail line in the front yard.  And what that does to her retirement,
     her dream of this, and her way of life and her business plan -- that
     leads to a whole series of questions that are just beginning to be asked
     about property values, perceived risk, actual risk, all those kinds of
     things.  These are questions that people just ask and I say, well I can
     answer it or I'll get back to you.  Those are my two favorite response.
         The challenge is to communicate the risk, both real and
     perceived.  And as I heard earlier a couple of times, to acknowledge the
     -- Robert said cultural heritage and someone else kind of turned that
     into a different meaning.  But the impacts on the community lifestyle,
     all that kind of thing, the property values.
         I've been involved with this program on and off since the
     passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, like Steve.  And from the very
     start it was my observation that transportation has always taken a back
     seat.  The guidelines say that finding a safe place for 10,000 years is
     more important than getting the waste there.
         What we're seeing in the EIS is that same thing.  There's
     just a barebones minimal amount of information on what they call the
     Carlin rail route, which is the one we're concerned with.  And DOE has
     made it very clear that they will make a decision on transportation
     based on that amount of information.  I challenge each of you to read
     the portions of the EIS that, for the sake of this discussion, talk
     about the Carlin route and then think about building a rail line through
     your community based on that amount of information and whether you would
     accept it and whether you would be comfortable with the Federal
     Government making a decision about building a rail line to transport
     anything, including nuclear waste based on the lack of information
     that's in that document.
         We have developed a GIS system which has come in very handy
     recently.  And through our analysis of overlaying this rail route with
     our parcel maps, we have found that 59 percent of the assessed parcels
     in Eureka County are within 10 miles of this proposed rail line, so we
     are quite effective, as are a lot of out-of-towners who own property.
         What's missing, as Mike said, in the EIS, and what we are
     concerned about, whether or not there's an EIS, is the emergency
     response, the emergency medical -- it's just not there.  I liked Mike's
     term "emergency mismanagement" because that's a real possibility, too.
         Sometimes we as the county's kind of -- there's a seesaw and
     we go like this and the other one goes like this, and that's a very
     possible thing to do when you have as urban a state as we have and as
     many rural counties as we have all being together at the same time.  One
     of the things that we have identified that Clark doesn't appreciate that
     much is that if something happened in one of our communities, it would
     affect 100 percent of the residents of our community -- 100 percent.
     Whereas it would be a very small percentage likely, of the vast urban
     populous.  This isn't a right or wrong; it's just an interesting
     observation, and sometimes we see that rural is the solution because
     there's fewer people.  And we're concerned that that's a risk trade-off
     that we're not all involved with.  Is it all okay to dump it on rural
     America?
         Finally, I think the hidden strategy in the EIS is to put
     enough information to build a repository, postpone the decisions on
     transportation, even though you're going to make them on the information
     that's in the EIS, so that by the time you make the decisions, you tell
     the public, well I'm sorry, we're already building your repository; it's
     too late to do anything about the transportation.  That's a long way off
     from Crescent Valley, but those are some of the issues that we deal with
     as we're considering the risks of transportation.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks Abby.  So far, there seems to be
     a theme of lack of information and analysis on transportation issues.
     But perhaps just as importantly, the lack of focus -- that might be the
     wrong way to say it.  But, has transportation really be adequately
     factored in to the whole waste management decision making process.  And
     let's go to Fred to see how all that holds up.
         MR. DILGER:  I'm in an awkward position this afternoon.  not
     only have my colleagues stolen my thunder for tomorrow, to add insult to
     injury, I've got to steal my own thunder for tomorrow, so I'll be in
     Abe's boat, redoing the presentation tonight.
         I just want to reiterate a couple of things and highlight a
     couple of things that have already been said pretty much, that we think
     are important.  The first is Jim's point about an integrated approach.
     We've been involved with the Department of Energy in one particular
     site, the site that shipped leaking boxes of radioactive materials to
     the test site for about six years, trying to get some agreement with
     them.  We've only been partially successful, and our success has not
     been applied complex-wide.
         On the low-level side, there's fragmentation and what we see
     as very, a lot of confusion.  Added on to that, the high-level waste
     program just worsens the situation from our perspective, and we think
     that the Department of Energy needs to take a look at the management of
     transportation.
         Another issue that's been raised here today is stakeholder
     involvement.  I think one of the things that has impeded stakeholder
     involvement and the transportation program in particular has been the
     sheer scale of the problem that we're talking about, that there's a
     reluctance on the part of the Department of Energy to address it on a
     national level, by trying to get some -- you know, there'd be no limit
     to the stakeholders that you could involve in a project like this.  But
     it does seem to us like something that has to be done.
         Transportation has, for the most part, been largely ignored
     over the last few years.  We call it the "field of dreams" approach; you
     know, if we build it, then it will come.  And just to highlight Abby's
     point, the thinking seems to be that if the Department of Energy spends
     all of its money constructing the site, they can turn to the Congress
     and say, well we've done our job; now it's your turn to make the
     transportation part of it work or give us the funds to make it work.
         I want to talk to something, I want -- I suppose you'll hear
     about it later on, but I do want to say, you know, on a positive note,
     that WIPP probably provides the best model for how to do a
     transportation program successfully.  In fact, in my experience it's
     been the only one that has been successful on a national basis.  Part of
     the success of that have been that they have undertaken extra regulatory
     measures to ensure, get agreement with the stakeholders.  And this is
     something the Department of Energy should not be afraid to do.
         One think I think that the ACNW can, an issue the ACNW can
     treat is, I think we have an agency missing here today.  We have the
     EPA.  You're going to be talking to the NRC, but I think the Department
     of Transportation should be involved in meetings like this because,
     although the NRC has a key role or lead role in regulating the
     Department of Energy, ultimately when it comes to transportation NRC
     licenses casks, but there's a lot of other transportation issues out
     there that are going to fall through the cracks if we don't get the
     Department of Transportation involved.
         On the last, the last point I want to make is about
     transportation risk.  From our perspective, we choose to focus a little
     bit more on impacts.  This is because when the county commissioners turn
     to us and ask questions, it's always phrased in that way -- they want to
     know how it's going to affect people, how it will affect the county and
     that kind of thing.  Abby made the point about most of her constituents
     living near the area, the same thing that Mike mentioned.
         In our case, we've analyzed the routes that are contained in
     the draft EIS and done some simple modeling to estimate what the loss in
     property values might be.  If you take a very modest estimate, about 5
     percent, which is what was awarded in the Comas v. Santa Fe case,
     depending on the route you choose it varies between $17- and $54
     million, just from a route designation.  Now we don't know that that'll
     come to pass, but we do know that that's a big impact.
         When the county recorder was briefed on this, the first
     thing out of her mouth was that Clark County would lose between $2- and
     $3 million. The county government would lose between $2- to $3 million
     the day some routes were designated.  So we see this as an impact that
     is certainly not addressed in the EIS, and it's certainly something
     that's very, very real, and it's also something that Congress is
     probably not going to be willing to fund.  So with that, I'll be quiet
     and turn it back over to Chip.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Fred.  The "stealing the
     thunder" remark that Fred mentioned, stealing his own thunder, referred
     to -- for your information, there's going to be a presentation on
     transportation again tomorrow, from 4:15 to 5:00.  And although there
     may be different, the counties may have different interests in some
     respects, there seem to be some common threads that you all have
     expressed on this, and I would open it up to the rest of the panel,
     including those of you from the counties who might want to respond to
     something that the other counties have said.  Let's go to Robert Olden.
         MR. HOLDEN:  A doctor went looking for his patient and found
     him and said, "I have good news and bad news, so what do you want to
     hear?"  He said, "Well give me the good news first."  He said, "Well,
     the good news is that you have 24 hours left."  The patient said, "Well,
     if that's good, what's the bad?"  He said, "I tried to find you
     yesterday."
         [Laughter.]
         MR. HOLDEN:  In regards to models and transportation and
     providing for impacts and support, and costs in the event of event of
     transportation accidents, there's so much I'd like to say but I'll try
     to sum it up in as few words as possible.  But in regards to models, I
     don't think WIPP is the exact model.  And that's sort of like good news
     and bad news -- they're beginning to work with the tribes, but they
     should have done it 15 years ago.  I worked with some tribes about that
     time, 15 years ago, and the WIPP folks promised infrastructure,
     development, equipment, training, and readiness.  And that's not
     happened for a lot of the pueblos and tribes who will be impacted, who
     are impacted now and very soon.
         I guess I'm also saying a lot that I've said in previous
     meetings with DOE, with NRC, as well as FEMA.  And that's some of what
     Abby was saying, you know, that the places that's being looked at, the
     rural areas, places with little or no populations, those are describing
     tribal lands as well.  And they certainly deserve no less protection
     than anyone else in an urban area.  The resources do not go to those
     areas.  You folks involved with management, emergency management made me
     aware of that.
         You may have seen the crack response team out of Oklahoma
     City that responded to the bombing a few years ago.  That was a model
     and it worked very well.  I'm from Oklahoma, and t hat's good to see.
     But I know some folks who are in the urban areas who say, well, that's
     well and good, but we don't have anything because all of the money flows
     through the urban areas through Oklahoma to Tulsa and so forth.  So
     that's the downside.
         As Abby stated a while ago, a lot of the program dollars
     that were going out to states, and even to our organization, the NCAI,
     for transportation-related matters, training, readiness and just general
     information that's been cut off because the emphasis was on building the
     repository, and that was the lifeline to a lot of tribes in terms of
     just getting general information about what is coming soon into their
     front yard, and not necessarily the back yard.  And for many of these
     areas, DOE has maintained that many of these areas do not have emergency
     management infrastructures in place, and so they're having to gear up
     from scratch in some instances.  And DOE maintains that they, you know,
     they're not there to be the builder of these program; however, were it
     not for these, this radiological waste, they would not need these
     programs, at least at the level they now have to be prepared for.  But I
     guess what also is happening at the same time is the formula that's
     being looked at internally at DOE for providing resources to states and
     tribes under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act for safe routine
     transportation.  And these formulas certainly leave out, or seem to act
     against tribes because the dollars not only within FEMA but within DOE
     and other agencies, all of those have been going to the states and none
     to the tribes.
         There was a study that was done -- I guess the idea was to
     make us feel good, make tribes feel good, that there was funding to the
     states and tribe that showed at least they were getting some money.  But
     when you look at the proportions, the hundreds of millions of dollars
     that had gone to the states and the sums that had gone to the tribes,
     it's, it wasn't a laughing matter.
         I guess that's what I would like to see happen, is for
     someone to tap DOE on the shoulder and remind them of what we've been
     saying all along, that these programs take many, many years to put in
     place -- training, development, turnover, all these nuances that go into
     emergency management schemes.  We need those in place -- we needed them
     yesterday, of course, but we don't have them.  But still, DOE sees them
     on the horizon and we need to be ready for this.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you, Robert.  Some special issues in
     regards to the tribes there, but also some of the same types of common
     threads that we heard from the counties.  Bill?
         MR. VASCONI:  Yes, back to entitlement and benefits -- and I
     do appreciate your comments, Jim and Mike.  I think the entitlements
     equities issues have always been out there somewhere, especially that
     the local government would pursue.
         I've got an old copy here of the Weapons Complex Monitor of
     '96 -- Nevada Test Site is Nation's Largest Waste Disposal Site.  It
     also mentioned in here what money's being put out elsewhere, where
     Nevada test site with approximately 25 generators.  12 point, or $12.63
     per square foot.  You go to some place like Barneswell, South Carolina,
     it's $80 per square foot and $235 per cubic foot state surcharge.
     That's money that's going directly into the state to benefit their
     state.
         Nevada test sites to get -- and this is '96 -- 55,000
     shipments of low-level waste in the Nevada test site for the next ten
     years.  You talk about the transportation routes for Yucca Mountain.  I
     was on the site-specific advisory board.  If you wanted to talk about
     Yucca Mountain, what they reminded you of was the fact that you were in
     a study phase.  Yucca Mountain wasn't necessarily approved.
     Transportation couldn't be an issue.  Yet we have the same routes, the
     same railroads, the same counties, only one direction to go.  Why
     couldn't we talk about transportation issues?
         The WIPP in New Mexico gets $20 million immediately and
     annually for 14 years -- that's $280 million -- because their
     congressional delegation worked with the U.S. Congress on those equity
     issues.  Again, South Carolina, they receive $140 million annually,
     state surcharge, on radioactive storage.  Perhaps Nevada didn't hold out
     the right hand, because maybe it could have been cost prohibitive for
     nuclear waste to come here, had we pursued the fact that we want equity
     entitlement benefits.
         If I can just take another minute and then I'll get off of
     this.  Yes, increased funding to local units of government from the, for
     local impact environmental studies to include credible oversight issue
     funding.  A, a world-class environmental and energy research center at
     the University of Nevada; B, Federal funding for a state-of-the-art
     emergency response program; C, water right issues for southern Nevada
     growth; D, transition lease of Nevada's Federal lands to the state,
     which is 86 percent Federal; E, funding for southern Nevada's
     infrastructure and transportation systems; F, Nevada's university
     research and educational funding.  Two more.  A stewardship trust fund
     for grants to state and county identities for site and use of YMP as
     studies conclude, as a repository during replacement operations, as a
     monitor to the study area, and as a closure equity.
         The last one I would say is, yes there is a lot of folks who
     would like to see a rail line between northern and southern Nevada for
     use as a means of moving high-level waste and low-level waste.
         Number one, 13 of your 21 state senators are from Clark
     County.  That means 26 of your 42 state representatives are from Clark
     County.  All the money's basically in Clark County or hotels.  You're
     gonna play hell moving out nuclear waste through Clark County. But a
     railroad system going north and south to the geographical center of
     Nevada, yes, will upset people.  The Bowawe, the Crescent Valley, the
     Smokey Valley, Tonapar area, going on to the test site, it's doable.
     But when that nuclear waste is hauled, what do you have?  You have a
     railroad system in the geographical center of the state of Nevada, to
     open it up for issues, economic development, long beyond the emplacement
     of that nuclear waste.  It could be a benefit to the citizens of Nevada.
     Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Bill.  I guess what you're
     suggesting on the last point is that there may be longer term benefits,
     perhaps, to the state from at least one type of solution to the waste
     disposal problem.
         Do we have any other comments on transportation?  I think we
     did develop some ideas for the Advisory Committee that we'll come back
     to at the end of the day, then I have two flip charts full and we'll put
     those up on the walls for discussion and see what else we can get.  But
     are we, we about ready to take a break at this point?  All right.
         Let's try to come back a little bit after 4.  That'll give
     you 15-plus minutes and maybe we'll make up a little bit of time.  I
     think that a lot of the points that Steve was going to make have been
     made --
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CAMERON:  I'm not suggesting that you won't be on.  I'm
     just saying it might be shorter.
        [Recess.]
         MR. CAMERON:  We're going to start off again with Steve
     Frishman on why people distrust risk assessment.  Now, I think you've
     heard a lot of ideas along those lines already, but I'm gonna turn it
     over to Steve and we'll see if we can put a finer point on this.  Steve.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  I won't go through a lot of the things that
     have been heard already and things that I had thought about talking
     about, but I'll try to pull it together by maybe hitting some of the
     points that haven't been hit and maybe we can get some bigger
     generalizations out of it.
         First of all, when people think about risk assessment, in
     general it's at the time they're seeing the consequences of an accident.
     And often -- and I know people who do this, they have literally
     collections of press material for accidents that can't happen.  And
     there's lots of them and we're all well aware of that.  So what happens
     is they look at the consequence then they realize that, yeah, it was
     likely because it happened.  And then they get to the "what went wrong?"
     part.  And I think we all know superb examples of that from almost all
     walks.  I guess the most recent, most obvious was the Mars Planet Probe.
     And that was a pretty simple one for what happened.  Somebody had a
     problem between English and metric units.  But they probably announced
     that even with that problem, they were only sixty miles off.
         Then I was reading something, I guess today or yesterday,
     saying that "almost" doesn't matter in risk assessment.  If you're
     flying from London to Boston, if you're even 600 feet off, you end up in
     the Bay.  and if you're a couple hundred feet off, you're very likely to
     end up in the Bay.
         So this is the way people are seeing risk assessments.  They
     generally notice the ones -- and I don't know whether it's a function of
     where people get their information.  But the ones that are most
     noticeable usually have to do with human error.  In performance
     assessment or risk assessment, human factors are another story entirely.
     And I think people understand that.
         And one of the major elements in not trusting in risk
     assessments is because you have human error that is sort of a separate
     analysis, and that analysis is I guess related to what I was talking
     about before, and the whole group was talking about.  And that was this
     idea of, "did you think of everything?"  And very often, you thought of
     everything except one thing.  And that's the one thing that resulted in
     the observation of the consequences.  There may be other things that you
     didn't think of, but at least that one was the cause of the problem.
         Now John, you were talking about risk assessment and the
     world that you live in.  And I still think that there is some difference
     -- and I'm not sure that I've analyzed it enough, but I think there's
     some obvious components.  There's some difference between what I might
     refer to as industrial risk assessment and the level to which we're
     pushing the same principles and methods for total system performance
     assessment.  I know, I remember quite a few years ago, this committee
     held a couple-day meeting on risk assessment and just before that
     meeting I had read what I thought was a really fascinating paper in
     Science Magazine, where risk assessment was being applied to the design
     of off-shore oil structures.  The methodology was very tight; you could
     also see that you could make design responses to the risks if you
     thought it was economically worth it; and also safety factors for the
     workers and so on.  And it also came from a very, very large pot of
     experience, where you knew pretty well what the parameters were that you
     had to work with.  Many of them had been tested and you make your
     decisions about what level of safety you want.
         But with GSPA, as has been noted by all of us throughout,
     what we're pushing for, we're pushing for the future with essentially no
     experience.  And this makes me apprehensive, especially when I see that
     the regulatory world is changing over to essentially entire reliance,
     where as Part 60 with its subsystem performance requirements -- we were
     looking at some deterministic approach.  If you're looking for a site
     for a repository, there, at least at the time Part 60 was written and
     even at the time 191 was written, we were still thinking there must be
     some attributes that probably have to be there in order to provide, if
     nothing else, an indication of the level of knowledge that we had about
     the site.
         With performance assessment, we're all caught up -- Bob more
     than anybody -- trying to figure out, among other things, what level of
     knowledge is necessary, and then working with a model where maybe that
     level of knowledge maybe gives you confidence in the model, and maybe it
     doesn't.  So I don't know whether you agree, John, or not, but I think
     there's a fundamental difference.  And it's disturbing that essentially
     full reliance is going onto TSPA when there's, when the public just
     doesn't have the faith in risk assessments, which are sort of the father
     of this whole exercise.  And you may never, using risk assessment or
     total system performance assessment, you may never convince people that
     you know enough.
         This comes back to I think one of Paul's points, and that's
     that decisions are alternately made on belief.  And if people don't
     believe the risk assessment or the performance assessment, then it just
     isn't gonna happen probably.
         There is another example that got me interested not too long
     ago where, right now in the design there's very heavy reliance on the
     waste package itself.  And that reliance for a while was pretty
     satisfactory from the standpoint of the assessors.  But then the thought
     was, well maybe we're relying too heavily on it without a sufficient
     database, so what do we need to do, because you really can't get a
     sufficient database in anywhere the time you have available.  So what do
     we do?  Let's put another barrier there.  And we really don't need it,
     and I think I heard either Bob or one of his colleagues say that we
     really don't think that we need it but it's a good idea to do it anyway.
     So that again makes me kind of wonder why should we trust this total
     system performance assessment when there are then sort of arbitrary
     overlays put in because it might be wrong.
         I guess we need to be more insistent, I think on the part of
     all of us, insistent on the question that I raised before and we
     discussed -- have we thought of everything.  I know throughout this
     program, in my experience, each time there is sort of a major change in
     the thinking, it's presented as if everything has been thought of.  This
     gets pretty discouraging, you know, for the number of years that I've
     been involved in it because in each case we can usually find something
     that wasn't thought of, and then the result is either it doesn't matter
     because the performance assessment and the sensitivity analysis shows
     that it only represents a small part of the ultimate dose.  So either it
     doesn't matter or we'll come up with another Band-Aid.
         The question is always going to be there and never really be
     answerable until there's some kind of accident, about whether we've
     thought of everything.
         Another area where I think risk assessment enters into, or
     risk assessment is impacted in the sense of how much you trust it, is in
     the extent to which there is reliance on expert judgment and how much
     extra judgment is cranked into the actual methodology and the actual
     running of performance assessment.  And I guess the only thing that I
     can do in that area is quote something that Ralph Keany told this
     program, the DOE program, a long time ago:  "You just have to remember
     that expert judgement is a state of knowledge, not a state of nature."
     I think that has to be remember because often in this program, it's
     used, I think, to describe a state of nature.
         Back to the idea of having at least some deterministic
     gateways.  And I mentioned that I was, or I am, somewhat disturbed that
     we're losing some system performance assessment, or subsystem
     performance requirements.  The examples don't lead to confidence at all,
     and in fact probably reduce what confidence people may have in this very
     long-term performance or risk assessment.
         If you look at a few things that have happened in this
     program, some of which we've been discussing all around today, one of
     them is, why do we have a new EPA standard?  We have a new EPA standard
     because there came a time in the early '90s when it was apparent to
     nearly everyone that Yucca Mountain would exceed the carbon-14 release
     standard in 40 C.F.R. 191.  And there was a long, pretty difficult
     exercise that went on with trying to get the EPA to modify that
     standard, and the EPA determined that it did not need to modify the
     standard.  The Department went to the National Academy's Board on
     Radioactive Waste and the Board was not convinced that they would go
     back for a change in the standard.  So the Department went to Congress
     and got he standard changed.
         So here we have a standard that is a quantitative standard.
     It was agreed to by a lot of people when it was first established and
     now it's taken away and replaced by performance assessment.  Now, what
     would this tell a rational person?  Is performance assessment going to
     be as stringent as the rule that was thrown out?  Obviously not, if it
     was replaced by it.
         We're in the process of looking at the -- well we have Part
     63, which is a replacement for 60.  And a good part of what's going on
     in, or at least in part of the thinking in Part 63, is a response to a
     fairly long-term demand by at least some parties that the subsystem
     performance requirements have got to go.  And now we see the Department
     of Energy flipping back and forth on whether it's going to propose new
     site recommendation guidelines.  Well, that is because in the guidelines
     there's a disqualifier that reflects one of those subsystem performance
     requirements that the site probably can't meet, and that's groundwater
     travel time.  So again, we have a quantitative standard -- one that at
     one point in time was generally agreed was good, if for no reason other
     than to represent our level of knowledge of the proposed site.  Again,
     replaced by performance assessments.  The question comes up, if you had
     to throw out the rule that had a quantitative standard that either you
     met or you didn't and replaced it with performance assessment, is it
     more or less rigorous to use performance assessment?  Obviously it's
     gotta be less rigorous because the idea, or it's gotta be perceived to
     be less rigorous because the perception is that the site would probably
     pass through the performance assessment on the same types of factors.
         So I guess I have brought out some different points, but
     they're sort of the living points where, to date, you haven't had very
     much public reaction to the type of risk assessment that's being applied
     to this program because it's kind of a floating thing and not a lot of
     people have been involved in watching it.  The draft EIS is maybe the
     first chance and it's probably surprising people, but there aren't that
     many people who have actually even tried to delve into such an
     intimidating subject, other than those of us who have to for one reason
     or another.
         I just want to, I guess, add one last point.  And that is,
     this year there was a conference in Stockholm that was called VALDOR,
     and that's Values in Decisions on Risk.  Some very interesting papers; I
     recommend the proceedings to you.  And I think on the EPA Yucca Mountain
     page, there's a way to order the proceedings.  It tells you who to talk
     to, to order the proceedings.
         SPEAKER:  That's a different contract.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Is it on the TRV?
         SPEAKER:  It's on the TRV.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Okay, you're the one from the year before.
     Well, anyway.
         One of the things that I tried to explore in that meeting
     was this whole question of transparency.  And the reason that I went
     into it was that I had made an observation that first transparency is
     sort of a fad right now, and it's being, the word is being thrown in all
     directions with different people meaning different things when they say
     it.  But it's just the thing that's supposed to be done now.
         An observation that I made about the performance assessment
     program for Yucca Mountain was that there was an implication that
     transparencies means that it's right.  And that began to disturb me a
     little bit because it's very similar to the implication that if you do
     all your quality assurance correctly, according to the right procedures
     and so on, that the answer must be right.  That isn't the case.  Just as
     with transparency, that isn't the case.  And transparency also means
     different things to different people.  Transparency in the performance
     assessment program in Yucca Mountain actually means what Abe was talking
     about in terms of clarity, comprehensiveness, documentation,
     traceability.  But to other people, it means more than that.  If you
     look in my dictionary -- not everybody's dictionary has it, but I'm
     fortunate enough to have a dictionary that includes in the definition of
     transparency without corruption.  And this is important in the sense
     that transparency to the public means much more than just the mechanics
     that Abe was talking about.  What it means is that the process has been
     open throughout on the way to a decision.  And if you don't like the
     word corruption, you can translate that to a transparent process from
     the public standpoint is one that not only does all of those things, but
     is also fair.  And in risk assessment, you don't have a lot of room to
     deal with the question of values and fairness being a value.
         I'm sure that the reason for that conference was because
     risk assessors are in a big dilemma, and it's over that exact situation.
     And that's, how do values get applied into decisions on risk?  In the
     conference we didn't answer the question.  We talked a lot about things
     that may or may not help, just as today we've talked a lot about things
     that may or may not help in getting additional involvement in the risk
     assessment questions.
         But there has got to be some way -- only because what's
     happening right now is not working, and that's that in reality the
     people who are most affected by decisions on risk are the ones who don't
     trust the way those decisions were made.  And like the people in
     Crescent Valley will never trust how the decision was made if the rail
     line comes through their valley.  You can tell them all about risk; you
     can say this was the lowest risk of all options.  They're not gonna
     believe that.
         So in the end, I think it's important that you're looking at
     the question, maybe coming from the standpoint of public involvement.
     But what it really comes down to is this question that the conference
     was after, and that's how do you incorporate values to the extent that
     people, whether they agree or not with a decision, at least have some
     confidence that all of the things that were important to them were
     considered in that decision.  And that comes back to, did you think of
     everything?  And the answer for the Yucca Mountain risk assessment or
     performance assessment program is assuredly no.  And the reason that
     it's no is because there's no place to consider values.
         I think I'll leave it at that.  There are other places where
     I could go but that fills in at least some of the gaps or at least makes
     more explicit some of the things that were said.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thank you very much, Steve.  That was
     very thoughtful.  I'm not sure that everybody will agree with your
     points but --
         MR. FRISHMAN:  If they agreed with me, I'd be out of work.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CAMERON:  Now that's tempting.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CAMERON:  I'm sure that tempts a lot of people, but we
     won't go there.
         MR. FRISHMAN:  Either that or you can buy a lot of
     insurance.
         MR. CAMERON:  What I would suggest doing is that maybe --
     I'm not sure I captured all of Steve's assessment of problems, and I put
     solutions over here.  I want to check with everybody to see whether they
     agree -- first of all, whether I captured --
         Then we have an ACNW advisory committee wrap-up session that I'm
     going to ask Dr. Garrick to lead off, and maybe we can fold those last
     two sessions together to talk about some of these recommendations that
     we heard, but we're not going to go to the audience right now.
         If you people around the table can indulge me on this list
     of problems that Steve identified, maybe we can at least come up with a
     taxonomy here.
         The first point was -- of distrust is that -- well, the
     whole idea of human error.  You're going to miss something.  Have we
     thought of everything?
         Does anybody have -- want to take issue with that?  I mean
     I'm talking about gross terms here.  Does anyone object to the fact that
     this is not a problem?
         MR. VASCONI:  Well, I don't think it's a problem.  You know,
     I'm one of the Americans that think that, between the National Academy
     of Sciences, the NRC, the EPA, and several other organizations,
     including the advisory board, my god, there's been a hell of a lot of
     work done on Yucca Mountain.
         I would like to have a penny for every piece of paper that's
     been wasted at Yucca Mountain, let alone oversight, etcetera.  I don't
     know of any other country in this world that has gone to the efforts of
     trying to please the people.
         I also worked at the Nevada test site as a radiation
     technician monitor when it was the Atomic Energy Commission.  I see a
     lot of response from DOE when you ask them questions.  They don't want
     to get caught in a mistake.  They give me answers.  They give a lot of
     our folks answers.
         Now, some of us might not be happy with them, but I see a
     lot of cooperation going on, I see a lot of effort being made to make
     this right, to make this work.  There are others who are paid to say
     what they do and the state is in opposition of Yucca Mountain.
         MR. CAMERON:  That's a fair point, Bill, and I'm going to
     put that up here.
         Let's go to Mal and then to Dave.
         Mal?
         MR. MURPHY:  I agree with everything Bill said with respect
     to the dedication and technical qualifications of the people involved in
     the program, but that same thing was true about the National Aeronautics
     and Space Administration, too, and they didn't have that final meeting
     to sit down and say, now, are we dealing with metric or are we dealing
     with English, and as a result, we all know what happened.  We just
     burned up a spaceship or whatever it was called that we sent somewhere.
     So, I mean I think the answer is obvious.
         MR. CAMERON:  Perhaps a good illustration of the point.
         MR. MURPHY:  We may not have thought of everything.
         I don't know whether we've thought of everything or we will
     have thought of everything by the time Abe gets around to putting the
     final cover on the license application, but I'm sure it's inconceivable
     to him that he wouldn't have one final meeting to sit down and say --
     and that meeting should involve everybody -- as many people as possible
     to say have we thought of everything?
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.
         Abe?
         MR. MURPHY:  Are we talking metric or English here?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  I wasn't going to respond to each one of
     these in particular.  I wanted to make a couple of general statements,
     but I'll wait until you give me the opportunity to do that.
         On human error, I think when it comes to the transportation
     and operational stages, there are genuine concerns about error.
         I don't see not thinking of everything as a human error.
         I see that as a process thing, that you involve as many
     outside experts as you can find in giving you advice and looking over
     your work and making sure that it includes pretty much what everyone
     else will do, and in that sense, we cooperate, we're part of the Nuclear
     Energy Agency in Paris, and we compare notes on features of processes
     and those types of things.
         But still, on the bottom rung, it's up to us to make the
     case that we've thought of everything that could be important and either
     dismissed it or incorporated it into our modeling, and I think that's
     the application that Steve was getting at.
         MR. CAMERON:  Judy, do you want to comment on the problem?
         MS. TREICHEL:  Yeah.  I think anytime that anybody announces
     that they have ruled out any possibility of human error, they're
     obviously wrong, and that you can't have a project, whether it involves
     nuclear waste or anything, that has a potential for harm where a human
     error can bring it down.  It just can't be done that way or you have
     disasters, but I also want you to take steering committee off.
         MR. CAMERON:  Is there no one here that thinks a steering
     committee is -- because it's irrelevant to me as the facilitator.  Is
     there no one who thinks that a steering committee might be a solution to
     did you think of everything?
         Abe?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  Actually, we don't call it that, but I think
     the process that I described where we, each time, start over and bring
     in all the experts working on the process level and then work up --
     that's exactly the purpose for that, is to say have you learned anything
     since this last time that would cause you to rethink the way that we're
     handling this, and so, we do make a consistent effort at trying for
     that, but obviously, there could be unknown unknowns out there, which by
     definition are unknown.
         MR. CAMERON:  And that's your internal model.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  Yes.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Do you need something like that from
     the standpoint of the public, I guess, is the question.
         MR. MURPHY:  Well, remember, you know, that's the purpose of
     the licensing process, too.  I'm surprised Bill didn't jump in on this,
     too.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. MURPHY:  Let's face it.  The ultimate did-you-think-of-
     everything question, I guess, is the one -- is posed by the Nuclear
     Regulatory Commission before they issue a construction authorization.
         MR. CAMERON:  Bill.
         MR. REAMER:  Well, I guess I would look at it a little bit
     differently.
         I would be concerned about an attitude that was expressed by
     any applicant or licensee that said we've discounted human error, we've
     looked at everything, we're sure that human error is not a problem, and
     we're sure that we've thought of everything.
         I think that we need attitudes that are always looking at
     those two questions, that are looking at experience and evaluating
     experience and deciding whether there are any lessons to be learned
     about human activity.
         Mistakes can happen in the process that are harmless
     mistakes, but we should look at those closely, we should try to learn
     from them, and we should evaluate our processes all the time, and the
     same thing with respect to have we thought of everything.
         I think the attitude that we want to see -- or at least this
     is my personal view -- is a humble attitude that says we are always
     looking, we are always evaluating, we're looking for more.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Humility plays a role, actually, and
     I'm taking steering committee off before I get in trouble.
         DR. GARRICK:  I object.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.  Well, that's good enough.  Thank
     you, Dr. Garrick.
         DR. GARRICK:  Let me just make the following point.
         Whenever I hear a position taken on Site A that's adamant,
     whether it's pro or con, that gives me pause for thought as to why, and
     I think the -- all we're suggesting here is that, in a very important
     application involving billions of dollars and very fundamental to our
     economy, the steering committee concept -- and you can call it some
     other name -- appeared to serve a very important conduit or mechanism
     for public participation in a highly technical process, and so, as a
     candidate solution, I don't see how logic would say that you have to
     eliminate it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you.  And that's all -- I think
     that is a very, very good articulation of the only significance that
     this has.  Okay.  So, I think that was great.
         Fred.
         MR. DILGER:  I'd just like to make a couple of points.
         First is that I don't think we can afford to discount human
     error at all and organizational error, but the political scientist Aaron
     Dabsky made the point that there probably wasn't any -- that after a
     certain point, there was no -- you were not going to get much return on
     your investment trying to anticipate every possible thing that could
     wrong in an organization, and so, he argued that you should create a
     system that will respond to events effectively rather than trying to --
     rather than spend a lot of time and energy trying to anticipate
     everything, and that's something that should have -- that I think is
     worth looking at.
         There's been a lot of new work about high reliability or
     highly reliable organizations -- aircraft carriers, emergency rooms,
     that kind of thing -- where people are brought in from all over the
     place and work together effectively over long periods of time, and this
     is the kind of organizational analysis that probably needs to be done
     for a Yucca Mountain -- at least, certainly, the Yucca Mountain
     transportation program.
         MR. CAMERON:  And what would you label that, this
     organizational analysis you're talking about?  A high reliability?
         MR. DILGER:  How about -- an old term is organizational
     effectiveness.
         MR. CAMERON:  So, I can list that over here?  You would
     suggest that?
         MR. DILGER:  Yes.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.
         Abe.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  In order to move this along a little faster,
     can I object to the breakouts which Steve Frishman created, which I
     think confuses some issues that are totally related and unrelated at the
     same time?  Can I make a political statement and then maybe everybody
     else argue with it and we can be done with five of those at the same
     time?
         MR. CAMERON:  Should we just eliminate these without the the
     polemical statement?  No, I'm kidding.  I think that that's fine.
         Take all of this with a lot of grains of salt, because we
     don't have the time to try to go through the methodology to -- but you
     know, I think maybe the most important point is to see if we all agree
     on this identification of -- Steve's take on the problem.
         So, why don't you go ahead and say what you want to say?
         MR. VAN LUIK:  All right.  And then I'll truly be quiet.
         The full reliance on risk assessment to ESPA -- I think if
     you read the NRC and the EPA proposed standards, you will see that an
     important part of the decision is relying on risk assessment to ESPA.
         However, there are the requirements for showing multiple
     barriers, and there are other things in there, and on top of that -- and
     this leads me to objecting to the -- whatever is under your arm right
     there.
         On top of that, the arbitrary overlays -- one of the reasons
     --
         MR. CAMERON:  I wasn't sure what that was.  I'm sorry.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  One of the reasons that we went to this
     arbitrary overlay of a drip shield is because we looked at the VA.
         We saw a 10,000-year performance was very good.  We saw that
     there was a lot of uncertainty largely because of the potential for
     dripping which we didn't have quantified to the point where we felt we
     had enough uncertainty, so we created an uncertainty shield.
         We called it a drip shield, but it's really an uncertainty
     shield, and to say that that's arbitrary -- what we said was we did the
     analysis, but we are not as confident of that analysis as we feel we
     should be.
         Therefore, we will add in this additional protection, and
     that gives us more confidence in the results of the TSPA.
         So, it's doing exactly what I think is required in terms of
     giving an extra layer of confidence.
         Now, the expert knowledge over-emphasis -- for the VA, we
     used some expert elicitation to give us model parameters, etcetera.  As
     fast as we can, we're moving away from that and building a base in data,
     but let's not forget that we can't worship data either.  It needs to be
     interpreted, it needs to be set into its context, and you can take all
     the core data that you want at a very small scale, but it will tell you
     very little about mountain-scale property.
         So, everything that we do in terms of data also requires the
     expert judgement of internal experts, which we like to fortify with
     outside experts, also.
         DR. GARRICK:  Just a comment, as a practitioner, I'd like to
     make the observation that more gross errors in risk assessments have
     come from errors in logic than have come from insufficient data.  You
     can change a logic gate and change the answer by several orders of
     magnitude with one mistake on the logic gate.  You can make all kinds of
     errors on data input and not have the same impact on the bottom line
     result.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you very much.
         DR. GARRICK:  So, the issue is not just data.  It's data
     plus the structure, how the thing works, and being able to represent
     exactly how the system operates.
         MR. VAN LUIK:  And going right back to the top, did you get
     enough input from various biases or belief systems to give you the
     indication that you've covered the major potential effects on the
     system.
         On the political override thing, I think it's wonderful that
     the EIS has been discussed here, the DEIS.  We are not taking comments
     here.  I hope all these comments will come to us in the proper process,
     but the point of the whole environmental impact statement process is to
     disclose the risk.
         It's not to make the decision on what is going to be the
     route or what is going to be the approach.  It's to disclose to the
     decision-makers who can then add in their other values, which is that
     last point, in finally making those decisions.
         And then, on the delta in the rules, I think that was an
     unfortunately shortsighted comment on the part of Steve, and I've told
     him this before.
         When we look at the EPA standard, DOE did object on the
     basis of the carbon-14 was going to cost us billions to show compliance
     with, although we thought we could, yet the risk to the population was
     so low that it really didn't make much sense.
         You multiply a very small number by 10 billion people, which
     was the assumed population for the world over 10,000 years, and sure,
     you get a large number.
         I must compliment in the EPA.  In the DID, the statement
     that accompanies the proposed standard -- I recommend you all read it --
     they do a very nice analysis of the carbon-14 releases and show
     basically that it's a very small impact on the local community and,
     therefore, much smaller on the communities farther away.
         The real reason that I personally like the new standard is
     because it protects the people most likely to be affected.
         The old standard allowed releases to a certain point in the
     geosphere based on generic assumptions about a site having ground water
     and surface water dilution and making an impact on the world.
         I have been quoted -- and I will never say this again --
     that the old standard allowed people to be fried in the vicinity of
     Yucca Mountain, even though it protected the world.  That turns out to
     be an overstatement.
         However, if you take the releases allowed by the old 10 CFR
     191 and do not dilute them and bring them directly to Amargosa Valley,
     those people at 20 kilometers receive whopping doses, and so, I think
     the people of Nevada and the people of Amargosa Valley should thank the
     EPA for correcting this in a site-specific manner for Yucca Mountain,
     and it was the right thing to do from that perspective.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you.
         Let me check in with Dr. Garrick and the group here at this
     point.
         We have Mr. Dials with us, who is going to do a
     presentation, and we have wrap-up that I think would be useful to do to
     go through some of the things we have heard about the advisory
     committee, what recommendations or issues they might want to explore to
     see if we agree with them, disagree, want to amplify on them, and I
     don't think that we can really close later than quarter to six or six at
     the latest, because we do have a public meeting that's going to start at
     seven, and we have to do some room rearranging, things like that.
         Should we close this discussion down now, go to Mr. Dials,
     and then come back and wrap up on these recommendations?
         Dr. Garrick, what's your pleasure?
         DR. GARRICK:  I think we'll want to hear what Ray Clark has
     to say, and then, yes, I think it's very important for us to get to Mr.
     Dials, because I think he does have an important message for us.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.  Good.
         Ray?
         MR. CLARK:  First of all, I take exception to the fact that
     people would get fried in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain under our
     standards.
         I assume you're referring to the release limits in 191?
     There was also an individual protection standard in that regulation,
     which was 15 millirem -- it is now.  So, there are two parts to that.
         For one thing, I think I heard Steve say that we've now
     switched to PA, which we didn't do in 191.  Maybe I missed your point.
     But we did use PA or refer to -- maybe we didn't use the term, that we
     talked about some other definition.
         Finally, since Steve raised it, I will throw a quick
     advertisement in here.
         About a year ago, we did cosponsor a symposium in Stockholm
     for environment regulation.  It was -- we think -- was the first time a
     meeting was held for international environmental regulators, and that
     was cosponsored with the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute, which
     is the equivalent of my office in Sweden, and the Stockholm Environment
     Institute, which is a non-profit organization in Stockholm, and yes, the
     directions for ordering that proceeding is on our web-site.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks a lot, Ray, and thanks to Steve
     for taking the time to give this some thought.  Not everybody agrees
     with the identification of the problems, but at some point, trying to
     work through this might be a useful exercise.
         But at any rate, let's bring George Dials up to talk about
     the WIPP experience and public environment.
         MR. DIALS:  My name is George Dials.  I'm the president and
     general manager of TRW Environmental Safety Systems, which is the M&O
     for the Yucca Mountain project, and I'm not here today to talk to you
     about Yucca Mountain.  I'm here to talk about a public outreach approach
     and successes that were related to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
         For a number of years, I was a senior executive in the
     Department of Energy, for about six years, exactly.  I spent most of
     that time in Carlsbad, New Mexico, working on the Waste Isolation Pilot
     Plant project.  I was also the manager for the national trans-uranic
     waste program, which was the umbrella activity under which the WIPP
     facility rested.
         I want to talk a little bit about the approaches we took at
     that project in terms of communicating very broadly with the public and
     trying to achieve some measure of understanding of one another's mutual
     views, perspective, and interest on a very important national program,
     and I'm glad to know -- and I'm sure you've had some very interesting
     discussions today on risk and risk assessment and different perspectives
     on risk, and I'm sorry I missed that.  It's one of my personal
     interests, and I dealt with Dr. Garrick for many years in the past on
     this issue related to WIPP.
         I'm glad to recognize that not many of us are truly
     committed to living in a risk-free world or we wouldn't be here at this
     meeting today.  I had to come down through the spaghetti bowl from my
     office.  I can tell you that's certainly not a risk-free activity in any
     measure of the word "risk."
         I want to go through some overheads with you, and I've got
     just some slides here that have a lot of words on them, and I'll try to
     talk you through it and hope they generate your thinking and some
     questions.
         One of the things we had to do with the Waste Isolation
     Pilot Plant project was to re-baseline the activity and the approach.  I
     was asked in October 1993 to undertake a management assessment of what
     was going on with the program and to try to help chart a path forward to
     licensing the facility.
         I was at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory at that
     time as one of the assistant managers running a group of activities
     there, and it demonstrated some ability to communicate with the public
     and to understand their perspective and solve problems.
         As a result of my participation there -- and it wasn't my
     decision-making, necessarily, that led to these results, but it was an
     activity I was pleased to be a part of -- some very specific decisions
     were made that put us on a path to dealing with public perceptions of
     the WIPP project and regulatory and licensing issues related thereto.
         We decided to establish a new Department of Energy
     organization committed specifically and totally to dealing with the
     issues related to the national trans-uranic waste program, and we called
     that the Carlsbad Area Office, and it reported directly into the
     Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, Tom Grumbly at that
     time, with a reporting line also to Secretary Hazel O'Leary.
         We also put the authority and the responsibility into that
     office and into the manager's hands in that office.  There wasn't a lot
     of bureaucratic overlay in terms of impedance to the decision-making.
         We were charged with specifically focusing on the regulatory
     licensing and stakeholder issues related to the site and to deal with
     their concerns and with the regulatory and licensing requirements.
         We canceled a much maligned, criticized on-site testing
     program to introduce containers, drums of trans-uranic waste underground
     in bins to do some gas generation testing and other sort of testing
     which we believe was a flawed approach to sort of short-circuit the
     licensing regulatory process, and we committed openly and frequently to
     greater public involvement in decision-making processes and began the
     effort to engender that very quickly.  It is not an easy thing to do
     when you enter a organization that is greatly distrusted by the public.
         I remember one meeting very well in Santa Fe where I was
     introduced by the state regulatory agency, the secretary of the energy
     and minerals department at the time, as the new manager of the WIPP
     project and was informed shortly thereafter by some of the activist
     groups that they've had seven previous managers of the WIPP project,
     none of whom they believed, why should they believe me, and my response,
     I thought, was focused and accurate:  You shouldn't believe me until I
     demonstrate through my actions that what I tell you is what I will do,
     and we started from there.
         It was not a smooth road, it wasn't easy, but we did get
     there.
         We did, in our communications plan, develop some focused
     themes that we consistently talked about.  We reminded everyone,
     including ourselves, why we were doing what we were doing.
         We reminded everyone, including our oversight committees --
     we had an independent oversight group that had been in existence for
     many years in New Mexico that was independently funded, was
     independently operated, it's had the same director for 18 years now, a
     gentleman named Dr. Bob Neil.
         We informed the WIPP panel of the National Academy of
     Sciences and all the other interested groups that we were working on a
     serious national problem, and our mandate was very simple, to try to
     develop a solution to the problem that minimized the risk to the
     nation's population.
         We communicated our concerns about worker safety and the
     safety of the public and our commitments to those.
         We talked about the very importance of dealing with this
     issue in terms of meeting other national imperatives that had been
     publicized, publicized, publicized, and communicated by the new
     Secretary of Energy and her assistant secretaries, and that was this
     very important goal of cleaning up the weapons complex sites, and I
     can't remember who the author was, but I remember the book quite well,
     which I read -- it's "Everything I Needed to Know I Learned in
     Kindergarten."
         One of the very important lessons there was clean up your
     own mess.  Well, the mess we're talking about cleaning up is a very
     difficult mess, but it's one that we are responsible for, not my
     grandchildren or great-grandchildren or their grandchildren.
         We are responsible for it.  We have an ethical, moral
     imperative to deal with the problem we have created which put -- and I
     believe I'm the first one that communicated this in terms that I could
     understand and that my mother, who lives in West Virginia, with an
     eighth-grade education could understand -- that within a 50-mile radius
     of all the trans-uranic waste sites, where we had de facto interim
     storage facilities and still have them today, live 53 million Americans.
     That's a lot of the population.  If you look at the number of people who
     live within the sites that Yucca Mountain is concerned about, that
     number goes up considerably.
         So, it is a national problem.  WIPP was a national problem.
     Trans-uranic waste storage and disposal is a national problem we should
     all be concerned about.
         Our attempts to identify public key concerns were difficult
     at best.  It was interesting that, as Winston Churchill said, you know,
     speaking of the United States and England, two great nations separated
     by a common language, we find that the groups who are interested broadly
     in these issues are very diverse and we do not speak the same language.
         Scientists and engineers, in fact, don't speak the same
     language.  Political scientists and social scientists don't speak the
     same language.  Regulators and license applicants do not speak the same
     language.
         So, we have a difficulty in communicating about these issues
     that makes it very incumbent upon us to maintain open communication
     lines even when we are talking past one another, and we need to have
     some way to bridge those communication lines so we finally focus in on
     what the issues are.  It's difficult, at best.
         We found that personal safety and environmental impacts due
     to storage were important but not the overriding consideration of most
     of the public interest groups are involved in this issue.
         As I've heard just briefly this afternoon, the primary issue
     and concern that became the issue and concern as identified in every
     environmental impact statement -- and by the way, we did three
     environmental impact statements for WIPP -- the first one to select the
     site, the second one to do the construction of the research facilities,
     and the third one to actually select the site for disposal.
         So, we had lots of opportunity for hearings and
     communication and do these alternative assessments and define the risk
     of those judgements, and as Abe has said, in the NEPA process, if you go
     back to the fundamental rationale for it, it's a decision-making tool to
     help identify all the risks.
         It isn't the decision-making document whether you open the
     facility.
         But we found that the public's primary concern was
     transportation, transportation, transportation, and we dealt with it in
     a very focused way, and I am pleased to have heard here this afternoon
     some recognition that we did some things right and there's some value in
     looking at the transportation protocols and the systems set up at WIPP
     for some guidance on how to do it for other programs.
         We found it very important that the key decision-makers in
     all of our activities not only within the government -- and I was a DOE
     official at that time, I'm not a DOE official now, so if it sounds like
     I say something about setting national policy or policy related to WIPP
     or Yucca Mountain or anything else, forgive me.
         I am no longer a national policy setter.  April will keep me
     straight.  I'm now in the private sector, and I defer the national
     policy-making to Lake Baird and the other people who run the program on
     Yucca Mountain and now to the folks who run the WIPP project.
         But it is critically important that the people who are
     setting national policy and who are setting the policies that the
     stakeholder groups respond to are informed, that we all have the same
     hymnal, so to speak, whether we're all singing in the same tune or not.
         We took extraordinary measures to ensure that every bit of
     information that I had at my disposal was made available to the public.
     This was not an easy task, and it met with some resistance from those
     who held the view that the public didn't always understand all the
     technical documents.
         I thought my response was very appropriate, said hell I
     don't understand them all either, but I still get them.
         So, you've got to share the information.  Exclusion is a
     great sin when you're dealing with these sort of issues.  Inclusion is
     the way to go, and inclusion in terms of distributing the information is
     critical.
         You have to realize, as has been said here, that the
     stakeholder groups who are very interested and who feel that they may be
     most adversely affected do not necessarily have the same resources you
     do to access information.  So, it takes extraordinary measures to make
     sure the information is available.
         One of the things we did when we produced the license
     application that went to our regulators, Environmental Protection
     Agency, we produced a citizen's guide to the compliance application
     document.
         We made the application available to everybody.  The citizen
     guide helped us understand what it contained, and I'm sure it helped the
     citizens who were interested in what was contained in those tens of
     thousands of pages also to know what was there and where to find it.
         We found that, although we were able, often, to generate
     participation in our meetings, that trans-uranic waste shipment and
     disposal was not necessarily a high priority on all the stakeholders'
     lists of things to worry about, particularly when they were distant from
     New Mexico.
         It was much more focused in New Mexico, particularly in
     Albuquerque and Santa Fe, in terms of environmental groups who were
     concerned about what the State was trying to do and the Federal
     Government was trying to do with opening the facility, and in Carlsbad,
     which was, interestingly enough, a very supportive and pro-actively
     supported population base, basically, who sought the siting of the
     facility in Carlsbad early on and supported it throughout the efforts to
     get it licensed, the mayor was apt to tell folks there that he ran on a
     pro-WIPP opening platform and got 89 percent of the vote.
         So, it was -- although there were some folks who opposed the
     facility, it was, by and large, supported by the local community.
         The challenges and focus areas for us became fairly evident.
     We focused our activities on our neighboring communities in New Mexico.
     That's where our most active stakeholders on a day-to-day basis were.
         The Environmental Evaluation Group, which was the
     independent oversight group, funded through one of the state
     universities and independent -- it has one time been established as part
     of the State Government, it was under the environment department, but it
     was found that there was too much politics to play in that sort of
     organizational construct, and it was removed to the university system,
     which while -- most people tell me university systems are fairly
     political -- it's certainly somewhat immune from the day-to-day politics
     that goes on around the statehouse.
         Bob Neil is still the director of that group.  He could be
     available, if anybody's interested, I'm sure, to talk about their
     involvement and role that they played.
         The other stakeholder groups were based primarily in
     Albuquerque and Santa Fe.  Albuquerque, of course, is the largest city.
     That's the population base.  It's also the location of the waste in New
     Mexico.
         You know, until WIPP opened last May, there was no waste in
     Carlsbad, it was all in Albuquerque or Los Alamos and traveling the road
     through Santa Fe up to Los Alamos or down to Sandia Labs often.
         We focused some attention there.  We enhanced our
     cooperative relationships with organizations in the communities that
     were interested in hearing about the project and why it was important.
         We presented our rationale for -- and made the technical and
     safety and scientific basis that supports the safety case that this was
     the right thing to do in the national interest, that it truly minimized
     the risk and would minimize the risk to large numbers of folks who were
     potentially exposed to any sort of radioactive releases that might occur
     at these temporary storage facilities, and got some understanding, I
     believe, that there was a rational approach and rationale for doing what
     we were proposing.
         We took on the -- in the national outreach effort, there was
     a need to communicate with the states and the interest groups around the
     sites, where there was large -- there were large quantities of trans-
     uranic waste in temporary storage.
         This includes most of the national laboratory systems and
     other -- in the system, and other sites such as Savannah River, Hanford,
     Oak Ridge.
         It was interesting that the -- while the trans-uranic waste
     issues, compared to the other issues they were worried about there, like
     high-level waste disposal or nuclear materials, other nuclear materials
     disposal, or nuclear weapons storage activities were not really high on
     their priority list, because in comparison, the radiation exposure risk
     -- again, this is a -- goes to perception of risk, and it differed for
     each site -- were much lower than, say, at Hanford, the liquid high-
     level waste in the tanks that were gurgling.
         So, we took the programs to them, talked about where we were
     in the scientific basis, engaged the site-specific advisory boards at
     each of those sites in terms of our activities and our scientific and
     technical baseline and the regulatory issues related to what we're
     trying to do and the transportation issues.
         One of the big differences in the program related to trans-
     uranic waste and the program related to high-level waste is we did, in
     fact, start early and focused and worked it often on the transportation
     side.
         The WIPP transportation protocols were negotiated over a
     long period of time with the governors of the states affected by the
     transportation activities and the state agencies in those states.
         We did have protocols put in place with the Western
     Governors Association initially, the Southern States Energy Board, and
     the Southern Governors Association, and the National Governors
     Association, which defined the extra-regulatory and the regulatory
     things we would do to ensure safe transportation of trans-uranic waste
     through their states.
         There was, obviously, a role played by the Department of
     Transportation in terms of helping define and select the most
     appropriate transportation routes.  These were, in fact, then,
     coordinated with each state and selected and approved by each state.
         We did training in each location in terms of emergency
     response.  We did training in terms of communications and tracking of
     transportation shipments.
         We did find, because we started early -- and this is a
     lessons learned, I think, that could apply in any other sort of campaign
     to move radioactive materials -- that you can start the emergency
     response training programs too soon.  I have found, through that
     experience, that there is high turnover in most emergency response teams
     in most states and cities, locations.
         So, you can train the people who are gone by the time you
     start the campaign if you don't have a planned, focused effort to do the
     training.  It's almost just-in-time training in some senses.
         But we did actually have very good response in working with
     the states and the emergency response and safety professionals in each
     state, including the state police in most cases, who had a very
     prominent role there.
         That includes our interactions with the State of Nevada in
     terms of training and agreement on the protocols for WIPP shipments.
         There is a document called a PIG, which is the protocol
     implementation guideline, that is available to everyone that could give
     you some idea of the way we went about the transportation planning,
     route designation, and emergency response training systems and also the
     way we went about the exercise program and funded the programs.
         From Los Alamos, once you get out of Los Alamos County,
     you're on Pueblo land, on a state highway but on Pueblo land -- at the
     Pueblo fire department, we add exercises where they, in fact, operated
     as a first responder and did extraordinarily well.
         I think I've covered some of the institutional programs.  We
     did talk about the governors associations, those sorts of things.
         It's very important to engage the institutional groups in
     meaningful participation.
         Without the support of the institutions that represent the
     governors, we would not have been able to effect the sort of successful
     protocols that had been used for other waste shipping campaigns
     successfully in addition to the WIPP campaigns.
         International interactions were important because we, as you
     have suggested, were very concerned about making sure we had covered
     everything.
         The United States is not alone in dealing with this
     difficult complex problem of nuclear waste disposal.  Every nation in
     the world that has a nuclear program, be it a weapons program, a defense
     program, or a civilian reactor program or research program, has the
     problem of what to do with nuclear waste.
         We are, in fact, a leader in dealing with this issue.
         It was important to me to engage the International Atomic
     Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, which is part of the
     Organization of Economic Community Development that's based in Paris --
     the IAEA is based in Vienna as a UN agency -- engage those two entities
     in an overview of our program.
         At some risk to the program and with great concern expressed
     by our regulator, the EPA, who wasn't sure this was such a good idea, I
     negotiated an agreement, with the blessing of my bosses in DOE
     headquarters, with the IAEA and NEA to do a joint international review
     of the technical and scientific baseline and regulatory baseline for our
     program.
         This review was conducted by internationally recognized
     experts, world-class scientists and engineers, and risk assessors, and
     confirmed for us that we had, in fact, dealt with the major issues.
         There were some things brought up that we had not thought of
     but we were able to deal with and able to address in a meaningful way.
         So, the international view and the international cooperation
     is important.  The Secretary of Energy, in fact, has announced a big
     international conference that's taking place at the end of this month
     and the first of November in Denver to pull in the leaders of the
     international program.
         One of the things we addressed in those sort of
     collaborations -- and we included the stakeholders in all of these
     activities.
         When I talk about our activities and what we're engaged in,
     it included invitations to the Environmental Evaluation Group, a long
     list of stakeholders who expressed an interest in being involved,
     including Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Citizens Against
     Radioactive Dumping, the Sierra Club, all of the groups who have an
     interest in this, and local citizen groups, rotary clubs, whatever the
     group was, to be involved.
         We were very inclusive, which sometimes takes a lot of
     effort and patience, because as your meetings do, a lot of people need
     to be heard and you want to hear everybody and you want to deal with the
     issues.
         See, Paul Davis, from Sandia, was involved in an effort that
     we undertook very early, that he helped invent, in fact, that was very
     successful in dealing with stakeholder perspectives on the scientific
     and technical baseline of the program.
         We went through a prioritization program called the systems
     prioritization method and published the reports on this where we
     revisited the technical baseline for the program to help prioritize the
     important parameters or important research activities that needed to be
     undertaken.
         We invited all the stakeholder groups to participate in
     that, and they participated very well, in large part, and provided some
     very useful insights that we were able to use to prioritize our
     scientific and technical program as we were moving towards finalizing
     the performance assessment, same process you will use in Yucca Mountain,
     the total systems performance assessment, to demonstrate compliance and
     support the compliance case with the regulatory program that EPA had
     established.
         Our communication plan was proactive, rather than being an
     advocate or reactive.  We were proactive in anticipation of future
     problems and proactive in bringing people to the table to discuss the
     issues.
         We were firm in our belief that our scientific and technical
     baseline was sound and we had dealt with the issues, but we were
     frequently addressing concerns and issues that were brought up by
     stakeholder groups and reporting back when we took actions in response
     to their concerns.
         We, in fact, did change, in the process of doing the systems
     prioritization method, some of the approaches we were taking to dealing
     with issues.
         We built relationships of trust because we were
     communicating.
         That doesn't mean we agreed always with the path forward,
     but we always worked on a professional way to honestly address the
     concerns that were raised and created a two-way communication channel
     that made it timely to exchange concerns and address concerns.
         At the end of the effort, as the compliance application was
     going in, we called together a special group, including representatives
     from the environmental groups, to address a list of issues that were
     first formulated by this group but were defined as issues that had been
     put on the table that had not been adequately addressed and spent a lot
     of time with a group that had come together, were chosen by their
     representative organizations to deal with the issues.
         We wanted no issue left that had not been addressed.  That
     did not mean we reached consensus on our compliance application or on
     the decision to open the facility.
         There are still groups in New Mexico who oppose the Waste
     Isolation Pilot Plant and think it should never have opened.
         We encourage technology transfer.  We were very proactive in
     seeking an opportunity to interact in public forum.  We participated
     openly in all the EIS activities.  We had many hearings and made an
     effort to ensure that all interested groups were recognized and
     participated.
         Again, this is not an easy take to undertake, and there are
     contentious issues, and there are honest differences of opinion about
     what is the right thing to do with nuclear waste.
         One of the things we tried to do is to get us all working
     from the same frame of reference.  For example, in the regulations that
     the EPA put in place for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the standards,
     after 150 years we had to assume in the performance assessment and in
     our operation of the facility that we would lose institutional control
     of the facility.
         Now, there was no more definition of the underlying
     assumptions for that, but if you assume that the U.S. Government loses
     institutional control of a Federal facility, then, in our view, we must
     assume that, if you had the no-action alternative, the same assumption
     should be applied.
         That is, we want to get on an equal basis of assessing the
     risk and the impacts.
         So, as we addressed that issue, we found that was the one
     that was most difficult for some groups to accept, and we would say
     that, if you assume we lose, in New Mexico, institutional control of
     WIPP, then we've also lost institutional control of Sandia and all those
     very critical materials that are there, and institutional control of Los
     Alamos, where we have thousands of drums of trans-uranic waste and much
     more highly-radioactive materials in temporary storage, and then assess
     the comparative risk of each of those.
         We opened an office in Santa Fe, and I've already gone
     through a lot of this.  We assigned staff particularly to deal with
     this.
         We found one of the things we weren't communicating very
     clearly with the public -- as many of you know, New Mexico is a
     bilingual state, by and large, particularly the northern part of the
     state.  We didn't have any fluent Hispanic speakers on our staff when I
     first got there.
         We changed that very quickly when we opened the office and
     found that to be a very effective way to engender broader participation
     in the discussions and debate from the small communities throughout
     northern New Mexico who also had a voice and thought they would be
     adversely affected by the decisions that were being made.
         We partnered with Los Alamos in northern New Mexico on some
     things in terms of dealing with the technical issues.  We didn't
     necessarily partner with them on dealing with all the public issues.
         Los Alamos, as it were, is very highly respected from a
     technical/scientific standpoint, but they're accused often of being
     unreliable partners in the community and unresponsive to broader
     community needs.  I think we helped them recognize some of that and deal
     with it.
         It was very important, though, that we -- I think the most
     important step, actually, was to open the office up there and to be
     there every day and be available and open to all the citizens, no matter
     how they felt about the program, and all our data, all the computers
     were there, they could get access to a computer, they had access to all
     the compliance documents, they had access to the database, they had
     access to staff who would make sure they got information and could
     answer their questions.
         I think our winning strategy -- and this is winning strategy
     in the sense of dealing with public issues, in communicating with the
     public, and in moving the project forward -- was simply this:  We had
     focused leadership with the authority and responsibility to take the
     actions necessary to deal with public issues.
         We demonstrated a best-in-class.  We were the first DOE
     facility to get a volunteer protection status gold star award, which is
     a commercial OSHA safety award that made us self-regulating.
         We figured if we couldn't demonstrate that we were concerned
     about the safety of our own staff, why should the public believe we're
     concerned about their safety?
         We had some excellent environmental programs and activities.
         We had a well-integrated organization in the sense that our
     team of scientists, engineers, public affairs people, social scientists,
     legal staff were integrated in line with the same vision and mission and
     the same commitment to public outreach.
         It didn't take more than one complaint from the public about
     somebody being obtuse, uncooperative, or demeaning to have them removed.
         We implemented a sound science and engineering program in
     which the public had some input through the systems prioritization
     method, primarily, and some groups were very adept at raising and
     pushing technical issues, and we had to address those and did so
     successfully.
         We had a very detailed and aggressive schedule -- and I'm
     going to show you that in a minute -- which included the stakeholder
     involvement pieces.
         So, the interactions with the public were as important on
     our schedule and were statused every month and conducted every month,
     every week as they were scheduled.  The public saw that and, I think,
     appreciated being on the schedule, first of all, and then appreciated us
     statusing and making sure that those things were done.
         We had frequent regulator interactions, and many of those
     meetings -- not all of them, because we did respond to our regulators'
     desire, and one axiom of licensing that I have learned in my career --
     and I've licensed lots of things, from coal mine preparation plants to
     coal mines to helping license the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
         One axiom of licensing, of regulator interactions is you
     give the regulator what they want.  So, my NRC friends are here, I know.
         We'll give you what you want, and we won't argue with you
     about whether you need it or not.
         And frequent stakeholder outreach and involvement -- and I
     do have -- I'll show you this.  This is a very busy slide, but I want
     you to see that the stakeholder piece was on there and statused just
     like every other important piece of the program, had equal high
     priority.
         We were dealing with the public for whom we worked,
     actually, and their involvement was critical to our success.
         I believe we did some things that provide some lessons
     learned.  We did not do all of these things without making a lot of
     mistakes.
         We did have some very contentious meetings and briefings
     with both regulators and activist groups, but our disagreements were
     always honest and always in the open, and we were, I think, very
     religious in responding to requests for information and getting back to
     people when there was an issue that was raised.
         If we didn't agree with you, you knew about it up front, as
     soon as we had an opportunity to deal with the issue.
         I'm happy to be here today.  I'll be happy to answer any
     questions, John, if that's appropriate.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you.  We would thank you for the
     terrific presentation.  You touched on a lot of issues that the people
     around the table have been talking about.  I would apologize for all of
     us for our being sort of behind in schedule, because I know that we'd
     love to keep you here with questions.  I think we'll have to keep that
     pretty minimal at this point.
         MR. DIALS:  I've got another meeting to go to, too.
         MR. CAMERON:  Mike?
         MR. BAUGHMAN:  I was just curious, George.  Your disposal
     decision plan shows that interactions with the EEG and with the NAS were
     probably more frequent than any other interactions that you had, just
     summing these up.  I wonder if you could just characterize the role that
     the EEG played in this program and in, you know, resolving technical
     questions, things of that matter.
         MR. DIALS:  Well, that's a good question.
         We didn't list all the things in there.  There's a piece of
     the thing that was missing where we had other groups listed who
     participated in these.  So, the EEG group were quarterly meetings that
     were open to the public, and they were often the genesis for other
     public groups to come in and be involved.
         So, EEG activities were established early in the program.
         It was felt by the State of New Mexico, once the AEC,
     initially, and then ERTA, then DOE got the program going, that they
     needed some independent technical oversight group that could address the
     program and represent the state's best interest.
         It was initially created as an arm of or adjunct to the
     environment department, New Mexico Environment Department.
         Bob Neil was selected as the first director.  He's been the
     first and only director.  He's still the director today.
         The funding for the program was from the Department of
     Energy initially, through the environment department, but with no
     ability or opportunity to sort of direct their work.
         We didn't review their reports.  We received them and
     responded to them, but we had no draft reviews or anything like that.
         At one point, there was an attempt made to politicize some
     of the activities in the '80s, early '80s, and a decision was taken by
     the Congressional delegation, Senator Dominici and Senator Bingaman, to
     remove it from the environment department and move it under the
     university group, and it maintained the same role and organizational
     structure.  Bob Neil remained the director.
         They were funded through New Mexico Tech and had the same
     obligation to review and comment upon the technical scientific baseline
     for the repository.
         MR. CAMERON:  What was the composition of -- we've been
     talking about steering committees and things like that.  What was the
     composition of the EEG?
         MR. DIALS:  The EEG is largely Ph.D., Masters-degreed
     scientists and engineers.  I think the staff was up to about 16 people
     at one time, a budget of about $2 1/2 million.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  So, scientific expertise rather than,
     for example, a group of affected -- representatives of affected
     interests.
         MR. DIALS:  That's right.  That particular group had that
     mandate.
         They did interact and act as a catalyst for other groups, of
     course, and were a resource and often called on by other groups to
     explain and address issues of concern.
         MR. CAMERON:  And maybe the same type of catalyst that the
     advisory committee could perhaps serve, and I think that that's what's
     being explored here.
         MR. DIALS:  I think it was an effective organization in
     terms of dealing with technical scientific issues and holding our feet
     to the fire in terms of transparency and dealing with the issues in a
     way that they felt were fully resolved.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Well, that's great, Mr. Dials.  I guess
     we probably should move on to our wrap-up, but we thank you very much
     for the presentation.
         [Applause.]
         MR. CAMERON:  We're going to sort of combine the last two
     items on the agenda, which is the advisory committee role and a
     discussion of what the advisory committee might do in terms of public
     involvement, risk communication, and a lot of other things we've been
     discussing.
         I'm going to turn it over to Dr. Garrick, the chair of the
     advisory committee, to give us a little bit of an overview on the
     committee.
         DR. GARRICK:  I've been thinking to myself here how I could
     make a story about what we are exciting, and I am not sure I've been
     successful, but one thing I think would -- maybe would be of interest to
     all is to make it short.
         So, I'm going to do that, because if the people from the
     public want to hear more about ACNW, we'll have another opportunity
     later tonight to answer questions and what have you, even though our
     primary interest is to listen.
         Let me just make a comment or two about what ACNW is.
         Of course, we are an independent group.  We are a very small
     group, and when we have a full committee, there are four full-time
     members.  We are one short at the present time.  We offset our lack of
     expertise and our shortage of representation by bringing consultants in.
     That's why we have Milt Levenson with us today, and he's been with us
     the last couple of meetings.
         Our purpose is to use our expertise and independence to,
     hopefully, add credibility to NRC's decisions.
         Our scope is rather extensive.  It includes transportation,
     storage and disposal of high- and low-level radioactive waste, as well
     as reactor and nuclear material plant decommissioning activities.
         However, much of our emphasis of late is focused on Yucca
     Mountain.  It is, as has been said many times today, a unique project, a
     first of a kind, and it's a first of a kind, certainly, for the NRC and
     its advisory organizations.
         In addition to the business of advising the Commission, we
     do provide a forum for various stakeholders to air their views.
         We have been aggressive in this regard, and we encourage
     everybody to use this committee as a vehicle to express their views to
     the Commission, directly to the Commission, as well as to us.
         We have had some evidence that we do influence changes.
         We've seen changes in DOE's program that coincide with some
     of our recommendations, and also, that, I think, means that, as you, the
     public, influences us, we have the ability to focus on those issues and
     exert whatever influence or advice that we can on having an impact on
     the Yucca Mountain project.
         I think that, as far as our over-arching kinds of messages
     are concerned, we have been emphasizing three, primarily, in our
     dealings with the NRC commissioners and the chairman.
         One has to do with providing advice and whatever assistance
     we can to make this transition into a risk-informed approach to
     regulation.
         I put emphasis on "informed" because I know there's some
     anxiety with a lot of people about moving to a risk-based type of
     regulatory practice.  Part of the anxiety is because it's not clear what
     it really is and what it really means.
         I think the past chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory
     Commission was quite creative and had considerable vision to come up
     with the concept of risk-informed regulation.  I think it's the way to
     do it.  It gives us a chance to address the business of how risk should
     play out in the regulatory process in phases, and if the early phases
     prove to have real problems, corrections can be made, and even the
     possibility exists to take a new direction.
         The second message that we have emphasized a great deal is
     the message of understanding the safety assessments.  We've been calling
     it here today, probably an over-used word -- I tend to agree a little
     bit with Steve on this point -- transparency.
         What we're really talking about here is simply understanding
     what's going on, simply being able to see a logical structure and a
     somewhat understandable basis of the conclusions of the risk measures,
     safety measures.
         And then the third message that we've given a lot of
     emphasis to -- and we've stuck our neck out on this one a little bit,
     because some people would say we are not public relations experts, which
     we are not, that we are not risk communicator experts, which we are not
     -- and that is the issue of involving the public, but we have, as a
     body, as a group, tried desperately to at least understand more clearly
     how, as technical people, we can do our part in better involving the
     public, better reaching out to them, and better understanding what the
     issues are.
         So, I think that's about all I want to say at this point and
     see if we can't pick up a little time.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.
         I thought it might be useful to just run through some of the
     notes I took where people referred to things that they might want the
     advisory committee to consider, and obviously, these are just a small,
     small part of what the advisory committee does, and they do have an
     action plan, which I found to be very interesting in terms of what their
     goals and objectives are, and that will give you an idea of the
     framework that the advisory committee is working from, but let me run
     through some of the things that I've heard to see if there's any
     agreement, disagreement, amplification anybody wants to put on them,
     anything else that we want to capture here, and excuse my scrawl, but
     review of NRC staff evaluation of public comments on Part 63 was one
     thing that we heard, I think, from Steve this morning.  Any comments on
     that?
         [No response.]
         MR. CAMERON:  The Committee should take a broad look at
     mitigating license conditions regardless of the scope of the
     environmental impact statement, and my apologies to those who suggested
     these for perhaps what is an awkward characterization on my part, but
     Dr. Wymer, do you have something to add on that?
         DR. WYMER:  Yeah.  In one of the earlier discussions, the
     point was brought out that perhaps we ought to go beyond what's in these
     documents and explore regions that aren't really covered by the
     documents because they're not necessarily all-inclusive, and I think
     that may be one of the important roles that this committee actually
     tries to play.
         We do tend to think out of the box a little bit more than
     most of our -- many of our associates who have very definite assignments
     and very definite roles.
         We do it to the point, actually, where people sometimes
     accuse us of trying to tell DOE how to do their business rather than
     telling NRC how to conduct their business, but it is a role that we
     play, and it's one that we are not really apologizing for even though we
     sometimes are criticized for it.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you for adding that, and that's part of,
     I guess, your uniqueness vis a vis some of these other organizations.
         Another thing that I heard was the advisory committee should
     ensure that the NRC develops a better rationale for its position on
     ground water protection.  Any comment on that?
         Murphy?  Nothing?
         MR. MURPHY:  I thought the NRC explained its position on
     additional ground water protection requirements pretty well in the
     meetings that they conducted up in Ni County, but Ni County's position
     on that issue is not driven by how articulate the NRC's statement of its
     position was.
         It's simply driven by the fact that the citizens of New
     Mexico, with the WIPP project, get an additional ground water protection
     standard and, by god, the citizens of Ni County are entitled to one,
     too, regardless of the scientific rationale.
         That may be a good idea, but I don't know how much that's --
     a better rationale is unlikely to change people's minds in that area.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you.
         Make sure regulatory documents -- for example, the
     environmental impact statement -- express the uncertainty involved.  I
     think that may go to the point that was raised by Dr. Wymer about
     looking past just what's in the document to what's not in the document.
         Any comments on that?
         [No response.]
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.
         Going over to the next flip chart, there's that horrible
     term "steering group" again, but I have included in that bullet the
     system prioritization idea that Paul was talking about and, indeed, as
     George Dials noted was Paul's brainchild, actually, as a way of have we
     thought of everything and bringing in a broad public perspective and
     involvement into that, and of course, we talked about the Exxon Valdez
     experience, and I think Fred said that there may be a number of other
     models, so to speak, that can be found in the National Research Council
     book.  Anybody have anything to say about that?
         [No response.]
         MR. CAMERON:  Next thing is challenge the NRC staff to take
     a hard look at the Department of Energy environmental impact statement
     in terms of transportation.  I mean that is a more specific point that's
     put on a lot of these other more general points.
         Comments?
         [No response.]
         MR. CAMERON:  More involvement of Department of
     Transportation in the process.  I don't know how often the Department of
     Transportation has been before the advisory committee or how
     transportation has been looked at, but that's another comment.
         Any further on that?
         Fred?
         MR. DILGER:  I'd just like to expand that a little bit.  I
     meant really Federal agencies that might be relevant.  The DOT came to
     mind immediately.  Another one that might be worth talking to is the
     Bureau of Land Management.
         A good deal of the property that the proposed rail lines and
     heavy haul routes and that kind of thing are maybe built across is their
     land, and some of that land they have agreements with local governments
     about the use of.  So, there may be benefit in the committee talking to
     them.
         MR. CAMERON:  So, perhaps casting a wider net in terms of
     issues and impacts and involvement.
         More attention to tribal issues and needs.  I think we heard
     from Robert a number of times on various issues related to that.
         Does anybody want to add anything for the advisory
     committee's consideration?
         There are a set of view-graphs, flip-charts in here that --
     I tried to characterize the major points that people were making, but
     these are what I've picked up for the advisory committee.  There may be
     more when you look through that.
         I guess maybe it would be useful to not only go to Milt but
     to just see if there's any final brief comments for the advisory
     committee's benefit that anybody around the table wants to make in terms
     of this first effort.
         Let's hear from Milt first, and then we'll go to Mike.
         MR. LEVENSON:  We've tried to listen and understand concerns
     and comments, but there's two things I'd like to point out.
         One is the ACNW is a technical advisory committee to NRC,
     and some of the concerns that we have -- because some of us have the
     same concerns you have -- don't come under the jurisdiction of the NRC,
     and therefore, there's very little the ACNW can do.
         They can only make recommendations about issues where the
     NRC has responsibility and authority, and so, if, in our letters or
     reports that come out of this, you don't see a mention of something that
     you raised, it doesn't mean we didn't think it was legitimate, it just
     isn't in the purview of this group.
         Second is an observation, because I know a lot of people in
     Nevada have got a lot of history and background with the testing
     station, and you have a lot of views of DOE.
         Historically, NRC has not been involved in reviewing and
     licensing DOE activities in the past.  So, you shouldn't necessarily
     apply those things of the past to this activity, which is quite
     different.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks for that important
     clarification, Milt.
         Mike?
         MR. BAUGHMAN:  I would just -- I don't know how the ACNW
     operates, but my guess, as one county representative, I would hope that,
     at some point in the near -- or not necessarily near future, but at some
     point in the future, we, as participants in this meeting today, would
     get some sense of what influence these recommendations have had on how
     you intend to business.
         So, perhaps when you report back, you could include, you
     know, some indication that your comments have influence or will
     influence our deliberations, you know, in the following ways.  That
     would certainly give me a little greater confidence in even this
     exercise.
         DR. GARRICK:  Yeah, I think that's an excellent comment, and
     part of what I was going to talk about a little bit that would have been
     somewhat of an illustration of this -- I was going to give you some
     examples of where recommendations of the committee did influence the
     regulatory preparation and other decisions that were made by the NRC.
         MR. CAMERON:  John, you might just tell people how the
     advisory committee communicates with the Commission after it has its
     meetings.
         DR. GARRICK:  Well, we do it in a number of ways.
         We, of course, depending on the issue, will prepare usually
     a letter addressed to the Chairman, and those letters are very
     methodically developed and take a lot of energy and debate and
     discussion, and we may prepare anywhere from 10 to 15 letters of that
     type a year, depending on just what the issues are.
         So, the letters are one important vehicle.  Those letters
     are responded to by the Executive Director's Office, through the
     Commission, back to us, so that there is a documented feedback.
         In addition to the letters, we have one-on-one meetings with
     the commissioners quite frequently to better understand what's on their
     mind and to have an opportunity to get input for our planning exercise,
     and then we have the formal, somewhat formal public meetings with the
     Commission where we go over a lot of the issues that had been previously
     covered in the letters, we amplify on them, indicate the direction that
     the committee seems to be going, and of course, we use the public
     meetings, Commission meetings, as source material for our future
     planning.
         So, there's a number of mechanisms of interacting with the
     Commission and the staff, and of course, our meetings, which happen
     eight to 11 times a year, are quite extensive, from two to three days,
     most often three days, of listening to presentations from either the
     applicants or the NRC staff or outsiders as appropriate on specific
     issues.
         So, it's a rather positive feedback system that we have, and
     we carry that even further in that we do a self-assessment, go through a
     self-assessment process each year, where we kind of line up the
     recommendations we've made against actions taken by the Commission and
     activities of the Commission and try to measure what our impact has
     been, what our progress has been, and of course, all this becomes input
     for our annual planning exercise that has as its objective re-examining
     our mission, our vision, the scope of our activities, and re-
     establishing our priorities into first- and second-tier levels, and as
     we said earlier today, the meeting we had approximately a year ago with
     the public was a major influence in elevating the whole issue of risk
     communication, public involvement from a -- up to a tier one priority.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you very much, John.
         Let's go to Abby for a comment, final comment from her, and
     then over to Robert Holden.
         Abby?
         MS. JOHNSON:  Well, I want to compliment this committee on
     taking the initiative to put this roundtable together, and I learned a
     lot today, and it's not often that we get to have this sort of, believe
     it or not, re-waxed exchange of views.
         The message I would like to send to the committee is to take
     on the Nevada public involvement challenge as a special concern of the
     committee.
         In Bill Reamer's remarks, that was his fourth point, involve
     the public throughout.  He said that NRC wants to have a relationship
     for the long term and is committed to having public access to the safety
     assessment information.
         Well, it's pretty hard to have public access to the safety
     assessment information when you're 3,000 miles away or when you're eight
     hours from Las Vegas and all that kind of thing.  It really is hard.
     It's really a challenge.  And it would be great if we had someone who
     was asking those questions on a regular basis other than us and who was
     thinking about that and bringing those things up and saying, well, what
     are you doing about that and how's it going with Nevada and are you
     getting public involvement and that kind of thing.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Abby.
         Robert Holden.
         MR. HOLDEN:  Someone asked me earlier if I was the eternal
     optimist for still coming to these meetings, but you know, maybe it's
     like those machines in each town.  You know, if you pull them enough
     times, you might get lucky.  But I don't know if that's going to happen
     in this area or not, but I still have to try.
         I guess the alternative is to throw up your hands, either
     that or lock your borders, and some tribes have done that in the past.
         I just had to have a conversation with Mr. Dials in terms
     of, you know, some of the history of WIPP prior to his coming and even
     while he's there and just remind him of, you know, some of the things
     that happen over that period of time, and one of the things he did say
     was that, yes, I realize that these things take a long time, these
     agreements, these programs, emergency management take a long time to get
     in place, as well as the infrastructure.
         So, all I said was that I wish he would have said that in
     here, but some tribes did close their borders in order to respond, to
     prompt INEL, to prompt WIPP, to prompt the Federal Government on foreign
     shipments to recognize their sovereignty.
         There's been much talk about the economic loss that could
     follow in terms of development of these types of activities, as well as
     accidents.
         The only thing I would say in response to that is that, you
     know, the cultural loss can be put into dollars.  In risk assessment,
     you can't use the risk assessment models, because they don't incorporate
     dose pathways.  They do not incorporate the types of loss impacted from
     tribal members, to tribal members.
         The cultural people -- the loss in terms of -- you know, one
     of the analogies that's used is pesticides.  If there's pesticide, into
     --
     It may impact a weed grown along that river, which someone will pull and
     chew, to make into a basket.  It will get into their system and it will
     get into the system of their children and their children's children, as
     well as if that pesticide impacts that plant, it may die.  That person
     will not be able to make a basket.  That person will not be able to give
     that basket to someone in the community to do a ceremony.  That person,
     therefore, will not have a place, whoever sings that song and whatever
     that ceremony is about.
         Those are the things that we're talking about.  Those are
     the cultural differences that we talk about.  It takes a long time to
     communicate that.  And I just have to remind the NRC that part of the
     truster's responsibility that they bare is to do this outreach with
     tribal governments.  How long it takes, that's not what we think of, in
     terms of time.  What we look at is the long term, the long haul.  And in
     closing, all I say is what I said at the beginning, there's two types of
     land:  there's Indian country and former Indian country.
         Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Robert.  I think that several
     members of the public are going to be joining us again tonight, when we
     come back.  There's one person, who has been here all day, who I just
     want to give an opportunity to make a brief statement to the Committee,
     and this is Ervin Lent, Nye County Supervisor, District III, over in
     California, 17 miles from the proposed nuclear depository.
         MR. LENT:  I share a lot of the sentiment and concerns that
     Mr. Holden has expressed.  Being Native American myself and representing
     probably 50 percent of -- well over 50 percent of the Native Americans
     in Nye County, as well as a good number of non-Natives, our concern
     primarily is with transputation and the assessments, as they pertain to
     accidents, something that is very, very important in our minds.  And
     given the relationships in the past of different federal agencies toward
     the top -- coming from the top down, we need to establish again that
     element of trust.  And I think that this meeting here today, what I hear
     primarily is that you want the public to trust this activity and see
     this thing come to fruition.
         In the south of our county, which is fairly isolated, and
     listening to the different speakers speaking about -- assuming that the
     level of risk is fairly low there, I think that would be something that
     we need to re -- or not only reassess, but look at even more
     intricately, due to the fact that the lower county is not equipped to
     address any type of accident in the area.  I think that the quickest
     response time in that area could be up to two hours, depending on which
     area has the most prepared response team.  We will need Hazmats
     training.  We will, also, need some type of infrastructure perhaps or
     reorganization to address areas that pertain to accidents.
         I think that most of all, in concert with that, is the
     tribal element.  We, also, have a group called the Timbashish Shoshone,
     who is in the process of acquiring about 7,800 acres of land, not only
     the greater portion in California, but, also, in Nevada -- I believe Nye
     County and an adjacent county.  Should those efforts become reality, we,
     again, have those agreements between those tribes that need to be worked
     out.
         How this proposed repository interacts with the National
     Parks Service, whether it's federal property or not -- I think that the
     National Park Service, who will be not only sponsoring, but having the
     reservation within the borders of the National Park Service could
     perhaps offer some complications.  I don't know.  But, I think those are
     some of the things that we really need to look at.  And I speak as a
     county supervisor and as a person, who represents the concerns of my
     constituents.
         So, I thank you today for giving me the opportunity to
     comment.  Thank you, very much.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thank you, very much, Supervisor Lent,
     for those comments.  And I'm going to turn it back over to Chairman
     Garrick, to formerly adjourn the meeting.  I would just thank all of you
     for your participation.  You really listened to each other and we had a
     good discussion.
         DR. GARRICK:  Thanks, Chip, an outstanding job.  I had to be
     convinced that a facilitator was a good idea.  I think I'm now
     convinced.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. GARRICK:  Well, I think we've had a long day, and I
     think that we have established a very important setting and preamble for
     the meeting later this evening.  Obviously, everybody is invited to
     return with us again.  Our strategy is going to be principally to listen
     and to get input and to perhaps modify these points that we've just
     highlighted and be put on the spot, so to speak, as a committee, as to
     whether or not we picked up our lessons well and made anything happen.
         I would like to think that this will happen again.  I don't
     know on what frequency or what kind of a schedule, but there's no doubt
     about it, in my mind, that we will be back and you will have a chance to
     express yourself again and examine our performance.  And that will
     become very important input into our self-assessment process.
         So, unless there's some burning questions on the minds of
     people before we close this session, I would say that we've had a very
     successful day and we are adjourned.
          [Whereupon, the meeting was recessed, to reconvene at 7:00 p.m.,
     this same day.].                     E V E N I N G  S E S S I O N
                                                      [7:00 p.m.]
         DR. GARRICK:  We can come to order.  The Advisory Committee
     on Nuclear Waste's purpose tonight is primarily to listen, as we've
     doing a great deal of today, to listen to your concerns and ideas.  We
     aren't going to talk much about technical facts or attempt to answer
     technical questions necessarily about the NRC.  We have with us tonight
     Mr. Bill Reamer of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Division of Waste
     Management and he has agreed to answer questions and discuss issues from
     the point of view of the NRC.
         In addition to hearing your concerns and suggestions, we
     want to have this opportunity to talk, to communicate, and, to a certain
     extent, clarify the role of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and
     how it differs from being part of the NRC staff.  And of course, one of
     the important outcomes would be to get your thoughts on how we can
     better fulfill our role.
         We do believe that the Advisory Committee has quite a unique
     role of providing independent technical oversight to the NRC Commission
     and staff.  And, of course, our responsibilities go beyond just
     critiquing the NRC's technical program.  We try to anticipate emerging
     issues.  We try to be proactive.  We try to be a set of eyes and ears
     for the Commission, looking a bit into the future.  And, of course, if
     you were with us today, we work very hard to try to get the technical
     case supporting the safety of Yucca Mountain in as clear and real
     English form as possible and do whatever we can to assist the decision-
     making process.
         We're not here to provide a lot of answers tonight.  We are
     struggling, ourselves, to examine the issues and to find answers.  And
     we're not here to tell you that the repository is safe.  We don't know
     that yet.  We are attempting to be very focused on what the real risks
     are.  The Committee is not necessarily a group of experts on the
     regulations.  We do think we have some expertise with respect to the
     technical issues that are involved.  We think that the safety questions
     are probably even more fundamental than regulations.  And our hope is to
     think, as much as possible, outside of the box, so to speak, and to make
     a significant contribution to something that was discussed at length
     today, namely this business of asking the right questions and asking a
     reasonably complete set of questions.
         Our perspective is to protect the health and safety of the
     public; that's why we're here.  We want to understand what the risks
     are, as you do; what are the threats.  We have learned a great deal, as
     you have, about what's going on at Yucca Mountain.  And we are going to
     continue to be persistent and focused on our effort to give ourselves
     the kind of assurance that we need to have about the safety of the
     repository, so that we can communicate that to you.
         We have heard a great deal about the -- because of the
     complexity of the analysis supporting the safety case for the
     repository, the business of communication is greatly compromised.  Since
     our meeting a year ago, we have been extremely sensitive to this whole
     issue and asking ourselves how can we get the language in a farm that
     does a better job of telling us and you just how thorough the analysis
     of the mountain is and what it really seems to be saying.
         So, I think that with that and with the help of Chip
     Cameron, who has been chosen to help facilitate the discussion tonight,
     we will kind of open it up.  I will say before I do that, to my
     colleagues here, if any of them have a comment to make or want to better
     articulate our purpose for being here than I have been able to do so, I
     welcome that.
         George?
         MR. HORNBERGER:  Fine.
         DR. GARRICK:  Ray?
         DR. WYMER:  You've go approval.
         DR. GARRICK:  Milt?
         [No response.]
         DR. GARRICK:  Okay.  I guess it's your show, Chip.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you, Dr. Garrick.  I think that
     we're going to be relatively free form tonight.  We don't have a set
     agenda.  As the Chairman of the Advisory Committee noted, they wanted to
     -- they want to listen to your concerns, try to help you better
     understand what their role is.  The Committee is very interested in
     finding out how the public can be more effectively involved on high-
     level waste issues.
         If you want to make a comment or ask a question, please
     raise your hand.  I'll bring you this talking stick.  And if you could
     just state your name and affiliation, if appropriate, for the transcript
     that we're keeping here, and the transcripts will be available for
     people to look at.  I would just say, relax.  We're going to be pretty
     informal tonight and so just try to get your questions answered, get
     your concerns out for the Advisory Committee, and just try to enjoy the
     discussion tonight.
         I'm going to start with this gentleman in the back.
         MR. VASCONI:  Bill Vasconi, Nevada resident.  I've been here
     since 1964.  And I worked first as a radiological technician monitor,
     then I went into construction.  And I've been a construction worker ever
     since '64.
         First of all, I'd like to thank the Committee.  I enjoyed
     today.  In most cases, it's the same players.  How you reach the Nevada
     citizens, to get more people involved, I'm hard pressed to tell you.  I
     will surrender the mic to any assemblymen that's here, any senator from
     the State of Nevada.  This is what happens at most of the meetings.  So,
     we come down and we tell you how we feel and try to keep it under five
     minutes and go about our business.
         Recent survey, Las Vegas, Nevada, asking folks what their
     biggest concerns were; what are your priorities.  Well, they started
     with things like traffic, roadways, water, school, growth.  About number
     14, somebody says, well, don't you know what Yucca Mountain is.  I sat
     in a meeting one night and asked somebody what NTS stood for.  They
     said, that's easy, no to smoking.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. VASCONI:  A lot of things have happened at the Nevada
     test site.
         MR. CAMERON:  I like that.
         MR. VASCONI:  At one point in time, we had over 11,000
     people working there.  As far as the economy of Las Vegas, Nevada to the
     construction workers -- union construction workers, a worse thing could
     have happened at a better time.  As you can see by the growth of this
     city, they had someplace to go to work.  A good many other folks, as
     wages and benefits were predicated by the union men, also found work.
     But the folks I think about are the rural counties.  You know, they're
     hard pressed.  Their economy is hard pressed when Nevada test site
     closed.  A lot of good folks worked at the Nevada test site.
         So, yeah, we're concerned with health and welfare -- I mean,
     with our health and safety.  We have environmental concerns.  But, you
     know, we, also, have an economic concern.  There's a good many Nevadans
     that like to maximize the benefit that could be derived from the
     scientific and technological expertise that's been developed at the
     Nevada test site over the last four-and-a-half decades.  A good many
     Nevadans, and I hope I represent some of them, feel this is a national
     issue, a national problem, and we recognize it as such.
         We can see commercial spent fuel rods.  There's, also,
     defense waste.  What do we have, 114 nuclear submarines?  How many
     carriers do we have?  We park them up and down our coast at any number
     of seaports.  Isn't that a national problem?
         Nevada makes its livelihood -- a general livelihood off of
     tourism, off of people coming to this town.  Yes, there is some risk
     concern with the fact that maybe some of these tourists won't like the
     idea of nuclear waste being stored 100 miles away.  But let's look at a
     different point.  Aren't we helping the nation?  Aren't we taking that
     nuclear waste away from water aquifers; away from populated areas?
     Doesn't Nevada accept concrete, steel, produce, textiles from states
     that use nuclear energy to produce it?  And you can't say "foreign
     made," because a German car, a Japanese car probably got nuclear energy
     involved with it.  Now, why should Nevada accept people's wages and
     vacation monies?  Why should they ask them to come to Las Vegas and
     spend their money?  But, they don't want to have nothing to do with
     nuclear.  Nuclear will never be taken out of the picture.
         I hope there's no resentment to my comments.  I feel that
     there's a good many folks in Nevada that feel the same way I do.  If
     there was something wrong with nuclear, if there was something wrong
     with 10,000 years -- why don't we go out to Nellis Air Force Base, the
     fourth largest yard of nuclear weapons in the United States.  Fourteen-
     hundred-and-fifty nuclear devices at Nellis Air Force Base, 600 of them
     are unclassified, atomic cruise missiles, several hundred bombs -- they
     are all transported there.  But the fact remains, I don't know what drip
     shields are on those nuclear devices.  I know they're guarded by
     America's finest.  They are probably 18 years old.  I don't know if them
     nuclear devices in Nevada at the Nellis Air Force Base are going to last
     10,000 years.  To me, that's a real concern, the population of one
     million plus people, to have a nuclear arsenal inside our city limits.
     That's not waste, gentlemen.
         Now, I usually do this, if there's any questions or comments
     that you want to ask me about, how about it?  Otherwise, thank you for
     listening to me and it's been a pleasure.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you, Bill.  Maybe it would be useful to
     just see if there's anybody who has a follow-up to Bill's opening
     question, is how do you get more people involved interested in these
     issues.  I'm making an assumption that that would be useful and helpful.
     I'm not sure that that assumption is correct.
         But, do you have something on that, sir, that you want to
     say, on that issue?  All right, and please identify yourself for the
     transcript and for everybody here.
         MR. CHASE:  How to get more people involved?  How many
     people in this room have read a number of DOE reports, technical
     reports, okay?  How many people here can understand those technical
     reports from a scientific viewpoint, not a bus will drive down the
     street and it will leak radioactive material?  That's not the issue.
     The issue is:  why did it happen in the first place and what can we do
     about it.
         I would now like -- also, if you will permit, I would like
     to make -- just add on a remark to this last gentleman who spoke.  The
     real problem here, I think, goes something like this:  40 years ago --
     45 years ago, DOE made a judgment to bury nuclear waste and whatever
     high-level nuclear waste in a geological repository.  Nothing wrong with
     that.  Forty-five years ago, that seemed to be the best technology.
         But that's 45 years ago.  Hasn't the scientist or the
     scientific community dreamed up any better way to bury these waste or,
     perhaps, not bury them?  How about not burying them and using them
     instead?  There are enumerable uses -- I say "enumerable;" I don't want
     anybody to ask me how many is enumerable.  But, at a recent meeting at
     NRC, I got a couple of brochures that listed many uses.  I know that
     some gymnasiums in this country, they use a radiated resin for floor
     polish.  In every home built in Las Vegas, at least that I know of,
     there are smoke detectors.  All you've got to do is look inside that
     smoke detector and there's a little white box in there that says,
     "americium," and this is high-level nuclear waste; be careful, a
     warning.
         Obviously, what we're doing is burying something which can
     be used and who knows what we're burying could be a real national
     resource.  After all, every atomic weapon in the United States' arsenal
     is fired by -- or triggered, let me use that word -- triggered by a
     nuclear -- high-level nuclear product that is removed from these wastes.
     It's called transputation.  A lot of people in this room know what at
     least the word "transputation" is.  I don't know the atomic
     understanding of it.  But, I know that it's a trigger for every single
     weapon used in the United States.
         It seems incredible to me that we all sit in this room now -
     - you people sit in this room, trying to improve the safety of Yucca
     Mountain.  Can you tell me how much waste they intend to put in Yucca
     Mountain?  No, you can't.  You know how much?  Seventy-thousand tons?
     How much?  Twice that, right.  I heard that number, 40,000 tons.  Does
     that mean that the radiation from there is acceptable to NRC?  And don't
     forget, if you take a look at the data you people are using to base your
     judgments on, it's 40 years old.  Can't you go back 40 years and see
     what were the reasons, what were the radiation levels that caused them
     to choose Yucca Mountain?  It must have been zero; otherwise, they
     wouldn't plant it there.
         I'm a geologist and I know that in a rock nest that large,
     what you can say about its consistency is -- that the only thing that
     you can say about it is it's inconsistent.  There are faults.  There are
     all kinds of different rock structures, flow rates, lord knows what
     else.  It's a volcano deposit and you want to have grief with it.
         So, we sit here saying we're going to do this or do that.
     But, nobody puts a time limit on it.  I just put a 40 year time limit.
     You people are talking about 10,000 years of half life.  Will your level
     never change in 10 years?  Do you really mean -- do you really mean that
     for the next 10,000 years, you're going to monitor the area around that
     mountain?  Now, if that's what you mean, well, okay.  I don't really
     think you mean that.
         Also, we have to consider other things, and I really didn't
     mean to get into all of this, but this gentleman raised the issue and
     it's a real issue.  What is all of this going to cost?  Now, I've heard
     numbers like by the time they seal both ends of Yucca Mountain tunnel,
     we'll have $150 billion involved.  Now, I heard that number.  Please
     don't push me against the wall.
         Now, if we don't bury the waste, if we use it -- I know one
     customer right now that will be more than willing to buy the electrical
     power that's generated in the process, in this transputation or
     accelerator process.  The Nevada Power Company would be delighted to buy
     it.  I know of -- looking at Los Alamos, the Los Alamos site is ringed
     on all sides by companies doing research in the use of atomic
     transputated or atomic products, all of this derived from the thing we
     call waste.  And, incidentally, waste is a misnomer.  It's not waste;
     it's a very valuable national resource, which is being buried, because
     nobody has the courage to stand up and say, hey, folks, hasn't anything
     improved over the last 40 years or 45 years; can it not be done some
     better way?
         And one more thing:  I know they're building accelerators
     now in three other locations.  Mr. Richardson has designated them.  To
     me, it's almost naive to assume that that waste or -- that waste is not
     going to come to Nevada.  There is no place else.  To bury it on site,
     they're going ot use the same estimates and same analysis techniques
     they used at the mountain.  It seems incredible to me that here we have
     a national resource that's just -- just perfect to be used for national
     defense, too, and civilian use.  And I just heard the other day there's
     some kind of an atomic radio nuclide.  I don't know what it is.  It's
     being -- it's going to be used now to treat Parkinson's disease.  It can
     be extracted from the nuclear waste.  People take an x-ray once in a
     while.  That's, also, done by radionuclide techniques.
         There are many others; really, there are very many others.
     Yet, we sit here and we talk about monitoring this waste to make
     absolutely certain that its level is fine for how many years, 10,000?
     There's one of those radio nuclides, incidentally, as a half life of a
     million years.  So, are we going to sit out there and monitor this?
     Where's the money going to come from?  I say this to you:  what we
     really need is a financial analysis of some kind, where we say how much
     does -- how much will the Yucca Mountain facility cost over its lifetime
     -- its expected life time.  And we need another analysis:  how many
     products can be derived from the waste, if we don't bury it; how many
     dollars does that come to?  And I just mentioned two.
         The third thing we have to mention and really think about --
     this gentleman that was up here before really raised the issue -- if
     when we seal the repository and we say, fine, can't put anymore waste in
     here, this is it and that's it, folks, a lot of people are going to get
     thrown out of their jobs.  But, if we keep the waste on the surface, if
     we don't bury it, if we use it -- and the technique for using it are
     common.  If you like, you can ask the Russians; they know how to do it.
     There's no secrets to this.  The Russians, the English, the French, ask
     them.  There may be modifications that we have to do here, but Los
     Alamos is a wonderful lab.  Why let them build an accelerator at Los
     Alamos, when it's needed here?  They're not going to get any waste
     shipped in there.
         So, what I'm trying to suggest to you is this:  please take
     a look at history.  I know a lot of us have a great difficulty in
     learning anything from history, but take a look at history and take a
     look at the current situation that we're faced with here.  Jobs -- look,
     you've got people out there at the test site --
         MR. CAMERON:  Can I ask you to sort of --
         MR. CHASE:  Give it up?  Okay.  There will be many, many
     jobs, if you don't bury the waste.  That's all I'm saying.  You're going
     to replace -- you've got people, who have been trained, and I wish some
     of you would -- give me just another minute.  When I first saw -- they
     sent me out to this double -- they said to me, we're going to send you
     out to a place that's godforsaken.  Take a look around and let us know
     what's going on out there.  This godforesaken place they sent me to was
     Los Alamos.  And I got out there and I tell you, what I saw would really
     scare you.  All the scientists were living in army tents, with the
     bathroom facilities outside the tent.  There was -- they were eating
     army food, because that's all they had.  People think they're forgotten
     out there.
         Of course, things got better later on.  When they went to
     get people to help them construct -- do the experimental work to build
     the bomb, they found out nobody knew anything about this kind of atomic
     thing and they found out, also, that people wouldn't believe them
     anyhow.  Who in his right mind would believe that a piece of particle of
     matter a millions of an inch could do more damage than a 2,000 pound
     bomb?  Nobody.  So, they had a lot of trouble and they had to do a lot
     of training.  Now, you've got a core of people out there, really
     experienced people, know how to handle this material, know what to do
     with it, can easily be trained for accelerator work.  Why not take
     advantage of that resource?  There's lots of it out there and the jobs
     will increase, if the State of Nevada pushes to build experimental
     facilities to find new and better uses for what's in the material.
         Thank you.
         MR. CAMERON:  Please state your name for the record.
         MR. CHASE:  Oh, Lawrence Chase.
         MR. CAMERON:  Lawrence Chase?
         MR. CHASE:  Chase, yeah.
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.
         MR. CHASE:  Incidentally, I graduated from NRC.  That's
     where I retired from.  I just want you know.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thank you, very much.  And I take it, going
     back to your first comment about how to get more people involved, that
     it would be -- and just a "yes" or a "no" on this one -- it would be
     helpful if the documents -- the material was easier to understand.
         MR. CHASE:  Oh, yes, absolutely.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay; good.  Thank you.
         Do we have any more suggestions on how to get more people
     involved?  Let's go to Mike and then we'll come back over to Grant.
         MR. BAUGHMAN:  I would suggest that you go to where people
     are going to be impacted.  This is a community of a million-and-a-half
     people, 90 miles away, who have very little prospect of having waste
     shipped through their area, because, in all likelihood, politics will
     dictate that it go elsewhere.  The NRC had a meeting up in Calyante and
     I guess the answer would be come to Calyante; go to Nye County.  Those
     are the places where impacts would be felt.  And we had a meeting in
     Calyante and RC came.  We had, I'd say, probably 40 citizens there.
     That's about 10 percent of our population.  We should have 150,000
     people here tonight, if they care to the same degree that they care in
     Lincoln County.
         You're in the wrong place.  They don't care here, because
     they're not going to be impacted.  And I know my colleagues from Clark
     will take issue with that, but it's true.  And I think the decision
     makers ought to perhaps consider that.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Mike.  Grant, I'm coming right
     back to you.  I think, Judy, do you want to comment on what Mike just
     said?  Go ahead.
         MS. TREICHEL:  Judy Treichel, Nevada Nuclear Waste Task
     Force.  Are you at the table going to answer questions this evening or
     just listen, because I got questions?
         DR. GARRICK:  Well, we're primarily here to listen; but, if
     you have questions, we're not going to --
         MS. TREICHEL:  Well, because you're trying to answer the
     question how to get people involved.
         DR. GARRICK:  Right.
         MS. TREICHEL:  If there was a meeting held here and we knew
     about it and it was possible to do what people wanted to do -- let's
     just say I could bring in 200 people.  That would be very easy.  It
     could be more than that.  And those people came in and their question to
     you was:  we're here; we want to be involved; we do not want the Yucca
     Mountain project to happen; what should we do first?  What would anybody
     tell them?
         DR. GARRICK:  Well, I think that our whole posture is to
     gather information, get a better understanding of the issues associated
     with the licensing of Yucca Mountain, because our charter is to advise
     the Commission on the licensing of the mountain.  So, I think that
     issues beyond that are probably beyond our charter.
         MS. TREICHEL:  Okay.  And if -- would you or anyone at NRC
     be willing to tell them that if you and two-, three-, five-hundred
     thousand showed up at a licensing hearing and said, this is something we
     do not want licensed, that they would be successful?  Is there any
     channel in which they go?  That's why people are not here.  That's why
     they donate to something like the task force, so that they believe that
     they're being covered because I'm here.  But, they don't see a clear way
     that they can have their way.  There's just no system -- process that
     you follow, if you want to be able to have your way on not wanting the
     project.
         DR. GARRICK:  Yeah.  Well, I've spoken from the point of
     view of the ACNW.  Maybe, Bill, you'd want to speak from the point of
     view of the NRC.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, Bill, and then we're going to go to
     Grant.
         MR. REAMER:  Well, I would suggest the reason that people
     show up is so that we can hear what their concerns are.  Without that
     information, we -- we're, obviously, not going to be responding to the
     concerns that people have in their mind, if they don't express it.  So,
     I think one good reason for people to show up -- a good reason for
     people to come is to express their concerns, so we can use that to
     direct our own work and review.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Bill.  I think we may come back
     to put some finer points on this issue.  Grant, do you want to talk
     about how to get more people involved?
         MR. HUDLOW:  Yes.
         MR. CAMERON:  And please state your name, please.
         MR. HUDLOW:  I'm Grant Hudlow.  I'm with the NREC
     organization out of UNLV.  Yeah, I think that Judy hit the nail on the
     head, that if you want people here on this particular issue, you need to
     provide a way that they can impact this decision.  And you have -- the
     NRC already has a way to do that, if they wanted to, and that is the NRC
     is allowed to reject Yucca Mountain specifically if transputation can be
     proved as a viable alternative.  And DOE has really dug in their heels
     on that issue, even though the National Labs, with the DOE money,
     actually developed the technology and the military has it in use in
     orbit around the earth right now.
         So, there's no excuse that this won't work.  Los Alamos has
     got to study it again.  Livermore studied it in the '60s; Los Alamos
     studied in the energy crisis.  They couldn't do it.  Those people are
     researchers.  So, if you give somebody a project to research, what are
     they going to do?  They're going to research.  What are they going to
     recommend?  Needs more research.  They want the money, right.  Are they
     going to go out and build a plant?  Are they going to go out and make a
     deal with the power companies to put this technology in, to get rid of
     this so called waste?  Of course not.  But, the NRC has the power to
     tell them Yucca Mountain is off.  That's the end of the story.  We're
     going to do transputation.
         Now, if you do something like that, you'll have people
     showing up, because, now, you're saying to them, okay, how can we get
     this done; what are the politics; what senators can we impact; what
     congressmen can we impact; and what technical transfer systems can we
     set up to take the information out of the labs and put it into the power
     companies.
         DR. GARRICK:  Yeah, well, just a comment:  as far as the
     activities of the ACNW are concerned, the issue of something like
     transputation has not come up, because it's not on the agenda of NRC or
     what have you.  But, I will say this:  that everybody on this Committee
     wears other hats and some of those hats have involved direct involvement
     in the consideration of transputation as an alternative or as a
     complement.
         And I don't know if you are all familiar with it, but the
     National Academy of Sciences did an extensive study a few years ago on
     transputation and separations techniques -- advanced separations
     techniques, and the general conclusion of that was a negative one, as
     far as it being economically viable.  And I, also, wonder if the people,
     who are advocating transputation, appreciate the ramifications of a
     transputation industry, in terms of the added nuclear facilities that
     would be required to implement it.  If we want to support a program
     where there is going to be many times more money spent than there is now
     on the nuclear industry, you know, you might jump on the transputation
     bandwagon, because the methods that have been advocated and proposed
     require a whole infrastructure of nuclear facilities that don't now
     exist.  So, it's not as if this hasn't been a concept that hasn't been
     examined.  All of us have had an exposure to it, at one time or another,
     and it's been around for 40 years, right, Milt?
         So, I think, also, Ray would like to comment specifically to
     Judy's comment.
         DR. WYMER:  Yeah, I certainly understand your position.  You
     should understand ours.  Ours is to be objective.  We can no more advise
     you on how best to avoid having a repository in Yucca Mountain, as we
     could advise DOE on how to have one.  You know, neither direction is our
     role.  One of the things we can do and what we're trying to do here is
     to provide mechanisms to get information out, so that you can have the
     best available information to promote whatever your position is,
     whatever anybody's position is.  That's our legitimate role, no matter
     what our personal opinions might be.
         Now, I would like to say something about -- also about
     transputation system.  I have been involved somewhat in that over the
     years, more recently just this past summer.  Both the Japanese and the
     French have major programs -- major national programs on partitioning
     the transputation for the destruction of these elements, which are very
     long lived and hazardous to your health.  And about two to two-and-a-
     half years, both of those countries will be coming forth with their
     reports and their recommendations to their governments.  These will be
     very carefully -- each of them is a 10-year study.  They are very
     carefully planned, executed; many, many millions of dollars put in by
     each country on them.  It will probably be a good idea for us to await
     the outcome of these two countries' investigations.
         Just as a footnote to that, there is currently a resurgence
     of interest in partitioning transputation in the Department of Energy,
     and there was a so called road mapping effort carried out this past
     summer to -- under the -- really under the instigation of Dimeniche, to
     see whether or not this is a good idea and then we'll find out in the
     congressional action in the fall whether or not that funding is
     continued.  So, those are some comments on transputation.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks Dr. Wymer.  Milt?
         MR. LEVENSON:  Yeah.  I think there's somewhat of a general
     misunderstanding about transputation.  The use of accelerators to get
     rid of fission products by transputation may or may not be technically
     and may or may not be economically feasible, but what is very clear is
     that it is not a producer of energy.  It is a huge consumer of energy.
     And if you build big accelerators to transpute the fission products, you
     probably will have to build a bunch of big nuclear power plants to
     provide the electricity.  It doesn't provide you electricity; it's a
     consumer.
         MR. CAMERON:  That's an important clarification.  And we're
     going to go to this gentleman right here, all right.
         MR. BYRAM:  Yes, my name is Roy Byram.  I've been in and out
     of Las Vegas since World War II.  Now, the last 10 years -- about 10
     years ago, I've got some uranium up in California.  There's three
     townships up there.  It's probably the largest deposit in the United
     States.  But, every time we get ready to open it up, the world market
     collapses.  The Soviet Union collapsed 10 years ago.  Yellow cake went
     down to four dollars a pound, about what it had been in 1938.  In '73,
     it was $43.50, when the cartel had it.
         So, anyway, the thing I want to impress, I've been to
     several -- that was a retrofit of the new plants, ore to gas.  And this
     -- there was actually a live nuclear device, which had been intended to
     set off, cause the loss of life, and so forth.  But, through a strange
     set of circumstances, this didn't come about.  Well, now, of course,
     it's well known in government circles who did this.  As a matter of
     fact, the device that was intended to be used is in an old burrow pit
     along the Pennsylvania Turnpike, which was used for a rock quarry.  And
     so, when these people had to ditch it there, they conveniently found the
     site with public nuisance and kids were swimming and occasionally one of
     them would drown.  So, they just filled it in.  Well, you can go out
     there and check your radiation.  The thing is still sitting there
     ticking away.
         So, I think what you have to do is point out the dirty air
     lobby and their financial plots.  Now, in the State of Nevada, the
     politicians are all pimps for the dirty air lobby.  They get most of
     their funding from that.  They put out all this bad talk.  And when
     you're dealing with a bully, you've got to stand up to him and you've
     got to -- you've got to kick him in the scrotum.  That's to get their
     attention.  And this is what the pro-nuclear people don't do.  They just
     sweet talk.  I mean, you've got to go after these people.
         Now, the oil people, the builder burgers run the world.
     They put one of their own kind in the White House, because he was -- he
     had the reputation of being -- controlling the vote, which he certainly
     exploited to great advantage.  Well, whether he's actually guilty of the
     various things they accuse him of, I doubt it.  I think he's probably a
     pedophile.  But, anyway, that's my own feeling.
         MR. CAMERON:  May I ask you to sort of wrap it up?
         MR. BYRAM:  Okay.  Well, I'm just --
         MR. CAMERON:  I don't think this has ever been brought to
     the table.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. BYRAM:  Okay.  But, anyway, I'm just telling you, you
     fellows here, you're going to sweet talk yourself out of business.
     You've got to go after the bad guys and be just as bad as they are.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you, Roy.  Roy, what was your
     last name?
         MR. BYRAM:  Byram, B-y-r-a-m.
         MR. CAMERON:  B-y-r-a-m, Roy Byram.  Okay, thank you, Roy.
         DR. GARRICK:  We won't forget that.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Sally -- Sally Devlin?
         MS. DEVLIN:  I'm Sally Devlin and I'm from Parwaukee, Nye
     County, Nevada and I have been attending these meetings for well over --
     going on my seventh year.  And I got into this, because all of the
     transport was to go through Parwaukee to Yucca Mountain.  And I said,
     "over my dead body." And I went back to school and I have continued on.
         One of my suggestions in how to get more people here is have
     somebody important come here.
         [Laughter.]
         MS. DEVLIN:  Now, I'm sorry, but I have no idea -- Mr.
     Richardson is the head of it.  I never met him.
         MR. CAMERON:  I didn't think anybody was going to be able to
     follow Roy.
         [Laughter.]
         MS. DEVLIN:  Well, I'm sorry, I do not know who on the
     Nuclear Regulatory Commission is going to be the five people who is
     going to say "yes" or "no" to Yucca Mountain.  And I certainly would
     like to meet them personally and either hit them over the head or shake
     their hand.  And I think this is terribly important.
         Nye County is -- I don't know who does the scheduling for
     the meeting, but we've had one NWTR meeting since '97 and we've had one
     DOE meeting and that's it.  All the other meetings have been in
     Amargossa and Beatty and I thoroughly object to it.  So, whoever does
     the scheduling should find out where the people are.  We have 35,000
     soon to be 60 people in Parwaukee.  There are 1,400 or less in Amargossa
     and they have 1,000 in Beatty.  Who do you want to talk with?  The
     people that are affected.  There's nobody at Lathrop Wells, at this
     time.  So, I'm sorry, they're not many there.  But, we have to have a
     little humor.
         But, I did -- I did want to bring something up and that is,
     I really came here, because I feel so strongly about the environmental
     impact statement of the DOE, that it is among the poorest I have ever
     read, and I've read dozens of them.  And I feel that your group should
     make the DOE, and this is my contribution to this evening, responsible,
     not only fiscally, but morally to the public and ethically to the
     public.
         And my title is naked and I'm going to expose the DOE, who
     is running around naked.  And the Department of Energy, who owns the
     mythical kingdom of Yucca Mountain, might want to excavate not one, but
     two repositories.  They haven't a clue for a design.  And if anybody can
     show me in 1,600 pages where they've designed one repository, much less
     two repositories, I'll eat the paper.  They haven't a clue for the
     design of the storage of 70,000 to 140,000 metric tons of high-level
     radioactive waste.  And in that report, for years, everything was called
     metric tons HLW.  In this report, they very covenly changed it to metric
     tons heavy metal.  Now, that's fraud on the public.  This stuff is
     radioactive and I want to see that "R" in there.  That's another thing.
     This is fraud on the public.
         Now, the other problem is defense waste.  Ten percent or 20
     percent in the one or two repositories will be defense waste and that is
     classified.  And as far as I am concerned, you cannot put classified
     waste in my mountain.
         The next thing that they haven't done is the canisterization
     for this high-level waste.  And I have been to dozens of meetings on
     this subject.  They want 10-11,000 or 20-22,000.  It will cost, from the
     last I heard, 350,000 a piece to 500,000 a piece.  That, to me, is $100
     billion.  And I'm sorry, it is unacceptable, because these canisters are
     imaginary and unsafe.  We've had explosions in Michigan and Wisconsin,
     just the same as in Japan.  And what is worse about the canisterization
     is they have not, for one minute, in this 1,600 pages, discussed my
     bugs, and I'm talking about my cropic invasion.  And my bugs love the
     nickel.  They love the steel.  They love all these wonderful metals and
     they will poison the water faster than anything in the world.  So that
     my cropic invasion, the colloidal movement of water, is not even
     considered in these 1,600 pages and it should be.
         The other thing that is most important is transputation, and
     we are talking about digging an imaginary mountain and having imaginary
     canisters to be transported by imaginary DOT, who have never been to our
     meetings, who have held two meetings in the last six years in Las Vegas
     and never been seen since.  And what is worst about the DOT is they are
     not indemnified from liability, as is DOE.  And for those of you who
     don't know what indemnification from liability is, it means that years
     ago, there was no insurance, in case there was an accident.  And it
     started, I think, with five, ten million.  Now, it's up to 550 million.
     If there is a DOE nuclear accident, a place is indemnified for that
     amount per accident, period.  This is the -- whatever it is; I forget --
     what is it -- Rice Anderson Act.  And this is absolutely unacceptable,
     because you blow up Chicago, 550 million.  We build half a casino here
     in Vegas for that amount.
         [Laughter.]
         MS. DEVLIN:  So, this is what we're talking about, is that
     it is criminal.  And if you're going to kill us, I want to be paid for
     it.
         [Laughter.]
         MS. DEVLIN:  Now, what is DOT's accident record?  When I
     gave testimony, their accident record since '87 to '96, with the
     chemical industry, at the plants on delivery, they had 250,000
     accidents, '87 to '96.  On the roads, they had 260,000 -- you may quote
     my GAL report -- and no indemnification.  Now, we're talking about
     indemnification from the hauling companies.  Come on, what are they
     hauling?  A mythical canister to an unbelievable, unreal repository.
         It is really a shame, and I say that because of all the
     other things I'm involved with, our growing scientific engineering
     industries have developed the technology to make the waste vanish and
     these companies will make fortunes.  The last I heard, a gram of
     plutonium was selling for 20,000.  I think that is a nice hunk of
     change.  And these reusable commodities and billions of taxpayer's money
     will be saved.  I wonder if you government people have ever heard of
     saving taxpayer's money, of encouraging entrepreneurs to go into new
     things.  Years ago, my family had a horse and, boom, the cars came
     along.  They bought the cars.  This is what we've got as an analogy for
     Yucca Mountain.  We don't need it.
         The final thing is the emperor has spending billions of
     dollars running around naked in invisible clothes.  If this project
     continues in perpetuity, it might turn the residents of Nye and Clark
     County, Nevada into two-headed mutants, who feed on fuel pellets, if you
     remember my analogy on this.  It is unacceptable to dump all of the
     nation's nuclear waste in our leaking mountain, with no comprehensive
     plans or projected costs.  The environmental impact statement is a
     mythological vacuous waste of money and paper.  And I heard it cost over
     20 million to produce.  That's absolutely unacceptable.
         Yucca Mountain, to begin with, is no analog and that is the
     concept for it.  We should not bury high-level nuclear waste and I am
     appealing to the ACNW to write off one of its inimicable recommendations
     that the NRC reject this project.  And remember, I am leaving you with
     assumed uncertainty.
         DR. GARRICK:  I have to say that we have come along way.
     The last time you spoke a year ago, we were gods.
        And now, it's a masterful putdown.
         MS. DEVLIN:  No coffee, that's why.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CAMERON:  We -- the chairman of the Commission did come
     out and talk to people last March or April, I guess.  But, I just wanted
     to just go back to Sally's recommendation, which has been suggested in
     other times, is that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, itself, actually
     come out to Nevada and have one of their Commission meetings out here.
     So, I'll just put that on there.
         And I want to ask Abby if she would just repeat -- you made
     a point this afternoon about the NRC having more of a presence here and
     you were telling the Advisory Committee about that; but, I think, in the
     past, you have amplified on that particular idea and I thought it might
     be useful for the Committee to hear that.
         MS. JOHNSON:  Well, I'm so glad you called on me, Chip.  I'm
     Abby Johnson with Eureka County, Nevada, and I will amplify on that and
     then I have a comment.  I think this came up at the NRC meeting in June,
     regarding the rule, when Bill Reamer mentioned his desire to have a
     long-term relationship with Nevada or something like that, but not to
     locate a functional office in Nevada.  And one way to have a long-term
     relationship is to both live in the same place.  I've done this and it
     really does work much better than the long distance relationship.
         And so, my comment in that area is that in order to have
     meaningful and public involvement with the Nuclear Regulatory
     Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs to be in the place
     where the project is.  Now, I know there's a couple of folks, who are
     here, who go out and look over DOE shoulder.  But, those aren't the
     people that are interacting with the public; those aren't the people
     that are communicating with the public; those aren't the people, who are
     prepared to represent the Commission in Nevada.  And I think that's what
     Chip was referring to, is that there needs to be -- as long as we're
     going in this direction, there needs to be -- you can't have the long-
     term involvement, if you don't have the actual presence of long-term
     involvement and the commitment, which isn't just words, but it's deeds,
     as well.
         The comment I want to make goes back to part of the
     discussion we were having this afternoon, and for those that weren't
     here, I'll sort of try to frame it.  It was called, "did we forget
     something." And it was about when the Department of Energy is putting
     together their plan for how they're going to keep this waste allegedly
     contained and thinking about did we remember everything, is there
     something that we've forgotten -- kind of like when you're packing for
     the family vacation and you want to make sure that everybody has their
     toothbrush and their sandals and their bathing suits.  And what we were
     assuming in that discussion is that everybody wants to discover that we
     forgot our toothbrush.  And the comment that I have, and this is not a
     comment to reflect poorly on individual employees of DOE or the NRC, but
     if we have a project where the mission of the Department of Energy is to
     open Yucca Mountain, that getting to yes thing that I talked about this
     morning, then it's really not in the interest of Department of Energy
     employees and their contractors and subcontractors, blah, blah, blah, to
     discover, oh, oh, we're missing the toothbrush.  It's better just to
     keep going and keep getting to yes and not discover flaws or even
     possibly fatal flaws in the project.
         Now, that's DOE.  But, I have a similar concern about NRC.
     In order to understand the project, NRC and DOE have to work closely
     together.  And there becomes a sort of sense of camaraderie and
     collegiality and all those things when you work closely with other
     people, in order to work on frankly a common goal of getting DOE
     licensed.  I heard Bill Reamer today say that NRC will be the
     independent regulator, will take an independent look.  But, at the same
     time, I'm concerned that that same sort of philosophy might be
     applicable in the NRC and that it's not in anybody's interest to find
     stuff wrong.  It's in everybody's interest to make sure we don't find
     anything wrong, so that we can get this project -- get this project on.
     And that is my concern, because I feel that already, there are a number
     of flaws; that if we were looking for flaws in the project, the project
     would have already been stopped.  But, because we're not looking for
     flaws in the project, we're only -- we only want to hear good news.  And
     because we only want to hear good news, we frame everything in terms of
     the good news.
         MR. CAMERON:  Thanks, Abby.  I think it might be appropriate
     to let Bill Reamer say something about this issue of closeness between
     the regulator and the potential licensee and to ask others in the
     audience.  Bill, can sincerely say any number of times about how the NRC
     is going to be independent.  Are there certain actions that can be taken
     to give the public more assurance that the NRC will be independent?
         MR. REAMER:  Well, I think the NRC is independent and we
     need to appear to be independent, as well, and so our relationship has
     to be consistent with that and it has to appear to be consistent with
     that.  And that means we have to conduct ourselves that way.
         The other point that is made, that we're not interested in
     finding flaws, I would disagree with that.  I think the only way that I
     can perform my job is if I check and recheck and find everything.  And
     this is, also, the attitude that I would hope that DOE has and I hear
     DOE say that they will check and recheck and look for flaws.  And this
     is -- I think this accounts for the success that we've seen with the
     nuclear reactor program, that they are interested in looking and finding
     the flaws and correcting them, because they understand that's the way
     they achieve the public protection, the excellence that we all want.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, thanks, Bill.
         MS.  DEVLIN:  What is this link between NRC and the 15 and
     25 -- and the --
         MR. CAMERON:  EPA?
         MS.  DEVLIN:  -- EPA?  That's always in the press.  And I
     think the public would be most interested in this.  Is NRC trying to get
     rid of the EPA?  This is terribly confusing.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Let's try to -- I guess you revealed
     our dirty secret about getting rid of the EPA.  But, let's see if we can
     clarify that.  I just was wondering, anybody else want to address,
     before we go to clarification about the relationship between the EPA and
     NRC, this issue of the independence -- the perceived and real
     independence of the NRC?  Okay, Grant?
         MR. HUDLOW:  I think this goes back, also, to how do you get
     more people here.  And Congress has been concerned enough about not only
     the DOE, but all of the bureaucracy, that they passed the Results Act
     some time ago and the GAO, now, is writing up each organization, how
     they're doing on the Results Act.  And, of course, the entire -- the DOE
     is probably coming from secrecy, probably has more problems than the
     other civilian type of bureaucracy.  But, the problem is that where
     you're used to doing things in a cultural way -- bureaucratic culture
     forms and then you come along with a Results Act.
         We talked about that quite a bit this morning.  Lynn started
     off right away that we're trying to learn how to be leaders, in a word.
     And it's the same thing with the NRC perception of independence.  They
     can say that they're independent from now until dooms day and that's not
     what gets people to believe them.  What gets people to believe them is
     they ask people what do you think the problems are, how can we solve the
     problems, and get the input, which is back to how do you get people here
     that want to do that.  You need to ask for that.
         In industry the way we do that, people -- you know, they're
     used to the boss telling them what to do.  And so when they ask them
     what do you think, they're thinking, there's running through their mind,
     well, let's see how much trouble is that going to get me into, if I open
     my big mouth, right.  So, we have to do something to encourage them.
     And what we did in electronics was we guaranteed them that we would run
     a test based on whatever their ideas were.  And so that put the
     engineers to work, because people say things that are not in
     engineeringese or bureaucratese or whatever and somebody has got to
     translate it into a test.  And that gives you, then, the interest level
     that people will buy into it.
         You get -- one of the problems in the government bureaucracy
     is when you do this procedure, you get a productivity increase of a
     factor of four.  In industry, that's big money.  In the government, who
     cares.  My paycheck comes anyway.  My boss is going to do whatever he
     does.  My subordinates are going to do whatever they do.  There's no
     incentive for them to get that efficient.  But, it's more than the
     efficiency.  There is an incentive for them to get the PR straightened
     out and you're suffering from a PR problem right now.  And that's very
     easily solved with those procedures.
         MR. CAMERON:  We've heard strains of this actions speaks
     louder than words, show us how the NRC has changed something by what the
     public has said.  I don't know, perhaps food for thought for the NRC
     perhaps is do people -- does the public really know about all of the
     actions that we take vis-a-vis DOE in this pre-licensing stage, where we
     request that they change something or do something.  In other words, is
     that documented for the public?  I don't know.  Milt, if you have any --
     if you want to comment on anything like that.  But, it doesn't seem like
     people have an awareness of what the real relationship might be.  Milt,
     do you want to make a comment?
         MR. LEVENSON:  Just one comment about this business of the
     regulator and the regulatees.  I spent seven years working for the
     electric utility industry and, at one point, I was president of the
     American Nuclear Society.  I suspect I know a couple of thousand people
     that work in licensed nuclear power plants.  And I don't know anybody
     that considers anybody from the NRC a comrade or a buddy or anything but
     a pain in the but.
         And so that isn't -- you have to look at what's actually
     happened.  And we've got a history, not just one group, but there's a
     hundred licensed nuclear power plants in this country and a couple of
     hundred facilities, hospitals, all licensed.  And everybody here will
     know somebody that works in some of these places and you can just check
     on what is that relationship.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Milt.  Let's go to Judy.
         MS. TREICHEL:  We don't necessarily see it on that level.
     And if you -- one of the few exposures I have to NRC is to get the
     weeklies, where I chose letters that have been written and minutes from
     meetings that have been held and so forth.  And I've heard several times
     the chair saying that they did not want to be a burden on the licensee.
     This has come up several times with petitions that have gone to them
     about taking extra precautions for Y2K, possibly trying to shut down
     some plants that may be bad actors or aren't quite compliant yet with a
     lot of things.  And I think the only -- we've never had, in this state,
     a licensee, so we don't know that, and DOE is not even an applicant yet.
     So, we haven't seen that sort of thing.
         What we have seen is stories that have been written about a
     problem on the Colorado River, where there is a uranium mine with a
     tailings pile.  And it's right near the river and the owner wants to cap
     it over, because it's much cheaper than moving it away from the water.
     And NRC said, that's fine.  They checked off the boxes, it's just fine,
     and people have said, no, no, that's not the way to go.  And NRC seemed
     absolutely helpless to do anything about that, because it appeared that
     all of the boxes had been checked off, whether it was ultimately the
     real solution to the problem or not.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Judy.  That issue of perception
     that may -- that may not be correct, but it is a perception out here.
     Mary?
         MS. MANNING:  Any time you tell the public that you're a
     regulatory agency, their eyes are going to glaze over.  From a real --
     from being in the public -- for representing the public, as I do at
     these things, I -- the public would like to know if the Commission has a
     bottom line.  If Department of Energy submits a license application, if
     it goes through hearings, if the NRC finds a fatal flaw, any flaw --
     let's take the issue of groundwater travel time.  Let's say the NRC
     scientists come up with a much faster travel time than the DOE does.
     Will that be enough to stop the repository?  Because, if you're going to
     play your independent role as a reviewer and as a regulator, the public
     needs to know if you have a bottom line, and that's not clear at all.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Mary.  And the question is:
     how do you demonstrate that before you get to the bottom line.  Do we
     have some comments from people, who have not spoken yet tonight on any
     of these issues or anything that they would like the Advisory Committee
     to hear about?  John?
         DR. GARRICK:  I just want to -- I will probably ramble a bit
     about what Mary just said.  I won't speak for the NRC, but I will speak
     for the ACNW.  We do have a bottom line.  We will honor the law, the
     standard, whatever that may be.  But, in the meantime, the Committee has
     been very persistent and deliberate in trying to deal with what we
     sometimes call the "so what question," the "so what question" being what
     does this really got to do with safety.  We hear a tremendous amount of
     presentations and discussion and we often -- and we're always searching
     for what the connection is between what we're hearing and the
     performance capability of the repository.  So, I think from a technical
     standpoint, there's no doubt about having a bottom line and there's no
     doubt that if we see something that's fundamentally in error or
     questionable, we don't hesitate to express that and advise the
     Commission accordingly.
         So, I don't quite understand this notion that we're not (a)
     flaw searching and (b) calling it to the appropriate people's attention.
     Because, if we're not doing that, then, of course, we're not doing our
     job.  And I think that the advisory committees are pretty well
     established in their ability to burrow in on issues that are safety
     related.  And I think that as Milt Levenson spoke in terms of a
     licensee, that there's a great deal of evidence among licensees that,
     indeed, that job is being done.
         I think that what we're dealing with here, and Judy said it
     very well, is a project that's a unique project for which there's no
     real precedence of licensing.  And we're all, therefore, learning as we
     go along.  We even -- we had to learn how to do the safety case.  In
     fact, we're still learning how to do it.  And secondly, the State of
     Nevada has no experience with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  And
     that is a handicap that somehow has to be overcome.  And we're hoping
     that this kind of a meeting is making a contribution to that.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, John.  We're going to go to
     Bill Reamer now.  But, John's comments would prompt me to ask whether
     anybody would want to offer an opinion.  Is this independent role of the
     Advisory Committee separate from the NRC appreciated by people?
     Because, we keep sort of lumping them all together and there is a
     different relationship there.  I don't know if anybody wants to comment
     on that at all, but let's go to Bill Reamer.
         MR. REAMER:  We do have a bottom line.  It's compliance with
     our regulations.  It's compliance with our proposed Part 63, when that
     rule is made final, which should be sometime in the first quarter of
     next year.  And it's DOE's burden to provide a licence application and
     defend a licence application and prove that they meet our regulations,
     comply with our regulations.  And it's our obligation to review that
     closely, to weigh all the information and reach impartial and objective
     conclusions.  And we will do that.  And this is the way we regulate
     broadly within the industry and this is the way we will regulate this
     project here.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Bill.  Is there anybody that we
     haven't heard from yet that wants to say something to the Advisory
     Committee while they are out here in this public meeting?
         [No response.]
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  There was a question about the
     relationship between EPA and NRC, in terms of the standard, that
     apparently seems to be still a matter of confusion.  Bill, can I go to
     Captain Clark for just sort of a brief explanation of the relationship
     between the two agencies?  And where is Sally?  Okay, we'll wait on
     that, because I think she needs to hear it.
         Anybody else back here that would like to make a comment?
         [No response.]
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Well, I think we're getting near the
     end of our string.  I don't know where Abe had to go to find Sally, but
     --
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CAMERON:  -- I guess I'll just try to fill the time up
     here.  Does the Committee, Dr. Garrick, want to offer anything at all?
         DR. GARRICK:  Well, I think that we've -- it's been said
     many times that the fundamental driver of the nuclear safety community
     has been the radiation dose.  It's always thought that way.  And, of
     course, there is a dose response curve that converts a dose to health
     effects.  And as we heard this morning, there continues to be some
     controversy about that, particularly with respect to low-level
     radiation.  But, I think that this Committee is pretty much on record
     supporting the conclusion that all pathways 25 MR standard is -- does,
     in fact, achieve the goal of protecting the health and safety of the
     public.  So, I don't -- you know, it's not -- for us, it's not a
     complicated issue.
         As to what the underlying debate is between the NRC and the
     EPA, I'll let the NRC address that.  We all know, of course, that what
     it really has to do with is the groundwater standard and that
     implementing and allocating radiation -- allowed radiation dose to the
     groundwater standard makes that, in fact, the standard.  And that is in
     the judgment of most experts in health physics and is way below what is
     necessary to achieve the goal of protecting the health and safety of the
     public.  So, I don't think it's much more complicated than that.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, Dr. Garrick.  Ray Clark from
     the EPA, if we can get you to perhaps just tell us what the relationship
     is between NRC and DOE, in terms of setting standards; secondly, why the
     EPA believes that 25 millirem is a better standard than 15 millirem; and
     thirdly, what your viewpoint is of what Dr. Garrick said, that with a
     separate groundwater standard, that does, indeed, becomes the standard
     and the 25 versus 15 millirem is basically moot, if I understood Dr.
     Garrick correctly.  So, there are three questions for you.
         MR. CLARK:  You're going to have to walk me back through the
     three questions, I'm afraid.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CLARK:  We'll do it one at a time.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay; good.
         MR. CLARK:  Well, as far as the four millirem being the
     standard, I think Abe said it probably better than I could today and
     with more authority, that we have a number of options for compliance
     points and a number of scenarios and it just depends on the conditions
     that exist in the final standard, as to which is the controlling factor.
     So, to just say that -- well, I don't know if that's what Dr. Garrick
     was saying, but if just to say that four is lower than 25, that may not
     be the case.
         What is our second --
         MR. CAMERON:  The second ball, I guess, what the basic
     relationship is between -- I think some people sound like for one, they
     don't understand why does the -- why does the NRC have standard setting
     authority; why does the EPA have standard setting authority.  And I
     guess the last question would be:  why does the EPA think that 15
     millirem is better than 25 millirem?
         MR. CLARK:  Well, the EPA, clearly, has standard setting
     authority through the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and it's incumbent upon
     the Commission to be consistent with those standards.  So, there's -- is
     that the relationship you're looking for?  No.
         MS.  DEVLIN:  It's involved here.  What I take, everybody
     seems to be their own -- there is no communication.  You can set one
     standard, they can set one standard, and you have to meet in the middle.
         MR. CAMERON:  So, I think you need to put a finer -- we're
     going to go to Bill Reamer to talk a little bit about the relationship.
     Could you talk about the 25 versus 15?  Or, perhaps, we'll go to Mal
     Murphy on that.  Go ahead.
         MR. CLARK:  All right.  As far as 15 versus 25, I -- I mean,
     the Commission is entitled to their opinion as to what the standard
     should be, just as anybody else is.  We arrived at 15 after taking into
     consideration the NES recommendation as to the risk level.  And it's a
     fine point, but based on our factors, 15 is within that range; 25 is
     slightly above it.  Fifteen is, also, consistent with the generic
     standards that we have out.  Those are standards under which WIPP was
     approved.  Well, that's the only one that's been approved so far under
     the standards.  But, that's -- it is consistent with that.
         The risk level involved at 15 is roughly within the risk
     limits allowed in other EPA programs.  I'm sure the Commission would
     argue with this to some extent, but 15 is, also, consistent with a
     number of international or at least other foreign country standards.
     Well, basically, that's the reason we arrived at 15.
         MR. CAMERON:  Ray, before we go to Mal Murphy, can you just
     let the people who weren't with us this afternoon, can you tell them
     when the public meetings are going to be on the proposed EPA standard
     this year?
         MR. CLARK:  Sure.  It's not a public meeting.  It's
     technically a public hearing.  But, the -- well, out here will be next
     week -- I don't remember the dates -- the 19th -- yeah, the 19th,
     Amargossa Valley in the community center, starting at noon.
         MR. CAMERON:  Let me put these -- let me just put these up
     here for people, so there's no confusion:  October 19th at the Amargossa
     Valley community center, AV community center, noon until what time, Ray?
         MR. CLARK:  That was left undefined.  As long as there is
     interest, we will stay there that evening.
         MR. CAMERON:  It starts at noon.  And we will go to Mal.  Is
     there another public hearing here?
         MR. CLARK:  On the 20th and 21st, it's here in Las Vegas.  I
     forget the exact name of the facility.  It's 101 Convention Center
     Drive.  It's Las Vegas Conference and Convention Services or something
     to that effect, Room 111.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay, 101 Convention Center Drive, Room 111,
     and --
         MR. CLARK:  Noon till 9:00 p.m., the first day, 20th.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  If anybody wants a clarification on
     that, please see Ray.  And let me go to Mal Murphy.  He may be able to
     help us out.  But, you go ahead, you have something more to say?
         MR. CLARK:  You think Mal can -- no, never mind.  Just one
     more quick comment and I don't know if that's important or not, at this
     point:  I've heard several times today that this effort to license Yucca
     Mountain is a first of its kind effort.  Clearly, WIPP, which is a
     geological repository, has been through not the same process granted,
     but it is a repository that has been approved.  It's not the same waste,
     it's not the same medium, but it is a repository and has been through
     the process.  I just want to throw that out.
         The first day in Las Vegas, noon to 9:00 p.m; second day in
     Las Vegas, 9:00 a.m. to noon.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thank you.  Noon to 9:00 p.m.; 9:00
     a.m. to noon the second day.  Let's go to Mal Murphy from Nye County on
     the EPA standard.
         MR. MURPHY:  Yeah, let me just -- on the Amargossa Valley
     hearing, before I get into the standard, the -- you will recall, I'm
     sure, Ray, that the EPA committed to us, in a phone call last week, that
     there will be at least the brief evening session at the Amargossa Valley
     community center, because the Nye County Board of County Commissioners
     will be meeting, I think, essentially all day that day on the 19th.  And
     so commissioners and those in attendance at the Commission meeting
     wouldn't be able to attend a meeting at the Amargossa Valley community
     center until that evening.  So, it will go from noon until no one else
     wants to speak during the afternoon, I guess.  But, then for at least
     some brief period in the evening, starting at I don't know what time,
     but there will be an evening session.
         But, just a couple of points:  first of all -- well, let me
     identify myself.  I'm Mal Murphy and I'm the regulatory and licensing
     adviser to the Nye County nuclear waste repository project office.  The
     Nye County position on the EPA standards is currently undergoing
     internal county review.  And so, I don't -- I can't speak for the county
     this evening on what our position is with respect to EPA's proposed
     standards.  But, you know, we will be stating that position formerly
     next week.
         But, just a couple of points on the additional groundwater
     protection standards versus the 15 millirems, for example.  The 15
     millirem, as we understand it, is an all pathways, all radionuclide
     standard, whereas the maximum contaminant levels in the additional
     groundwater protection do not apply to all radionuclides.  They apply
     only to selected radionuclides.  So, there is that difference.
         As far as the relationship goes between the EPA and the NRC,
     unfortunately -- I think both agencies would agree unfortunately, over
     the years, Congress has, from time to time, given both the NRC and the
     EPA overlapping -- somewhat overlapping authority in these areas, most
     recently, I guess, in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the Energy Policy
     Act of 1992.  And so, both agencies have a legitimate statutory role to
     play in formulating whatever they think is necessary in the area of
     radiation protection out at Yucca Mountain.
         With the EPA, under the law, getting the last pitch, if you
     will, so that once the EPA standards are in place, then whatever the NRC
     does has to conform to or be consistent with -- I can't remember the
     exact language; Bill Reamer does, I'm sure -- but the NRC has to follow
     the lead of the EPA.  But, the NRC has its own independent statutory
     authority, as does the EPA, and that, from time to time over the years,
     has generated some conflict and jealousy between the agencies.  But, we
     think the EPA is leading the way in this and we're confident that the
     NRC will eventually, as they're required to, conform their standards to
     whatever the EPA finally adopts.
         MR. CAMERON:  Bill, do you want to just make sure that
     people understand Mal's last point, that there will not be two
     conflicting standards -- and then we'll come back over to Judy -- that
     eventually there's just going to be one standard, so there's no
     confusion on this?
         MR. REAMER:  Yeah.  I can confirm what Mal described.  And
     I'm not clear whether this responds to Sally's question, but the law,
     the Energy Policy Act of 1992, gives EPA authority to set a dose
     standard for Yucca Mountain.  That will be the only standard -- the law
     says that will be the only standard that applies to Yucca Mountain.  And
     it, also, says that one year after EPA issues that standard in final
     form, which we heard today would be approximately August of 2000, that
     the NRC must modify its requirements to be consistent with that
     standard.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.  Thanks, bill, and I would thank Ray and
     Mal and Bill for trying to clarify that for us.  Let's go to Judy.
         MS. TREICHEL:  This may be a good way to come to a
     conclusion.  I think I finally have something you can do.  I know you
     can't dump the dump.  You can't get into transputation.  One of the
     things that definitely needs to be recommended is for those of us here
     in Nevada, who try and do it all -- when it comes to this program, DOE
     has thousands of employees with all kinds of departments and, obviously,
     so does the NRC, because we're winding up now where we have hearings
     from two agencies and proposed guidelines, proposed rules, proposed
     standards.  We've got meeting dates with one agency, which is the NRC,
     falling on top of each other.  And tomorrow is an excellent example,
     where the LSN people are meeting a couple of blocks away, you're back
     here meeting, and we're flying back and forth between the two, to catch
     the sessions that we believe we need to see, that are the most
     important.
         And this isn't the first time.  But, it seems to me that
     with the sort of money and numbers of people and whatever, there could
     be a calendar person that would be able to do this, because we've, for
     many years, had problems with meetings falling on top of each other; not
     always in the same town, but coinciding.
         MR. CAMERON:  you're right, Judy, we ought to be able to
     handle that.
         MS. TREICHEL:  Then hit the hammer.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. CAMERON:  All right.  Thank you, very much.  LSN is
     licensing Support Network.
         I don't see anybody else that we haven't heard from tonight.
     And, John, I would leave it to your discretion, as the chairman, about
     how much longer you want to go on.
         DR. GARRICK:  Well, I'm hungry.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. GARRICK:  It's been a long day and I'm certainly
     satisfied that everybody has had an opportunity to express themselves.
     And I think we have a great deal of information.  I think we've
     summarized some points along the way.  This, together with what we did
     this morning, gives us a lot to work with.  We do intend to write a
     letter to the Commission about this day's events.  And I suspect you
     will see appearing in that letter a lot of the things that Chip has
     noted on the chalkboard.
         MR. CAMERON:  Okay.
         DR. GARRICK:  So, unless we want to review those, Chip, I'm
     ready to adjourn.
         [Whereupon, at 8:45 p.m., the meeting was concluded.]
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