Event Desc|En No|Site Name|Licensee Name|Region No|City Name|State Cd|County Name|License No|Agreement State Ind|Docket No|Unit Ind1|Unit Ind2|Unit Ind3|Reactor Type|Nrc Notified By|Ops Officer|Notification Dt|Notification Time|Event Dt|Event Time|Time Zone|Last Updated Dt|Emergency Class|Cfr Cd1|Cfr Descr1|Cfr Cd2|Cfr Descr2|Cfr Cd3|Cfr Descr3|Cfr Cd4|Cfr Descr4|Staff Name1|Org Abbrev1|Staff Name2|Org Abbrev2|Staff Name3|Org Abbrev3|Staff Name4|Org Abbrev4|Staff Name5|Org Abbrev5|Staff Name6|Org Abbrev6|Staff Name7|Org Abbrev7|Staff Name8|Org Abbrev8|Staff Name9|Org Abbrev9|Staff Name10|Org Abbrev10|Scram Code 1|RX CRIT 1|Initial PWR 1|Initial RX Mode1|Current PWR 1|Current RX Mode 1|Scram Code 2|RX CRIT 2|Initial PWR 2|Initial RX Mode 2|Current PWR 2|Current RX Mode 2|Scram Code 3|RX CRIT 3|Initial PWR 3|Initial RX Mode 3|Current PWR 3|Current RX Mode 3|Event Text| Part 21|57243|RSCC dba Marmon||1|East Granby|CT|||N||||||Phillip Sargenski|Adam Koziol|07/25/2024|11:05:00|07/23/2024|0:00:00|EDT|7/2/2025 4:42:00 PM|Non Emergency|21.21(d)(3)(i)|Defects And Noncompliance|||||||Lilliendahl, Jon|R1DO|Feliz-Adorno, Nestor|R3DO|Azua, Ray|R4DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 7/3/2025

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - NON-COMPLAINT INSULATED CONDUCTOR The following is a synopsis of information received via fax: A reel of insulated conductor was found non-compliant due to failure of insulation tensile and elongation at break test following air oven aging. Wire from the non-compliant reel was delivered to nine plants. Affected plants: Wolf Creek, Dresden, LaSalle, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Arkansas Nuclear One, Waterford, Susquehanna, and Davis Besse. Reporting company point of contact: RSCC Wire and Cable LLC dba Marmon Industrial Energy and Infrastructure 20 Bradley Park Road East Granby, CT 06026 Phillip Sargenski - Quality Assurance Manager Phone: 860-653-8376 Fax: 860-653-8301 Phillip.sargenski@marmoniei.com * * * UPDATE ON 08/23/24 AT 1315 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * * The vendor provided the final report for this event listing corrective actions and the estimated completion dates. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Skokowski), R4DO (Vossmar), and Part 21 group (Email). * * * UPDATE ON 09/04/24 AT 1044 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO NESTOR MAKRIS * * * The vendor notified the NRC that they plan to send additional finding data regarding this notification via fax and/or email within the next day or two. Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Drake), and Part 21 group (Email). * * * UPDATE ON 09/06/24 AT 1327 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ADAM KOZIOL * * * The vendor identified an additional non-compliant shipment of insulated conductor. Affected plant: Calvert Cliffs Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Drake), and Part 21 group (Email). * * * UPDATE ON 9/17/24 AT 1641 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * * The vendor identified an additional non-compliant shipment of insulated conductor. Affected customer: Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division. Notified R1DO (Werkheiser), R3DO (Ziolkowski), R4DO (Azua), and Part 21 group (Email). * * * UPDATE ON 9/26/24 AT 1030 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ADAM KOZIOL * * * The vendor is continuing to conduct inventory sampling which involves a 14 day aging test. Due to the length of testing, the vendor plans on submitting their final report the week of October 7, 2024. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R3DO (Havertape), R4DO (Young), and Part 21 group (Email). * * * UPDATE ON 10/28/24 AT 1121 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * * The vendor has decided to expand the scope and breadth of the review to ensure they have identified and corrected for the full extent of the matter. Additional time is needed to complete this review. Notified R1DO (Eve), R3DO (Edwards), R4DO (Warnick), and Part 21 group (Email). * * * UPDATE ON 02/13/25 AT 1125 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO IAN HOWARD * * * The vendor has decided to expand the scope and breadth of the review to ensure they have identified and corrected for the full extent of the matter. RSCC is reviewing shipments from the past 18 months to ensure it has accounted for all non-conforming products. Additional cables related to this scope have been identified and impacted customers have been notified. ***UPDATE ON 03/28/2025 AT 1039 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO RODNEY CLAGG*** The vendor has identified cable(s) that could be affected and have advised customers of the issue and requested that samples be returned to the vendor facility for further verification testing, which is a process that remains ongoing. This testing will confirm the cable's safety related function. Once the testing is complete, the vendor will notify the NRC with an updated and final Part 21 report. Notified R1DO (Arner), R3DO (Gilliam), R4DO (Deese), and Part 21 group (Email). * * * UPDATE ON 05/06/2025 AT 0935 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * * The vendor provided an update on their ongoing evaluation. The vendor continues to receive product from their customers and perform their evaluations. The process is still ongoing. Notified R1DO (Eve), R3DO (Ruiz), R4DO (Dodson), and Part 21 group (Email). ***UPDATE ON 06/03/2025 AT 1605 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO ERNEST WEST*** The vendor provided an update on their ongoing evaluation. The vendor continues to receive product from their customers and is performing evaluations. Test results for completed testing have been forwarded to customers. The process is still ongoing. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R3DO (Orlikowski), R4DO (Dodson), and Part 21 group (Email). * * * UPDATE ON 07/02/2025 AT 1634 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * * The vendor provided an update on their ongoing evaluation. The vendor continues to receive product from their customers to perform evaluations. Test results for completed testing have been forwarded to customers. The process is still ongoing. Notified R1DO (Carfang), R3DO (Havertape), R4DO (Warnick), and Part 21 group (Email). | Agreement State|57265|Colorado Dept of Health|BAE Systems|4|Boulder|CO||GL000246|Y||||||Kathryn Kirk|Robert A. Thompson|08/08/2024|11:08:00|08/07/2024|0:00:00|MDT|7/16/2025 7:15:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Vossmar, Patricia|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 7/17/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE - LOST STATIC ELIMINATOR The following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the Department) via email: The Department reported that on August 7, 2024, the licensee notified them of a lost NRD model P-2021 static eliminator containing 0.7 mCi of polonium 210. The licensee continues to search for the device. Colorado event ID: CO240020 * * * UPDATE ON 07/16/2025 AT 1816 EDT FROM KATHRYN KIRK TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * * The following update was submitted by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the Department) via email: "The Department was notified today of a static elimination device (serial number: A2MU000) previously reported as missing in August of 2024, was found on 05/21/2025. The device was leak tested and will be sent back to the manufacturer. NMED Number: CO240020" Notified R4DO (Drake), NMSS Events Notifications (email), ILTAB (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | Agreement State|57565|Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency|Hot Shots NM, LLC|3|Loves Park|IL||IL-01874-01|Y||||||Gary Forsee|Karen Cotton-Gross|02/21/2025|12:33:00|05/28/2024|0:00:00|CST|7/24/2025 4:49:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Feliz-Adorno, Nestor|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 7/25/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNPLANNED EXPLOSION AND CONTAMINATION The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (Agency) via email: "On 2/19/2025, Agency staff conducted a routine inspection at Hot Shots NM, LLC. At the time of inspection, it was discovered that on 5/28/2024, a pharmacist used a standard hot plate in lieu of a heat block in order to tag 2 curies of Tc-99m to Sestamibi. The heating caused the glass vial to explode, resulting in a major spill. The event resulted in contamination of the clean room and contamination to (2) individual's face and hair. "The matter was discussed the next day [2/20/2025] with supervisory staff, and it was determined that the licensee failed to report the event as required under [32 Illinois Administrative Code] 340.1220(c)4 and likely 340.1220(b)2, both requiring notification to the Agency within 24 hours. This matter is reportable to the U.S. NRC within 24 hours. "Due to a lack of records or licensee evaluation of dose from absorption through skin required under 32 Illinois Administrative Code 340.220(d), there is no current estimate to the amount of occupational exposure to the contaminated workers. Inspectors are actively gathering survey readings, specific activity, and variables that may allow an estimation of potential dose to workers. No workers reported to the hospital as a result of the incident. The investigation is ongoing, and updates will be provided as they become available." Illinois Reference Number: IL250009 * * * UPDATE FROM GARY FORSEE TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1628 EDT ON JULY 24, 2025 * * * The following update was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (Agency) via email: "After a detailed investigation and multiple reports from the licensee, very few data points were available to bound the shallow dose equivalent (SDE - skin dose) to the two contaminated workers. Working from the data available, the licensee's consultant estimated Individual 1 received 290 mrem skin dose and Individual 2 received between 7090 and 170,290 mrem skin dose. As stated by the licensee's consultant, 'due to the lack of available survey and occupational monitoring records for the duration of the exposure for Individual 2, and the occupational exposure records for the remainder of the calendar year, it is assumed that this individual received an annual SDE of at least the occupational limit of 50,000 mrem. Without further information, the assigned dose for Individual 2 in this event is based on the worst-case scenario of 170,290 mrem, which does not take into account any potential attenuation or air gap as a result of settling on hair'. The only variables available to assist the Agency in a shallow dose equivalent estimate were the 2 curies of Tc-99m contained within the 3.6 milliliter vial, as well as statements from employees noting contamination on skin, neck, and hair up to 8.5 hours post-incident. Initial personnel decontamination efforts were conducted up to 25 minutes after the ruptured vial containing the Tc-99m. Since no survey readings or personnel exposure assessments were documented, the Agency was unable to conclusively determine if an employee received a 50-rem skin dose as a result of this incident. However, given the dose to the skin per microliter per hour (based on the range from two references), and noting contamination was noted on employee's hair, face, and neck even after initial decontamination attempts (decontamination was 25 minutes post incident), and noting the employee continued to work approximately 8.5 hours before completing decontamination; there is a high likelihood this incident 'may have caused, or threatened to cause' a shallow dose equivalent to the skin in excess of 50 rem. No workers reported to the hospital as a result of the incident and there was no evidence of deterministic effects. As a result of the information above, this report is being updated to include a likely occupational exposure in excess of the regulatory limits. Root cause was failure to follow established procedures for large spills. The licensee detailed corrective action including new training and procedures. Pending appropriate enforcement action, this investigation is considered complete." Notified R3DO (Zurawski), NMSS Events Notification, NMSS (Allen)| Part 21|57680|Asco Valve||2|Aiken|SC|||Y||||||Bryan Causey|Josue Ramirez|04/24/2025|15:56:00|04/24/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/11/2025 10:01:00 AM|Non Emergency|21.21(d)(3)(i)|Defects And Noncompliance|||||||Pearson, Laura|R2DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|Part 21 Materials, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 7/14/2025

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - SOLENOID VALVE FAILS TO OPERATE AFTER EXTENDED DE-ENERGIZATION The following is a summary of the information provided by ASCO via email: This report relates to the failure of a single air-operated valve identified by Dominion Energy at North Anna due to failure of the associated solenoid valve. The solenoid valve periodically failed to reposition, or only partially repositioned, after periods of extended de-energization. As part of testing, the ASCO NP8321 solenoid valve series and all ASCO NP-series solenoid valves were qualified to sit in a normally energized position and were not tested for extended periods of de-energization. The U-cup seal was tested and ASCO determined that this U-cup seal experienced performance limitations at low air operating pressures (below 40 psi) and the valve did not shift completely to an energized state. An alternative valve (NP8300) is recommended by ASCO for this customer application. In the interim, ASCO recommends increasing the inlet air pressure to the valve to at least 80 psi not to exceed the maximum 150 psi to conservatively ensure proper operation of the NP8321 series valve in a de-energized state. ASCO concludes based on design and known operating experience that only the NP8321 model valve exhibits this condition. ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual installation and operating condition of this valve to determine whether this condition would create a `substantial' safety hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21.3. The report is intended to provide investigation results and recommendations. Each end user needs to perform their own evaluation based on the information provided in this notification. Bryan Causey Quality Engineer Bryan.Causey@Emerson.com The only plant known to be affected at the time of the report is North Anna. * * * UPDATE ON 07/11/2025 AT 0907 EDT FROM BRYAN CAUSEY TO IAN HOWARD * * * The following is a summary of the information provided by ASCO via email: ASCO performed extensive testing on this valve with a variety of U-cup seals and found all U-cup seals used for the NP8321 series have low pressure de-energized dormancy performance limitations. For applications where the valve is at 80 psi, ASCO will be updating guidance to indicate that a minimum pressure rating of 80 psi must be maintained when switching from the de-energized state to the energized state for normally closed valves. For normally open valves, 80 psi must be maintained when switching from the energized state to the de-energized state. ASCO ensures application at or above 80 psi would meet its equipment qualification requirements. For applications between 40 and 80 psi the utility has not observed any low-pressure dormancy issues on valves that have already experienced the applications longest possible period of de-energization, ASCO advises that the valve remain in service for the rest of its equipment life, during this time ASCO recommends looking for an appropriate alternative valve and solution for this system. ASCO recommends an NP8300 or NP8316 valve as a suitable replacement. For applications at or below 40 psi, the utility should consult with ASCO at the earliest opportunity. The NP8300 is a potential replacement for the NP8321 series but it is not a drop-in replacement. The NP8300 series consumes twice the wattage of NP8321 and has a lower flow rate. If the lower flow and higher wattage of the NP8300 are acceptable limitations for the utility's application, then ASCO would recommend a NP8300 valve. If the application requires the same wattage and can manage higher flow, a NP8316 can replace a NP8321 but the higher flow rate may require changes to the specific system in place. The NP8316 does have a lower minimum operating pressure differential of just 10 psi instead of 15 psi, but the flow is several times higher than the NP8321. For this solution to work, the system would need to be tolerant of this higher flow and ensure that the minimum operating pressure differential of 10 psi (measured between in the inlet port and exhaust port) is maintained with appropriate piping/regulators and exhaust pipes capable of ensuring that the minimum pressure is maintained. This could include changing out piping and regulators for larger sized pipes and regulators to match the higher Cv [valve flow coefficient] of the NP8316 series. ASCO concludes that for applications at or above 80 psi, the NP8321 series valve meets its full equipment requirements. For applications below 80 psi, ASCO recommends replacing the value based on the above guidelines. Notified R2DO (Davis) and the Part 21 groups (email).| Agreement State|57746|SC Dept of Health & Env Control|NAN YA Plastics Corp. America|1|Lake City|SC||471|Y||||||Adam Gause|Sam Colvard|06/06/2025|11:50:00|06/05/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/16/2025 7:19:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Henrion, Mark|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 7/17/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN GAUGE The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Environmental Services (the Department) via phone and email: "The licensee informed the Department via telephone on June 5, 2025, that a fixed gauging device was disabled or failed to function as designed. The licensee reported that a sealed source was stuck (exposed) in a dip tube assembly that was attached to a process vessel. The licensee reported that a representative from a licensed service provider was on-site and was able to remove the sealed source from the dip tube assembly and place the sealed source into a transport shield. "The sealed source is a 9 millicurie cobalt-60 Berthold Technologies USA, LLC Model P2608-100. "The licensee did not report any overexposures or ongoing health/safety concerns. "This event is still under investigation by the Department." * * * UPDATE ON 7/1/2025 AT 1357 EDT FROM JACOB PRICE TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * * The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Environmental Services via email: "The on-call duty officer was dispatched to the facility to investigate the event on June 6, 2025. All observations and information from the interviews were consistent with the details obtained from the initial report." South Carolina Event Report ID Number: SC250006 Notified R1DO (Carfang) and NMSS Events Notification (email) | Agreement State|57780|Kansas Dept of Health & Environment|BHC Inc|4|Wyandotte|KS||22-B1053|Y||||||Aaron Short|Adam Koziol|06/24/2025|12:01:00|06/09/2025|3:10:00|CDT|6/24/2025 12:11:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Bywater, Russell|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE The following is a summary of information provided by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) via email: On June 9, 2025, at 0310 CDT, licensee employees discovered that a work trailer had been forcibly entered, and several items stolen including a moisture density gauge. The gauge, a Humboldt 5001 EZ (serial number 10103) containing 11 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241/Be, had last been verified onsite on June 6, 2025, around 1730. The theft was reported to KDHE and Kansas City Police Department. Kansas Event Number: KS250005 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Agreement State|57781|MA Radiation Control Program|Second Street Iron and Metal|1|Everett|MA||N/A|Y||||||Robert Locke|Ian Howard|06/24/2025|12:13:00|06/16/2025|10:00:00|EDT|6/24/2025 1:48:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Arner, Frank|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND RADIOACTIVE SOURCE "On 6/16/2025, at 1000 EDT, Radius Recycling in Everett, MA, reported that portal monitors detected radioactive contamination in a scrap load. The load was shipped back to the origin of the load, Second Street Iron and Metal in Everett, MA, on the same day. "On 6/24/2025, Atlantic Nuclear identified a static eliminator [in the scrap load which is] containing a Ra-226 source. The source measured 50 mR/hr on contact and 1.5 mR/hr at one foot from the source. Given this information, the source activity is estimated to be 0.2 mCi. This quantity is immediately reportable to NRC pursuant to 105 CMR 120.281. "The device is now located in a drum in a locked room at the facility with no access to personnel. "The model number and serial number of the source and the device are unknown at this time." MA Event Number: N/A THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Agreement State|57782|NC Div of Radiation Protection|Refresco Beverages|1|Wilson|NC||1708-0G|Y||||||Ken Bugaj|Sam Colvard|06/25/2025|9:50:00|06/10/2025|0:00:00|EDT|6/25/2025 9:57:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Arner, Frank|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GAUGE The following information was provided by the North Carolina Radioactive Materials Branch (NC RMB) via email: "The NC RMB reports the loss of a generally licensed fixed nuclear gauge source (Manufacturer: Industrial Dynamics Co. Ltd. (Filtec), Model: 06110, SN: 2234, 100 mCi, Am-241). "The licensee believes the entire device may have accidentally been thrown into the trash or scrap. The device was stored in a maintenance trailer and was being used for spare parts. The device was last seen on June 17, 2024, during routine preventive maintenance by a field service engineer. Upon discovering the missing source, the licensee searched the site, and the device could not be found. The licensee does not possess a survey meter. The incident was reported to the NC RMB on June 10, 2025. On June 24, 2025, an NC RMB inspector conducted an on-site search for the source and the source could not be located. "Licensee believes the device was accidentally thrown away due to staff not understanding the radiological importance of the device. A thorough search was performed by both the licensee and agreement state staff and the source could not be located." NC Event Number: NC250008 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Agreement State|57783|Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency|Northwestern Memorial Healthcare|3|Chicago|IL||IL-01037-02|Y||||||Robin Muzzalupo|Ian Howard|06/25/2025|15:11:00|06/25/2025|0:00:00|CDT|6/25/2025 3:37:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Zurawski, Paul|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency via phone and email: "On 6/25/2025, the associate radiation safety officer at Northwestern Memorial Healthcare (IL-01037-02) called to advise that following a successful Sir Spheres therapy procedure at Central DuPage Hospital, the nuclear medicine technologist dropped the residual dose vial containing 72 mCi of Y-90 Sir Spheres on the floor within the nuclear medicine hot lab (restricted area). Nuclear medicine personnel followed emergency procedures and promptly notified radiation safety staff. Contamination of personnel was limited to clothing and booties which were immediately removed and placed in storage for decay. Subsequent personnel surveys were conducted and confirmed contamination was limited to clothing and booties with no contamination to the skin. The licensee met reporting requirements of 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(a)(2). Inspectors will conduct a reactive inspection on 6/26/2025, to verify appropriate surveys were conducted and confirm adequate decontamination of personnel and the hot lab." Illinois NMED Number: IL250026| Agreement State|57784|Texas Dept of State Health Services|DAE and Associates LTD|4|Rosenberg|TX||03923|Y||||||Sindiso Ncube|Ernest West|06/25/2025|19:06:00|06/24/2025|0:00:00|CDT|6/25/2025 7:13:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Bywater, Russell|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|CNSNS (Mexico), -|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email: "On June 25, 2025, the licensee notified the Department of the theft of a moisture density gauge. The gauge, a Troxler 3430, contains an 8 millicurie (mCi) cesium-137 sealed source and a 40 mCi americium-241/beryllium sealed source. The theft occurred in Fort Bend County on June 24, 2025. The radiation safety officer (RSO) stated that a technician, after completing his work at a job site, placed the gauge in the back of his pickup truck. The technician placed the gauge in its transport container which was then secured with double locks. The RSO stated that the technician left the job site and drove to a gas station. It was at the gas station that he noticed that the gauge was missing. The locks securing the gauge transport container had been broken, and the container, including the gauge, stolen. The technician reported the theft to the RSO and the Harris County Sheriff's department. The licensee stated that the source rod was in the secured and locked position at the time of the incident. The licensee also stated that no unintended exposure to the public exceeding dose limits is expected due to this incident. "Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA 300 reporting requirements." Texas incident report number: 10205 Texas NMED number: TX250030 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation|57786|Oyster Creek|Holtec International|1|Forked River|NJ|Ocean|GL|N|72-15||||ISFSI|Michael Gilbert|Ernest West|06/26/2025|16:21:00|06/26/2025|15:02:00|EDT|6/26/2025 7:13:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|Offsite Notification|||||||Arner, Frank|R1DO|NMSS_Events_Notification, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "At 1502 [EDT on 6/26/2025] Oyster Creek notified the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) due to spill of approximately 50 gallons of water from a chill water system that contained low levels of Cs-137 and Co-60. The spill was stopped, and the system was drained. The spill did not meet reportability requirements under 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 20, 40 CFR 302, 40 CFR 355, and NUREG-1022. "No personnel were injured. "Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), this report is being made due to contacting the state of New Jersey (other government agency)" The NRC Resident will be notified. | Agreement State|57788|Maryland Dept of the Environment|Johns Hopkins Imaging, Bethesda|1|Bethesda|MD||RAML #31-314-01|Y||||||Krishnakumar Nangeelil|Sam Colvard|06/27/2025|17:50:00|06/27/2025|12:49:00|EDT|8/4/2025 2:15:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Arner, Frank|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|Silberfeld, Dafna|NMSS|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 8/5/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE The following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) via phone and email: "On Friday, June 27, 2025, at 1249 EDT, MDE Program Manager received an email from the radiation safety officer (RSO) at Johns Hopkins University Radiation Control Unit, regarding a radiation overexposure incident involving a declared pregnant worker at the Johns Hopkins Bethesda PET facility. "The RSO reported that a PET technician received the following radiation doses over the past three months: "Fetal dose: 13.149 rem "Whole body dose: 29.966 rem "Extremity (ring) dose: 6329 rem "Following the notification, the MDE contacted the RSO by phone to obtain additional details about the incident. "The RSO explained that the employee's radiation exposure levels remained within acceptable limits until mid-March 2025. At that time, the technician began receiving higher-than-typical doses. The employee was informed when elevated exposure levels were initially observed in April 2025 dosimetry records. "Upon reviewing the May 2025 dosimetry reports, the Radiation Control Office observed that the exposure levels were significantly elevated. As a result, the June 2025 dosimetry was expedited, which confirmed doses exceeding investigation thresholds. The employee was promptly notified of the dose results and was immediately removed from any work involving radioactive materials. The RSO has initiated a root cause investigation and will notify the MDE as required. This communication serves as a preliminary notification; MDE will follow up on the case and will provide further updates as appropriate." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The overexposure was limited to one worker as two other workers' dosimetry indicate normal exposures. It is unknown at this time what radiopharmaceutical was involved or if there is an indication of spread of contamination. MDE does plan to perform a reactive inspection. * * * UPDATE ON 6/27/2025 AT 1858 EDT FROM KRISHNAKUMAR NANGEELIL TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * * The following summary of information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) via phone and email: The facility and license number is Johns Hopkins Imaging, Bethesda (RAML #31-314-01). The radiopharmaceuticals used contains F-18 and G-68. MDE called the facility RSO and the RSO determined that there is no indication of a spill or spread of contamination at the facility. Notified R1DO (Arner), NMSS Events (email), NMSS (Silberfeld). * * * UPDATE ON 8/4/2025 AT 1400 EDT FROM KRISHNAKUMAR NANGEELIL TO JON LILLIENDAHL * * * The following summary of information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment via email: Following further investigation, the facility received updated dosimetry reports from their contractor. These values were confirmed through reanalysis using multiple instruments. Based on this reassessment, the originally reported doses were found to differ slightly from the earlier reported values. Specifically, the updated fetal dose is 14.790 rem. Notified R1DO (Henrion), NMSS Events (email), NMSS (Allen).| Power Reactor|57790|Cooper|Nebraska Public Power District|4|Brownville|NE|Nemaha||Y|05000298|1|||[1] GE-4|Randy Kouba|Sam Colvard|06/30/2025|20:35:00|06/30/2025|16:41:00|CDT|7/9/2025 1:57:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|Loss Comm/Asmt/Response|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 7/10/2025

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF THE PUBLIC PRIMARY ALERT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax: "On 6/29/2025, at 1641 CDT, the National Weather Service reported to Cooper Nuclear Station that the National Warning System (NAWAS) radio tower near Shubert, Nebraska was non-functional. The Shubert Tower transmitter activates the Emergency Alert System (EAS)/tone alert radios used for public prompt notification which is part of Cooper's primary alert and notification system (ANS). On 6/30/2025, at 1641 CDT, the Shubert Tower transmitter remained non-functional for 24 hours. "This primary ANS equipment was not restored to service within 24 hours, and therefore this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), since the backup alerting methods do not meet the primary system design objective. The backup notification system is available to use for notifications if needed. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." * * * UPDATE ON 07/09/2025 AT 1453 EDT FROM BAILEY GILES TO ERIC SIMPSON * * * "At 1045 CDT, on 7/09/2025, Cooper Nuclear Station was informed that the NAWAS radio tower near Shubert, Nebraska has been restored to service. "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified." Notified R4DO (Dodson).| Non-Agreement State|57791|IRIS NDT|IRIS NDT|4|Rollins|WY||13-32791-01|N||||||John Wojno|Robert A. Thompson|07/01/2025|10:08:00|06/30/2025|11:36:00|MDT|7/1/2025 10:47:00 AM|Non Emergency|30.50(b)(2)|Safety Equipment Failure|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|RADIOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT FAILURE The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: On June 30, 2025, the licensee was performing radiography at a temporary jobsite at the HF Sinclair Refinery with a SPEC-150 camera using a 1.474 Tbq Ir-192 source. With the source extended, a crankout came into contact with a hot pipe, melting the crankout and damaging the source cable. At 1136 MDT, the radiographers determined the source could not be retracted. The radiographers extended the boundary and established a watch to prevent unauthorized entry. A technician certified for source retrieval used a source retrieval kit and successfully retracted the source at 1203. The crank cable had to be pulled directly due to the cable damage. The maximum dose to any of the radiographers was 9 mrem. No members of the public received any exposure due to the event. | Agreement State|57792|Texas Dept of State Health Services|Formosa Plastics Corporation Texas|4|Point Comfort|TX||03893|Y||||||Sindiso Ncube|Tenisha Meadows|07/01/2025|15:38:00|06/30/2025|0:00:00|CDT|7/1/2025 3:47:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT FAILURE The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email: "On July 1, 2025, the Department received a notification from the licensee regarding a mechanical failure involving a level/density measurement gauge. The licensee reported that the failure was discovered on June 30, 2025. The affected gauge is a Berthold model LB 300 IRL Type I, containing a 500 millicurie cesium-137 sealed source. According to the licensee, the failure occurred when the cable connected to the source carrier broke, causing the source to become lodged within the thermowell inside the process vessel. The licensee stated that the vessel contains product, which is effectively shielding the source and limiting radiation levels outside the vessel. The licensee added that radiation surveys conducted on the vessel exterior indicated exposure levels of less than 2 milliroentgens per hour (mR/hr). There is no indication of elevated radiation risk to workers or members of the public. The licensee further stated that Berthold is scheduled to retrieve the source and repair the cable on July 2, 2025. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA 300 Reporting requirements." Texas Incident Number: 10207 NMED Number: TX250032 | Power Reactor|57793|Millstone|Dominion Generation|1|Waterford|CT|New London||N||3|||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|Scott McArthur|Adam Koziol|07/02/2025|11:38:00|05/06/2025|21:08:00|EDT|7/2/2025 12:17:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.73(a)(1)|Invalid Specif System Actuation|||||||Carfang, Erin|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|0|Cold Shutdown|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||60-DAY NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION The following is a summary of information that was provided by the licensee via phone and fax: "Millstone Power Station Unit 3 is submitting a 60-day telephonic notification in lieu of a licensee event report (LER) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) for an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). "On May 6, 2025, at approximately 2108 EDT, while Millstone Power Station Unit 3 was in mode 5 during a refueling outage, an invalid safety injection (SI) signal was initiated. The actuation was not the result of intentional manual actuation and not in response to actual plant conditions requiring safety system operation. This resulted in the automatic start of both emergency diesel generators (EDGs), and the complete initiation on both trains of the following: main steam line isolation, containment isolation phase 'A', and safety injection signal. No injection into the reactor coolant system occurred, and the EDGs remained unloaded. All equipment not administratively locked out responded as designed, and the plant remained stable throughout the event. Control room operators responded in accordance with appropriate operating procedures and restored the affected systems. This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)- including safety injection signal, containment isolation signal, and start of both emergency diesel generators. "There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event." | Power Reactor|57794|Calvert Cliffs|Constellation Nuclear|1|Lusby|MD|Calvert||Y||2|||[1] CE,[2] CE|Hummer, Kerry|Brian P. Smith|07/02/2025|12:11:00|07/02/2025|8:42:00|EDT|7/2/2025 12:44:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||||Carfang, Erin|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "At 0842 EDT on 7/2/25 with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power, an actuation of the emergency safety features actuation system (ESFAS) undervoltage (UV) occurred on the safety related 4kV bus '21' during steady state conditions. The cause of the UV actuation was the loss of the 13/4 kV transformer 'U-4000-12' due to its feeder breaker tripping open. The '2A' emergency diesel generator automatically started as designed when the UV signal was received and re-powered 4kV bus '21'. "This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the ESFAS. "There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."| Agreement State|57795|Colorado Dept of Health|Fairfield Inn by Marriott|4|Lakewood|CO||GL000212|Y||||||Kathryn Kirk|Tenisha Meadows|07/02/2025|12:39:00|07/01/2025|0:00:00|MDT|7/2/2025 12:55:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN The following is a summary of information received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email: One exit sign, containing 10 curies of tritium, was determined to be lost by the licensee. Manufacturer: SRB Technologies Model Number: BX-10-BK Colorado Event Number: CO250019 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Agreement State|57796|Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm|Honeywell International Inc.|1|Duluth|GA||GA 832-1|Y||||||Chelsea Parkerson|Tenisha Meadows|07/02/2025|15:16:00|06/27/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/2/2025 3:28:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Carfang, Erin|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RUPTURED SEALED SOURCE The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program Environmental Protection Division (the State) via email: "On June 27, 2025, a krypton-85 sealed source capsule ruptured while unloading a Honeywell model 2201 series thickness gauge. The manufacturing engineer immediately turned on the fume hood and left the room when it was noticed the radiation monitors in the area rapidly increased in dose. It was determined the capsule had ruptured. The highest dose rate in the area of the source was 7 mR/h. The source was placed in the fume hood to allow gas to escape. The dose rate returned to normal approximately an hour after the source was placed in the fume hood. The dose rate at the source was then indistinguishable from background. The empty capsule was placed in a paint can containing cat litter and placed in their radiation source storage area. "As a corrective action, all persons performing this activity have been retrained on loading and unloading the model 2201 source capsule, and regarding the importance of safety when unloading sealed source capsules containing [radioactive material]. "The thermoluminescent dosimeter badge of the manufacturing engineer will be sent to Landauer [the manufacturer] and the licensee will notify the State when they receive those results. Respirators are not utilized in their daily operations. The State will continue to investigate the incident and will follow up with new information." Additional information on the sealed source: Model: KAC.D5 Serial number: TW911 Activity: 14.8 GBq of krypton-85 as of December 2, 2011 Georgia incident number: 101 | Agreement State|57797|Wisconsin Radiation Protection|Labcorp Early Development Lab|3|Madison|WI||025-1076-01|Y||||||Sarah Bouche|Tenisha Meadows|07/02/2025|16:43:00|06/10/2025|0:00:00|CDT|7/2/2025 4:55:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Havertape, Joshua|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|CNSC (Canada), - (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF LICENSED MATERIAL The following information was received from the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (the Department) via email: "On June 11, 2025, the Department received a telephone notification that the licensee was unable to locate two vials of carbon-14, with an aggregate activity of 1.92 mCi. The vials were identified by the licensee as missing on June 10, 2025. The licensee completed an investigation by June 26, 2025, and submitted a written report to the Department. The licensee determined the package in the original transport box was mistakenly picked up by a third-party cleaning service and disposed of as normal trash. The landfill was contacted. There are no suspected health or safety risks to any worker or member of the public. The Department will perform an investigation into this incident." WI Event Report ID No: WI250006 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Agreement State|57798|Virginia Rad Materials Program|Hillis-Carnes Engineering|1|Alexandria|VA||107-453-1|Y||||||Sheila Nelson|Brian P. Smith|07/02/2025|17:09:00|07/01/2025|20:30:00|EDT|7/8/2025 6:14:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Carfang, Erin|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE The following report was received via email by the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP): "At approximately 1515 EDT on 7/2/2025, VRMP was notified of an incident involving a stolen portable nuclear gauge. Sometime between the hours of 1500 on 7/1/2025 and 0700 on 7/2/2025, a Troxler model 3411 portable nuclear density/moisture gauge containing 9 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241 was discovered missing from a construction site. The authorized user notified the radiation safety officer (RSO) who went to the site to search and then notified the VRMP. "Per the RSO, at approximately 1500 on 7/1/2025, the authorized user left the gauge on the site to carry other items to his vehicle outside the fenced construction site a short distance away when it started to rain and then found the gate to the site locked when he returned to retrieve the gauge. He did not notify the RSO at that time. He returned at approximately 2030 on 7/1/2025 to find the gauge missing. He returned to the licensee's office and notified the RSO around noon on 7/2/2025. The RSO went to the site to search for the gauge. When he could not find it, he contacted the VRMP. He is also contacting the Alexandria Police Department to report the theft. The gauge was not in the transportation box when it was left on the site. "VRMP will follow up with an investigation." Virginia Event Report Number: VA250002 * * * UPDATE ON 07/08/2025 AT 1740 EDT FROM SHEILA NELSON TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * * The following information was provided by the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) via email: "The VRMP was notified at 1230 EDT that the missing gauge has been recovered. The gauge appears to be undamaged with no signs of tampering. The licensee will obtain a leak test and evaluate the gauge for serviceability. The agency will schedule an in-person investigation." Notified R1DO (Bickett), NMSS Events Notification (email), ILTAB (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | Agreement State|57799|Minnesota Department of Health|IRISNDT, Inc.|3|St. Paul Park|MN||1238|Y||||||Tyler Benner|Tenisha Meadows|07/03/2025|13:51:00|07/02/2025|11:30:00|CDT|7/3/2025 2:04:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Havertape, Joshua|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE The following information was received from the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), Radioactive Materials Unit via email: "On July 2, 2025, MDH received an email stating that on July 2, 2025, at 1130 [CDT] the licensee had a source retrieval [issue] of a 35.64 Ci Ir-192 source in a SPEC 150 camera. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) was notified that a radiographer was unable to retract the source to its fully shielded position during radiographic operations. The radiographer's assistant cranked the source out and realized that he had gone too far and notified the radiographer. The radiographer investigated the situation and observed the source was spooled on the ground. The radiographer alerted the RSO. The RSO informed all radiation workers to establish a 2 mR/hr boundary. The RSO and a staff member, who is trained in source retrieval, were able to crank the source back into its fully shielded position at 1203 [CDT]. The radiographer received 144.9 mrem whole body. The RSO calculated the radiographer received 526.27 mrem to the feet. The RSO received 4.5 mrem and the source retrieval staff received 0.3 mrem. MDH plans on conducting an investigation next week." Minnesota Event Report ID: MN250003 | Power Reactor|57800|Farley|Southern Nuclear Operating Company|2|Ashford|AL|Houston||Y|05000348|1|2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP|Aaron Shelley|Tenisha Meadows|07/03/2025|17:27:00|07/02/2025|19:22:00|CDT|7/17/2025 2:31:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|Loss Comm/Asmt/Response|||||||Blamey, Alan|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 7/18/2025

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF SEISMIC MONITORING FOR EMERGENCY PLAN ASSESSMENT The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "At 1922 CDT on 07/02/2025, the Farley Unit 1 and Unit 2 seismic monitoring panel experienced a fault, rendering the panel nonfunctional. "Compensatory measures for seismic event classification have been implemented in accordance with Farley procedures. "This report is being submitted as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the seismic monitoring panel is the method for evaluating if an operational basis earthquake (OBE) threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event. This is in accordance with the initiating condition for a seismic event greater than OBE levels and emergency action level HU2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee confirmed alternative means of recognizing a seismic event for emergency plan entry are available. * * * UPDATE ON 07/17/2025 AT 1420 EDT FROM DANIEL HERSHMAN TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * * The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "It was determined through event investigation that two additional unplanned events occurred within a 3-year period. The seismic computer experienced an unplanned event on 9/29/24 at 1306 CDT and was restored on 9/30/24 at 1742. The other unplanned event occurred on 3/19/25 at 1120 and was restored to service on 3/24/25 at 1626. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R2DO (Davis)| Agreement State|57801|Texas Dept of State Health Services|GeoTex Engineering|4|Fort Worth|TX||L06677|Y||||||Bruce Hammond|Robert A. Thompson|07/07/2025|10:40:00|07/07/2025|5:18:00|CDT|7/7/2025 10:40:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Dodson, Doug|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|CNSNS (Mexico), -|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE The following information was provided by the Texas State Department of Health (the Department) via email: "On July 7, 2025, at about 0710 CDT, a report was made by the licensee that an Istrotek model 3500 moisture density gauge containing a 10 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am241/Be source had been discovered stolen at 0518 CDT on July 7, 2025, from the bed of a pickup truck at the residence of an employee in Fort Worth, Texas. The securing chains and locks had been breached overnight and the gauge taken. "The gauge handle was secured by a lock; no immediate public health issue is anticipated. "A report was made to the Fort Worth Police Department." Texas incident number: 10208 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Agreement State|57802|SC Dept of Health & Env Control|WestRock CP, LLC|1|Florence|SC||080|Y||||||Jacob Price|Ernest West|07/07/2025|12:55:00|06/10/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/7/2025 1:06:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Bickett, Brice|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTERS The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Environmental Services (the Department) via phone and email: "The licensee informed the Department via email on July 3, 2025, (a phone notification was not made to the Department), that two fixed gauging devices were disabled or failed to function as designed. The licensee reported that a 2 curie cesium-137 Kay-Ray/Sensall Inc. model number: 7700Y-1000, serial number: S95K1307 was stuck in the open position (exposed), and a 100 millicurie Cs-137 Texas Nuclear model number: 570-571157C, serial number: B2988 is stuck in a partially open position (exposed). Both of the devices are attached to a process vessel. "The licensee also informed the Department that a 100 millicurie Cs-137 Texas Nuclear model number: 570-571157C, serial number: B2987 has a visible crack in the source housing and is attached to a process vessel. "The licensee performed ambient dose rate surveys and reported results similar to the Sealed Source and Device Registry (SSDR) certificates. "The licensee did not report any overexposures or ongoing health/safety concerns. "This event is still under investigation by the Department." South Carolina Event Number: TBD | Agreement State|57803|Minnesota Department of Health|US Steel - Keewatin Taconite|3|Keewatin|MN||1078|Y||||||Ty Benner|Ernest West|07/07/2025|17:22:00|07/07/2025|10:00:00|CDT|7/7/2025 5:32:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Gilliam, Jasmine|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER The following information was received from the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), Radioactive Materials Unit via email: "On Monday, July 7, 2025, at 1000 [CDT], the licensee discovered a gauge with a stuck shutter. The gauge is a Texas Nuclear fixed gauge with a 200 mCi Cs-137 source. Maintenance was planned on the apron feeder near the gauge. The maintenance group requested the electrical group close the shutter on this gauge. The electrical crew was unable to close the shutter after multiple attempts and decided to remove the gauge and place it in a container containing lead plates. The radiation safety officer (RSO) took readings 1 foot from the top and sides of the container. The highest reading was 0.3 mR/hr. The container was labeled as radioactive material and taped off with red tape. The RSO reached out to QAL-TEK to dispose of the unit. QAL-TEK stated they may be able to come out in less than two weeks." Minnesota Event Report ID: MN250004 | Power Reactor|57804|Fermi|Detroit Edison Co.|3|Newport|MI|Monroe||N|05000341|2|||[2] GE-4|Glenn West|Ernest West|07/07/2025|22:36:00|07/07/2025|15:45:00|EDT|7/22/2025 5:53:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|Accident Mitigation|||||||Gilliam, Jasmine|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 7/23/2025

EN Revision Text: RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL COMPLEX PUMP ROOM DAMPER FULLY CLOSED The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "On 7/7/2025 at 1545 EDT, one of the division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) complex pump room dampers was noted to be full-closed instead of at the expected full-open position based on outside air temperatures. An operator walkdown confirmed that the division 2 RHR pump room temperature controller was attempting to open the damper. Per plant procedures, the affected RHR service water (RHRSW), emergency equipment service water (EESW), and emergency diesel generator service water pumps (DGSW) were declared inoperable. Division 2 EESW supports the safety function for all division 2 safety systems, including high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). Therefore, HPCI was also declared inoperable. Since HPCI is a single-train safety system, this meets the criterion for event notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The damper will be blocked to the position required based on current and projected outside air temperature, this will return the systems to operable. The cause of the damper failure is unknown and under investigation." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Multiple technical specification limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were entered as a result of this event. Fermi Unit 2 expects to be able to exit the LCOs within the required timeframes. * * * RETRACTION FROM JOSH MORSE TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1616 EDT ON JULY 22, 2025 * * * The following retraction was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "Following the initial event notification, further analysis of the condition identified that since the residual heat removal complex room temperature (85 degrees F) was less than the limit bounded by a calculation (<104 degrees F), and the dampers were blocked in a position in accordance with plant procedures within 24 hours of the event, there is reasonable assurance that the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system would be able to perform its safety function. Therefore, HPCI is considered operable for the condition. "No other concerns were noted during the event. HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). "Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC event report 57804 can be retracted and no licensee event report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted." Notified R3DO (Zurawski)| Non-Agreement State|57805|Apache Deepwater LLC|Apache Deepwater LLC|4|Houston|TX|Harris|General|N||||||Laura Hogge|Jordan Wingate|07/08/2025|10:42:00|08/01/2017|0:00:00|CDT|7/8/2025 11:10:00 AM|Non Emergency|20.2201(a)(1)(i)|Lost/Stolen LNM>1000x|||||||Dodson, Doug|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|CNSNS (Mexico), -|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|LOST GENERALLY LICENSED SOURCE The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: During a recent license renewal inquiry, it was discovered that during the decommissioning of the licensee's deepwater flow line in August 2017 a jumper with a generally licensed meter containing a nuclear source was removed and inadvertently scrapped. This event is under investigation by the licensee. Roxar Flowmeter Model number: RFM-SH7950 Source: Cs-137, 30 mCi General License Number: 725736-16 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Hospital|57806|SSM Health|SSM Health|3|St Charles|MO||24-1159-01|N||||||Britta Green|Robert A. Thompson|07/09/2025|16:49:00|07/08/2025|11:18:00|CDT|7/9/2025 5:21:00 PM|Non Emergency|35.3045(a)(1)(i)|Dose <> Prescribed Dosage|||||||Gilliam, Jasmine|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|MEDICAL EVENT The following is a summary of information was provided by the licensee via phone: A planned treatment administering three Y-90 microsphere doses resulted in underdoses of greater than 20 percent for all three doses. The start of the treatment was delayed as the treatment room was not available at the scheduled time. Doses were dispensed assuming a treatment time of 0930 CDT, but actual treatments were delayed until 1118, 1156, and 1244 CDT, respectively. The licensee is also investigating a potential complication in establishing intravenous access to the treatment site (liver). Actual doses planned and administered were as follows: First treatment at 1118 CDT: planned 18.9 mCi, actual 14.1 mCi Second treatment at 1156 CDT: planned 13.8 mCi, actual 10.1 mCi Third treatment at 1244 CDT: planned 17.2 mCi, actual 12.0 mCi Initial review by the authorized user has concluded the treatments administered were adequate and no further treatment is planned. The attending physician and patient are being notified. An NRC Region III inspector was on-site and has been notified. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. | Agreement State|57807|Texas Dept of State Health Services|Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP|4|Sweeny|TX||L 06771|Y||||||Art Tucker|Robert A. Thompson|07/10/2025|20:11:00|07/10/2025|0:00:00|CDT|7/10/2025 8:12:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Dodson, Doug|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN GAUGE SHUTTER The following information was provided by the Texas Department of Health (the Department) via email: "On July 10, 2025, the Department was notified by the licensee that the shutter on a Vega model SH-F1 gauge containing a 1,000 millicurie (original activity) Cs-137 source had failed in the open position during testing. Open is the normal operating position. The licensee reported there is no risk of additional radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers due to this shutter failure. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300." Texas incident number: 10209 | Fuel Cycle Facility|57808|Louisiana Energy Services|Louisiana Energy Services, Llc|2|Eunice|NM|Lea|SNM-2010|Y|70-3103|||||Holly Harvey|Ernest West|07/11/2025|12:51:00|07/10/2025|13:30:00|MDT|7/11/2025 1:09:00 PM|Non Emergency|PART 70 APP A (b)(1)|Unanalyzed Condition|||||||Davis, Bradley|R2DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|UNANALYZED CONDITION The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "The facility is in a safe and stable configuration and no accident has occurred. "Urenco USA stores '1S' bottles in storage cabinets that are verified as safe-by-design, and have been analyzed for storage in the storage area as sub-critical under all normal and credible abnormal conditions. '1S' bottles were removed from cabinets and placed onto carts awaiting transfer to new approved cabinets in the cylinder receipt and dispatch building (CRDB). "An analysis exists for this configuration of '1S' bottles on carts in other areas of the plant but does not presently exist for '1S' bottles stored on carts in the CRDB. The collection of '1S' sample bottles on several mobile carts potentially falls outside of the normal operating conditions analyzed in nuclear criticality safety and integrated safety analysis (ISA) related documentation and results in the facility being in a state that was different than analyzed in the ISA. "Corrective actions have begun." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Personnel access to the area has been restricted pending completion of the evaluation. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2. | Power Reactor|57810|Watts Bar|Tennessee Valley Authority|2|Spring City|TN|Rhea||Y||2|||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|Ryan Nessell|Josue Ramirez|07/13/2025|17:10:00|07/13/2025|14:18:00|EDT|7/13/2025 5:17:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS Actuation - Critical|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||Davis, Bradley|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby||N|0||0|||N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "At 1418 EDT on 7/13/2025, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a main turbine trip. The trip was not complicated with all systems responding normally post trip. "Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the steam dump system and the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. Unit 1 is not affected. "Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The expected actuation of the AFW system (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight-hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). "There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the main turbine trip was due to the loss of both main feed pumps due to a loss of secondary power. The cause of the loss of secondary power is still being investigated. | Agreement State|57811|RI Dept of Radiological Health|Electric Boat|1|North Kingstown|RI||RI 3D-005-01|Y||||||Catherine Perham|Kerby Scales|07/14/2025|14:22:00|07/14/2025|0:06:00|EDT|7/15/2025 5:22:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Eve, Elise|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE The following information was provided by the Rhode Island Department of Radiological Health via email: "At 0006 EDT, on July 14th, 2025, an Electric Boat employee was attempting to retract an Ir-192 source of 19.5 Ci. The employee was only able to retract the source halfway back to the exposure device when the source would not move any further. The employee then cranked the source back out into the collimator to provide shielding. The employee then contacted their supervisor to report the emergency notification and follow the emergency procedures as required. The boundaries were verified to be less than 0.5 mR/hr at all boundaries. There were no un-monitored personnel in the area. Additional personnel were provided to maintain control of the area. The radiation safety officer (RSO) was contacted at 0013 and notified of the hung source. The RSO arrived on site at approximately 0043 to assess the incident and determine a corrective action on how to move forward. The RSO and the radiographer returned the radioactive source to the exposure device at approximately 0300. The highest dose received by any individual of the recovery team was 1 mrem. The source in the exposure device was secured and returned to storage." Rhode Island Event Report ID Number: Rhode Island-25-01 | Agreement State|57812|Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency|Teasdale Foods |3|Hoopeston|IL||9206798|Y||||||Gary Forsee|Josue Ramirez|07/15/2025|17:22:00|07/15/2025|0:00:00|CDT|7/22/2025 4:50:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Nguyen, April|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB, (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 7/23/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email: "On July 15, 2025, the Agency became aware that a generally licensed gauge containing 100 millicuries of Am-241 could not be located. The gauge, a Peco Controls Corporation Gamma 101P, (SN G011619735), was one of (8) listed in use at Teasdale Foods in Hoopeston, IL. According to the (relatively new) registrant's management, records of the device could not be found and search efforts have been unproductive. An investigation is still underway to determine the root cause and the effectiveness of corrective actions." Sealed source information: Serial number: 5445LA Illinois item number: IL250027 * * * UPDATE FROM GARY FORSEE TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1639 EDT ON JULY 22, 2025 * * * The following update was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: "Agency staff conducted a reactive inspection on 7/21/25 and discovered two additional 'Gamma 101P' gauges were missing and could not be accounted for. There does not appear to be any intentional theft or diversion, rather loss of accountability and oversight during routine maintenance. The Agency investigation is ongoing." Notified R3DO (Zurawski), NMSS_Events and ILTAB (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Power Reactor|57813|Prairie Island|Nuclear Management Company|3|Welch|MN|Goodhue||Y|05000282|1|||[1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP|Jason Rhody|Josue Ramirez|07/16/2025|13:57:00|07/16/2025|9:59:00|CDT|7/16/2025 2:06:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS Actuation - Critical|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||Nguyen, April|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby||N|0||0|||N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "At 0959 CDT on 7/16/2025, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor tripped coincident with operation of a bus 11 knife switch during performance of [surveillance procedure] SP 1857, 4KV bus 11/12 undervoltage and underfrequency relay test. The trip was not complicated with all systems responding normally post trip. "Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam using the steam dump system and the main feedwater system. Unit 2 is not affected. "Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The expected actuation of the auxiliary feed water system (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight-hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). "There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." | Agreement State|57814|Florida Bureau of Radiation Control|Cardinal Health|1|Gainesville|FL||3453-2|Y||||||Monroe A. Cooper|Josue Ramirez|07/16/2025|15:33:00|07/16/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/16/2025 3:39:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Eve, Elise|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email: "The BRC received notification from Cardinal Health that a courier, employed by a courier company, was involved in a traffic stop resulting in an arrest. The courier was transporting a radioactive materials package containing one 5 mCi I-131 source at the time of the arrest. The transporting vehicle was then held at a towing company storage, with the towing company stating an intent to retain all impounded material until proper permissions could be received from the vehicle owner. The towing company was informed that they must release the material to Cardinal Health and have agreed to comply." Florida Incident Number: FL25-069 | Agreement State|57815|Alabama Radiation Control|INEOS Styrolution America LLC|1|Decatur|AL||902|Y||||||Undria McCallum|Josue Ramirez|07/16/2025|18:23:00|07/16/2025|9:14:00|CDT|7/16/2025 6:30:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Eve, Elise|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER The following is a summary of information received from the Alabama Office of Radiation Control (the Agency) via email: "On July 16, 2025, at 0914 CDT the Agency received a call from the radiation safety officer (RSO) for INEOS Styrolution American, LLC. stating that during regular shutter checks, the shutter for the Ronan Model SA1-F37 Serial No. 8171GK, with 5000 millicuries cesium-137 would not close. The facility contacted RSO Services to schedule repair of the device. The facility has a maintenance outage scheduled in September of this year. "The Agency will provide more information as the investigation continues." Alabama Incident Number: 2025 25-02 | Power Reactor|57816|North Anna|Dominion Generation|2|Richmond|VA|Louisa||Y|05000338|1|||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP|Bob Page|Josue Ramirez|07/17/2025|11:38:00|07/17/2025|11:00:00|EDT|7/17/2025 11:56:00 AM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|Offsite Notification|||||||Davis, Bradley|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "At 1100 EDT on 07/17/2025, North Anna Power Station reported elevated levels of tritium in a ground water monitoring well to the State of Virginia as a non-voluntary reporting of tritium. An investigation is currently ongoing to identify the cause of the elevated tritium levels. The tritium levels in this location do not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. "This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of the other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | Agreement State|57818|Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency|Isomedix Operations, Inc.|3|Libertyville|IL||IL-01123-02|Y||||||Robin G. Muzzalupo|Josue Ramirez|07/17/2025|16:20:00|07/16/2025|0:00:00|CDT|7/17/2025 4:33:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Nguyen, April|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT FAILURE The following report was received by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email: "The Agency was contacted this afternoon (7/17/25) by Isomedix Operations, Inc. in Libertyville, IL to advise of a reportable equipment failure. "According to the report, the radiation monitor used to perform required radioactivity measurements of the pool water (e.g., leak testing of the pool irradiator sources) failed at some point in the last month. It was discovered yesterday, 7/16/25, during a routine monthly check when the system failed to alarm when tested with a check source. "Replacement monitoring equipment was installed, and the pool water was determined to be free of radioactivity. This incident had no impact to public or worker safety, nor is there any indication of leaking sources. However, the reportable criteria in 32 Illinois Administrative Code 340.122(c)(2) appear to have been met. The licensee met the 24-hour reporting requirement, and the Agency will report the matter to the NRC shortly. "Inspectors will conduct a reactive inspection to determine root cause and corrective action." Illinois Item Number: IL250028 | Agreement State|57819|Texas Dept of State Health Services|Braskem America Inc.|4|Freeport|TX||06443|Y||||||Sindiso Ncube|Tenisha Meadows|07/19/2025|15:04:00|07/18/2025|0:00:00|CDT|7/19/2025 3:10:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Drake, James|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN GAUGE SHUTTER The following information was provided by the Texas Department of Health (the Department) via email: "On July 19, 2025, the Department was notified by the licensee of a gauge shutter mechanism failure. A Vega gauge model SH-F2, containing a 300 millicurie cesium-137 sealed source, was reported to be stuck in the open position. Open is the normal operating position. The issue was discovered on July 18, 2025, and the licensee confirmed there is no risk of additional radiation exposure to the public or workers due to this on/off mechanism failure. "Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300 reporting requirements." Texas incident number: 10210 NMED number: TX250035 | Power Reactor|57820|River Bend|Entergy Nuclear|4|St Francisville|LA|West Feliciana||Y|05000458|1|||[1] GE-6|Jason Fortenberry|Robert A. Thompson|07/21/2025|22:51:00|07/21/2025|15:48:00|CDT|7/21/2025 11:05:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel|||||||Drake, James|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOOR UNSECURED The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "On July 21, 2025, at 1548 CDT, River Bend Station (RBS) was operating at 100 percent reactor power when the central alarm station received a door alarm indicating that PW123-01 was not fully secured. A security officer was dispatched and found the door closed with the dogs (latches) not engaged. The security officer fully engaged the dogs at 1551 CDT. "PW123-01 is a secondary containment door. With the dogs not being engaged, secondary containment was inoperable for 3 minutes. "This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function due to the inoperability of secondary containment. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee entered technical specification LCO 3.6.4.1 while the door was unsecured. | Agreement State|57821|NC Div of Radiation Protection|Instrotek|1|Durham|NC||032-1073-1|Y||||||Travis Cartoski|Brian P. Smith|07/22/2025|12:30:00|05/08/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/22/2025 12:47:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Dentel, Glenn|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION EVENT The following report was received by the North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection via email: "On May 8, 2025, the licensee reported that a source [Am-241/Be, CPN23, 50mCi] was ruptured during a source recovery task. The source was being removed from a nuclear gauge down hole probe. Once the source was removed from the probe, it was immediately leak tested. Two leak tests were performed and both readings pegged at full scale on the licensee's GM Pancake Survey Meter. The area was immediately cleared and one individual (the person conducting the source removal) was found to have contamination on their hands at 6000 CPM and 3500 CPM on portions of their clothes. This person was immediately decontaminated and a follow-up urine bioassay revealed less than minimum detectable levels. No other employees were contaminated, and the source was secured, awaiting disposal via a radioactive waste broker. Additional surveys of the work area revealed areas that required decontamination. The area was secured from entry and is awaiting decontamination by an outside vendor." North Carolina Event Number: 250009| Power Reactor|57822|Susquehanna|Ppl Susquehanna Llc|1|Allentown|PA|Luzerne||Y|05000387|1|||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|Ken Hulbert|Brian P. Smith|07/22/2025|17:22:00|07/22/2025|15:10:00|EDT|7/22/2025 5:32:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A)|ECCS Injection|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS Actuation - Critical|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||Dentel, Glenn|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||M/R|Y|96|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown||N|0||0|||N|0||0||MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "At 1510 [EDT] with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 96 percent reactor power, the reactor was manually scrammed due to loss of main transformer cooling. The scram was not complex, all systems responded normally post-scram. Main turbine bypass valves opened automatically to maintain reactor pressure. "Operations responded to stabilize the plant. High pressure coolant injection momentarily injected into the reactor vessel and was subsequently placed in standby. Reactor water level has stabilized and is being maintained with the '1B' reactor feed pump. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 was not impacted. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical and the emergency core coolant system discharge to the reactor coolant system, this event is being reported as a four-hour and eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 10 CFR 50.72{b){2)(iv)(A), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). "The Unit 1 reactor is currently stable in mode 3. An investigation is in progress into the cause of the loss of main transformer cooling. There was no impact to the health or safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The state of Pennsylvania has been informed." | Agreement State|57823|Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm|Aliance Health Care Services|1|Lilburn|GA|Gwinnett|GA 1490-1|Y||||||Shatavia Walker|Brian P. Smith|07/23/2025|11:39:00|03/27/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/23/2025 12:05:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Dentel, Glenn|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERED SOURCES The following report was received by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email: "On March 27, 2025, two sources (Ge-68) were found at a car repossession lot. It was determined the sources had been at that car repossession lot since sometime in October of 2024 and remained there until March 27, 2025, at which time GFD Hazmat recovered them and handed them off to EPD. The original activity was 1.49 mCi per source. The estimated decayed value was 0.05 mCi at the time of discovery and 0.04 mCi to date. The manufacturer confirmed the shipping location (GA 1490-1) and date of the source with a serial number. "The licensee responded with disposal records to Sanders Medical (Tennessee licensed facility). Sanders was able to confirm receipt of the material on April 15, 2025. It was determined the serial numbers listed on the lead pigs did not match the serial number of the enclosed sources. "On April 15, 2025, GA 2047-1 (Training Facility) gained possession of the found sources. The manufacturer (EZ) confirmed the same shipment location and licensee with the accurate serial numbers. After several attempts to reach out to Sanders, for confirmation of receipt, the State of Georgia could not get a response until July 15, 2025. At that time, a staff member from Sanders confirmed they did not receive, nor have they ever received the two sources. "The licensee was unable to provide disposal records for the sources, although routinely uses Sanders for disposal services. The licensee received a notice of violation on July 23, 2025." Georgia Incident Number: 102 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf| Non-Power Reactor|57824|Massachusetts Institute Of Tech (MITE)|Massachusetts Institute Of Technology|0|Cambridge|MA|Middlesex|R-37|Y|05000020||||6000 Kw Tank Research Hw|Edward Lau|Ernest West|07/24/2025|15:24:00|07/24/2025|12:00:00|EDT|7/24/2025 3:33:00 PM|Non Emergency||Non-Power Reactor Event|||||||Montgomery, Cindy|NRR|Lin, Brian|NRR|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On July 24, 2025, the licensee reported that it had violated Technical Specification 3.4.1.A. which requires the reactor to be secured when containment is not maintained. The console key switch was inserted while not having containment integrity. Prior to and at the time of the occurrence, the reactor was shutdown for more than two weeks for scheduled outage maintenance activities. Nuclear safety of the reactor was never challenged. This event did not cause the existence or development of an unsafe condition. The NRC Project Manager was notified. | Agreement State|57825|Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency|Rush University Medical Center|3|Chicago|IL||IL-01766-01|Y||||||Gary Forsee|Ernest West|07/24/2025|16:01:00|07/22/2025|0:00:00|CDT|7/24/2025 4:47:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Zurawski, Paul|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email: "The Agency was contacted on July 23, 2025, by Rush University Medical Center in Chicago to advise of an administration of Y-90 Theraspheres which resulted in an underdose exceeding 20 percent. The incident occurred on July 22, 2025. No untoward medical impact to the patient is expected. "The Agency was contacted by the radiation safety officer for Rush University Medical Center (radioactive materials license: IL-01766-01), on July 23, 2025, to report that a patient prescribed 47.42 mCi of Y-90 Theraspheres on July 22, 2025, received only 36.81 mCi of the prescribed dose. "The patient has been notified, and inspectors will verify that the referring physician was notified during a reactive inspection scheduled to occur on July 29, 2025. There was no reported adverse impact to the patient. The licensee reported using a smaller than recommended catheter due to the area being treated. The underdose (22.4 percent deviation between the prescribed and administered dose) meets the criteria as a reportable event under 32 Illinois Administrative Code 335.1080. The prescribed and administered dose (in terms of Gy) will be confirmed on site. The investigation remains ongoing. This medical event will be reported to the NRC Operations Center today, July 24, 2025." Illinois item number: IL250029 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. | Agreement State|57826|Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm|Tanner Health System|1|Carrollton|GA||GA 120-2|Y||||||Jake Chesser|Ernest West|07/24/2025|16:22:00|07/24/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/24/2025 5:06:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Dentel, Glenn|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVER EXPOSURE The following report was received by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email: "The licensee's radiation safety officer called and stated that, during a high dose rate procedure, the nurse got stuck in the vault and was behind the CT [computed tomography] lead shielding. The licensee plans to send out her dosimetry badge to be processed for dose received and perform a pregnancy test. "[The Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] will follow up with more information as we receive it." Additional information: The equipment involved was a GammaMedPlus 3/24iX remote brachytherapy afterloader containing a Ir-192 source with an activity of 3.158 curies. Georgia Incident Number: 104| Part 21|57827|Curtiss Wright Flow Control Co.||3|Cincinnati|OH|||Y||||||Margie Hover|Kerby Scales|07/25/2025|9:47:00|05/21/2025|0:00:00|EDT|7/25/2025 10:43:00 AM|Non Emergency|21.21(a)(2)|Interim Eval Of Deviation|||||||Zurawski, Paul|R3DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION The following is a synopsis of information provided by Curtiss-Wright (CW) via email: On 5/21/2025, Xcel Energy notified Curtiss-Wright about the failure of two NAMCO limit switches provided under CW project CJ21087 (tag number CJ2108701, serial numbers 01 and 04). The limit switches were dedicated by CW and shipped on 2/28/2025 to Xcel Energy. The switches failed a bench test performed by Xcel Energy, which aimed to verify that the contacts properly revert to their original state during spring return. Xcel Energy found that the contacts reverted to their original state prior to the audible click/snap, which is supposed to indicate contact changeover. The two units were returned to Curtiss-Wright on 5/29/2025. The test result was fully duplicated on one of the switches. For the other switch (serial number 04), the switch contacts intermittently failed to return to the original state at all, requiring manual assistance to do so. On 6/26/2025, CW sent the parts to NAMCO for repair. CW retested the parts after the repair. Part 04 still had the same issue with failing to reset as noted earlier. That limit switch was returned to NAMCO for a full evaluation. CW anticipates an update to this notification with final results on 9/23/2025. Potentially affected U.S. nuclear power plants: unknown at the time of the notification. Contact Information: Mark Papke Quality Assurance Manager Curtiss-Wright 4600 East Tech Drive Cincinnati, OH 45245 mpapke@curtisswright.com | Power Reactor|57831|Grand Gulf|Entergy Nuclear|4|Port Gibson|MS|Claiborne||Y|05000416|1|||[1] GE-6|Christina Brogdan|Robert A. Thompson|07/29/2025|3:44:00|07/28/2025|23:29:00|CDT|7/30/2025 4:57:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|Accident Mitigation|||||||Drake, James|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 7/31/2025

EN Revision Text: BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING INOPERABLE The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax: At 2324 CDT, on July 28, 2025, control room air conditioning (CRAC) 'B' tripped at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) approximately 5 minutes after loading the compressor by adjusting the thermostat [down] per standby service water quarterly surveillance instructions. CRAC 'A' was manually started at 2326 CDT and at 2329 CDT it subsequently tripped. After investigating the compressors and breakers per the alarm response instructions with no abnormal indications, CRAC 'B' was restarted and tripped again. Cooling water was rotated from plant service water to standby service water and CRAC 'A' was successfully restarted at 2358 CDT and remains in service. While both control room air conditioning subsystems were inoperable GGNS entered technical specification limiting condition of operation (LCO) 3.7.4 condition 'B', actions requiring verification of control room temperatures less than 90 degrees F and restoring one subsystem to operable status in 7 days. Control room temperatures reached 79 degrees F, maximum, before CRAC 'A' was restarted. GGNS has exited condition 'B' in LCO 3.7.4 and entered condition 'A' to restore CRAC 'B' in 30 days. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * RETRACTION FROM JEFFERY HARDY TO SAMUEL COLVARD AT 1648 EDT ON 07/30/2025 * * * "Investigation of the cause of the control room air conditioning (CRAC) `A' and `B' trips identified a plant service water / standby service water (SSW) crosstie valve which failed in its safety-related (closed) position as the cause. In an accident or transient, cooling water to CRAC `A' compressors would have been successfully provided by the safety-related SSW. As a result, CRAC `A' remained capable of fulfilling its safety function to maintain the control room environment less than 90 degrees F. "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction." Notified R4DO (Drake). | Power Reactor|57832|Monticello|Nuclear Management Company|3|Monticello|MN|Wright||Y|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|Lt Zlotnik|Jordan Wingate|07/29/2025|3:45:00|07/28/2025|20:58:00|CDT|7/29/2025 4:11:00 AM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS Actuation - Critical|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|Accident Mitigation|||Hills, David|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown||N|0||0|||N|0||0||MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 2058 CDT on 7/28/2025, a spurious trip of the reactor building exhaust ventilation [system] caused a subsequent trip of the reactor building supply ventilation [system]. This ventilation system failure resulted in the degradation of reactor building differential pressure and at 2200 CDT the differential pressure exceeded the technical specification limit, resulting in the inoperability of Secondary Containment. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). Failure of the ventilation system also resulted in elevated temperatures in the steam chase area of the plant. Operators reduced power to slow the temperature rise, however, at 2324 CDT on 7/28/2025 with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 41 percent power, the reactor was manually scrammed due to steam chase temperatures reaching the procedural limit. The scram was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-scram. Reactor water level is being maintained via the feedwater system. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. This condition is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). There has been no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Steam chase temperature has begun to lower, and the licensee intends to cooldown to mode 4 for maintenance. | Power Reactor|57833|Watts Bar|Tennessee Valley Authority|2|Spring City|TN|Rhea||Y|05000390|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|Brian McIlnay|Robert A. Thompson|07/29/2025|9:19:00|07/28/2025|13:33:00|EDT|7/29/2025 9:25:00 AM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Davis, Bradley|R2DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY EVENT The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "On July 28, 2025, Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) operations was informed that a WBN licensed reactor operator had tested positive for a controlled substance, in violation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) fitness for duty policy. A random screening was completed on July 17, 2025. The results were sent to the TVA medical review officer on July 28, 2025. The test was declared positive for a controlled substance and WBN operations was notified at 1333 EDT on July 28, 2025. The individual's unescorted access has been revoked." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Power Reactor|57836|Cook|Indiana/Michigan Power Co.|3|Bridgman|MI|Berrien||N|05000315|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|Bradford Culwell|Ian Howard|07/29/2025|13:00:00|06/06/2025|12:00:00|EDT|7/29/2025 2:24:00 PM|Non Emergency|21.21(d)(3)(i)|Defects And Noncompliance|||||||Hills, David|R3DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0||PART 21 - THERMAL OVERLOAD OF VOLTAGE REGULATORS The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "This is an initial report notification pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21.21. "Cook Nuclear Plant completed an internal evaluation concerning an issue with an emergency diesel generator (EDG) voltage regulator (VR) supplied by Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC. An issue was identified during a surveillance test conducted on April 22, 2025, concerning a thermal overload (TOL) for the VR which spuriously trips causing a condition where the EDG VR can no longer control the generator voltage, resulting in the inability of the EDG to supply automatic onsite emergency AC power. A failure analysis was completed on June 6, 2025, determined that the cause of the spurious trips is associated with a heater dimensional tolerance deficiency lowering the activation threshold of the TOL bimetallic strip and a workmanship deficiency associated with a braided control wire restricting the movement of the TOL pressure bar. Extent of condition examinations were performed and one additional TOL was found to be impacted. The two impacted TOLs have been replaced. A written notification will be provided within 30 days." Affected Plants: Cook Nuclear Power Plant. The NRC Resident has been notified. | Power Reactor|57839|Braidwood|Exelon Nuclear Co.|3|Braceville|IL|Will||Y|05000456|1|||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|Matthew McHale|Kerby Scales|07/30/2025|17:20:00|07/30/2025|12:30:00|CDT|7/30/2025 5:43:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS Actuation - Critical|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||Hills, David|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby||N|0||0|||N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "On July 30, 2025, at 1230 CDT, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to an over temperature delta 'T' reactor protection system actuation while critical. This event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). "Actuation of the auxiliary feedwater [system] occurred during the reactor trip response. The cause of the auxiliary feedwater auto-start was a LO-2 steam generator water level. The 1A and 1B auxiliary feedwater pumps started as designed when the LO-2 steam generator water level signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. Operators responded using procedures 1BwEP-0 and 1BwEP ES-0.1 to stabilize the unit in mode 3. "Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the main steam dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected. All systems responded as expected with the exception of steam pressure channel 1Pl-545A and steam flow channel 1Fl-523A, which both failed high during the lightning storm and subsequent transient. Actions per 1BwOA lnstrument-2 are in progress to address these failures. "There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | Power Reactor|57840|Browns Ferry|Tennessee Valley Authority|2|Decatur|AL|Limestone||Y|05000259|1|2|3|[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4|Douglas Peterson|Sam Colvard|07/30/2025|23:19:00|05/30/2025|0:00:00|CDT|7/30/2025 11:41:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.73(a)(1)|Invalid Specif System Actuation|||||||Davis, Bradley|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|0|Hot Shutdown|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|INVALID ACTUATION OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) GROUP 6 The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: "This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. "On May 30, 2025, during de-inerting of the Unit 2 drywell for a forced outage, Unit 2 received a partial primary containment isolation system (PCIS) group 6 isolation. Additionally, standby gas treatment system (SGT) trains `B' and `C' auto started. "Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 6 and SGT actuations are reactor vessel low water level (Level 3), high drywell pressure, or reactor building ventilation exhaust high radiation (reactor zone or refuel zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS and SGT was invalid. "Upon investigation, a fuse was found to have failed as a result of a hot spot due to a corroded lug, which was the cause of the isolation. The fuse was replaced, [lug cleaned], condition was cleared, and all systems were realigned as necessary. "There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. "This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 2017035. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." |